United States v. Isidro Aguilar-Mendoza ( 2018 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-2799
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ISIDRO AGUILAR-MENDOZA,
a/k/a ARTURO ROMERO-BOBADILLA,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 1:17-CR-00069-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 12, 2018
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2018)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Isidro Aguilar-Mendoza challenges his twelve-month sentence of
imprisonment for illegal reentry, arguing that it was both procedurally incorrect and
substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. Background
Aguilar-Mendoza was stopped by Pennsylvania police in February 2017 and
subsequently detained by immigration authorities. In July 2017, Aguilar-Mendoza, a
native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment that charged him
with illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). This was Aguilar-Mendoza’s
second illegal reentry conviction, although it is undisputed that he has entered the United
States illicitly and been removed at least five times, oftentimes under different aliases.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated a sentencing Guidelines
range of eight to fourteen months to which Aguilar-Mendoza did not object. At his
sentencing hearing, however, Aguilar-Mendoza requested a downward variance to time
served, explaining that he intended to return immediately to Mexico with his family
because his daughter was in poor health due to her Down syndrome. The District Court
ultimately imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment based
on Aguilar-Mendoza’s high rate of recidivism and the need to deter further illegal
reentry.
This appeal followed.
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II. Discussion1
On appeal, Aguilar-Mendoza argues his sentence was both procedurally and
substantively unreasonable based on essentially the same allegation: that in denying his
request for a downward variance, the District Court failed to adequately consider the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors,2 first by ignoring that he intended to immediately
return to Mexico on account of his daughter’s poor health, and second by overstating his
number of illegal reentries as “extremely high,” App. 30. Upon review, however, these
contentions are not supported by the record.
In reviewing for procedural error, we assess whether the District Court
meaningfully considered the defendant’s variance arguments as required by § 3553(a),
United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011), with the understanding that
“[t]he district court need not make explicit findings as to each . . . factor[],” United States
v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, however, the District Court did explicitly consider the relevant factors,
including Aguilar-Mendoza’s asserted family responsibilities, when it noted that while
“the Court first intended to give the maximum 14 months, . . . after consideration of other
factors, concerning particularly his family situation, the Court believes that a sentence in
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
The § 3553 factors include, in pertinent part, “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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the medium range would be sufficient to hopefully deter this person from future illegal
reentries.” App. 30. Aguilar-Mendoza thus fails to demonstrate procedural error.
In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we start from the premise that
“[s]entences that fall within the applicable Guidelines range are more likely to be
reasonable than those that do not,” United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir.
2015), and we “will affirm [the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district
court provided,” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Here, again, the District Court’s imposition of a twelve-month sentence, in the middle of
the Guidelines range, was not substantively unreasonable given the District Court’s
finding that “the record of the number of re-entries is extremely high” and that Aguilar-
Mendoza did not seem “deter[red ] . . . from . . . constant entry into this country.” App.
30. While Aguilar-Mendoza was only arrested for illegal reentry once before, it is
undisputed that he was removed from the United States repeatedly, sometimes voluntarily
without arrest, under his own name as well as under different aliases. Thus, the District
Court merely “determine[d] the appropriate sentence in light of the particular
circumstances of the case,” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561 (citation omitted), and Aguilar-
Mendoza cannot show his Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District
Court.
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