Toth v. Securities & Exchange Commission ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-6-2009
    Toth v. SEC
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-3289
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    Recommended Citation
    "Toth v. SEC" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1579.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1579
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-3289
    ___________
    DOUGLAS TOTH,
    Petitioner
    vs.
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
    Respondent
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Securities and Exchange Commission
    (No. 3-12739)
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 2, 2009
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
    (Opinion Filed: April 6, 2009)
    ______________
    OPINION
    ______________
    PER CURIAM.
    Douglas Toth petitions for review of an order of the Securities and
    Exchange Commission (“SEC”) sustaining a disciplinary sanction imposed on him by the
    1
    National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). We will deny the petition.
    I.
    Toth, a securities broker-dealer, was a representative of Bedminster
    Financial Group, Ltd. (“Bedminster”), an NASD member firm.1 NASD rules required
    Toth to register as a representative of Bedminster by filing a Form U-4. Before joining
    Bedminster, Toth discussed what to include on his Form U-4 with Bedminster’s majority
    owner, Robert Van Pelt, who then filed a Form U-4 on Toth’s behalf. Among other
    things, Form U-4 requires the representative to disclose whether he or she has been
    “named in any pending investment-related civil matter.” In response to that question,
    Toth’s Form U-4 stated “no.”
    In fact, however, Toth had been named as a defendant in a civil securities
    fraud action brought by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities. The NASD learned of this
    discrepancy in July 2004 as part of a routine examination of Bedminster. The NASD
    began an investigation, and its enforcement division ultimately filed a disciplinary
    complaint against Toth in October 2005. The complaint charged him with willfully
    causing the filing of a Form U-4 containing a misrepresentation of material fact in
    violation of NASD Membership Rule IM-1000-1 and Conduct Rule 2110.
    1
    The former NASD has been consolidated into an entity called the Financial Industry
    Regulatory Authority, Inc. See Kashner Davidson Secs. Corp. v. Mscisz, 
    531 F.3d 68
    , 71
    n.1 (1st Cir. 2008). Because all relevant events occurred before that consolidation, we
    refer to the entity as the NASD.
    2
    An NASD Hearing Panel conducted a hearing in May 2006. At the hearing,
    Van Pelt testified that Toth never told him about the New Jersey action, but Toth and his
    witness, Nicholas Thompson, testified that they had. The Panel also received
    documentary evidence. On August 9, 2006, the Panel issued a thorough written decision
    sustaining the charge and suspending Toth’s license for one year. In particular, the Panel
    found that: (1) Toth knew that he was required to disclose the New Jersey action on the
    Form U-4; (2) Toth discussed with Van Pelt what to include on the Form U-4 but failed to
    disclose the New Jersey action; and (3) Toth failed to review and sign the Form U-4
    either before or after Van Pelt filed it despite Van Pelt’s efforts to get him to do so. In
    essence, the Panel concluded that Van Pelt’s testimony was supported by other evidence
    and was otherwise more credible than the testimony of Toth and Thompson.
    Toth appealed to the NASD’s National Adjudicatory Council, which
    affirmed in a thorough decision issued July 27, 2007. Toth then appealed to the SEC.
    The SEC, exercising its jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2), thoroughly reviewed the
    record and affirmed by decision issued July 1, 2008. The SEC deferred to the Hearing
    Panel’s credibility determinations to the extent that they were based on the Panel’s
    observation of the witnesses, but otherwise reviewed the record de novo and
    independently reached the same conclusions. Toth now petitions this Court for review.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction to review the SEC’s decision pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
    3
    78y(a)(1). See Levine v. SEC, 
    407 F.3d 178
    , 182 (3d Cir. 2005). On review, Toth does
    not argue that the SEC committed any legal error and does not challenge the propriety of
    the sanction imposed on him. Instead, he challenges only the SEC’s factual finding that
    he did not tell Van Pelt about the New Jersey action. We review that finding for
    substantial evidence. See 
    id. Under that
    standard, we must affirm if the finding is
    supported by “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.’” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 
    399 F.3d 546
    , 552 (3d Cir. 2005)
    (citations omitted). See also Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 
    512 F.3d 634
    , 639 (D.C.
    Cir. 2008) (“The Commission’s finding . . . is conclusive if, under our ‘very deferential’
    substantial evidence standard, ‘a reasonable mind might accept the evidentiary record as
    adequate to support the Commission’s conclusion.’”) (citations omitted). In undertaking
    this review, “we may not ‘weigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions for those
    of the fact finder.’” 
    Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552
    (citation omitted). Our review of the
    record confirms that the SEC’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence here.2
    Toth’s argument that the SEC should have found that he disclosed the New
    Jersey action to Van Pelt is two-fold. First, he argues that the SEC should have believed
    him and Thompson instead of Van Pelt for a number of reasons. The SEC, however,
    2
    Pursuant to Rule 17(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the SEC
    initially filed a certified list of the documents contained in the administrative record in
    lieu of the record itself. Although Toth does not dispute the SEC’s account of the
    witnesses’ testimony and documentary evidence, we directed the SEC to file the actual
    record and have reviewed it ourselves.
    4
    thoroughly addressed each of these points, and our review of the record confirms that its
    conclusions are supported by substantial evidence for the reasons stated in its opinion.3
    Second, Toth argues that, given the conflicting testimony regarding whether
    or not he disclosed the New Jersey action to Van Pelt, the evidence against him was not
    sufficiently compelling to support the SEC’s conclusion. As the SEC argues, however,
    the evidence on which the SEC relied need not be “compelling” to survive review.
    Instead, it need only be substantial—i.e., evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept
    as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 
    Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552
    . Our review of the
    record confirms that Van Pelt’s testimony, together with documentary evidence such as
    3
    For example, Toth argues that Van Pelt’s testimony about his efforts to have Toth
    review and sign the Form U-4 is called into question by Van Pelt’s financial incentive to
    quickly register Toth. As the SEC explained, however, Van Pelt’s testimony is supported
    by the parties’ correspondence. Toth also argues that the SEC excused Van Pelt’s
    mistaken recollection of the location of the meeting at which they discussed what to
    include on the Form U-4 but rejected his and Thompson’s testimony for similar reasons.
    We agree with the SEC, however, that Van Pelt’s isolated mistaken recollection is the
    kind of minor discrepancy that does not require the rejection of a witness’s testimony.
    See 
    Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 558
    . The SEC’s reasons for rejecting Toth’s and
    Thompson’s testimony, on the other hand, were of a different order. Among other things,
    the SEC concluded that Thompson was impeached by his own failure to disclose his own
    involvement in the New Jersey action in a Form U-4, that neither Toth nor Thompson
    could recall the details regarding their alleged discussion of the New Jersey action with
    Van Pelt, and that the only documents Toth sent to Van Pelt regarding his employment
    disclosed certain arbitrations but not the New Jersey action. Toth also argues that it
    simply made no sense for him to fail to disclose the New Jersey action because he knew
    that the Form U-4 would be reviewed by the very agency that brought that action.
    Whatever Toth’s motivations, however, the SEC concluded that he nevertheless failed to
    disclose that lawsuit, and its conclusion has more than adequate support in the record.
    5
    the correspondence between Toth and Van Pelt, was more than adequate to support the
    SEC’s ruling. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
    6