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Jones v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections , 549 F. App'x 108 ( 2013 )


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  • CLD-127                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 13-3834
    ____________
    DAMON JONES,
    Appellant
    v.
    SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD
    SCI; JAY LANE, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT; BOLTON,
    UNIT MANAGER; KELLY, UNIT COUNSELOR;
    FRANCIS J. FEILD, MAJOR; ROBIN M. LEWIS; JOHN
    DOE; JANE DOE; DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA
    __________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-03365)
    District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
    __________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    December 12, 2013
    Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: December 17, 2013)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Damon Jones appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his
    amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal in part as
    moot and, in all other respects, dismiss it as frivolous.
    Jones, a state prisoner, was convicted in the Philadelphia County Court of
    Common Pleas of two counts of first-degree murder in May, 1983. In 1987, he was
    sentenced to death on both counts. On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    affirmed both the verdict and sentence, see Commw. v. Jones, 
    610 A.2d 931
     (Pa. 1992).
    As a result of the death sentences, Jones was moved to the state correctional institution’s
    Capital Case Unit (“CCU”), and thereafter was confined as a capital-case inmate within
    the Restricted Housing Unit. After filing a state post-conviction petition, Jones was
    granted a new penalty hearing on August 3, 2007. On December 14, 2012, the state trial
    court resentenced Jones to two terms of life in prison, the sentences to run consecutive to
    another life sentence Jones was serving on a separate first-degree murder conviction. At
    the resentencing, the trial judge ordered that Jones be removed from death row. Jones
    was transferred into the general population on or about January 17, 2013.
    Prior to his transfer off death row, in June, 2012, Jones filed the instant in forma
    pauperis civil rights action, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
     and 1985(3), in the United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the District of Attorney of
    Philadelphia and numerous state Department of Correction (“DOC”) officials. Jones
    alleged that the District Attorney delayed his resentencing by seeking continuances in
    state court, and he alleged that he should have been moved out of the CCU while he
    2
    awaited resentencing. Jones alleged constitutional violations relating to the conditions of
    his confinement on death row, which included a lack of fresh air and exercise, a
    windowless cell, no opportunity to associate with other inmates, inadequate privacy when
    he communicated with his attorney, and excessive noise and bad food, among other
    things. He alleged in particular that solitary confinement violates civilized standards of
    decency, and that the defendants conspired to continue his unlawful detention in solitary
    confinement by unlawfully delaying his resentencing. Jones noted that he had
    unsuccessfully grieved this issue through the prison grievance system in the summer of
    2010. Jones sought money damages for the alleged civil rights violations and a transfer
    into the general prison population.
    After Jones amended his complaint, the defendants moved in early 2013 to dismiss
    it on several grounds, including that Jones’ request for injunctive relief was now moot.
    In the main, the defendants took the position that the complaint was moot, and that, prior
    to his resentencing, DOC policy required that Jones not be transferred into the general
    population because in his case the punishment of death could potentially be reimposed at
    his new penalty hearing. In an order entered on August 30, 2013, the District Court
    granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint.
    Jones appeals. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Our Clerk granted
    him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to
    summary dismissal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third
    Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He was invited to submit argument in writing, and he has
    3
    done so. We have considered his submission, and will address the arguments raised
    therein.
    We will dismiss the appeal in part as moot and in part as frivolous. One purpose,
    and likely the primary purpose, of Jones’ civil rights action, was to hasten his
    resentencing; he undoubtedly hoped that he would receive a life sentence and be
    transferred off death row. Within six months of initiating litigation against the
    defendants, Jones achieved this goal and was transferred into the general population.
    This is the relief that he requested and thus the appeal is moot to the extent of his request
    for injunctive relief. The federal courts may adjudicate “only actual, ongoing cases or
    controversies.” Burkey v. Marberry, 
    556 F.3d 142
    , 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v.
    Continental Bank Corp., 
    494 U.S. 472
    , 477 (1990)). This “case or controversy”
    requirement continues at the appellate stage and requires that a party like Jones have a
    personal stake in the outcome. See 
    id.
     That personal stake in resentencing and transfer
    off death row is now absent from his case. We are, in this regard, unable to fashion any
    form of meaningful relief and thus the appeal is moot in part. See Artway v. Att’y Gen.
    of New Jersey, 
    81 F.3d 1235
    , 1246 (3d Cir. 1996).
    To the extent that Jones sought money damages for constitutional violations
    resulting from his confinement on death row prior to his resentencing, we will dismiss the
    appeal as lacking an arguable basis in fact or law, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1925
    (e)(2)(B)(i). With
    respect to the alleged delay in resentencing, the District Court reviewed the state court
    docket and determined that the delay was caused by Jones’ counsel and not the District
    Attorney. Defense counsel asked for several continuances in order to prepare for
    4
    resentencing, according to the state court criminal docket. See PBGC v. White Consol.
    Indus., Inc., 
    998 F.2d 1192
    , 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993) (court may consider admittedly
    authentic public document in ruling on motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s claim relies on
    that document). Defense counsel sought continuances, according to the docket, to
    conduct further investigation and to prepare motions in order to bar re-imposition of the
    death penalty. On June 11, 2012, Jones filed (in state court) his own motion to be
    removed from death row, but at no time prior to that date did he file any motions pro se
    or seek to have defense counsel removed or replaced. The Due Process Clause
    guarantees a reasonably speedy appeal. Burkett v. Cunningham, 
    826 F.2d 1208
    , 1221 (3d
    Cir. 1987). The delay in resentencing Jones was almost 4 years, but he does not dispute
    that his case remained a capital one, and he did not allege that his counsel’s stated need to
    prepare for resentencing in order to avoid another death sentence was illegitimate. With
    respect to the issue of prejudice, see 
    id.,
     we note that Jones’ convictions for first-degree
    murder were not vacated, and there was no chance that he would be released outright
    from prison because in Pennsylvania the sentence for first degree murder is either death
    or life in prison with no possibility of parole, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1102(a); 61
    Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6137(a)(1). Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that
    Jones failed to state a plausible constitutional claim relating to the delay in resentencing,
    and that his amended complaint should be dismissed with respect to the District Attorney.
    See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009)
    (plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
    draw on its judicial experience and common sense”).
    5
    To the extent that Jones alleged that the District Attorney and the DOC defendants
    conspired together to violate his constitutional rights by keeping him on death row until
    he was resentenced to two life terms, Jones failed to assert facts from which a
    conspiratorial agreement could be inferred. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
    Vocational Tech. Sch., 
    972 F.2d 1364
    , 1377 (3d Cir. 1992). Jones’ amended complaint
    was properly dismissed to the extent that his conspiracy allegations failed to state a
    plausible claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6); Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 679
    .
    With respect to his continued confinement on death row, Jones alleged that the
    punishment was excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He does not dispute
    that state law requires death-sentenced inmates to be housed in solitary confinement, see
    61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4303, or that he was a death-sentenced inmate until August,
    2007. Moreover, pursuant to DOC policy, inmates like Jones who are awaiting
    resentencing but who could potentially be resentenced to death must remain on the CCU.
    The response from prison officials that Jones received to his grievances indicated that,
    because he was awaiting resentencing where the punishment of death could potentially be
    reimposed, he was not eligible to be transferred into the general population. Jones
    challenges the constitutionality of this DOC policy.
    In rejecting Jones’ argument that the DOC policy is unconstitutional under the
    Eighth Amendment, the District Court reviewed section 4303, and noted that the
    Pennsylvania General Assembly vests authority with the DOC to determine how and
    where to hold inmates, citing 37 Pa. Admin. Code § 93.11(a) (“An inmate does not have
    a right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility.”).
    6
    Noting that Jones’ sentence was not modified until he was resentenced to two life terms,
    the District Court concluded that there was no constitutional violation in his case because
    the DOC policy as applied to him was consistent with current contemporary standards as
    embodied in Pennsylvania legislation, and grounded in well-reasoned policy.
    Jones argues that solitary confinement in particular has caused him emotional
    distress, but “freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
    incarceration,” Overton v. Bazzetta, 
    539 U.S. 126
    , 131 (2003). The restrictions in the
    CCU undoubtedly make a death-row inmate’s confinement more difficult to bear, but the
    conditions Jones described are not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for
    conditions of confinement for inmates sentenced to death. Cf. Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 485 (1995). The conditions of that unit are similar to those of administrative or
    disciplinary custody.1 In short, Jones failed to allege inhumane prison conditions, that he
    was deprived of basic necessities, or that the defendants acted with deliberate
    indifference in failing to protect his health or safety. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 836 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    , 298 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman,
    
    452 U.S. 337
    , 349 (1981). For this reason, and in view of the fact that Jones could have
    been resentenced to death, we agree with the District Court that keeping him in the CCU
    until he was resentenced did not amount to excessive punishment in violation of the
    Eighth Amendment. It necessarily follows that, because the DOC defendants who
    1
    We note that the Commonwealth Court has rejected an argument similar to Jones’ in
    Clark v. Beard, 
    918 A.2d 155
     (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
    7
    applied the policy to Jones did not violate any clearly established constitutional right of
    his. He is not entitled to any relief.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal in part as moot and in part as
    lacking an arguable basis in fact or law, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i).
    8
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