James Smith v. George Hayman , 489 F. App'x 544 ( 2012 )

CLD-226 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2203
___________
JAMES R. SMITH,
Appellant
v.
GEORGE HAYMAN,
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC);
MS. MICHELLE RICCI, Administrator of New Jersey State Prison (NJSP);
DOCTOR RUSTY REEVES, Director of Psychiatry;
DOCTOR JORDAN LIEBERMAN, Doctor, Doctor, New Jersey Regional of Psychiatry;
DOCTOR FLORA DEFILIPPO, N.J. State Prison Lead Psychiatrist;
DOCTOR RAY BAUM, Psychiatrist;
DOCTOR MARINA MOSHKOVICH, Doctor, N.J. State Prison Psychiatrist;
MS. KEASHA BALDWIN, Clinical Social Worker; JOHN/JANE DOES # 1-20
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 3:09-cv-02602)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 12, 2012
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2012)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
James R. Smith, a New Jersey prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals a series of District Court orders that dismissed his 1 civil-rights complaint in part
and granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. For the reasons that follow,
we will summarily affirm.
I.
In his 2009 lawsuit, which was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Smith accused
the defendants—various medical professionals and administrators associated with the
New Jersey State Prison, where he was and continues to be incarcerated—of violating his
constitutional rights. 2 Specifically, he alleged that the defendants: 1) subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment, failed to protect him, and failed in their obligation to
provide him with adequate medical care, in contravention of the Eighth Amendment; 2)
violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 3)
deprived him of his constitutional entitlement to privacy; and 4) retaliated against him for
complaining about his treatment and conditions in the prison. These claims arose out of
Smith’s attempts to be diagnosed with and treated for Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).
1
As this case involves a gender-identity issue, our choice of pronoun is freighted with
greater-than-usual significance. Because Smith has, throughout this litigation, referred to
himself using male pronouns—see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. DeFilippo’s Mot. for J. on
the Pleadings 2, ECF No. 70—we will follow his example.
2
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will not substantially recite the facts of
the case, which were developed at length in the various District Court opinions.
2
He asserted that, while born “biologically male,” he was “psychologically and
emotionally female.” Compl. ¶ 14. Despite this, however, the defendants refused to
properly treat him, would speak to him only in public areas of the facility that were not
conducive to confidential discussion, improperly disclosed his GID status to other parties,
and placed him with a cellmate.
Smith’s claims were dismissed in a piecemeal fashion throughout the course of the
multi-year litigation in the District Court. First, pursuant to its screening responsibilities
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the District Court determined that Smith’s
complaint failed to adequately state a failure-to-treat or Equal Protection claim. See
Smith v. Hayman, No. 09-2602, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15612, at *32–33, 35–36 (D.N.J.
Feb. 19, 2010). Smith also agreed to discontinue his suit against defendants George
Hayman, Rusty Reeves, Jordan Lieberman, and Ray Baum. See ECF Nos. 28, 61.
Following discovery, the remaining allegations were resolved when the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See Smith v. Hayman, No. 09-
2602, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44888 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Smith v. Hayman, No. 09-
2602, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6220 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2012). This appeal followed. 3
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Both a sua sponte dismissal
3
Smith has submitted an application for a certificate of appealability, which is not
necessary for the purposes of this non-habeas appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Although the Clerk entered a “no action” order on June 25, we have nevertheless
considered the arguments Smith raises in his application.
3
pursuant to a Court’s screening responsibilities and a grant of summary judgment are
subject to plenary review. Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 680 F.3d 296, 297 n.1
(3d Cir. 2012); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts, accepted as true and with all
reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Birdman v. Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A summary judgment motion, by contrast,
requires us to consider “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiffs,” construing the facts in favor of
the nonmovant and resolving all justifiable inferences in his favor. Banks, 680 F.3d at297 n.1; Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 2011). We may affirm the
judgment of the District Court on any grounds that support its decision, even if the
District Court itself did not rely upon them. See Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206
F.3d 323, 333 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
A) Dismissed Claims 4
4
In his complaint, Smith sued most of the defendants in their official capacities;
moreover, the complaint inconsistently allocated its demands for money damages and
equitable relief. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 144–47 (seeking injunctive relief), with Compl. 41
(seeking monetary damages against “each defendant”). To the extent that monetary relief
was sought from defendants who were acting as employees or agents of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections, such an action would be barred by Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir.
4
Smith argued that the defendants neglected to adequately treat his GID and
violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Having reviewed the complaint,
we agree with the District Court that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
A state is obligated “to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration”; accordingly, “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[]’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference inheres in an official’s “intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at
104–05. On the other hand, allegations of medical malpractice, or of mere disagreement
over medical treatment that is provided, do not rise to a constitutional level. See Spruill
v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, courts may not second guess the
propriety of a particular course of treatment, especially in the presence of sound
professional judgment. See Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762
2010); cf. Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections shares in the Commonwealth’s immunity). To
the extent that Smith sought relief from the defendants as agents of the University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, official-capacity suits were not barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873
F.2d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 657 (N.J. 1988)).
Mindful of our “special obligation” to construe liberally the pleadings of pro se litigants,
Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992), we will proceed as if those claims
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity were also raised against the defendants in their
individual capacities.
5
(3d Cir. 1979).
The complaint contains numerous references to treatment that was provided to
Smith, such as psychiatric testing (Compl. ¶ 46) and counseling (Compl. ¶ 94). This did
not satisfy Smith, who sought (inter alia) hormone-replacement therapy and permission to
present himself as a woman. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 44. While in certain circumstances the
failure to provide hormones and other courses of treatment can be constitutionally
impermissible, 5 the allegations of the present case do not show ignorance or an
affirmative failure to treat, but rather caution and diagnostic disagreement. Such
circumstances, in the absence of aggravating factors such as previous GID treatment or
even a definitive GID diagnosis, do not rise to the level of constitutional violation. See
Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(holding that, when plaintiff had been evaluated on multiple occasions and denied
eligibility for hormone treatment, “the instant record and circumstances . . . do[] not
constitute deliberate indifference”); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765–66 (8th Cir. 1996).
Smith’s Equal Protection claim also fails. Crucially, he has not shown that he “has
been treated differently from persons who are similarly situated.” Williams v. Morton,
343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). His identification with female prisoners is, in this
context, conclusory. Nor has he successfully pleaded a “class of one” claim. See
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010).
Therefore, the District Court correctly screened out these claims.
6
B) Summary Judgment
i) DeFilippo
Defendant DeFilippo, whose motion for judgment on the pleadings was converted
into one for summary judgment, argued that the record failed to demonstrate any personal
involvement in potential constitutional violations. The District Court concluded that
Smith “provide[d] no facts describing how DeFilippo, in a supervisory capacity,
allegedly violated his constitutional rights, i.e., he fail[ed] to allege facts to show that this
defendant expressly directed the deprivation of his constitutional rights, or that she
created policies which left subordinates with no discretion other than to apply them in a
fashion which actually produced the alleged deprivation.” Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6220, at *23–24. We agree. Aside from her response to a communiqué from Smith and a
short correspondence with defendant Ricci, DeFilippo was not involved in the present
controversy, and it is well established that respondeat superior cannot form the basis of
constitutional liability. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir.
2010). Thus, summary judgment was appropriately granted in her favor.
ii) Failure to Protect
Smith alleged that his current “double-lock” housing assignment constituted a
failure to protect him from other inmates, although it appears that no harm actually
transpired. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (Eighth Amendment
protects against future harm as well as present harm). But he has failed to present any
5
See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1987).
7
evidence that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or
safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). The record is devoid of
suggestions that he personally was vulnerable at the time he was transferred or that he
was likely to become so in the near future. Compare Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290,
294–95 (6th Cir. 2004) (substantial proffer of vulnerability and violent tendencies of
assailant); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 82–83 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A review
of the record reveals a prison system in crisis.”). While we are obligated to draw all
factual inferences in Smith’s favor, outside of deposition reference to protective custody,
see Smith Dep. 60:7–62:22, ECF No. 83-4, we are unable to discern any indication that
Smith, as he currently presented his gender identity and in his current state, would have
been excessively unsafe in the custody to which he was assigned. The defendants were
therefore entitled to summary judgment.
iii) Retaliation
Smith alleged that defendant Ricci retaliated against him for “filing remedy forms
against the law library [and a] whole lot of [other] things” by transferring him to a
double-occupancy cell. Smith Dep. 64:6–13. He speculated that she did so “in hopes
that the plaintiff would cause a ruckus so that the administration can place the plaintiff
into lockup in hopes of quieting him.” Compl. ¶ 113.
In order to sustain a retaliation claim, Smith was required to show that 1) he
8
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 2) he suffered adverse action,6 and 3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” of the adverse
response. Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2002). Apart from
temporal proximity, Smith failed to submit any evidence probative of retaliation. Nor has
he shown that the cell transfer was such that a person of ordinary firmness would have
been deterred from exercising his constitutional rights in its wake. Rauser v. Horn, 241
F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). We therefore agree with the District Court that summary
judgment was warranted on this claim.
iv) Privacy Violations
Finally, Smith claimed that the defendants (principally Moshkovich and Baldwin)
violated his constitutional right to privacy. He cited their decision to hold confidential
counseling sessions within view and within potential earshot of other inmates, as well as
assailing their disclosure of private medical information.
We have held that “the Fourteenth Amendment protects an inmate’s right to
medical privacy, subject to legitimate penological interests.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,
323 (3d Cir. 2001). In Doe, a inmate who was HIV positive was informed that his
6
The District Court held that, because Smith “ha[d] no protected constitutional right to a
housing assignment, he [could ]not claim ‘adverse action’ when his housing assignment
was changed.” Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44888, at *61. However, whether the
alleged retaliation affected a recognized liberty interest is irrelevant, because actions that
are not themselves constitutional torts may become so if substantially motivated by the
desire to punish an individual for exercising a constitutional right. See Mitchell v. Horn,
318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). Because Smith’s retaliation claim fails for other
reasons, this error is harmless.
9
condition would be kept confidential; however, prison procedures led to repeated
disclosures of his status, as “staff informed the escorting officers of Doe’s medical
condition,” and nurses “announced his medication loudly enough for others to hear.”
Also, the door to the examination room was kept open, allowing “officers, inmates, and
guards in the area to see and hear Doe and the treating physician.” Id. at 311–12. In
another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that
“individuals who are transsexuals are among those who possess a constitutional right to
maintain medical confidentiality,” arising from a situation in which a guard announced
the plaintiff’s status “in the presence of other inmates and staff members.” Powell v.
Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1999).
As a preliminary matter, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendants
improperly “disclosed” any of Smith’s medical information. Outside of discussions
between medical staff members and between DeFilippo and Ricci at Smith’s
instigation—surely an example of a legitimate penological interest—Smith points to
nothing that would suggest a gratuitous disclosure to inappropriate parties.7
Thus, the gravamen of Smith’s complaint is limited to the public nature of his
discussions with Baldwin and Moshkovich, both of whom appear to concede that the
situation, while less than ideal, was the best that could be managed given the lack of
7
Because we independently agree with the New Jersey state court on this ground, we
need not decide whether its opinion has preclusionary force.
10
other, more-private, secure environments. See generally Moshkovich Aff., ECF No. 83-
8, Baldwin Aff., ECF No. 83-9. We note, first, that both Moshkovich and Baldwin claim
that conversations were conducted with awareness of the proximity of corrections
officers and inmates, with efforts made to ensure that no other person could overhear the
topics of discussion. Moshokovich Aff. ¶ 10, Baldwin Aff. ¶ 10. Second, Smith agreed
that he was informed that the guards were not listening in on the conversation. Smith
Dep. 46:5–11. Third, there is no indication that any parties actually overheard the
discussions.
While Smith is justified in his displeasure with this arrangement, the record does
not demonstrate that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.
See Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2010). Our holding in Doe
recognized that the right to privacy was counterbalanced by legitimate penological
interests, such as safety and practicability of accommodation. Smith’s reliance on an
unpublished summary order from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
misplaced; the plaintiff in Hunnicutt v. Armstrong, 152 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), alleged that the defendants discussed private health issues in public, allowed
non-health staff access to his records, and violated psychiatrist/patient privilege, which
was sufficient to “achieve[] the goal of fair notice” and avoid dismissal under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a). Id. at 35–36. In other words, Hunnicutt is a pre-Twombly/Iqbal decision
about pleading standards; its Panel specifically “express[ed] no view on whether other
grounds exist[ed] to dismiss the complaint once it [wa]s amended.” Id. at 36. We are
11
aware of no case law, and Smith points to none, that would suggest that the conduct of
the defendants, in light of their attempts to avoid disclosure, violated a clearly established
constitutional right, and Doe did not establish any such rule with “obvious clarity.”
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we hold that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See id.8
IV.
For the reasons expressed above, this appeal does not present a substantial
question, and we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Murray v.
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
8
Smith repeatedly invokes the defendants’ alleged violations of, inter alia, internal
management procedures and agency regulations. But 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides relief
for violation of federal laws, not for violation of state or local law. McMullen v. Maple
Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2011).
12