Michael West v. Warden Fort Dix FCI ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 18-2243
    ___________
    MICHAEL WEST,
    Appellant
    v.
    WARDEN FORT DIX FCI;
    ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-08701)
    District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    October 15, 2018
    Before: GREENAWAY, Jr., RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 19, 2018)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Michael West, who is proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of
    his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    affirm.
    In 2013, West pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of
    New Jersey to child pornography charges, and the District Court sentenced him to 95
    months of imprisonment. In his § 2241 petition, West challenged the Bureau of Prison’s
    calculation of his sentence.1 Burkey v. Marberry, 
    556 F.3d 142
    , 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A
    challenge to the BOP’s execution of a sentence is properly brought under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2241.”). In particular, he claimed that the BOP did not give him credit for time served
    in a residential re-entry center, time during which he was restricted to home confinement,
    and time spent in state custody. After the Government filed an answer, the District Court
    denied West’s petition, holding that his claim was unexhausted and meritless. West
    appealed.
    We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
    standard to its findings of fact.” O’Donald v. Johns, 
    402 F.3d 172
    , 173 n.1 (3d Cir.
    1
    After filing his § 2241 petition, West submitted several motions to amend and to
    add exhibits to his petition. The District Court granted West’s requests insofar as his
    allegations and exhibits pertained to his sentence calculation claim. But the District
    Court denied West’s attempts to add claims alleging that the criminal court lacked
    jurisdiction to convict him and that his sentence violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    This was not an abuse its discretion. See Lake v. Arnold, 
    232 F.3d 360
    , 373 (3d Cir.
    2000). A federal prisoner’s challenge to the legality of his sentence and conviction must
    be raised in a § 2255 motion, except where the remedy under § 2255 would be inadequate
    or ineffective. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Okereke v. United States, 
    307 F.3d 117
    , 120 (3d
    Cir. 2002). West did not show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to consider the
    claims in his motion to amend that pertain to the criminal court’s jurisdiction and the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    2
    2005).
    On October 21, 2010, the FBI arrested West on federal child pornography charges.
    During West’s initial appearance the next day, a Magistrate Judge set bail at $100,000.
    West remained in custody until November 29, 2010, when the Magistrate Judge ordered
    his release to a residential re-entry center. Several weeks later, on December 21, 2010,
    the Magistrate Judge modified the conditions of release to permit home detention with
    electronic monitoring. At sentencing, the District Court ordered West to voluntarily
    surrender on March 4, 2013, but subsequently extended that date. West voluntarily
    surrendered to begin service of his sentence on April 3, 2013. The BOP calculated
    West’s sentencing as beginning on that date, and credited him with the time he spent in
    custody between the date of his arrest and the date he was released to the residential re-
    entry center. West argued, however, that he should have received credit for the entire
    period between the date of his arrest and the date he began serving his sentence.
    Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant is entitled to “credit toward the
    service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to
    the date the sentence commences ….” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Notably, the Supreme Court
    has held that “a defendant suffers ‘detention’ only when committed to the custody of the
    Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions… is ‘released.’”
    Reno v. Koray, 
    515 U.S. 50
    , 57 (1995). Indeed, “credit for time spent in ‘official
    detention’ under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in a
    3
    ‘penal or correctional facility’ … and who were subject to the BOP’s control.” 
    Id. at 58.
    Thus, prior to sentencing, defendants who are released on bail to detention in a residential
    re-entry center or to home confinement with electronic monitoring are not in “official
    detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b). 
    Id. at 65;2
    Rodriguez v. Lamer, 
    60 F.3d 745
    ,
    748 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that, under Koray, defendant could not receive credit for
    time spent in home confinement before sentencing). Accordingly, the District Court
    properly held that West is not entitled to credit for the time that he spent in the residential
    re-entry center or on home confinement.
    West also made several arguments pertaining to time that he allegedly spent (or
    will spend) in state custody. For example, he asserted that the sentencing court was not
    authorized to order “a term of imprisonment to run concurrent or consecutive to a yet to
    be impose[d] or non-existing state sentence.” He further suggested that he is entitled to
    relief under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers while “awaiting disposition of pending
    state charges.” Finally, West claimed that he should receive credit for “time served on a
    pre-existing state sentence.” The District Court found, however, that “[t]here is nothing
    in the record in this matter, or in the record of [West’s] criminal matter in this Court, or in
    [his] § 2255 proceeding that suggests he was even taken into custody by State authorities
    2
    In Koray, the defendant was required to be confined in a community treatment
    
    center, 515 U.S. at 53
    . West has not alleged that there is any meaningful difference
    between such a facility and a residential re-entry center. Cf. Garza v. Davis, 
    596 F.3d 1198
    , 1201 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[residential re-entry centers] and
    [community corrections centers] are two [terms] used to describe the same animal.”).
    4
    ….” West has not identified any error in this conclusion. Accordingly, there is no merit
    to West’s assertion that he is entitled to relief based on time spent in state custody.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.3 West’s “Motion for Summary
    Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)” – which seeks judgment in his favor on the
    basis that the Appellees’ brief was untimely filed – is denied. We note that the Appellees
    filed their brief within the deadline set by our order of July 25, 2018.
    3
    Because the sentencing calculations claims’ lack of merit provides an adequate
    basis upon which to affirm, we need not address the District Court alternative conclusion
    that West failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of
    Prisons, 
    432 F.3d 235
    , 239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
    5