United States v. Sadiel Gonzalez ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2580
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SADIEL GONZALEZ,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Crim. Action No. 09-cr-709)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 7, 2012
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Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: July 31, 2012)
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OPINION
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Appellant Sadiel Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals the sentence imposed by the
District Court following a guilty plea for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or
more of heroin. Gonzalez argues that the District Court erred by not granting his motion
seeking a downward variance from the applicable career offender range called for by the
Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court‟s
sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
On October 18, 2010, Gonzalez pled guilty to one count of distributing and
possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a). Based on the circumstances of Gonzalez‟s crime and his status as a career
offender, the Sentencing Guidelines suggested a range of 188 to 235 months of
imprisonment. Gonzalez did not contest his designation as a career offender. Instead,
Gonzalez requested that the District Court grant a downward variance from the career
offender sentencing range.
On June 1, 2011, Gonzalez appeared before the District Court for sentencing. The
District Court declined Gonzalez‟s request for a downward variance but sentenced
Gonzalez to 188 months in prison—the bottom end of the career offender range.
Gonzalez filed a timely appeal of his sentence.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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III. ANALYSIS
Gonzalez conceded that his criminal history placed him within the ambit of career
offender status and that, as a result of this designation and the nature of his crime, the
Sentencing Guidelines recommended a range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment.
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court‟s sentence was rendered
substantively unreasonable when the District Court denied Gonzalez‟s motion for a
downward variance. We conclude that the District Court properly exercised its discretion
in denying Gonzalez‟s motion.
An inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence asks “whether the
final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised
upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]
factors.” United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). “Absent procedural error, we will
affirm the sentencing court „unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court
provided.‟” Id. (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568). The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.
Applying this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.
The sentencing colloquy evidences that the District Court was thorough in its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. During the sentencing colloquy, the District Court
took note of Gonzalez‟s lengthy criminal history:
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[H]e‟s kind of like a walking crime zone when he‟s in the
neighborhoods that he‟s in . . . . He has a significant
record. . . . So it‟s never really peaceful around Mr. Gonzalez
when he‟s on the street.
....
Mr. Gonzalez is not one of these Sad Sack‟s that very often
the Court has before it, who is so low level and so muddled in
his life that heavy street crimes are all of the kind the offender
knows.
....
Mr. Gonzalez is far more high functioning as a human
being, as a drug seller, and as a criminal unfortunately.
(App. 48.) The District Court found that it could not “in good conscience, given the
responsibilities of sentencing[,] say that Mr. Gonzalez warrants a variance from the
harshness of a career offender status designation.” (App. 49.) The District Court
concluded that the bottom end of the sentencing range “is sufficient but not more than
necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing, which is just punishment for a life spent
committing crime after crime after crime, selling drugs, serious drugs and profiting from
it.” (App. 49.)
We find no merit to Gonzalez‟s argument that the District Court failed to give
sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors in the § 3553(a) analysis—Gonzalez‟s
learning disability, traumatic relocation to America from Cuba at a young age, medical
ailments resulting from being shot, and the violent death of his uncle—warranting a
downward variance. To the contrary, the District Court acknowledged Gonzalez‟s
troubled past and was candid about the difficulties he has faced obtaining gainful
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employment given his extensive criminal history. But the District Court noted that
Gonzalez was not merely a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Specifically, as
the District Court determined, Gonzalez made a conscious decision to engage in “a life of
persistent criminality on a fairly regular basis in spite of regular visits to state prisons and
federal prison.” (App. 48.)
Because the District Court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a downward variance from the
career offender range.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence.
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