River Valley Heights Corp v. Township of West Amwell ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-2042
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RIVER VALLEY HEIGHTS CORPORATION;
MERRICK WILSON,
Appellants
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WEST AMWELL
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-16039)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
On March 29, 2022
Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 1, 2023)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Developers sued the Township of West Amwell, claiming it violated the Fifth
Amendment by taking their property without providing just compensation. However, at
the time the Developers sued, the Township had not made a final decision to take the
property. Therefore, the District Court found the Developers’ claim was unripe, and
dismissed their suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We will affirm.
I.
The Township and the Fair Share Housing Center were parties to a declaratory
judgment action in New Jersey Superior Court. In December 2018, the Township
adopted a resolution to execute a settlement agreement with the Housing Center. The
settlement agreement provided that the Township would “secure title” to property owned
by River Valley Heights Corporation.1 We refer to the River Valley Heights
Corporation and its principal, Merrick Wilson, as the Developers.
The New Jersey Superior Court held a fairness hearing to decide whether the
settlement agreement satisfied the Township’s obligation under New Jersey law to
provide low- and moderate-income housing. The Court recognized
that aspects of the Township’s Plan regarding the Wilson property raises[sic]
yet unresolved issues concerning (1) whether the Township will follow
through to gain control of the site; and (2) whether the site is available,
feasible and suitable to meet the Township’s proposal, including issues
involving access, sewer and water availability.2
1
App. at 18 (Compl. ¶ 3), 110 (Certification of Merrick Wilson ¶ 2).
2
Id. at 67 (New Jersey Superior Court Order Re: Fairness Hearing).
2
In July 2019, the Superior Court ordered the Developers to allow the Township
and its contractors to access the property so that they could perform due diligence. At the
same time, the Superior Court ordered:
The Township shall engage in negotiations with Mr. Wilson for acquisition
of the Wilson Tract. If such negotiations do not result in an amicable
transaction of sale, the Parties shall discuss a timeline for a possible
condemnation of the Wilson Tract . . . Nothing herein shall obligate the
Township to acquire the Wilson Tract.3
A few weeks later, the Developers sued the Township under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the Township took the property without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The Township moved to dismiss the Developers’ action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The District Court found that
the parties did not dispute that the Township “has taken no action with respect to” the
property.4 Thus, the District Court concluded the Developers’ claim was unripe and
dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Developers appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.5 We, too, have
jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction.6 We review de novo the District Court’s order,
3
Id. at 70–71 (New Jersey Superior Court Order Re: Case Management) (emphasis
added).
4
Id. at 11.
5
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cnty. of Delaware, 968 F.3d 264, 268 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020).
6
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2007).
3
dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.7 We lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over unripe claims.8
III.
The Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause prohibits the government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation.9 “The paradigmatic taking
requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of
private property.”10 However, “government regulation of private property may, in some
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”11
“Such regulatory takings may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”12 Here, the
Developers allege a regulatory taking. They claim the “Township has effectively taken
the property” by entering into the settlement agreement with the Housing Center.13
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City,14 the Supreme Court held “a claim that the application of government
regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the
7
Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 356 n.12 (3d Cir. 2014).
8
See Marathon Petroleum Corp. v. Sec'y of Fin. for Delaware, 876 F.3d 481, 488 n.9 (3d
Cir. 2017).
9
U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359,
370 (3d Cir. 2012).
10
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
11
Id.12
Id. (cleaned up).
13
App. at 18 (Compl. ¶ 4).
14
473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of Scott,
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
4
application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Here, the District Court correctly
concluded that the Township had not made a final decision regarding the property. The
New Jersey Superior Court found that there was uncertainty over whether the Township
would follow through on its plan to acquire the property and whether the property is even
suitable for the Township’s purposes.
The Developers argue that the Supreme Court overruled Williamson County’s
finality requirement in a later decision, Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania.15 In
fact, although the Court partially overruled Williamson County in Knick, the Court
expressly said the finality requirement was not “at issue” in Knick.16 What’s more, since
Knick, the Court has reaffirmed the validity of the finality requirement.17 Thus, the
finality requirement is still good law. It renders the Developers’ claim unripe, and in turn
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over this action.
III.
We will affirm the District Court’s Order, dismissing this action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
15
139 S. Ct. at 2169.
16
Id.
17
Pakdel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, California, 141 S. Ct. 2226, 2228 (2021)
(“When a plaintiff alleges a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, a
federal court should not consider the claim before the government has reached a ‘final’
decision.”).
5