Edward Zampella v. Commissioner of Internal Reven ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENITAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-1672
_____________
EDWARD R. ZAMPELLA,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
On Appeal from the Record of
the United States Tax Court
(Tax Court Docket No.: 11-2488)
Trial Judge: Honorable Robert N. Armen, Jr.
Argued on March 5, 2014
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 4, 2014)
Frank Agostino, Esquire
Lawrence M. Brody, Esquire (Argued)
Agostino & Associates
14 Washington Place
The Bank House
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Counsel for Appellant
Gary R. Allen, Esquire
Robert J. Branman, I, Esquire (Argued)
Richard Farber, Esquire
Kenneth R. Rosenberg, Esquire
United States Department of Justice
Tax Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
P. O. Box 502
Washington, D.C. 20044
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Edward Zampella appeals from the Tax Court’s decision sustaining the
determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that denied him the first-time
homebuyer credit on his 2008 tax return. The Commissioner found that Edward’s
acquisition of property did not meet the definition of “purchase” under 26 U.S.C §
36(c)(3)(A)(i) because he acquired the property from a “related person”, and thus, is not
entitled to the tax credit. The Tax Court agreed. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm the decision of the Tax Court.
I. Background
a. Factual Background1
Maria Lee Zampella died on September 24, 2008. She left her entire estate to her
two sons, Edward and Arthur Zampella, “to be divided equally, share and share alike.”
1
As noted by the Tax Court, the parties stipulated as to these facts.
2
(A. 49.) Her Estate included a home located at 28 Schelly Drive, Middletown, NJ (“the
Property”). She also appointed her two sons as co-executors and beneficiaries of her
Estate.
Immediately following Maria Zampella’s death, her Estate had the Property
appraised at a value of $430,000. Edward desired to own the Property and issued four
checks totaling $215,000 payable to Arthur Zapolski. All of the checks were deposited
into the trust account of Zapolski, identified as the “Settlement Agent.” (A. 56.) Arthur
Zampella was then issued a check in the amount of $215,000 from the trust account and a
Deed for the Property was issued to Edward.
The Deed lists the Grantor as “Edward R. Zampella and Arthur F. Zampella
individually and as Co-Executors of the Estate of Maria Lee Zampella,” and the Grantee
as “Edward R. Zampella.” (A. 50-51.) Additionally, a HUD-1 Settlement Statement was
executed, which identified the seller as “Edward R. Zampella and Arthur F. Zampella as
Co-Executors and beneficiaries of the Estate of Maria Lee Zampella,” and the borrower
as “Edward R. Zampella.” (A. 56.)
Following this transaction, Edward claimed the first-time homebuyer’s credit
(“FTBHC”) of $8,000 on his 2008 tax return.2 On January 26, 2011, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (hereinafter “IRS”) sent Edward a notice of deficiency on account of
his ineligibility for the FTHBC. Following receipt of the notice, Edward filed for
redetermination with the Tax Court.
2
26 U.S.C. § 36(g) permits a taxpayer who makes a qualifying purchase in 2009 to treat
the purchase as if it were made on December 31, 2008.
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b. Tax Court Opinion
The Tax Court began its analysis by explaining the parameters of the FTHBC in
26 U.S.C. § 36, which allows up to an $8,000 credit to be claimed against an individual’s
Federal income tax. To be eligible an individual must qualify as a first-time homebuyer
who “purchased” a principal residence between April 9, 2008 and May 1, 2010.
Elaborating on the FTHBC guidelines, the Tax Court noted the following:
Section 36(c)(3)(A)(i) defines ‘purchase’ for purposes of the
FTHBC as ‘any acquisition, but only if * * * the property is not
acquired from a person related to the person acquiring such
property.’ Siblings are excluded from the definition of related
persons for FTHBC purposes. [26 U.S.C. §§] 36(c)(5), 267(b)(1),
(c)(4). However, under section 36(c)(5), related persons generally
include an executor of an estate and a beneficiary of such estate.
Sec. 267(b)(13).
(A10.)
Edward urged that he had acquired the Property from his brother, i.e. a sibling,
who is not a related person. However, the Tax Court agreed with the IRS’s position that
Edward had acquired the residence from a related person, namely, the executors of the
Estate, under 26 U.S.C. § 36(c)(5), which disqualified him from receiving the FTHBC.
The Tax Court relied upon the Deed listing Edward and Arthur as “Grantor” in their
representative capacities as co-executors. Similarly, the Tax Court noted that they were
identified in the HUD-1 Settlement Statement under “Seller” as co-executors and both
signed as “Seller”.
The Tax Court considered that Edward “urges us to treat his acquisition of the
residence as a bifurcated transaction such that he acquired only a one-half interest” from
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the Estate and the other “one-half interest from his brother directly.” (A11.) The Tax
Court refused to do so, writing that “the record indicates that petitioner acquired the
residence from an executor of the Estate and the substance of the transaction accords with
its form.” (Id.)
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Tax Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7442, 6214(a). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo the legal conclusions of
the Tax Court, while reviewing its factual findings for clear error. ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998).
III. Discussion
As stated by the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 36 allows a first-time homebuyer to claim
the FTHBC on the individual’s Federal income tax. The FTHBC can be equal to 10
percent of the “purchase price” of the residence, but cannot exceed $8,000. 26 U.S.C. §
36(a), (b)(1)(A). “First-time homebuyer” is “any individual [who] had no present
ownership interest in the principal residence during the 3-year period ending on the date
of the purchase”. Id. at (c)(1). “Purchase price” is defined as “the adjusted basis of the
principal residence on the date such residence is purchased.” Id. at (c)(4). Most
importantly, “purchase” is defined as “any acquisition, but only if-- (i) the property is not
acquired from a related person, and (ii) the basis of the property in the hands of the
person acquiring such property is not determined . . . under section 1014(a) (relating to
property acquired from a decedent).” Id. at (c)(3)(A)(i), (ii)(II). The definition of
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“related persons” in the statute exempts siblings, but includes “an executor of an estate
and a beneficiary of such estate.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 36(c)(5), 267(b)(13).
Edward argues the Tax Court erred by not applying New Jersey law to this
transaction. Relying primarily on the case of Matter of Will of Gardner, Edward argues
that upon his mother’s death, actual ownership of one-half interest in the Property passed
to him and one-half interest passed to his brother. 522 A.2d 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987) (“It is clear that title to real estate vests in a devisee upon the testator’s death
even before admission of the will to probate.” (internal quotations omitted)). Thus, he
urges, “[t]he Estate could not have sold the property to [him], because [his] brother”
already owned the half-interest Edward later purchased from him. Appellant’s Br. at 9.
However, as Appellee points out, Gardner—along with the other cases Edward cites—
relates to a vesting of an interest in property, not ownership.3 Indeed, in Gardner, the
issue was whether a third party, who had acquired the rights in a property from a devisee
to a contested will, could intervene in the court action resolving the matter. The Court
determined that intervention should have been allowed because the third party had more
than an expectancy interest. Gardner, 522 A.2d at 497. Consequently, we do not view
Gardner as standing for the proposition that title passed to Edward and his brother
immediately upon the death of their mother.
3
We note that Edward relies on other cases to support his contention. See I.E.’s L.L.C. v.
Simmons, 921 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2006) (‘Title to real estate vests
in heirs immediately upon the testator’s death, even before the will is probated.)”). After
review, we find no authority that establishes anything other than a vested interest in a
beneficiary or devisee upon the death of a testator, rather than actual ownership.
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We conclude that the Tax Court correctly determined that Edward Zampella
acquired the Property from the executors of his mother’s Estate. The documentation
attendant to the transfer accords with this determination. Edward was listed, along with
his brother, in his representative capacity as a co-executor, as “Grantor” on the Deed and
“Seller” on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement. (A. 50-51, 56.) In addition, Edward was
listed individually as “Grantee” on the Deed and “Borrower” on the HUD-1 Settlement
Statement. (Id.)
Edward also urges that we should look to the substance of the transaction, not its
form. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978) (“In applying this
doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities
of the transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed.”); see also
Rumsfeld v. United Technologies Corp., 315 F.3d 1361, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile
the taxpayer is bound by the form of the transaction that it has selected, the taxpayer’s
use of a particular form will not prevent the government from looking to its substance.”).
However, aside from the fact that Edward paid one-half the value of the property, rather
than the entire value, the substance of the transaction was that Edward acquired the
Property from the Estate. The Deed was executed with both executors as Grantor and the
money was exchanged in accordance with the HUD-1 Settlement Statement listing
Arthur Zapolski as “Settlement Agent.” We see no basis for disturbing the findings of
the Tax Court.
In sum, Edward does not qualify as a first-time homebuyer because the
documentation substantiates the Tax Court’s findings that he acquired the Property from
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his mother’s Estate. Accordingly, Edward did not purchase the Property within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 36(c) and thus, cannot claim the FTHBC.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the Tax Court.
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