Marcus Perez v. Jerome Teresinski ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 22-1962
__________
MARCUS PEREZ,
Appellant
v.
JEROME T. TERESINSKI, Esquire, in his personal and official
capacities c/o Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Ohio;
ANTHONY D. JACKSON, Esquire
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court Civil No. 2-21-cv-05020)
District Judge: Honorable Joshua D. Wolson
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 26, 2023
BEFORE: BIBAS, NYGAARD, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 10, 2023)
__________
OPINION *
__________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Marcus Perez appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint against
former Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney Jerome Teresinski (“ADA Teresinski”).
He argues that the court erred when it found that Perez’s claims were barred by absolute
prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity and abused its discretion by considering
exhibits attached to ADA Teresinski’s motion to dismiss. Because Perez’s arguments
lack merit, we will affirm.
I. Background
Perez pleaded guilty in 1990 to murder generally, robbery, criminal conspiracy,
possession of instruments of crime, and carrying firearms on public streets or public
property in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. At a
bench trial for a degree-of-guilt finding in front of then-Judge Theodore McKee, Perez
was adjudged guilty of first-degree murder. He argued in post-verdict motions that the
conviction should be reduced to third-degree, but the motions were denied. Perez was
sentenced to life imprisonment and concurrent sentences of one to five years each on the
conspiracy and robbery charges.
In 1993, Perez filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument was that
his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life
imprisonment during the plea colloquy. According to the original transcript, the court
said, “life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” ADA Teresinski worked on the opposition to
Perez’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the
2
transcript. The stenographer then filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect
that the court said, “life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied.
Then, in 2019, after obtaining a note handwritten by ADA Teresinski which
referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript, Perez filed another
PCRA petition. App’x 26. Perez and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office reached a
stipulated agreement to resolve the case. Perez’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-
pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to seventeen and a half to
thirty-five years’ imprisonment.
Perez then filed a lawsuit against ADA Teresinski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing that his ex parte communication with the stenographer violated Perez’s right to
due process and right to a jury trial. The District Court granted ADA Teresinski’s motion
to dismiss, finding his actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and
qualified immunity. Perez timely appealed.
II. ADA Teresinski is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
First, Perez argues that the District Court improperly dismissed his complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We exercise plenary review over both a
District Court’s dismissal under 12(b)(6) and its grant of immunity. See Kedra v.
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017). Because the Supreme Court sparingly
recognizes absolute immunity to § 1983 liability, we begin with analyzing whether
Teresinski is entitled to qualified immunity. See Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207–08
(3d Cir. 2008). He is.
3
A prosecutor acting in an investigative or administrative capacity may be entitled
to qualified immunity. See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir.
1999). Qualified immunity shields a state official from § 1983 liability unless “the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” and “the right was clearly established
at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The right’s contours must have been sufficiently
definite such that “any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014).
Precedent existing at the time of the conduct “must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.” Id. at 779 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the right should not be defined “at a high level of
generality.” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).
Perez argues that while working in an administrative capacity, ADA Teresinski
violated Perez’s “rights to due process and a jury trial.” Appellant Brief at 18. He argues
these rights “have long been clearly established” and “[i]t is frankly incomprehensible
that an assistant district attorney would not realize that an undisclosed alteration of a
transcript, used to keep a plaintiff confined for thirty-one years and obstruct the plaintiff’s
potential remedies, would comprise a due process violation.” Id. at 18–19.
But Perez’s claim has two problems. For one, the rights as asserted by him are
defined at a “high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. “The general
proposition” that an involuntary guilty plea violates due process and the right to a jury
trial “is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is
4
clearly established.” See id. And second, he does not point to any authority establishing
that a reasonable official in ADA Teresinski’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating a defendant’s right to due process and a jury trial by contacting the
stenographer. See Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778–79. These defects are fatal to Perez’s claim.
Because ADA Teresinski is shielded by qualified immunity, we need not address whether
absolute prosecutorial immunity applies as well. 1
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Perez’s
complaint.
1
We need not reach the argument that the District Court abused its discretion in
considering exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss because ADA Teresinski is entitled
to qualified immunity based solely on the allegations in Perez’s complaint.
5