Robert Jacobsen v. Citi Mortgage Inc ( 2018 )


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  •                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 17-3267
    ___________
    ROBERT JACOBSEN;
    CAROL JACOBSEN,
    Appellants
    v.
    CITI MORTGAGE INC, (NJ); CITI INC, (NJ); CITI MORTGAGE, (NJ);
    FEDERAL COURT DISTRICT MERCER COUNTY NEW JERSEY;
    FEDERAL COURT DISTRICT CAMDEN COUNTY NEW JERSEY;
    CLERK OF COURT MERCER COUNTY NEW JERSEY;
    CLERK OF COURT CAMDEN COUNTY NEW JERSEY;
    CITI MORTGAGE ARIZONA
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-01555)
    District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    March 20, 2018
    Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed March 20, 2018)
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se appellants Robert and Carol Jacobsen appeal from the District Court’s
    orders dismissing their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denying their
    motions for recusal. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
    I.
    In March 2017, the Jacobsens filed a complaint relating to their property at 49 Bay
    Way, Brick, NJ. They alleged that “Citi Mortgage utilized laches [and] dilatory practices
    to avoid re-financing” two mortgages on the property. The Jacobsens sought an order to
    “stop the foreclosure F38639-14,” referring to the New Jersey state court docket number
    of a foreclosure action. In that action, the state court entered summary judgment against
    the Jacobsens in 2015, and entered a writ of execution on their property in April 2016. 1
    Shortly after filing their complaint in the District Court, the Jacobsens filed their
    first of several motions for summary judgment. After the District Court denied the first
    two motions for summary judgment, the Jacobsens filed motions to recuse District Judge
    Michael A. Shipp and Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni. The Jacobsens did not
    make any allegations or arguments regarding the District Court’s bias. Instead, they
    argued that the District Court’s rulings in other cases were incorrect on the merits.
    1
    To the extent necessary, we take judicial notice of these facts. See CitiMortgage Inc. v.
    Robert C. Jacobsen, et al., Docket No. F-038639-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2014); In re
    Indian Palms Assoc., Ltd., 
    61 F.3d 197
    , 205–06 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Judicial notice may be
    taken at any stage of the proceeding, including on appeal”) (citations omitted); Werner v.
    Werner, 
    267 F.3d 288
    , 295 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of an
    adjudicative fact if that fact is not subject to reasonable dispute ... [and] capable of
    accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
    be questioned”).
    2
    The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits lower federal courts from exercising subject
    matter jurisdiction in certain cases already heard in state court. See Exxon Mobil Corp.
    v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005). The District Court also denied
    the Jacobsens’ motions for recusal as meritless, and denied their remaining motions as
    either moot or meritless. This appeal ensued.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review questions of subject
    matter jurisdiction de novo. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 
    615 F.3d 159
    , 163–64 (3d Cir. 2010). “In an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we
    review only whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege
    facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.
    Zoning Bd., 
    458 F.3d 181
    , 188 (3d Cir.2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
    We review a District Court's denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion. See
    Azubuko v. Royal, 
    443 F.3d 302
    , 303 (3d Cir. 2006).
    III.
    We agree with the District Court's determination that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine deprives lower federal
    courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims where: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in
    state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court
    3
    judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4)
    the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great
    
    Western, 615 F.3d at 166
    (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon 
    Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284
    ).
    Here, the New Jersey state court entered a judgment against the Jacobsens in the
    foreclosure action; the Jacobsens argue that they were injured by this judgment; the state
    foreclosure action preceded this federal action; and the Jacobsens explicitly asked the
    District Court to overrule the state-court judgment. Accordingly, the District Court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See In re Madera,
    
    586 F.3d 228
    , 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims that would
    negate state court judgment in foreclosure action).
    We also agree with the District Court’s determination that the motions for recusal
    were meritless. The Jacobsens failed to make any credible allegations that the District
    Court was biased. The Jacobsens’ argument relied almost exclusively on the adverse
    rulings by the District Court in this case and in prior cases. Adverse legal rulings are not
    proof of prejudice or bias, and are almost never a basis for recusal. See Liteky v. United
    States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994). The Jacobsens have not established that a reasonable
    person would conclude that the District Court’s impartiality might be questioned, and the
    District Court properly denied their motions for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; U.S.
    v. Ciavarella, 
    716 F.3d 705
    , 719 (3d Cir. 2013).
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Appellants’
    pending motions are denied.
    4