Twp. of Bordentown v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n , 903 F.3d 234 ( 2018 )


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  •                                    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 17-1047
    _____________
    TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY;
    TOWNSHIP OF CHESTERFIELD,
    Petitioners
    v.
    FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
    Respondent
    Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC,
    Intervenor Respondent
    _____________
    No. 17-3207
    _____________
    TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN, New Jersey;
    TOWNSHIP OF CHESTERFIELD;
    PINELANDS PRESERVATION ALLIANCE,
    Petitioners
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION,
    Respondent
    Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC,
    Intervenor Respondent
    ____________
    On Petition for Review of Orders of the Federal Energy
    Regulatory Commission
    (Agency Nos. FERC CPI15-89-000 and CPI15-89-001)
    and of the New Jersey Department of
    Environmental Protection
    (Permit Nos. Nos. 0300-15-0002.2 FWW150001,
    1322D DWP150001, 0300-15-0002.2 FHA150001,
    and 0300-15-0002.2 FHA150002)
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    June 11, 2018
    Before: CHAGARES, GREENBERG, and FUENTES,
    Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: September 5, 2018)
    Jennifer Borek
    Lawrence Bluestone
    Genova Burns
    494 Broad Street
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Counsel for Petitioner Township of Bordentown
    2
    John C. Gillespie
    Parker McCay
    9000 Midlantic Drive, Suite 300
    P.O. Box 5054
    Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
    Counsel for Petitioner Township of Chesterfield
    Paul A. Leodori
    Todd M. Parisi
    Law Offices of Paul Leodori
    61 Union Street, 2nd Floor
    Medford, NJ 08055
    Counsel for Petitioner Pinelands Preservation
    Alliance
    David L. Morenoff
    Robert H. Solomon
    Susanna Y. Chu
    Ross Fulton
    Rekha Sherman
    Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
    888 1st Street, N.E.
    Washington, DC 20426
    Counsel for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory
    Commission
    Gurbir S. Grewal
    Jason W. Rockwell
    Ryan C. Atkinson
    Lewin J. Weyl
    Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
    25 Market Street
    3
    P.O. Box 116
    Trenton, NJ 08625
    Counsel for Respondent New Jersey Department of
    Environmental Protection
    Christine A. Roy
    Brian B. Keatts
    Richard G. Scott
    Rutter & Roy
    3 Paragon Way, Suite 300
    Freehold, NJ 07728
    Counsel for Intervenor Respondent Transcontinental
    Gas Pipe Line Co LLC
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
    I. Introduction ............................................................... 5
    II. Background .............................................................. 6
    A. Statutory Background .......................................... 7
    B. Procedural History ............................................... 8
    III. Challenges to FERC’s Orders .............................. 12
    A. Interpreting the CWA ........................................ 12
    B. NEPA Challenges .............................................. 16
    1. Segmentation of PennEast .............................. 17
    2. Consideration of the SRL ............................... 24
    3. Potable Well Impacts ..................................... 39
    C. Need for the Project ........................................... 46
    4
    D. Good Faith Notice ............................................. 49
    E. Green Acres Act................................................. 52
    F. Cumulative Error................................................ 56
    IV. Challenges to the NJDEP’s Order........................ 56
    A. Jurisdiction Under the NGA .............................. 57
    B. New Jersey Law................................................. 64
    V. Conclusion ............................................................. 69
    I. Introduction
    This consolidated appeal considers a bevy of challenges
    brought by the Township of Bordentown, Township of
    Chesterfield, and Pinelands Preservation Alliance’s (“PPA”)
    (collectively, the “petitioners”), seeking to prevent the
    expansion of interstate natural gas pipeline facilities operated
    by the Transcontinental Pipe Line Company, LLC
    (“Transco”).1 The petitioners contend that the Federal Energy
    Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) violated the federal statute
    governing the approval and construction of interstate pipelines,
    as well as other generally applicable federal environmental
    protection statutes, by arbitrarily and capriciously approving
    Transco’s proposed project. The petitioners further maintain
    that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
    (“NJDEP”) violated New Jersey law by (1) improperly issuing
    1
    All three petitioners challenge the New Jersey
    Department of Environmental Protection’s actions, Docket No,
    17-3207, but only the Townships challenge the Federal Energy
    Regulatory Commission’s orders, Docket No. 17-1047. For
    convenience, we use “petitioners” interchangeably throughout
    the opinion to refer to both groups.
    5
    to Transco various permits that Transco was required under
    federal law to obtain before it could commence construction
    activities on the pipeline project, and (2) denying the
    petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the
    permits’ issuance, based only on the NJDEP’s allegedly
    incorrect belief that the New Jersey regulations establishing the
    availability of such hearings were preempted by federal law.
    As explained more fully below, although we conclude
    that the petitioners’ challenges to FERC’s orders lack merit,
    we agree that the NJDEP’s interpretation of the relevant federal
    law was incorrect, thus rendering unreasonable the sole basis
    for its denial of the petitioners’ request for a hearing. Given
    our disposition, we do not reach the petitioners’ substantive
    challenges to the NJDEP’s provision of the permits, which —
    assuming a hearing is granted — we leave for the NJDEP to
    address in the first instance. We accordingly will deny in part
    and grant in part the petitions for review, and we will remand
    to the NJDEP for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    II. Background
    This case presents challenges to both the federal and
    state governments’ treatment of Transco’s application to
    construct its interstate pipeline project. Before detailing the
    agency proceedings that preceded this appeal, we first briefly
    set forth the various interlocking federal and state regulatory
    schemes at play, which this Court has already elucidated in
    some detail. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y of Pa.
    Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
    870 F.3d 171
    , 174 (3d Cir. 2017)
    (“Delaware II”); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t
    of Envtl. Prot., 
    833 F.3d 360
    , 367–69 (3d Cir. 2016)
    (“Delaware I”).
    6
    A. Statutory Background
    Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (“NGA”), 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 717
    –717z, FERC is tasked with regulating the construction
    and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines. 
    Id.
     §§ 717f,
    717n. If FERC determines that a given project should proceed,
    it will issue a “certificate of public convenience and necessity”
    (the “certificate”), which in turn is conditioned on the pipeline
    operator acquiring other necessary state and federal
    authorizations. See Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 367–68. Among
    the regulatory schemes related to the NGA are the federal
    environmental laws, including the National Environmental
    Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
    –4370h, and the
    Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 1251
    –1388. NEPA
    is primarily a procedural statute that requires FERC to assess
    “the potential environmental impact of a proposed pipeline
    project.” Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368. Upon completing the
    analysis, FERC must issue either an Environmental
    Assessment (“EA,” if the analysis indicates that the project will
    have no significant environmental impacts) or an
    Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS,” if the analysis
    indicates that the project will be a “‘major Federal action’ that
    would ‘significantly affect[] the quality of the human
    environment’”). Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army
    Corps of Eng’rs, 
    869 F.3d 148
    , 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C)). As to the CWA, although the NGA
    explicitly “preempts state environmental regulation of
    interstate natural gas facilities,” it “allows states to participate
    in environmental regulation of these facilities under . . . the
    Clean Water Act.” Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368. The CWA
    permits states, subject to United States Environmental
    Protection Agency approval, to establish their own minimum
    7
    water quality standards, including by regulating the discharge
    of pollutants into bodies of water in the state. Id.
    The NGA and CWA converge where, to construct an
    interstate pipeline, a company must discharge into — or
    displace water from — the navigable waters of the United
    States. Before a company is permitted to undertake this
    activity, it must obtain a permit pursuant to Section 404 of the
    CWA, which itself may issue only after the company secures a
    state-issued Water Quality Certification, pursuant to Section
    401 of the CWA, “confirm[ing] that a given facility will
    comply with federal discharge limitations and state water
    quality standards.” Id.; see also 
    33 U.S.C. § 1341
    (a) (“Any
    applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
    . . . which may result in any discharge into the navigable
    waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a
    certification from the State in which the discharge originates or
    will originate, . . . that any such discharge will comply with the
    applicable [water quality] provisions . . . of this Act”). Because
    New Jersey has assumed permitting authority under Section
    404 — implemented by the NJDEP under the framework of the
    New Jersey Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (“FWPA”),
    
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13
    :9B-1 — the issuance of a Section 404
    permit in New Jersey carries with it a Section 401 Water
    Quality Certification. 
    N.J. Admin. Code § 7
    :7A-2.1(c)–(d);
    Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368–69.
    B. Procedural History
    The permits at issue in this case relate to Transco’s
    Garden State Expansion Project (the “Project”), by which
    Transco planned to upgrade its existing interstate natural gas
    pipeline system so that it could support the transportation of
    8
    another 180,000 dekatherms per day of capacity for natural gas
    from its Mainline to its Trenton–Woodbury Lateral. The
    Project proposed to construct a new meter and regulating
    station, compressor station, and electric substation along the
    Trenton–Woodbury Lateral in Chesterfield, New Jersey
    (Station 203), and to upgrade and modify the existing motor
    drives and compressor station located on the Mainline in
    Mercer County, New Jersey (Station 205).
    The New Jersey Natural Gas company (“NJNG”)
    contracted with Transco to utilize all the capacity added by the
    Project, for distribution via NJNG’s intrastate pipeline
    system. In anticipation of obtaining the excess capacity, NJNG
    has proposed to construct the Southern Reliability Link Project
    (“SRL”), a 28-mile-long intrastate pipeline that would connect
    to Transco’s Trenton–Woodbury Lateral pipeline and deliver
    gas south-eastward for connection into NJNG’s existing
    system. Separately, PennEast has proposed to construct the
    interstate PennEast Pipeline Project, which would deliver
    natural gas from Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale region and
    terminate at an interconnect with Transco’s Mainline. NJNG
    has independently contracted with PennEast to purchase
    180,000 dekatherms per day of the PennEast project’s expected
    supply, for delivery to the SRL via Transco’s pipeline
    network.2
    2
    Whereas the SRL — as a purely intrastate pipeline —
    would not be subject to FERC’s jurisdiction or oversight, the
    PennEast pipeline, which will traverse Pennsylvania and New
    Jersey, would be. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 717
    (b)–(c).
    9
    As required by the NGA, Transco sought and obtained
    from FERC a certificate of public convenience and necessity
    authorizing the construction of the Project, subject — as is
    generally the case — to Transco “receiv[ing] all applicable
    authorizations required under federal law.” Appendix
    (“App.”) 67. Prior to issuing the certificate, FERC conducted
    an environmental analysis and issued an EA concluding that,
    with the appropriate mitigation measures, the Project would
    have “no significant impact” on the environment. App. 1479;
    see also App. 45. FERC issued the EA in November 2015 and,
    after receiving comments, issued Transco the certificate in
    April 2016. Bordentown and Chesterfield moved FERC for a
    rehearing, which FERC denied in November 2016. See App.
    74–97.
    Because the Project would be situated in freshwater
    wetlands and transition areas, and the construction of the
    Project would require discharging fill or dredge material into
    navigable waters as well as the diversion of a significant
    volume of water, Transco applied to the NJDEP for a
    Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit and Water Quality
    Certificate (“FWW permit”) and dewatering permit, as
    required by the CWA and New Jersey law.3 The NJDEP held
    two days of public hearings to consider the FWW permit, and
    received over 1,800 written comments, which included
    concerns raised by each of the petitioners. After obtaining
    3
    Transco also applied for and received a Flood Hazard
    Area Individual Permit and Flood Hazard Area Verification,
    but subsequently relinquished the Permit after being able to
    move the Project out of the area subject to it, and the petitioners
    do not challenge the provision of those permits on appeal.
    10
    Transco’s responses to the public comments, as well as its
    responses to the NJDEP’s requests for additional information
    concerning possible alternative sites for an electrical substation
    that would be built as part of the Project, the NJDEP issued the
    FWW permit on March 13, 2017. Shortly thereafter — and
    also following a public hearing — the NJDEP on March 16,
    2017 issued the temporary dewatering permit.
    Pursuant to New Jersey law, the petitioners sought an
    adjudicatory hearing concerning each permit. Bordentown —
    later joined by Chesterfield and PPA — filed a request for a
    hearing on the FWW on March 22, 2017. On April 11, 2017,
    Bordentown alone also requested an adjudicatory hearing on
    the dewatering permit. Both requests were filed within the 30-
    day limitations period established under New Jersey law for
    seeking adjudicatory hearings. See 
    N.J. Admin. Code §§ 7
    :7A-21.1(b); 7:14A-17.2(c). Bordentown asserted that it had
    standing under state law to challenge the permits as a third
    party because it had a particularized property interest affected
    by the Project, given that part of the project would be built on
    Bordentown-owned land, which Transco had acquired through
    eminent domain under the authority granted by the FERC
    certificate. See NJDEP App. 37 & n.4; 15 U.S.C.
    § 717f(h). On August 22, 2017, the NJDEP denied the
    petitioners’ requests for an adjudicatory hearing on either
    permit. The sole stated basis for the NJDEP’s denial of the
    request was that this Court’s decision in Delaware I established
    that we have “exclusive jurisdiction to review the issuance of
    permits regarding interstate natural gas pipeline projects” and
    accordingly that by operation of the NGA “the state
    administrative hearing process provided for in the [FWPA] is
    not applicable to permits for interstate natural gas
    projects.” NJDEP App. 39. Concluding that the NGA
    11
    “requires that final permits be appealed to the Third Circuit,”
    the NJDEP denied the petitioners’ hearing requests.
    The petitioners timely sought review in this Court, both
    of FERC’s orders issuing the certificate and denying rehearing,
    and of the NJDEP’s issuance of the permits and its order
    denying the requests for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge
    them. We have jurisdiction to review these petitions for review
    of the federal and state agencies’ orders regarding the interstate
    Project under 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1).
    III. Challenges to FERC’s Orders
    We begin with the challenges directed at FERC’s orders
    (docket No. 17-1047). As explained more fully below, we
    conclude that the petitioners’ FERC-related claims are
    unavailing.
    A. Interpreting the CWA
    Before turning to the merits of the certificate’s issuance,
    we must address the petitioners’ challenge to its timing. As
    noted, Transco was required under the CWA to obtain a
    Section 401 permit from the NJDEP affirming that Transco’s
    discharge activities would comply with federal and state water
    quality standards. Under Section 401, Transco had to obtain
    such a permit prior to the issuance of any “Federal license or
    permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any
    discharge into the navigable waters.” 
    33 U.S.C. § 1341
    (a); see
    also 
    id.
     (“No license or permit shall be granted until the
    certification required by this section has been obtained or has
    been waived . . . .”). The petitioners argue that, despite this
    clear language, FERC issued the certificate to Transco before
    12
    Transco obtained the Section 401 permit from New Jersey,
    thereby authorizing the pipeline project that “may result in . .
    . discharge into the navigable waters” in contravention of §
    1341(a)’s mandate.
    FERC does not dispute that Transco had yet to obtain
    the Section 401 permit, but argues instead that it only issued a
    conditional certificate, which required Transco first to obtain
    the required state permits and then to secure FERC’s
    permission to proceed before it could begin any construction
    related to the project. See App. 67, 89–90. In FERC’s view,
    because the certificate did not, in fact, permit Transco to
    “conduct any activity” that could “result in any discharge into
    the navigable waters” until Transco had received the necessary
    state permits, FERC’s issuance of the conditional certificate
    prior to Transco’s receipt of the state-issued Section 401 permit
    did not contravene the CWA.4 We agree with FERC’s position
    and hold that FERC’s practice of issuing certificates that
    condition the start of construction on the receipt of the
    necessary state permits complies with the plain language of the
    CWA.5
    4
    We note that it is not FERC, but the Environmental
    Protection Agency, that is tasked with administering the CWA,
    so FERC’s views are not entitled to deference. See, e.g., Scafar
    Contracting, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 
    325 F.3d 422
    , 423 (3d Cir.
    2003).
    5
    In so holding, we agree with the reasoning of the Court
    of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Del.
    Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 
    857 F.3d 388
     (D.C. Cir. 2017).
    13
    As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    Circuit explained, “the ‘logically antecedent’ question under §
    401 is whether the disputed federal permit or license ‘is subject
    to the provisions of Section 401(a)(1)’ in the first place.” Del.
    Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 
    857 F.3d 388
    , 398 (D.C. Cir.
    2017) (“DRN II”) (quoting North Carolina v. FERC, 
    112 F.3d 1175
    , 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Where the conduct that the
    certificate authorizes “would not result in a discharge,” Section
    401(a) is inapposite and no “license or permit” is needed to
    engage in that conduct. 
    Id.
    The petitioners concede that the certificate did not
    permit Transco to engage in any construction — which
    implicitly acknowledges that it did not permit Transco to
    engage in any activity that could result in discharge — but
    argue that the certificate nevertheless “sanctions other conduct
    that Transco would not otherwise be permitted to undertake,”
    such as initiating condemnation actions under the NGA, 15
    U.S.C. § 717f(h). Pet. Br. 35. However, the activity that
    FERC’s certificate allows to commence — bringing a
    condemnation action — cannot, without a series of additional
    steps (among them the prohibited construction activities),
    result in the discharge of water.6 Even accepting the
    6
    The petitioners reply that nothing in the CWA “limit[s]
    the scope of covered permits to those [actions] that directly or
    immediately may result in a discharge” and that under the plain
    definition of “result” — meaning “a physical, logical, or legal
    consequence” — the certificate “which authorizes Transco’s
    pipeline, may ‘result’ in a discharge.” Reply 13–14 (quoting
    Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). But given the
    express condition that Transco obtain all the required state
    14
    petitioners’ argument, FERC’s conditional certification does
    not contravene the CWA’s requirements. The petitioners’
    argument would expand the CWA from a statute meant to
    safeguard the nation’s water sources to a statute regulating the
    initiation of an interstate pipeline’s construction
    process. However, the latter statute already exists and, as the
    petitioners themselves note, it provides Transco the
    condemnation authority upon the issuance of the certificate,
    with no caveats. To the extent that the NGA recognizes the
    continued applicability of the CWA, it is only with respect to
    pipeline-related activities that impact the CWA’s area of
    concern. The mere ability to initiate condemnation
    proceedings, proceedings regarding land from which discharge
    permits before obtaining authorization to begin construction —
    which the petitioners do not contest is the only conduct that
    could proximately result in discharge — the certificate alone
    neither “logically” nor “legally” results in the consequence of
    a discharge. It is black letter law that an independent
    intervening act — here, the state permit and FERC’s
    authorization to commence construction — severs the causal
    chain. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 
    809 F.3d 134
    , 160 (5th
    Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the Supreme Court [has] held that
    an injury [is] not fairly traceable” to an action where the
    “independent act of a third party was a necessary condition of
    the harm’s occurrence, and it was uncertain whether the third
    party would take the required step”), aff’d by an equally
    divided court, 
    136 S. Ct. 2271
     (2016). In summary, because
    no discharge-creating activity can commence without New
    Jersey independently awarding Transco with a Section 401
    permit, no activities that may result in a discharge can follow
    as a logical result of just FERC’s issuance of the certificate.
    15
    into the United States’ navigable waters might not even occur,
    plainly is not an activity that the CWA prohibits prior to
    obtaining a Section 401 permit.
    Because, as was the case before the D.C. Circuit, the
    petitioners have “pointed to no activities authorized by the
    conditional certificate itself that may result in such discharge
    prior to the state approval and the Commission’s issuance of a
    Notice to Proceed,” DRN II, 857 F.3d at 399 (quoting
    Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 
    807 F.3d 267
    , 279 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015) (Rogers, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the
    judgment)), we conclude that FERC did not violate the CWA
    by issuing the certificate prior to the NJDEP’s issuance of its
    Section 401 permit.
    B. NEPA Challenges
    Turning to the merits of FERC’s issuance of the
    certificate, the petitioners first raise a number claims asserting
    that FERC violated NEPA by failing — in numerous ways —
    to consider the full scope of the Project’s environmental
    impacts. The petitioners specifically challenge FERC’s
    conclusion that the Project’s impacts should be considered
    separately from the impacts of the PennEast and SRL projects,
    as well as FERC’s determination that the Project would not
    significantly impact the potable wells in the project’s vicinity.
    NEPA is “primarily [an] information-forcing” statute; it
    “directs agencies only to look hard at the environmental effects
    of their decisions, and not to take one type of action or
    another.” Sierra Club v. FERC, 
    867 F.3d 1357
    , 1367 (D.C.
    Cir. 2017) (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,
    
    938 F.2d 190
    , 194 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In addition to that general
    16
    directive, NEPA created the Council of Environmental Quality
    (“CEQ”) to issue regulations to effectuate the statute. These
    regulations are “‘mandatory’ for all federal agencies, carry the
    force of law, and are entitled to ‘substantial deference.’” Del.
    Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of
    Eng’rs, 
    685 F.3d 259
    , 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Marsh v. Or.
    Nat. Res. Council, 
    490 U.S. 360
    , 372 (1989)). A court
    reviewing an agency decision under NEPA and its
    implementing regulations may only overturn an agency action
    that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with law.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A);
    see also Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 685 F.3d at 271. So long as
    the agency takes a “‘hard look’ at the environmental
    consequences” the agency has satisfied its responsibilities and
    a reviewing court may not “substitute its judgment for that of
    the agency as to the environmental consequences of its
    actions.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
    427 U.S. 390
    , 410 n.21 (1976)
    (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 
    458 F.2d 827
    , 838 (D.C. Cir.
    1972)). In other words, NEPA “requires informed
    decisionmaking      ‘but     not     necessarily     the    best
    decision.’” WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 
    738 F.3d 298
    , 303
    (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting New York v. Nuclear Regulatory
    Comm’n, 
    681 F.3d 471
    , 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
    1. Segmentation of PennEast
    Under NEPA and its implementing regulations, when
    evaluating a proposed project’s environmental impacts, an
    agency must take account of “connected,” “cumulative,” and
    “similar actions” whose impacts should be “discussed in the
    same impact statement” as the project under review. 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.25
    (a). Where an agency instead attempts to consider
    such related actions separately by segmenting the mandated
    17
    unified review into multiple independent analyses that insulate
    each project from the impacts created by its sister projects, it
    “fails to address the true scope and impact of the activities that
    should be under consideration” and therefore runs afoul of
    NEPA. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 
    753 F.3d 1304
    ,
    1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“DRN I”). The petitioners allege that
    FERC did just that, by refusing to consider the Project’s
    impacts in conjunction with the anticipated impacts of the
    proposed PennEast pipeline that, when completed, will be the
    source of the gas that NJNG will transport using the capacity
    added by the Project. The petitioners insist that PennEast is a
    “connected action” that must be considered together with the
    Project because the two pipeline projects “lack independent
    functional utility.” Pet. Br. 16 (citing Native Ecosystems
    Council v. Dombeck, 
    304 F.3d 886
    , 894–95 (9th Cir.
    2002)). Given that the undisputed facts here clearly attest to
    the projects’ separateness, we conclude that FERC correctly
    rejected this argument.
    Actions are deemed “connected” with one another if
    they “(i) [a]utomatically trigger other actions which may
    require environmental impact statements,” “(ii) [c]annot or
    will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or
    simultaneously,” or “(iii) [a]re interdependent parts of a larger
    action and depend on the larger action for their
    justification.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.25
    (a)(1). The petitioners’
    claim relies on the third basis for finding a connected action.
    In line with the prevailing view amongst the Courts of Appeals,
    both FERC and the petitioners agree that the essential question
    is whether the segmented projects have independent utility.
    See Pet. Br. 16; App. 45; see also, e.g., Coal. on W. Valley
    Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 
    592 F.3d 306
    , 312 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The
    proper test to determine relatedness under 
    40 C.F.R. § 18
    1508.25(a)(1)(iii) is whether the project has independent
    utility.” (quoting Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 
    859 F.2d 1134
    , 1142 (2d Cir. 1988))); Great Basin Mine Watch v.
    Hankins, 
    456 F.3d 955
    , 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). Projects
    have independent utility where “each project would have taken
    place in the other’s absence.” Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
    
    685 F.3d 411
    , 426 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).
    The petitioners’ theory of interdependence — or, stated
    in the inverse, the lack of independent utility — relies entirely
    on their unfounded contention that “Transco’s sole stated
    purpose for the Project is to supply capacity to NJNG from the
    PennEast Line.” Pet. Br. 16. But this is simply not so. The
    statements that the petitioners point to in support merely
    articulate the undisputed fact that the Project would supply
    capacity to NJNG; they are agnostic as to the source of the gas
    that would utilize the capacity. App. 887, 1419.7 Rather, as
    FERC concluded below, the agreement between NJNG and
    Transco concerning the Project makes clear both that NJNG
    contracted for Transco’s capacity without regard to the source
    (or even availability) of the natural gas — which NJNG is
    alone responsible for sourcing — and, more importantly, that
    the actual source of the physical supply for the capacity added
    by the Project is the Station 210 Zone 6 pooling point, not the
    7
    Notably, only a few pages later in their brief, the
    petitioners again cite to page 887 of the appendix, but this time
    assert that the Project’s “sole purpose was to connect one of
    [Transco’s] existing pipelines to a new intrastate SRL pipeline
    to be constructed by NJNG.” Pet. Br. 22. It goes without
    saying that the “sole purpose” of the pipeline cannot be both to
    connect to PennEast and to connect to the Transco Mainline.
    19
    PennEast line.8 In addition, FERC found the PennEast
    project’s proposed capacity of 1,107,000 dekatherms per day
    is 90 percent subscribed by 12 different shippers, such that
    NJNG’s subscription makes up less than 15 percent of the
    pipeline’s capacity. App. 47–50; 80. In other words, the
    Project would go forward even if PennEast were not built (such
    that NJNG could not obtain PennEast gas to consume
    Transco’s capacity) and conversely the PennEast project would
    go forward even if the Project were not built (such that
    PennEast could not deliver its gas to NJNG).
    Indeed, in their reply, the petitioners all but concede that
    their segmentation claim fails. They acknowledge that
    PennEast has independent utility from the Project because it
    serves many shippers apart from NJNG. Reply Br. 7. They
    further concede that, even if PennEast is not built, NJNG could
    use the extra capacity provided by the Project to transport gas
    purchased from another supplier and moreover that NJNG’s
    contract with Transco obligates it “to obtain the gas regardless
    of whether the Penn East project is built.” Reply Br. 7. The
    petitioners’ continued argument that FERC improperly
    segmented the Project and PennEast thus relies on the
    petitioners’ bare assertion that this contractual setup — which
    establishes that NJNG must use the Project’s increased
    capacity whether or not the gas comes from the PennEast line
    — is entirely irrelevant to determining whether the sole
    8
    The Zone 6 pooling point is located north of Station
    205 (where the gas would divert down Transco’s Trenton-
    Woodbury lateral for delivery to NJNG at Station 203), which
    is itself located north of the point where PennEast is set to
    connect to the Transco Mainline.
    20
    purpose of the Project is to connect PennEast and the SRL. But
    even to describe the petitioners’ argument is to refute it. If just
    constructing the Project — and thus adding the capacity that
    NJNG requires — is sufficient to meet Transco’s contractual
    obligation, such that NJNG must buy the capacity regardless
    of any other contingency (such as PennEast’s status), then the
    Project’s construction alone plainly serves an independent
    purpose separate and apart from whatever happens to the
    PennEast pipeline.9 See, e.g., NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear
    9
    Because NJNG’s contract with Transco makes no
    mention of PennEast, the petitioners’ reliance on the Court of
    Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s rejection of an
    argument similar to the one FERC advances here in
    inapposite. In DRN I, the court accepted that proof of a
    project’s “commercial and financial viability . . . when
    considered in isolation” from the other projects that were
    allegedly being segmented was “potentially an important
    consideration in determining whether the substantial
    independent utility factor has been met,” but concluded that the
    “shipping contracts in this case” were insufficient because the
    contracts themselves tended to show that the projects were in
    fact “interdependent.” 753 F.3d at 1316 (emphasis
    added). Specifically, the court noted that the contract at issue
    calculated its rates by taking into account the costs and
    capacities of the other projects and had a provision explicitly
    allowing for a rate adjustment in the event of a the construction
    of one of the improperly segmented projects. Id. at
    1317. These provisions highlighted the interconnectedness of
    the projects. Here, by contrast, Transco and NJNG’s contract
    makes no mention of PennEast, the negotiated rate does not
    depend on the source of the gas, and the contract clearly
    21
    Regulatory Comm’n, 
    879 F.3d 1202
    , 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
    (rejecting as insufficient to rebut a finding of economic
    viability a petitioner’s claim that the developer had
    “envisioned” the project “as part of a larger” development
    plan).
    To conclude otherwise, the petitioners confuse the
    means of the Project for its ends. The Project exists to fulfill
    NJNG’s need for gas in southern New Jersey, a need that will
    exist and require satisfaction whether or not PennEast is
    constructed. As we elaborate on below in discussing the need
    for the Project, NJNG required more supply to shore-up the
    southern parts of the state after Hurricane Sandy. App.
    1419. To obtain that supply, NJNG contracted (1) with
    Transco to increase its pipeline’s capacity and (2) with
    PennEast to get the gas to Transco. But while Transco’s
    capacity increase is necessary to the plan, PennEast’s
    participation is not. NJNG can (and by contract, must) simply
    buy gas from the Zone 6 pooling point that was delivered by a
    different supplier.
    Finally, even if the petitioners are correct that we are
    obligated to ignore the contractual terms and focus only on the
    functionality of the pipeline, such an analysis points
    establishes that NJNG is solely responsible for acquiring the
    gas supply. Unlike in Delaware Riverkeeper, then, the Project
    is financially independent of PennEast, because it will be paid
    for and utilized regardless of PennEast’s existence. Under
    Delaware Riverkeeper’s own framework, this evidence is an
    “important consideration” in the independent utility
    analysis. Id. at 1316.
    22
    conclusively in FERC’s favor. Transco’s Mainline can change
    the direction of gas flow depending on market conditions. See
    App. 49–501. The Station 210 Zone 6 Pooling point
    (connecting Transco’s Leidy line to the Mainline) thus can
    either send gas from the Leidy line to the South or pull flow
    from the Gulf of Mexico northward, depending on market
    factors — such as where the cheaper gas is being produced.
    App. 49. The PennEast pipeline will connect to the Transco
    Mainline south of the Station 210 Zone 6 pool from which
    NJNG has contracted with Transco to obtain the supply created
    by the project. Accordingly, the Zone 6 pool will only be filled
    with gas physically brought in by the PennEast line during
    times when the Mainline is running South-to-North. The
    mechanics of the Transco Mainline’s flow — determined
    without consideration of the NJNG contract — make it highly
    unlikely that the physical gas flowing from the Zone 6 pool,
    through the Transco lateral, to the SRL will only be gas piped
    in by PennEast. In a pipeline, gas is fungible, so “its
    ‘transportation’ does not always take the form of the physical
    carriage of a particular supply of gas from its starting point to
    its destination.” Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 
    899 F.2d 1250
    , 1254 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990). NJNG’s contract to purchase
    gas from PennEast and its simultaneous contract with Transco
    for capacity to transport that exact amount of gas was not, as
    the petitioners argue to this Court, a contract to purchase and
    transport PennEast’s physical gas to the SRL. It was rather a
    contract to purchase an amount of gas from PennEast for
    inclusion in the Transco system, supported by a separate
    contract between NJNG and Transco to transport that same
    amount of gas from Transco’s pooling station to the SRL. As
    FERC explained in its order denying rehearing, although “it is
    feasible, using backhaul and other methods, that natural gas
    from the PennEast Project could ultimately be delivered on
    23
    Transco to reach the” SRL, that is not the way that the Mainline
    will necessarily operate. App. 81 n.36. The Project will thus
    often service the SRL with non-PennEast-derived natural gas,
    cementing our conclusion that the Project has a value
    independent of the PennEast line.10
    Because we conclude that the Project’s purpose is to
    supply the capacity that NJNG requested from their Zone 6
    pool, and that the source of the pool’s gas will be determined
    based on market conditions, we agree that FERC’s refusal to
    consider PennEast a “connected action” in the Project’s EA
    was not arbitrary and capricious.
    2. Consideration of the SRL
    a. Direct Review
    As an intrastate pipeline, the SRL does not fall within
    FERC’s jurisdiction under the NGA. Nevertheless, in
    10
    On this point, it is noteworthy that as of the time this
    case was submitted, the Project had been completed and placed
    into service, see FERC Docket CP15-89, Submittal 20180329-
    5212 (Mar. 29, 2018), whereas the PennEast pipeline had only
    just been approved by FERC, see PennEast Pipeline Co., 
    162 FERC ¶ 61,053
     (2018). See generally, e.g., Town of Norwood
    v. New Eng. Power Co., 
    202 F.3d 408
    , 412 (1st Cir. 2000)
    (holding that courts may take judicial notice of “the underlying
    FERC proceedings”). That the Project is operational and
    transporting gas even though PennEast has not yet even begun
    construction shows conclusively that the Project is not reliant
    on PennEast’s existence.
    24
    recognition of the fact that in some cases FERC “is required
    under NEPA to give some environmental consideration of
    nonjurisdictional facilities,” FERC has developed a four-factor
    balancing test “to determine whether there is sufficient federal
    control over a project to warrant environmental
    analysis.” Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 
    373 F.3d 1323
    , 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under the test, FERC considers
    (1) whether the regulated activity comprises
    “merely a link” in a corridor type project; (2)
    whether there are aspects of the non-
    jurisdictional facility in the immediate vicinity of
    the regulated activity that uniquely determine the
    location and configuration of the regulated
    activity; (3) the extent to which the entire project
    will be within the Commission’s jurisdiction;
    and (4) the extent of cumulative federal control
    and responsibility.
    
    Id.
     at 1333–34 (citing 
    18 C.F.R. § 380.12
    (c)(2)(ii)). As the
    Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
    explained, the purpose of this test is to limit consideration of
    the environmental impacts of non-jurisdictional facilities to
    cases in which those facilities “are built in conjunction with
    jurisdictional facilities and are an essential part of a major
    federal action having a significant effect on the
    environment.” Id. at 1334.
    Applying the test in its order denying the petitioners’
    request for rehearing, FERC concluded that “on balance” the
    factors weighed against federalizing the SRL. App. 83. It
    reached this conclusion after giving careful attention to each
    factor. As to the first factor, for the same reasons that PennEast
    25
    and the Project were not improperly segmented, FERC
    concluded that PennEast, the SRL, and the Project do not
    comprise a single corridor type project and that the Project
    would be a comparatively minor element compared to the 30-
    mile SRL. On the second factor, FERC concluded that the
    SRL did not “uniquely determine” the location of the project,
    because the SRL needed only to connect to the Transco lateral
    at some point at or downstream of the newly constructed
    Station 203, not to the compressor station itself. The location
    of Station 203, accordingly, was not uniquely dictated by the
    needs of the SRL. Regarding the third factor, FERC explained
    that (excluding PennEast which, as noted, is not part of the
    Project) the jurisdictional Project is dwarfed by the size of the
    SRL. FERC rejected the contention that its oversight of the
    PennEast’s and the Project’s costs — which the petitioners
    assert will be passed on to SRL ratepayers — means that FERC
    has decisional authority impacting the SRL. As FERC further
    explained, because each pipeline is owned by different
    companies, there will be no cost sharing between them; rather,
    shippers using each line will bear their own costs. Moreover,
    the tariffs of SRL, as an intrastate line, are governed by the
    New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and FERC has no role in
    funding, approving, or overseeing the SRL’s construction or
    operation. Finally, concerning the fourth factor, FERC noted
    the almost total absence of federal control over the SRL and
    rejected the petitioners’ argument that, by briefly traversing a
    federal military base and in light of some generally applicable
    federal permitting requirements, the SRL was subject to
    significant cumulative federal control. Although we recognize
    that one could quibble with its analysis of the second factor,
    we discern no abuse of discretion in FERC’s final analysis or
    its weighing of the factors.
    26
    The petitioners’ argument that the first factor is satisfied
    is based solely on their view that the Project, when considered
    in conjunction with the 122-mile PennEast line, is significantly
    larger than the SRL. But this avenue of attack is foreclosed by
    our agreement with FERC’s determination that the PennEast
    line was properly segmented from the Project. The petitioners’
    assertion that FERC has de facto jurisdiction over the SRL by
    virtue of its oversight over the Project’s rates which in turn
    impacts the SRL’s rates, even if accurate, articulates a logic
    that would extend FERC oversight over every non-
    jurisdictional project that attaches to an interstate pipeline.
    Such a rule would swallow the non-jurisdictional exception
    altogether. By its nature, a pipeline network consists of
    interstate and intrastate projects, and so the projects’
    connectedness alone — along with inherent cross-effects
    created by that connection — cannot weigh meaningfully in
    favor of federal control over purely intrastate projects. See
    New River, 
    373 F.3d at 1334
     (repudiating view that would
    require “the Commission to extend its jurisdiction over non-
    jurisdictional activities simply on the basis that they were
    connected to a jurisdictional pipeline”). Finally, that the SRL
    (1) would need to obtain an easement from the federal
    government, (2) traverses a federally designated National
    Reserve (managed by a state agency), and (3) must abide by
    generally applicable pipeline safety regulations are slim reeds
    upon which to assert cumulative federal control over the entire
    SRL. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co.,
    
    556 F.3d 177
    , 195 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the fact that
    a federal permit must be secured prior to commencing — and
    “is central to the success” of — a project, “does not itself give
    the [permitting agency] ‘control and responsibility’ over the
    entire” project); New River, 
    373 F.3d at 1334
     (deferring to
    FERC’s determination of insufficient control despite
    27
    petitioner’s argument that the project at issue was subject to
    numerous federal licensing requirements). Because the above
    three factors weigh clearly against asserting federal jurisdiction
    over the SRL, the possibility that the location of Station 203 —
    which links up to the SRL — was dictated in part by the
    location of the SRL does not render FERC’s ultimate balancing
    arbitrary and capricious. The record evidence falls short of
    showing that the location was “uniquely determine[d]” by the
    SRL, but even if it did, this factor alone would not change the
    reasonableness of FERC’s balancing, to which we accordingly
    defer. See New River, 
    373 F.3d at 1334
     (rejecting petitioner’s
    claim that satisfying the second factor, alone, is sufficient “to
    tip the balance in the four-factor test”).
    b. Cumulative Impacts
    The petitioners alternatively argue that, even if FERC
    were not required to assert jurisdiction over the SRL, it was
    nevertheless required under NEPA to assess whether — in
    conjunction with the jurisdictional Project — the non-
    jurisdictional SRL would foreseeably have cumulative impacts
    on the environment. Under NEPA’s implementing
    regulations, FERC is required to consider “the incremental
    [environmental] impact” of the jurisdictional action when
    added to the existing or “reasonably foreseeable” impacts of
    other actions, whether or not jurisdictional. 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7
    , .25; see also 
    id.
     § 1508.7 (“Cumulative impacts can
    result from individually minor but collectively significant
    actions taking place over a period of time.”). When conducting
    a cumulative-impacts analysis, FERC:
    [M]ust identify (i) the ‘area in which the effects
    of the proposed project will be felt’; (ii) the
    28
    impact expected ‘in that area’; (iii) those ‘other
    actions — past, present, and proposed, and
    reasonably foreseeable’ that have had or will
    have impact ‘in the same area’; (iv) the effects of
    those other impacts; and ([v]) the ‘overall impact
    that can be expected if the individual impacts are
    allowed to accumulate.’
    Sierra Club v. FERC, 
    827 F.3d 36
    , 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
    (quotation marks omitted) (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 
    433 F.3d 852
    , 864 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
    In line with this test, FERC determined that the
    Project’s “main region of influence” in which cumulative
    impacts might be felt was .25 miles from each of the Project’s
    components, but nevertheless considered the cumulative
    impacts of the SRL, PennEast line, and other projects even
    though they largely fell outside of the Project’s area of
    influence. FERC recognized that both the Project and the SRL
    would impact wetlands, but concluded based on the Project’s
    limited geographic and durational impact, along with FERC’s
    mandated mitigation measures, that any cumulative effects
    would be minor. It reached similar conclusions regarding
    impacts to vegetation and wildlife, explaining that cumulative
    effects are greatest when projects are built in the same
    geography, during the same time period, and where the impacts
    are expected to be long-term. FERC noted that the SRL,
    although largely occurring within existing rights of way, would
    be a significant pipeline project situated in a variety of habitats,
    including the protected Pinelands Area, and would be subject
    to extensive state-level regulation that would determine its
    ultimate environmental impacts. FERC accordingly outlined
    the potential area and kinds of resources that the SRL could
    29
    impact but — in recognition of the ongoing state regulation —
    did not firmly conclude how the impacts would manifest.
    Nonetheless, it determined that the Project’s largely short-term
    effects on vegetation and wildlife would not result in
    cumulative long-term impacts, even when added to the SRL’s
    potentially greater impacts, which would in any event be
    controlled by state regulators. FERC similarly concluded that
    the Project’s contribution to cumulative impacts on land use
    would minimal, given that only a small portion of the land
    permanently impacted by the Project would be forested,
    compared to the varied and more expansive terrain impacted
    by the miles-long SRL. Based on its finding that “each project
    would be designed to avoid or minimize impacts on water
    quality, forest, and wildlife resources,” and given the Project’s
    expected “temporary and minor effects,” FERC concluded that
    the Project “would not result in cumulative impacts.” App.
    1465, 1474.
    The petitioners complaint is not that the .25 mile area
    was incorrect,11 but that FERC failed to take full account of all
    the environmental impacts across the entire span of pipelines
    other than the project under review — impacts far afield from
    the geographic area impacted by the Project — merely because
    those pipelines will ultimately be part of the same network as
    that served by the Project. To echo the Court of Appeals for
    the District of Columbia Circuit, such an expansive reading of
    11
    Rightly so, given that the “determination of the size
    and location of the relevant geographic area ‘requires a high
    level of technical expertise,’ and thus ‘is a task assigned to the
    special competency of’ the Commission.” Sierra Club, 827
    F.3d at 49 (quoting Kleppe, 
    427 U.S. at 412
    ).
    30
    the cumulative impacts requirement “draws the NEPA circle
    too wide for the Commission,” which need only review
    impacts likely to occur in the area affected by the project under
    FERC review. Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 50. In this case,
    notwithstanding its determination — uncontested on appeal —
    that the area impacted by the Project was of an exceptionally
    small size, FERC considered the cumulative impact of the
    totality of the SRL (and PennEast) pipeline and determined that
    their cumulative impact was insignificant. In light of the
    gratuitousness of FERC’s extended cumulative impacts
    review, the petitioners’ complaint — which concedes the
    sufficiency of FERC’s analysis as it relates to wetlands — that
    FERC gave short-shrift to its consideration of the SRL’s
    impact on vegetation, wildlife, and aquatic species fails to
    persuade us.
    The core of the petitioners’ argument, that the SRL “as
    a major linear project” that will span “approximately 30 miles
    in length” will result in “considerable” environmental impacts
    along its path, Pet. Br. 20, itself defeats their claim that FERC
    had to consider all those various and oblique impacts when
    determining whether the SRL would cumulatively impact “the
    same area” as the project before it — involving no new pipeline
    construction and disturbing only the immediately surrounding
    area. Accordingly, FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
    when it “acknowledge[d] that these resources may be affected”
    by the SRL but properly determined that “a detailed analysis”
    of the impacts along the entirety of the SRL was “not within
    the scope of our environmental analysis” for the jurisdictional
    Project under review. App. 53. By detailing and recognizing
    even environmental impacts outside of the zone impacted by
    the jurisdictional Project, FERC gave the petitioners’ concerns
    the “serious consideration and reasonable responses” that
    31
    NEPA requires. Tinicum Twp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    685 F.3d 288
    , 298 (3d Cir. 2012). NEPA does not mandate
    exhaustive treatment of effects not plausibly felt in the
    Project’s impact area.
    But even taken head-on, the petitioners’ argument is
    unavailing. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, FERC did
    consider the SRL’s impact on vegetation and wildlife, and
    given the Project’s “minor . . . impacts” determined that the
    cumulative impacts would be insignificant. App. 1469. FERC
    explicitly acknowledged that the SRL may affect the Pinelands
    National Reserve and concluded reasonably that any impacts
    would be mitigated by the responsible state agency overseeing
    the permitting process for that project. App. 53. FERC was
    correct to rely upon New Jersey authorities to do so, as opposed
    — as the petitioners would have it — to assuming the worst
    and piggybacking that hypothetical impact onto the otherwise
    compliant jurisdictional Project.12 See, e.g., EarthReports, Inc.
    12
    The determination of whether a cumulative impacts
    analysis is required in the first place depends on a consideration
    of “the likelihood that a given project will be constructed”;
    “[t]he more certain it is that a given project will be completed,
    the more reasonable it is to require a[n] . . . applicant to
    consider the cumulative impact of that project.” Soc’y Hill
    Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 
    210 F.3d 168
    , 182 (3d Cir.
    2000); see also 
    id. at 181
     (“[T]he concept of ‘cumulative
    impact’ was not intended to expand an inquiry into the realm
    of the fanciful.”). Here, the petitioners try to have it both ways.
    In arguing that FERC improperly determined that there was a
    public need for the Project, the petitioners accuse FERC of
    accepting Transco’s “speculative” assertion of need given that
    32
    v. FERC, 
    828 F.3d 949
    , 959 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concluding that
    FERC reasonably relied upon the regulated parties’ “future
    coordination with” other regulators in its NEPA assessment);
    Ohio Valley, 
    556 F.3d at
    207–08 (upholding finding of no
    cumulative impact that was based partly on projected
    mitigation efforts because the mitigation was a condition of
    other permitting regimes to which the project was subject and
    thus was not speculative or conclusory); Friends of
    Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 
    968 F.2d 1549
    , 1555 (2d Cir.
    1992) (concluding that regulated parties’ responsibility to work
    with local authorities on mitigation proposal constituted a
    “rational basis” for FERC finding of no significant
    impact). Again, NEPA requires no more than the fair
    “there is a very real possibility that . . . the SRL will [not] go
    forward.”      Pet. Br. 22.        Nevertheless, the petitioners
    simultaneously demand that FERC consider the worst-case
    scenario of environmental impacts from the SRL as part of its
    approval of the Project, without accounting for the state-
    mandated mitigation that would necessarily attach to any
    approved plan. But obviously, if the SRL’s construction is at
    this point so speculative that it cannot be the basis of Transco’s
    proof of public need, then FERC need not consider the
    hypothetical cumulative impacts of that speculative project.
    Especially where, as here, we have concluded that FERC was
    correct to segment the Project and the SRL, our precedent
    demands that it be “sufficiently certain that [the] other projects
    will be constructed” before an agency is required to include a
    cumulative impact analysis in its EA. Id. at 182. The
    petitioners’ explicit contention that this certainty is lacking is
    itself a reason to reject their complaints about the sufficiency
    of FERC’s cumulative impacts analysis.
    33
    consideration and reasonable responses that FERC provided to
    the petitioners’ concerns.
    Furthermore, had FERC failed to give the specific
    attention that it did to the various types of impacts that the SRL
    might potentially cause, we would still approve their
    cumulative impact conclusions. Aside from their challenge to
    FERC’s determination of the Project’s well impacts (discussed
    below), the petitioners do not contend that FERC improperly
    concluded that, taken alone, the Project would not
    “significantly affect[] the quality of the human
    environment.” App. 64; see also App. 1424 (concluding in the
    EA that “the impacts associated with th[e] Project can be
    sufficiently mitigated to support a finding of no significant
    impact”). And — again, besides the wells challenge —
    nothing in the petitioners’ briefing suggests that FERC’s
    detailed consideration of the Project’s impacts to the area’s
    geology; water resources; vegetation; wildlife; endangered
    species; cultural resources; land use, recreation, and visual
    resources; or air quality and noise was erroneous or
    wanting. FERC thus reasonably concluded in the EA that the
    Project’s “minimal impacts” in its service area — relegated
    largely to “geological and soil resources” impacts and other
    temporary impacts — meant that the Project necessarily
    “would not result in cumulative impacts.” App. 1465, 1469.
    We conclude that FERC did not abuse its discretion in reaching
    this decision. This is especially true considering that the
    impacts from the SRL that the petitioners allege FERC ignored
    are different than the limited kind of impacts that FERC
    concluded were likely to result from the Project and so are less
    likely to result in cumulatively significant impacts when
    34
    considered together.13 See Council of Envtl. Quality,
    Considering Cumulative Effects Under the National
    Environmental Policy Act 8 (Jan. 1997) (“Cumulative effects
    need to be analyzed in terms of the specific resource . . . being
    affected.”). Given that the petitioners failed to show anything
    more than minimal impacts from the Project itself, they have
    failed to show that FERC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
    determining that the Project would likewise not contribute to
    significant cumulative impacts, even taking into account the
    potential different impacts of the SRL on other areas within the
    Project’s region. This conclusion is reinforced by the
    petitioners’ own insistence that the SRL’s construction is being
    held up by legal challenges, Pet. Br. 22–24, such that whatever
    impacts it causes will be temporally distinct from the Project’s
    short-term impacts. See, e.g., Friends of Santa Clara River v.
    U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
    887 F.3d 906
    , 926 (9th Cir. 2018)
    (concluding that where an EIS reasonably finds that a project
    is unlikely to have an impact on a given population, that it is
    “also not arbitrary or capricious to conclude that the Project
    would not result in significant cumulative . . . impacts” to that
    13
    For instance, the petitioners argue that FERC failed
    to consider the “cumulative impacts on . . . aquatic species”
    associated with the construction of the Project and the
    SRL. Pet. Br. 21. But the EA is clear that the Project “would
    not impact any waterways.” App. 1445; see also App. 58
    (reiterating that restrictions aimed at protecting certain fish
    species were inapplicable because “no surface waters will be
    affected by project activities”). Obviously, to the extent that
    the Project is expected to have no impact on aquatic species, it
    cannot incrementally impact whatever aquatic species are
    impacted by the SRL.
    35
    population); Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v.
    FERC, 
    762 F.3d 97
    , 113 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding
    cumulative impact analysis finding “no significant cumulative
    impacts were expected” where the project under consideration
    “itself was expected to have minimal impacts” and — as is the
    case here — the two projects had distinct construction
    timelines). By addressing and expressly considering the
    specific concerns raised by the petitioners, FERC “fulfilled
    NEPA’s goal of guiding informed decisionmaking” and
    ensured that FERC at least considered the wisdom of the
    agency action. Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1370–71; Sierra Club
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
    867 F.3d 189
    , 196 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
    (“Our job is simply ‘to ensure that the agency has adequately
    considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its
    actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.’”
    (quoting DRN I, 753 F.3d at 1312–13)).
    The petitioners nevertheless argue that this low-impact
    project should be halted as a result of the possibly significant
    — but mostly different-in-kind — impacts of the nearby but
    later-in-time SRL. But this cannot be how the cumulative
    analysis inquiry operates. To hold otherwise would permit a
    jurisdictional project with little environmental impact to be
    torpedoed based only on a nearby non-jurisdictional project’s
    significant impact, which FERC has no authority to control or
    mitigate. Such a rule would effectively condition the approval
    of pipelines operating under federal jurisdiction on the
    fastidiousness of pipeline companies operating in the same
    region under state authorities. Pipelines subject to lax state
    authorities or state environmental requirements that fall short
    of federal standards could, by mere proximity to a
    jurisdictional project, trump federal regulation and undermine
    FERC’s careful balancing of environmental protection and
    36
    public energy needs. Less pernicious, if a proposed state-
    governed project has potentially significant impacts but has not
    yet gone through the state’s regulatory process (which could
    be expected to mitigate those impacts), such a project would
    essentially stay all federally regulated projects proposed in the
    area until the state agency either rejects the plan or approves a
    mitigation proposal. Congress surely did not intend for
    FERC’s exclusive authority to control interstate pipeline
    construction to be so easily usurped by state
    regulators. Rather, the cumulative impacts analysis was meant
    to address instances where the jurisdictional project itself has
    minor environmental impacts that nevertheless fall short of
    stopping the project, but where — if added to the minor
    impacts from nearby non-jurisdictional projects — the
    cumulative impact of all the projects would be significant. See
    
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.7
     (“Cumulative impacts can result from
    individually minor but collectively significant actions taking
    place over a period of time.”); cf. 
    id.
     § 1508.27 (setting out
    considerations for whether a project is “significant,” including
    whether it “is related to other actions with individually
    insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts” (emphasis
    added)). The analysis was not intended to combine the effects
    of a nearly no-impact project with those of a project with
    potentially serious impacts and then to bar them both.
    The relevant question — as FERC correctly understood
    — is rather whether, taking the non-jurisdictional impacts as a
    given, the addition of the jurisdictional project’s impacts on top
    of the other projects’ existing or anticipated impacts renders
    significant those projects’ otherwise insignificant impacts. See
    
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.7
     (“Cumulative impact is the impact on the
    environment which results from the incremental impact of the
    action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
    37
    foreseeable actions . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cascadia
    Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
    801 F.3d 1105
    , 1112
    (9th Cir. 2015) (“An agency can take a ‘hard look’ at
    cumulative impacts . . . by . . . incorporating the expected
    impact of [a forthcoming] project into the environmental
    baseline against which the incremental impact of a proposed
    project is measured.”); see also App. 1471 (“Only a small
    portion of forested land use would be impacted by the
    operation of the [Project]. These impacts would not contribute
    significantly to the cumulative impacts of the other projects in
    the region. Since the . . . [SRL] include[s] a linear pipeline, [it]
    would result in greater temporary and permanent impacts in
    acreage and affect a variety of land uses.”). In other words, the
    analysis looks at the marginal impact of the jurisdictional
    project when added to the non-jurisdictional projects’ impacts,
    and asks whether the addition of the project under review
    affects a meaningful increase in the projected environmental
    impacts. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau
    of Land Mgmt., 
    387 F.3d 989
    , 994 (9th Cir. 2004); Landmark
    West! v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    840 F. Supp. 994
    , 1011 (S.D.N.Y.
    1993), aff’d, 
    41 F.3d 1500
     (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the
    cumulative impacts analysis requires “the consideration of the
    foreseeable actions of others as background factors, but does
    not require that the impacts of others’ actions be weighed in
    assessing the significance of [the] action[ under review].
    Rather, the [agency] need weigh only the marginal impacts of
    its own actions.”). Where the other projects’ impacts are
    themselves already significant or greatly outweigh the
    jurisdictional projects’ impacts, such that the jurisdictional
    project will not meaningfully influence the extent of the
    already significant environmental impacts, the cumulative
    impacts test is inapposite. Were this not so, a single proposed
    project with a significant projected impact would preempt any
    38
    other development — even no-impact or impact-reducing
    projects — regardless of whether the proposed project
    ultimately will come to fruition or have those expected
    impacts. Plainly, such an application of the cumulative
    impacts analysis is unreasonable and unwarranted, and we
    reject it. We conclude that FERC adequately addressed the
    Project’s cumulative impacts.
    3. Potable Well Impacts
    The petitioners’ final NEPA-based claim regards
    FERC’s conclusion that the Project’s construction would not
    significantly impact the water quality of wells or cisterns in the
    service area. In its EA, FERC determined that “[m]inor,
    temporary impacts on groundwater infiltration could occur as
    a result of tree, herbaceous vegetation, or scrub-shrub
    vegetation clearing” around Station 203 during its
    construction, but that Transco would thereafter “restore and
    revegetate cleared areas to pre-construction conditions to the
    maximum extent practicable.” App. 17–18. The EA continued
    that, in the event that groundwater is “encountered during
    construction,” Transco would adhere to a series of mitigation
    measures, which would ensure that “impacts on groundwater
    would be adequately minimized.” App. 18. Although reaching
    this general conclusion about the risk of groundwater impacts
    as a result of the Project, FERC made no specific finding about
    the impacts to any particular wells or cisterns “within 150 feet
    and up to one mile” from the Project, because at the time of the
    EA, neither FERC nor Transco had identified any such
    resources. App. 17. Accordingly, the particular finding that
    FERC did not “anticipate any significant impacts on cisterns,
    wells, or septic systems in the Project areas” was based most
    39
    directly on FERC’s understanding that those resources simply
    did not exist.
    Transco and several commenters subsequently notified
    FERC that there were numerous private wells in the project
    area. Nevertheless, based on additional assurances from
    Transco that it would remedy any damage or disruption to the
    water supply — and without revising the EA or identifying the
    specific number of potentially impacted wells — FERC issued
    Transco the certificate, subject to additional monitoring and
    mitigation conditions. These included the requirement that
    Transco identify and file the locations of all private wells in the
    Station 203 project area prior to beginning construction;
    conduct “pre- and post-construction monitoring of well yield
    and water quality”; and report to FERC any complaints it
    receives from well owners and how the complaints were
    resolved. App. 56. Some of the petitioners challenged the
    propriety of the certificate, arguing that the underlying
    assessment of the impact on wells was necessarily insufficient
    given that it was made without regard to the number of
    impacted wells. In denying the motion for rehearing, FERC
    rejected this claim, asserting that the certificate’s requirements
    that Transco identify and monitor the wells, and Transco’s
    promise to “minimize and remediate impacts” and “to repair,
    replace, or provide alternative sources of potable water” in the
    event of more permanent impacts, “appropriately identify and
    mitigate     any     potential    impacts       to    groundwater
    resources.” App. 87.
    On appeal, the petitioners in large part renew the
    challenge levied before FERC. They add that even if FERC
    were not absolutely required to identify the number of affected
    wells, its proposed mitigation plan is inadequate because: (1)
    40
    it cannot effectively be enforced, and (2) because without
    knowing how many wells are potentially impacted, it is
    impossible to determine whether the proposed mitigation plan
    will suffice. The petitioners contend that FERC’s “no
    significant impacts” conclusion was therefore arbitrary and
    capricious because it was not based on sufficient evidence.
    Because we conclude that FERC sufficiently established the
    efficacy of the proposed mitigation plan, we will not disturb its
    conclusion that the Project’s groundwater impacts — if any —
    will not be significant.
    When an agency’s “proposed mitigation measures [are]
    supported by substantial evidence, the agency may use those
    measures as a mechanism to reduce environmental impacts
    below the level of significance.” Nat’l Audubon Soc. v.
    Hoffman, 
    132 F.3d 7
    , 17 (2d Cir. 1997). Mitigation measures
    will be deemed “sufficiently supported” where “they are likely
    to be adequately policed,” such as where the mitigation
    measures are included as mandatory conditions in a
    permit. Id.; Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev.
    v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
    524 F.3d 938
    , 955–56 (9th Cir.
    2008) (explaining that an “‘agency is not required to develop a
    complete mitigation plan detailing the precise nature . . . of the
    mitigation measures[,]’ so long as the measures are ‘developed
    to a reasonable degree.’” (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation
    Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
    241 F.3d 722
    , 734 (9th Cir. 2001))).
    Nor must the proposed mitigation be included in the
    original EA in order to pass muster under NEPA. If FERC in
    its certificate order addresses the commenters’ concerns about
    the adequacy of the EA’s analysis and clearly articulates its
    mitigation plan therein, it takes “the requisite ‘hard look’ at the
    impact of the . . . Project on the environment.” DRN II, 857
    41
    F.3d at 401 (quoting NRDC v. Hodel, 
    865 F.2d 288
    , 294 (D.C.
    Cir. 1988)). This is because NEPA’s “purpose is not to
    generate paperwork — even excellent paperwork — but to
    foster excellent action” and to “[e]nsure that environmental
    information is available to public officials and citizens before
    decisions are made and before actions are taken.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 1500.1
    ; Kleppe, 
    427 U.S. at 409
     (“By requiring an impact
    statement Congress intended to assure [consideration of the
    environmental impact] during the development of a proposal .
    . . .”). The command to conduct an EA is not an end in itself,
    but a means to achieve informed decision-making, and
    reviewing courts should not elevate the form of the analysis
    over its substance by requiring that the totality of the relevant
    information be included in the EA in the first instance. “The
    role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has
    adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact
    of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious,”
    Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 
    462 U.S. 87
    , 97–98 (1983),
    not to police precisely how — or in what form — the agency
    engages in the requisite analysis. See, e.g., DRN II, 857 F.3d
    at 396 (explaining that courts should not “flyspeck” FERC’s
    NEPA analysis and should defer to its expertise “so ‘long as
    the agency’s decision is fully informed and well-considered’”
    (quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Myersville Citizens
    for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 
    783 F.3d 1301
    , 1323 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015), then quoting Hodel, 
    865 F.2d at 294
    )). Where the
    EA fails to address fully a specific issue but the record makes
    clear that the agency and public were apprised of the deficiency
    and that the agency sufficiently considered the matter before
    making a final decision or permitting actions to be taken, it has
    fulfilled NEPA’s procedural mandate.
    42
    FERC determined in the EA that groundwater effects
    were expected to be temporary, limited, and controlled by
    Transco’s adoption of prophylactic measures to limit sediment
    discharge. After it learned of the wells’ existence, FERC
    imposed supplementary measures to mitigate and remedy any
    damage to private wells in the project area, along with a
    reporting framework to ensure Transco’s compliance. We
    conclude therefore that the record establishes that FERC
    adequately considered the potential impact to the wells,
    responded appropriately to the concern, and reasonably
    concluded that in light of its intervention, any impact would be
    insignificant. Given that FERC in the EA had already reached
    a reasoned conclusion regarding the intensity of the expected
    effects of the construction — which it deemed to be minor and
    transient — its failure to detail fully the number of wells
    potentially impacted by this limited impact is insufficient to
    render its findings arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners do
    not contend that FERC underestimated how the construction
    would impact a well in the project area, but only that it has not
    confirmed how many wells this uncontested calibration would
    disturb. FERC could reasonably conclude that a consequence
    whose intensity was unlikely to significantly impact any one
    resource was likewise unlikely to significantly impact
    additional — but distinct — instances of that same resource.14
    This case is therefore unlike the Babbitt case cited by
    the petitioners, in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
    Circuit rejected the agency’s EA that made a no significant
    14
    Nor have the petitioners advanced any reason to
    believe that minor passing impacts to several individually
    owned wells would have cumulatively significant impacts.
    43
    impact finding without articulating the expected intensity or
    expected consequences of the projected environmental
    effects. See 
    241 F.3d at 732
    . The Babbitt case involved the
    impact of growing cruise ship traffic in the Glacier Bay. The
    agency recognized that expanded traffic would increase the
    level of underwater disturbance, the risk of collision with sea
    life, and the risk of oil spills, and acknowledged that the
    intensity and effects of such increases on the sea life were
    “unknown.” 
    Id. at 729
    . Nevertheless, the agency asserted that,
    with the proposed mitigation, the action would have no
    significant effect on the environment. 
    Id.
     In rejecting the
    sufficiency of the agency’s analysis, the court explained that
    the EA’s uncertainty over the intensity of the projected
    environmental effects necessitated the preparation of the more
    comprehensive environmental impact statement. 
    Id.
     at 731–
    32. Given the agency’s failure to quantify the likely intensity
    or effect of the action, and the agency’s failure to impose
    mandatory mitigation conditions as part of the EA, the court
    likewise rejected the agency’s assertion that its mitigation plan
    could adequately control these unknown effects. 
    Id.
     at 734–
    36.
    The issue in Babbitt was not that the agency did not
    know, for instance, how many sea lions would be impacted by
    the traffic increase, but rather that it did not know the intensity
    of impact in the first place. We recognize that in certain
    circumstances — such as where the intensity of the impact is
    expected to be moderate or significant — the failure to identify
    the number of species or resources impacted could render the
    EA insufficient because the magnitude of gross harm would be
    too uncertain. That is not the case here, however, where FERC
    identified the intensity of the impacts and concluded that they
    would be minor and temporary. Even without knowing the
    44
    precise number of wells potentially impacted, FERC could
    reasonably conclude that the total environmental impact of
    such low-intensity and fleeting effects would be insignificant,
    especially when accounting for the mandatory mitigation and
    remedial conditions imposed upon Transco in the certificate,
    which FERC has assured the Court that it will enforce.15 See
    15
    The petitioners assert that the mitigation measures are
    insufficient because Transco is not required to affirmatively
    report impacted wells and FERC cannot adequately impose
    remedial measures if Transco fails to comply. FERC reiterated
    in its order denying rehearing, however, that if Transco’s post-
    construction testing showed decreased well yield or water
    quality, FERC has authority to require Transco to mitigate the
    impact. App. 88. FERC’s clarification implies Transco’s
    responsibility to inform FERC of any changes. Moreover,
    landowners can be expected to complain to Transco if there is
    a noticeable change in their well’s yield or water quality,
    complaints which Transco is expressly required to pass on to
    FERC. If the impacts on the wells are so negligible that the
    landowner does not even notice them, then such impacts are —
    as FERC predicts will be the case — insignificant and do not
    require mitigation. Finally, the petitioners in their Reply brief
    do not challenge FERC’s authority to enforce any required
    remediation, which we conclude is amply supported by the
    applicable federal legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 717o (granting
    FERC the “power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe,
    issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and
    regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out
    the provisions” of the NGA); id. § 717f (“The Commission
    shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate
    and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such
    45
    id. at 735 (recognizing that even where mitigation procedures
    are not fully developed, “the imposition of special conditions,
    enforced through a permit,” and adequately supervised could
    “ensure[] that the measures would be enforced in a manner that
    properly reduced negative environmental impact”). We
    therefore reject the petitioners’ claim that FERC’s treatment of
    the well impacts ran afoul of NEPA.
    C. Need for the Project
    FERC must determine that the proposed project “is or
    will be required by the present or future public convenience
    and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e), prior to granting a
    certificate of public convenience and necessity under the NGA.
    This inquiry involves two steps. First, FERC asks whether “the
    project will ‘stand on its own financially’ because it meets a
    ‘market need.’” Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1379 (quoting
    Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1309). The point of this step is “to
    ensure that a project will not [need to] be subsidized by existing
    customers.” Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1309. This element can
    accordingly be established by the existence of contracts
    subscribing to the capacity of the project. Id. Second — if
    market need is shown — FERC will then “balance the benefits
    and harms of the project, and will grant the certificate if the
    former outweigh the latter.” Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at
    reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and
    necessity may require.”); id. § 717t-1 (granting FERC the
    power to impose civil fines of up to $1 million per day for the
    violation of “any rule, regulation, restriction, condition, or
    order made or imposed by the Commission under authority of
    this chapter”).
    46
    1379. Whether to grant a certificate is “peculiarly within the
    discretion of the Commission,” Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1308
    (quoting Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
    257 F.2d 634
    , 639 (D.C. Cir. 1958)), and a reviewing court’s task is
    limited to ensuring that “the decision was based on a
    consideration of the relevant factors” and not a result of “a
    clear error of judgment.” 
    Id.
     (quoting ExxonMobil Gas Mktg.
    Co. v. FERC, 
    297 F.3d 1071
    , 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). FERC’s
    findings of fact — such as a finding of need — are conclusive
    if supported by substantial evidence. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b).
    Applying the above criteria in this case, FERC found “a
    strong showing of public benefit” based upon NJNG’s
    “binding precedent agreement” to purchase 100 percent of the
    Project’s capacity that outweighed the Project’s “minimal
    adverse impacts,” and so granted the certificate. App. 42. The
    petitioners challenge this finding as arbitrary and capricious
    because FERC “considered only Transco’s asserted need for
    the Project, ignoring other factual developments” that the
    petitioners assert “demonstrated that the need was
    speculative.” Pet. Br. 22. Specifically, the petitioners argue
    that regulatory and legal challenges to both the SRL and
    PennEast created a “very real possibility that neither” project
    would be built, which in the petitioners’ view would “obviat[e]
    the need for the Project.” Id. FERC rejected this argument in
    denying the petitioners’ motion for rehearing, noting that
    NJNG’s contract was itself sufficient to establish need and that
    the Project was not reliant on the existence of either the
    PennEast or SRL. Again, we agree.
    The petitioners’ argument that the need for the Project
    is speculative misapprehends the purpose of the analysis, the
    focus of which is on the objective existence of a market need,
    47
    not the precise mechanics of fulfilling that need. See, e.g.,
    Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1379. A contract for a pipeline’s
    capacity is a useful indicator of need because it reflects a
    “business decision” that such a need exists. See App. 76. If
    there were no objective market demand for the additional gas,
    no rational company would spend money to secure the excess
    capacity. Cf., e.g., Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 
    693 F.2d 870
    , 884 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that, in the ordinary course, a
    company’s “legitimate business decisions” will not be against
    their self-interest). In this case, FERC reasonably relied on
    NJNG’s binding contract to utilize all of the Project’s capacity
    — a contract that was not contingent on the completion of
    either the SRL or PennEast16 — as evidence of the market need
    and proof that the Project will be self-supporting. As
    numerous courts have reiterated, FERC need not “look[]
    beyond the market need reflected by the applicant’s existing
    contracts with shippers.” Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1311
    (quoting Minisink, 762 F.3d at 111 n.10).
    Even were this not the case, the petitioners’ view of the
    need is myopic. The need is not, as they contend, to provide
    16
    The petitioners concede that “the precedent
    agreements may be binding on NJNG” even if the SRL is not
    built, but curiously insist that this “does not mean the NJNG
    will remain obligated to continue with the precedent agreement
    if the SRL is not completed.” Reply Br. 5 n.1. We discern no
    meaning to the word “binding” other than “having legal force
    to impose an obligation,” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
    2014), and so fail to understand the petitioners’ hypothetical in
    which a party to a binding agreement is nonetheless free to
    shirk its enforceable obligations thereunder.
    48
    capacity for gas to reach the SRL; this is the means of fulfilling
    the need, not the need itself. Rather, the “need” is for the
    provision of “enhanced reliability and resiliency to NJNG’s
    service territory in Monmouth and Ocean Counties,” App. 790,
    which is why NJNG is building the SRL and why it is seeking
    additional capacity from Transco. This need exists
    objectively, and independently of the SRL. If for whatever
    reason NJNG cannot build the SRL as it is proposed, this need
    for “enhanced reliability and resiliency” will endure, and the
    Project will still be necessary to meet that need by providing
    additional capacity for the southward supply of natural
    gas. Nor, as we explained above, is the Project reliant on
    PennEast’s completion. Thus, FERC correctly determined
    based on substantial evidence that even if the SRL or PennEast
    were not built, the Project would still serve the public need.
    Because the petitioners do not challenge FERC’s balancing at
    step two of the analysis — regarding which FERC is afforded
    “broad discretion,” Minisink, 762 F.3d at 111 — we conclude
    that FERC properly granted the certificate to Transco.
    D. Good Faith Notice
    The petitioners’ next challenge — that, contrary to the
    requirements of 
    18 C.F.R. § 157.6
    (d)(1), Transco failed to
    provide petitioner Bordentown with notice of Transco’s
    application — likewise fails. Section 157.6(d)(1) required
    Transco to “make a good faith effort to notify all affected
    landowners and towns” of its application, within three days of
    FERC’s March 13, 2015 filing of the Notice of Application
    regarding the Project. We discern no basis in the record to
    disturb FERC’s conclusion that Transco did so.
    49
    Most fundamentally, the petitioners’ claim is
    unsupported by any relevant citation to the record, and is belied
    by FERC’s explicit finding in its order granting the certificate
    that Transco complied with the “intent of the landowner
    notification requirements.” App. 44. This finding, like all
    FERC fact-finding, is conclusive where supported by
    substantial evidence. FERC’s determination is supported by
    Transco’s submission, filed March 24, 2015, that it had
    “mailed notices to all affected landowners” and re-mailed to
    new addresses the notices that were returned undelivered,
    FERC Docket CP15-89, Submittal 20150324-5228 (Mar. 24,
    2015), and FERC’s own investigation confirming the
    submission’s accuracy, App. 44, 96. By contrast, the
    petitioners’ claim that Bordentown was not given notice is only
    a representation in their appellate brief, which does not
    constitute record evidence, see United States v. Genser, 
    582 F.2d 292
    , 311 (3d Cir. 1978), and is in fact contradicted by the
    record, see, e.g., App. 1735–38 (letters dated September and
    October 2015 in which Transco’s counsel discusses the Project
    with Bordentown’s counsel, and which noted discussions from
    as early as August 2015). We therefore defer to FERC’s fact-
    finding and conclude that Transco satisfied their good faith
    notice requirements.17
    17
    To the extent that the petitioners claim that the alleged
    failure to provide notice implicated their constitutional rights
    to Due Process and thus must be subjected to more exacting
    review, we note that the petitioners at the very least received
    constitutionally sufficient notice of Transco’s project, as
    evidenced by their participation in the notice and comment
    period following the EA and their petitioning for
    rehearing. See All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, More
    50
    In addition, FERC has long maintained that notice
    published in the Federal Register satisfies the Commission’s
    notice requirements. See App. 97. Given the deference owed
    to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, see, e.g.,
    Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less,
    
    768 F.3d 300
    , 313 (3d Cir. 2014); Marseilles Land & Water
    Co. v. FERC, 
    345 F.3d 916
    , 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining
    that “agencies are entitled to great deference in the
    interpretation of their own rules” unless the interpretation is
    “plainly erroneous” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
    Co., 
    325 U.S. 410
    , 414 (1945))), FERC’s view that its statutory
    notice requirement was satisfied by the notice of the
    application published in the Federal Register is conclusive of
    this claim.
    or Less, 
    746 F.3d 362
    , 366 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
    landowners “received notice ‘reasonably calculated . . . to
    apprise’ them of [the company’s] FERC application” where, in
    the months between the company’s application and FERC’s
    order granting the certificate, the company negotiated with the
    landowners to seek an easement and filed a lawsuit for
    permission to survey the property in relation to the project
    (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314 (1950))); Moreau v. FERC, 
    982 F.2d 556
    , 569 (D.C.
    Cir. 1993) (holding, in a case where parties had actual notice
    before FERC granted the certificate, that the “Due Process
    Clause does not require notice where those claiming an
    entitlement to notice already knew the matters of which they
    might be notified”).
    51
    E. Green Acres Act
    The petitioners’ penultimate claim is that FERC erred
    by granting Transco the certificate because it will permit
    Transco to construct the Project on property subject to
    regulation under New Jersey’s Green Acres Act,18 without first
    seeking state-level approval to divert the property to non–
    Green Acres uses. This argument is facile because the
    petitioners entirely fail to articulate what portion of its
    governing law was violated when FERC neglected to seek New
    Jersey state approval before granting the certificate of public
    necessity, the authority over which Congress exclusively
    vested in FERC.
    Although the parties primarily dispute whether the
    Green Acres Act is preempted or whether FERC addressed
    sufficiently the Act’s substantive concerns before granting the
    certificate, we need not even get that far. Nothing in the NGA,
    NEPA, or its implementing regulations require FERC to do
    anything more than at most consider the proposed land-use and
    18
    The Green Acres Land Acquisition and Recreation
    Opportunities Act of 1975 (“Green Acres Act”) was “designed
    to provide State funding to assist municipalities with the
    acquisition and development of property for conservation and
    recreation” and “required State-level approval of the sale . . .
    of all conservation or recreational properties” either purchased
    with, or owned at the time of, the municipality’s receipt of the
    funding. Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 
    584 A.2d 784
    , 785
    (N.J. 1991).
    52
    its alternatives.19 There is certainly no requirement that prior
    to issuing a certificate, FERC pass through the procedural
    hoops that the state places upon the alienation of land subject
    to its authority. The petitioners’ demand that FERC should
    have proceeded with “caution” in light of New Jersey’s
    exacting regulatory scheme, Reply 16, while laudable, finds no
    support in the text of FERC’s regulations. Given that FERC
    did not have to receive New Jersey’s approval prior to its
    issuance of the certificate, we cannot conclude that it erred by
    failing to do so with regard to the Green Acres Act.20
    19
    Although FERC must consider the environmental
    impacts of the pipeline’s siting and to the extent feasible to
    respect state conservation designations, see, e.g., 
    18 C.F.R. § 380.15
    , as a purely process-oriented statute NEPA cannot and
    does not require FERC to undertake any substantive acts, such
    as specifically complying with a state’s land-use
    regulations. And the petitioners have not argued on appeal that
    FERC’s consideration of the Green Acres property violated
    NEPA’s procedures.
    20
    In any event, we note that FERC’s granting of the
    certificate (thereby accepting that the pipeline would pass
    through land subject to the Green Acres Act) was not
    irreconcilable with Transco thereafter going through the
    process mandated by the Act, which Transco has indeed agreed
    to do. To the extent that Transco would have had to utilize the
    right to seek eminent domain that is conveyed by the receipt of
    the certificate, it would only be because Bordentown — the
    landowner actually subject to the Green Acres Act — refused
    to agree to seek a diversion under the Act or because New
    Jersey refused to permit a diversion. The petitioners’ argument
    suggests to the contrary that the granting of the certificate
    53
    If anything, the NGA itself suggests that FERC need not
    concern itself with the legal technicalities concerning — or the
    ownership status of — land upon which FERC determines that
    the placement of a pipeline would be in the public interest. The
    NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (h), affords certificate holders the right
    to condemn such property, and contains no condition precedent
    other than that a certificate is issued and that the certificate
    holder is unable to “acquire [the right of way] by
    contract.” Two salient points emerge. First, this section places
    sole responsibility on the certificate holder — not FERC — to
    secure the legal right to utilize the land at issue. Second, there
    is no requirement that the certificate holder first attempt to
    acquire the property via the state’s preferred process: if the
    holder cannot reach an arm’s-length agreement with the
    property owner, then the holder may proceed under §
    717f(h).21 To the extent, then, that any preemption is squarely
    immediately condemns the property, notwithstanding state
    law. This is plainly incorrect, as the certificate merely signals
    FERC’s approval of the Project’s siting, based on the
    assumption that Transco will either receive the landowner’s
    permission to use the property or else exercise its statutory
    right to condemn the property. Because FERC could issue the
    certificate and Transco could still (and, in fact, did) thereafter
    proceed via the Green Acres Act, it is unclear what additional
    “caution” the petitioners expect FERC to afford to the Green
    Acres Act scheme or, indeed, how much caution would in their
    view suffice. Reply 16.
    21
    Although the statute directs the United States District
    Court overseeing the condemnation proceeding to “conform as
    nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar
    54
    at issue here, the NGA already speaks pellucidly about the
    hierarchy of land rights, and it is entirely silent about any
    requirement that the state’s existing regulations concerning the
    land be substantively complied with or respected. Cf.
    Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 
    723 F.3d 238
    , 243–
    45 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the NGA preempts state
    zoning and land use requirements, save for those enacted under
    the Clean Air Act, CWA, or Coastal Zone Management Act
    (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d))).
    Finally, we would be remiss not to point out that
    although the petitioners levy their challenge against FERC’s
    issuance of the certificate, the real target of their claim is
    actually the Township of Bordentown’s interpretation
    thereof. FERC, in issuing the certificate, did not specifically
    opine that any particular provision of the Green Acres Act is
    preempted. See App. 63 (explaining generally in the certificate
    order that state requirements that “prohibit or unnecessarily
    delay Transco from meeting its obligations under this Order”
    are “preempted by the certificate”). To the extent that
    Bordentown feels compelled to ignore the Green Acres Act as
    a result of FERC granting the certificate, then it is their
    (allegedly overbroad) reading of FERC’s authority that is to
    blame. If, conversely, Bordentown concludes that the granting
    of the certificate does not override the applicability of the
    Green Acres Act, then “no harm, no foul,” as FERC would not
    action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the
    property is situated,” this requires district courts to attempt to
    mirror the state courts’ condemnation proceedings, not to adopt
    the state’s administrative scheme concerning the alienation of
    the land at issue. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
    55
    — in the petitioners’ telling — have exceeded its authority by
    granting the certificate notwithstanding its failure to consider
    the Green Acres Act. Put simply, “[u]nder either
    interpretation, the certificate order has only whatever
    preemptive force it can lawfully exert, and no more.”
    Myersville, 
    783 F.3d 1321
    . Because FERC, when issuing the
    certificate, did not “purport to compel” Bordentown to
    undertake an act inconsistent with the NGA, and because “no
    provision of the [NGA] identified by [the p]etitioners barred
    [FERC] from issuing a conditional . . . certificate under these
    circumstances,” the petitioners’ Green Acres Act challenge
    fails. 
    Id.
    F. Cumulative Error
    The petitioners finally ask that we grant the petition
    based on the cumulative effect of FERC’s various alleged
    errors. Under the cumulative error doctrine — which we have
    to date applied only in the context of criminal trials — a court
    “may determine that, although certain errors do not require
    relief when considered individually, the cumulative impact of
    such errors may warrant a new trial.” SEC v. Infinity Grp., 
    212 F.3d 180
    , 196 (3d Cir. 2000). We need not decide whether the
    cumulative error doctrine applies in this type of case, because
    even assuming its applicability, our conclusion that none of
    FERC’s challenged decisions were individually erroneous
    forecloses a cumulative error claim. See 
    id.
    IV. Challenges to the NJDEP’s Order
    We now turn to the petitioners’ challenge to the
    NJDEP’s conclusion that the New Jersey regulations
    establishing the availability of adjudicatory hearings to contest
    56
    the grant of water quality permits to an interstate pipeline
    project were preempted by federal law (docket No. 17-
    3207). As noted above, we conclude that the NJDEP
    misunderstood the scope of the NGA’s assignment of
    jurisdiction to the federal Courts of Appeals. Because this
    erroneous view was the only articulated reason for its denial of
    the petitioners’ hearing request, we will remand to the NJDEP
    for reconsideration of the petitioners’ request and to give the
    NJDEP the opportunity to in the first instance address the
    petitioners’ substantive challenges to the provision of the
    permits.
    A. Jurisdiction Under the NGA
    We begin with the language of the federal statute that
    the NJDEP purports divests it of jurisdiction to grant
    adjudicatory hearings arising from permit decisions affecting
    interstate natural gas pipelines. Under the NGA:
    The United States Court of Appeals for the
    circuit in which a facility subject to section 717b
    of this title or section 717f of this title is proposed
    to be constructed, expanded, or operated shall
    have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any
    civil action for the review of an order or action
    of a . . . State administrative agency acting
    pursuant to Federal law to issue, condition, or
    deny any permit, license, concurrence, or
    approval . . . required under Federal law . . . .
    15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). By the plain language of the statute,
    the conferral of “original and exclusive jurisdiction” to the
    federal Courts of Appeals is limited to “civil action[s] for the
    57
    review of an order or action of a Federal agency . . . or State
    administrative agency.” Id. The term “civil action” is not
    defined either in § 717r or anywhere in the NGA, so we must
    “look to the common meaning of the term in deciding whether
    ‘civil action’ encompasses” a state administrative proceeding,
    as the NJDEP claims. Schindler v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    29 F.3d 607
    , 609 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Our review
    assures us that a “civil action” refers only to civil cases brought
    in courts of law or equity and does not refer to hearings or other
    quasi-judicial proceedings before administrative agencies.
    The Supreme Court has recognized that “the word
    ‘action’ often refers to judicial cases, not to administrative
    ‘proceedings,’” West v. Gibson, 
    527 U.S. 212
    , 220 (1999), and
    has parsed statutes based on Congress’s understanding of the
    distinction between a civil “action” in a court and an
    administrative “proceeding” at the agency level, New York
    Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 
    447 U.S. 54
    , 60–62 (1980). This
    Court, for its part, has held in the context of interpreting a
    statute providing for attorneys’ fees in taxpayer disputes
    against that IRS that the even broader term “‘civil action or
    proceeding’ includes only judicial proceedings and not
    administrative actions.” Toner v. Comm’r, 
    629 F.2d 899
    , 902
    (3d Cir. 1980). Our sister Courts of Appeals have reached
    similar conclusions. In Schindler, for instance, the Court of
    Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “[u]nder Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 3, a ‘civil action’ is commenced by the filing of a complaint
    with the court,” and quoted Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary’s
    definition of “‘civil action’ as ‘litigation in a civil court for the
    recovery of individual right or redress of individual
    wrong.’” 
    29 F.3d at
    609–10. In another case, that court
    explicitly stated that a hearing “at the administrative level” was
    not “in a ‘civil action.’” Levernier Const., Inc. v. United
    58
    States, 
    947 F.2d 497
    , 502 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g.,
    Howard v. Pritzker, 
    775 F.3d 430
    , 432 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
    (distinguishing, in the Title VII context, between the “final
    administrative action” and the subsequent “civil action”
    consisting of “a de novo court proceeding”). Black’s Law
    Dictionary similarly defines an “action” as a “civil or criminal
    judicial proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary 31 (8th ed.
    1999); see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 202 (3d ed. 1969)
    (defining a civil action” as “any proceeding in a court of justice
    by which an individual pursues that remedy which the law
    affords him”); Bouvier Law Dictionary Desk Edition (2012)
    (defining a “civil action” as “[a]ll actions in law or equity that
    are not criminal actions” and noting that it is “the generic term
    for all lawsuits”).
    The Supreme Court has long recognized that
    administrative hearings, even to the extent that they in some
    ways mirror an adversarial trial, do not constitute proceedings
    in courts of law or equity. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 
    431 U.S. 105
    , 115 (1977) (holding that “procedural due process in the
    administrative setting does not always require application of
    the judicial model”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229–30 (1938) (explaining that the purpose of the
    section of the NLRA at issue there, which freed an
    administrative tribunal from applying the rules of evidence
    required “in courts of law and equity,” was to “free
    administrative boards from the . . . technical rules” inherent “in
    judicial proceedings”). And notably, the New Jersey Supreme
    Court has explicitly held, in upholding the constitutionality of
    an administrative body tasked with adjudicating allegation of
    unlawful discrimination, that administrative adjudication
    “involves no . . . intrusion upon subject matter jurisdiction of
    59
    the judicial branch over traditional causes of action at law or in
    equity.” David v. Vesta Co., 
    212 A.2d 345
    , 359 (N.J. 1965).
    Viewed in light of both federal and New Jersey
    authority, and barring any specific statutory language to the
    contrary, a hearing before an administrative body is not a “civil
    action.” Accordingly, such hearings are not impacted by §
    717r(d)(1)’s assignment to the federal Courts of Appeals the
    exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions challenging a state
    agency’s permitting decision made pursuant to federal
    law. Because, as relevant here, the NGA explicitly permits
    states “to participate in environmental regulation of [interstate
    natural gas] facilities” under the CWA, Delaware I, 833 F.3d
    at 368, and only removes from the states the right for their
    courts to hear civil actions seeking review of interstate
    pipeline–related state agency orders made pursuant thereto, the
    NGA leaves untouched the state’s internal administrative
    review process, which may continue to operate as it would in
    the ordinary course under state law.
    That § 717r(d)(1)’s scope is limited to judicial review
    of agency action, and does not implicate or preempt state
    agency review of the agency’s own decision, is also apparent
    from the statute’s structure. For example, § 717r(b) — which
    is titled “Review” and discusses appeals to the Courts of
    Appeals from a FERC order — allows a party “aggrieved by
    an order issued by the Commission” to “obtain a review of such
    order” in the Courts of Appeals. In contrast, § 717r(d)(1) —
    which is titled “Judicial review” — grants “original and
    exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an
    order or action of a . . . or State administrative
    agency.” (emphasis added). Congress therefore clearly
    understood the difference between establishing direct judicial
    60
    “review” over agency action (supplanting any alternative intra-
    agency process) and creating an exclusive judicial forum in the
    federal Courts of Appeals for a “civil action” challenging an
    agency’s decision-making (separate from the agency’s own
    internal review process). As opposed to affirmatively
    installing federal courts to oversee the administrative process,
    as it did in § 717r(b) by placing the “review” of all FERC
    action in the Courts of Appeals, Congress did not interject
    federal courts into the internal workings of state administrative
    agencies. See Berkshire Envtl. Action Team, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas
    Pipeline Co., 
    851 F.3d 105
    , 112–13 (1st Cir. 2017) (“We see
    no indication that Congress . . . intended to dictate how (as
    opposed to how quickly) [the state agency] conducts its
    internal decision-making before finally acting.”). The myriad
    “state procedures giving rise to orders reviewable under §
    717r(d)(1) may (and undoubtedly do) vary widely from
    jurisdiction to jurisdiction,” some of which may permit intra-
    agency review and others which may not. Id. at 109. Perhaps
    in recognition of this diversity, § 717r(d)(1) merely establishes
    that a party who seeks judicial review of a state agency
    decision via a collateral civil action challenging the correctness
    of the decision, may only bring that civil action directly to the
    federal Courts of Appeals, not the state courts or federal district
    courts.
    Finally, although not squarely faced with this issue, this
    Court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have
    implicitly held that state administrative review of interstate gas
    permitting decisions is not preempted by the NGA. In our
    recent opinion in Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary
    Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Nos.
    16-2211, 16-2218, 16-2400 (3d Cir. Sept. 4, 2018) (“Delaware
    III”), as well as in Delaware II and Berkshire, the courts
    61
    considered whether § 717r(d)(1) includes a finality
    requirement such that the federal Courts of Appeals lack
    jurisdiction to hear the case if the state makes available
    additional administrative remedies before the permitting
    decision takes effect. If the NJDEP’s and Transco’s position
    in this case were a correct reading of the statute (that “any civil
    action for the review” in § 717r(d)(1) includes administrative
    review), then those courts would not have considered whether
    administrative review was an available or mandatory remedy
    in the state’s administrative scheme, because the NGA would
    have cut off any state review other than the initial decision,
    making that decision by default final. In Delaware II, however,
    this Court assumed that the petitioners could have sought an
    appeal to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board
    (“EHB”) if they had done so within the time period provided
    in the Pennsylvania statute. See 870 F.3d at 177. And in
    deciding the issue left open by Delaware II, we concluded in
    Delaware III that the Pennsylvania DEP’s issuance of a Water
    Quality Certification was final and appealable to this Court
    “[n]otwithstanding the availability of an appeal to the EHB.”
    Delaware III, slip op. at 18. Although reaching the opposite
    conclusion in regards to the finality of the Massachusetts
    permitting process, the court in Berkshire determined in light
    of that state’s administrative scheme that it did not have
    jurisdiction to hear the case until the state environmental
    agency held the adjudicatory hearing that petitioners had
    sought, and issued an order thereupon. See 851 F.3d at 112–
    13.22 If the plain impact of § 717r(d)(1) was to remove from
    22
    In Delaware II and III, we distinguished Berkshire on
    the basis that the Pennsylvania statute allowed construction to
    begin immediately upon the issuance of the agency’s decision,
    62
    the states any and all review over the issuance of such permits,
    those cases would not have proceeded based on the
    understanding — express or implicit — that state
    administrative review was available if desired. The only
    whereas the Massachusetts statute at issue in Berkshire did not
    allow any action on the permit until the expiration of the period
    for seeking an adjudicatory hearing. For present purposes,
    however, the technical details of the state’s administrative
    scheme are irrelevant. If the NJDEP and Transco are correct
    that the clear text of the statute demands that all review of
    permitting decisions must occur in this Court only, it would be
    counterintuitive to assert that we will ignore the statute’s
    mandate and permit administrative review in contexts where
    the state’s administrative scheme established that an initial
    decision is not final until the parties have an opportunity for
    review. Cf. Delaware III, slip op. at 12–13 (“Although the
    decisionmaking process we are reviewing is defined by
    Pennsylvania law, we nevertheless apply a federal finality
    standard to determine whether Congress has made the results
    of that process reviewable under the [NGA].”). Rather,
    accepting the NJDEP’s and Transco’s view, the statute — by
    eliminating any review other than federal Court of Appeals
    review — would operate to make final the state’s initial
    permitting decision, notwithstanding whatever administrative
    review scheme the state otherwise had in place. Nor, for that
    matter, do the NJDEP or Transco assert that any such carve-
    out exists for state schemes that create a single or unitary
    proceeding that includes administrative review. But as we
    made clear in Delaware III, such distinctions in the state
    administrative scheme are “probative of whether that decision
    is final.” Id. at 16.
    63
    plausible conclusion to draw from these cases and from the text
    of the statute itself is that § 717r(d)(1) does not preempt state
    administrative review of interstate pipeline permitting
    decisions.
    B. New Jersey Law
    Having decided that the NGA does not preempt the
    regular operation of New Jersey’s administrative review
    process, we turn next to the determination of whether the
    NJDEP’s refusal to afford the petitioners an adjudicatory
    hearing based on the NJDEP’s erroneous interpretation of the
    NGA amounts to a violation of New Jersey law. As explained
    below, we conclude that it does.
    Federal courts reviewing state agency action afford the
    agencies the deference they would receive under state
    law. See, e.g., Delaware II, 870 F.3d at 181. Accordingly, we
    look to New Jersey law to determine the prism of our review
    of the NJDEP’s denial of the petitioners’ request for an
    adjudicatory hearing. Similar to review under the APA,
    judicial review of New Jersey administrative agency decisions
    is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision
    “is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,” but no deference is
    owed to “the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its
    determination of a strictly legal issue.” In re Taylor, 
    731 A.2d 35
    , 42 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of
    Sec., 
    312 A.2d 497
    , 501 (N.J. 1973)). Likewise, we afford no
    deference to a state agency’s interpretation of federal law,
    which we instead review de novo. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm.
    Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 
    271 F.3d 491
    , 516 (3d Cir. 2001).
    64
    The NJDEP regulations implementing the FWPA allow
    a party to request an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the grant
    of an FWW permit. The FWPA explicitly provides for the
    availability of such a hearing where the requestor is the permit
    seeker, 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13
    :9B-20, and — as recognized in the
    NJDEP regulations, see 
    N.J. Admin. Code § 7
    :7A-21.1(e)
    (FWW); § 7:14A-17.2(c) & (f) (dewatering) — the New Jersey
    Administrative Procedure Act recognizes the rights of
    “[p]ersons who have particularized property interests or who
    are directly affected by a permitting decision” to such a
    hearing, 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52
    :14B-3.1(b) & 3.2(c).23 Under its
    regulations, when a third party asserting such a property
    interest seeks an adjudicatory hearing regarding a permit, the
    NJDEP has the responsibility in the first instance to either deny
    the request — and in doing so to provide the reasons for the
    denial — or to approve the request and to forward the matter
    to the Office of Administrative Law, where an ALJ will hear
    the dispute and then issue a report and recommendation for the
    consideration of the NJDEP Commissioner. 
    N.J. Admin. Code § 7
    :7A-21.1(f)–(g), 7:14A–17.5(b); see also 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52
    :14B-10(a)–(c). Although the FWW regulations do not
    articulate a standard by which the agency must decide whether
    to approve or deny a petition for an adjudicatory hearing, the
    denial of a request for a hearing on a dewatering permit is
    23
    The petitioners assert that they meet this standard. In
    denying the petition for a hearing, the NJDEP expressly
    withheld decision on the claim, NJDEP App. 37 n.4, and
    neither the NJDEP nor Transco address this fact-specific issue
    on appeal. Given our disposition, we need not reach the issue,
    which we leave for the NJDEP to address in the first instance
    when reconsidering the petitioners’ hearing request.
    65
    limited to an enumerated list of reasons. 
    N.J. Admin. Code §§ 7
    :7A-21.1(f); 7:14A–17.4. In either case, the NJDEP must
    clearly articulate the reasoning behind its decision so that a
    reviewing court can determine whether the decision was in
    error. See 
    id.
     §§ 7:7A-21.1(f); 7:14A–17.4(e); see also In re
    Authorization For Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permit
    6, Special Activity Transition Area Waiver For Stormwater
    Mgmt., Water Quality Certification, 
    80 A.3d 1132
    , 1147 (N.J.
    App. Div. 2013); Atl. City Med. Ctr. v. Squarrell, 
    793 A.2d 10
    ,
    16 (N.J. App. Div. 2002).
    Here, the NJDEP denied the petitioners’ request for an
    adjudicatory hearing on the FWW and dewatering permits on
    the sole basis that, pursuant to the NGA, the federal Courts of
    Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear any challenges to
    final decisions granting permits, and accordingly that the
    provisions permitting an adjudicatory hearing to contest such
    decisions were preempted.24 Because we conclude that the
    NJDEP’s reading of the NGA was erroneous as a matter of law
    and that the NGA does not preempt the regular progression of
    intra-agency review of a permitting decision, the NJDEP’s
    denial of the petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing
    24
    We need not determine whether or not a NJDEP
    permitting decision is already final during the period when a
    party may still seek an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the
    permit because, as explained below, the fact that we may have
    immediate jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a permitting
    decision does not mean that the agency charged with
    administering the permitting process is thereby divested of its
    authority to review challenges to its permits via its established
    administrative procedures.
    66
    based on that misunderstanding was unreasonable and so
    cannot stand.
    The NJDEP and Transco urge that jurisdiction properly
    lies in this Court because the permit decision was final and
    because requiring exhaustion of state remedies would run
    counter to the NGA’s purpose of streamlining natural gas
    permits. This may be so. However, the determination of
    whether we may assert jurisdiction immediately upon a
    permitting decision does not answer whether the agency is
    simultaneously stripped of jurisdiction to provide an
    administrative adjudicatory hearing in the ordinary
    course. Our limitation to considering only final orders, see
    Delaware III, slip op. at 10, is a constraint on our own
    jurisdiction, not a determination that we are the only forum
    available to consider final orders.25 Indeed, if the NJDEP and
    25
    In other words, our own limitation to hearing only
    final orders is not necessarily tantamount to creating an
    exhaustion requirement in the state process. See, e.g.,
    Delaware III, slip op. at 17 (“[F]inality is ‘conceptually
    distinct’ from the related issue of exhaustion of administrative
    remedies.” (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n
    v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
    473 U.S. 172
    , 192 (1985)));
    Berkshire, 851 F.3d at 110 (explaining that “[f]inding that a
    statute requires final agency action is different from finding
    that it requires exhaustion” (citing Darby v. Cisneros, 
    509 U.S. 137
    , 144 (1993))). Assuming that a state considers an order
    final even though additional state agency procedures may be
    available — and that the classification is consistent with
    federal finality standards — we may consider a judicial
    challenge to the order despite the petitioner’s failure to exhaust
    67
    Transco are correct that the NJDEP orders at issue here were
    final when issued, see Transco Br. 24; NJDEP Br. 10, 12, New
    Jersey clearly provides for a 30-day window to seek an
    adjudicatory hearing to contest that final order. We therefore
    do not necessarily disagree with the NJDEP and Transco’s
    assertion that the petitioners could have immediately appealed
    the NJDEP’s orders to this Court. Nor do we disagree that,
    assuming the petitioners sought immediately to bring such a
    civil action — and again putting aside the question of finality
    — this Court would be the only judicial body to which such a
    challenge could be brought. Our holding is only that (1)
    instead of bringing a civil action in this Court, the petitioners
    were entitled under New Jersey law to have alternatively first
    sought an intra-agency adjudicative hearing, and (2) the
    NJDEP violated New Jersey law by unreasonably denying the
    petitioners’ request for such a hearing based on its misreading
    of the NGA and this Court’s precedent.
    In sum, although the plain language of the NGA strips
    state courts — as well as federal district courts — of
    jurisdiction to hear civil actions challenging an administrative
    agency’s permitting decision regarding interstate natural gas
    pipelines, it does not purport to meddle with the inner workings
    of the agency’s approval process or to insert federal appellate
    those further state administrative remedies. See Delaware III,
    slip op. at 12–13, 17. And conversely, even though a petitioner
    might have the right immediately to commence a civil action
    in this Court, this does not necessarily extinguish his or her
    right instead to seek redress via the available administrative
    avenues before filing that civil action.
    68
    courts arbitrarily into the state administrative scheme. The
    language of the statute merely requires that judicial challenges
    to the outcome of the administrative process come straight to
    us. If, however, a state allows for an internal administrative
    review of a permitting process, such a process does not
    contravene the NGA. Because the NJDEP denied the
    petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing based on its
    belief to the contrary, we will remand to the agency with
    instructions to reconsider the petitioners’ request for a hearing
    in light of our clarification. In doing so, we express no opinion
    on the petitioners’ ultimate entitlement to an adjudicatory
    hearing based on New Jersey law.
    V. Conclusion
    In light of the foregoing, we will deny in part and grant
    in part the petitions for review, and remand to the NJDEP for
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    69
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1047; 17-3207

Citation Numbers: 903 F.3d 234

Judges: Chagares, Greenberg, Fuentes

Filed Date: 9/5/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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