United States v. Derek Spriggs ( 2023 )

ALD-076 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-3005
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEREK EUGENE SPRIGGS,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-12-cr-00300-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal as Untimely
and on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 19, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed February 8, 2023)
________
OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Derek Eugene Spriggs, a prisoner at FCI-Coleman, appeals from orders of the
District Court denying his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) and denying a motion for reconsideration. The Government has filed a
motion for summary affirmance. For the following reasons, we will grant the motion and
summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In 2013, Spriggs was convicted in the District Court of felon in possession of a
firearm, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and conspiracy to
distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g), 924(c) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841. He was sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment. We affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Spriggs, 591 F. App’x
149 (3d Cir. 2014). Because Spriggs had to serve out the remainder of a state sentence,
his reporting date to federal prison was delayed by nearly seven years. See ECF No. 91
at 2 n.1.
In February 2022, Spriggs filed a pro se motion for “compassionate release”
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act, which
authorizes criminal defendants to seek reductions of their sentences by demonstrating
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances.1 See ECF No. 89. Spriggs argued that he
suffers from numerous medical conditions which expose him to a high risk of serious
1
The Government conceded that Spriggs exhausted his administrative remedies as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See ECF No. 98 at 4 n.1.
2
illness or death from COVID-19, including obesity and epilepsy. He also maintained that
this Court’s decision in United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2020 ) (en
banc) (holding that inchoate offenses are not included in the definition of “controlled
substance offenses”), established that he was erroneously sentenced as a career offender,
and that, but for that error, he “would have already been released from prison.” ECF No.
89 at 8. Spriggs claimed that his susceptibility to COVID-19 combined with the impact
of Nasir were extraordinary circumstances warranting compassionate release. Finally, he
asserted that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed in favor of
release, particularly in light of his rehabilitative efforts while in prison.
The District Court assigned counsel, who filed a brief in support of the § 3582
motion arguing that Spriggs’ increased risk of complications from COVID-19 was an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance for release and that the § 3553(a) factors
supported granting relief. In an order entered July 13, 2022, the District Court denied the
§ 3582 motion. Spriggs filed a timely pro se motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the District Court had failed to consider the impact of Nasir
on his sentence. See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 451 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012)
(presuming that the incarcerated appellant filed his motions on the date that he executed
them); see also Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1988) (extending the
prison mailbox rule to motions for reconsideration), abrogated on other grounds
recognized by Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2010). He also argued that
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an intervening Supreme Court decision, Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389
(2022), supported reconsideration of his motion. The District Court denied the Rule
59(e) motion by order entered October 6, 2022, and Spriggs appealed. The Government
seeks summary affirmance.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We review a district court’s
decision to deny a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). “[W]e will not disturb the
District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We also review an order denying a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2018).
A district court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “after considering
the factors set forth in § 3553(a) . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
2
A § 3582 motion is a continuation of the prior criminal proceeding, see United States v.
Arrango, 291 F.3d 170, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam), so, to be timely, a
defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court no later than 14 days after
the challenged order is entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Although Spriggs’
notice of appeal was filed outside this time period, we will review the merits of the
appeal. The 14-day period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case is non-
jurisdictional, see Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2010), and
the Government does not invoke Rule 4(b) but asks us to rule on the merits. See id. at
329; see also United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012).
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§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We agree, for the reasons provided by the District Court, that Spriggs’
medical conditions did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting
compassionate release.
On appeal, Spriggs argues that the District Court erred in failing to consider
whether his “admitted invalid career offender sentence” under Nasir constitutes an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance warranting compassionate release. Resp. to
Mot. for Summ. Affirmance at 1. Regardless of whether the District Court should have
explicitly considered Spriggs’ argument, our decision in Nasir does not provide him with
an extraordinary and compelling basis for release. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th
255, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that neither the length of a lawfully imposed
sentence nor non-retroactive changes in statutory sentencing law establish extraordinary
and compelling circumstances for release). And because Spriggs cannot make this
“threshold” showing, his reliance on Concepcion is misplaced. 142 S. Ct. at 2404
(holding that courts may consider intervening changes in law or fact when resentencing a
defendant under the First Step Act); see also United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th
Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “Concepcion is irrelevant to the threshold question whether
any given prisoner has established an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for release”).
In any event, the District Court determined that the § 3553(a) factors weighed
against early release. Spriggs does not challenge that alternative basis for denying his
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§ 3582 motion.3 See Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018).
Based on the foregoing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for compassionate release or the motion for reconsideration. Spriggs’
challenge to the District Court’s orders does not present a substantial question. We
therefore grant the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, and we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
3
Spriggs likely could not demonstrate that the District Court clearly erred in its
assessment of the § 3553 sentencing factors. Because of his extensive criminal history,
Spriggs was subject to a potential sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment under the
Sentencing Guidelines. His sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment was 10 years below
the Guidelines range. See United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020)
(noting that sentence reduction was not warranted where, among other factors, “the court
had already varied downward by five years from Ruffin’s guidelines range when
imposing [a] lengthy sentence”). And, because of the delayed start, Spriggs had served
only 20% of his federal sentence at the time he filed his § 3582 motion. See Pawlowski,
967 F.3d at 331 (noting that “the time remaining in [the] sentence may – along with the
circumstances underlying the motion for compassionate release and the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities among similarly situated inmates – inform whether immediate
release would be consistent with” the § 3553(a) factors). The District Court therefore
concluded that any further reduction would be inconsistent with the goals of sentencing,
in particular, the need for the sentence to “provide just punishment” and “reflect the
seriousness of the offense.” ECF No. 100 at 4.
6