United States v. Telwin Vincent ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-1958
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TELWIN VINCENT
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-21-cr-00567-001)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 24, 2023.
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 31, 2023)
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OPINION*
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Telwin Vincent challenges the reasonableness of the 41-month sentence he received
after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to use
unauthorized access devices. We discern no error and will affirm.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
I. DISCUSSION1
Vincent contests both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court applies the appropriate
enhancements and deductions under the Sentencing Guidelines, considers any motions for
departure, and weighs the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States
v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2020). A procedurally reasonable sentence is also
substantively reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”
United States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Tomko,
562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
According to Vincent, his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
Government misinformed the District Court that he was ineligible for a sentence of
noncustodial probation. But Vincent was indeed ineligible for probation. He pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a crime punishable by up to 30 years’
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349. An offense punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of 25 years or more is a Class B felony. Id. § 3559(a)(2). By statute, a court
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). In reviewing a sentence, we
defer to the district court’s factual findings “and reverse only for clear error” but consider
legal rulings de novo. United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted). Because Vincent did not raise procedural objections to his sentence below, we
assess the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for plain error. United States v.
Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). We review the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski, 27
F.4th 897, 911 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
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cannot sentence a defendant to probation for a Class B felony. Id. § 3561(a)(1).
Next, Vincent contends the Government misinformed the District Court that the
Guidelines range was mandatory, thereby rendering Vincent’s sentence procedurally
unreasonable. That assertion is inaccurate. The Government explicitly apprised the Court
of its duty to exercise discretion in sentencing Vincent.
In a final procedural challenge, Vincent argues that the District Court failed to
adequately consider his personal history and caregiving role for his mother. But the Court
specifically acknowledged Vincent’s past hardships and the toll incarceration would have
on his family. It nevertheless determined that the gravity of his offense and the need for
deterrence warranted a sentence within the Guidelines range. Thus, the District Court
properly “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)
(citation omitted).
Although Vincent states in passing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 41-month prison
term,” Opening Br. 12, he offers no argumentation in support of that conclusion. As this
contention is merely “adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed
argument,” it is waived. United States v. Penn, 870 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Rodriguez v. Mun. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011)). And, in any event,
Vincent’s cursory allegations do not rebut the presumption that a sentence that falls within
the Guidelines range is reasonable. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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