Peter Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC ( 2018 )


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  •                                          PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 17-3285
    _____________
    PETER HUMPHREY; YU YINGZENG; CHINAWHYS
    COMPANY LTD, Appellants
    v.
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC; GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC
    ________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D. C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-05924)
    District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro
    ________________
    Argued May 24, 2018
    Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit
    Judges
    (Opinion filed: September 26, 2018)
    Philip M. Bowman, Esq.
    Boies Schiller & Flexner
    575 Lexington Avenue
    7th Floor
    New York, NY 10022
    Joan D. Gallagher, Esq.
    Gallagher & Turchi
    1760 Market Street
    Suite 1100
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    James Hickey, Esq.
    Gallagher Law
    1600 Market Street
    Suite 1320
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    John T. Zach, Esq.         (Argued)
    Boies Schiller & Flexner
    575 Lexington Avenue
    7th Floor
    New York, NY 10022
    Counsel for Appellants
    Kurt W. Hansson, Esq.       (Argued)
    Paul Hastings
    200 Park Avenue
    New York, NY 10166
    Nathan P. Heller, Esq.
    DLA Piper
    1650 Market Street
    One Liberty Place, 49th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Stephen B. Kinnaird, Esq.
    Paul Hastings
    875 15th Street, N.W.
    Suite 1000
    Washington, DC 20005
    Jayne A. Risk, Esq.
    DLA Piper
    1650 Market Street
    One Liberty Place, 49th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    James B. Worthington, Esq.
    Paul Hastings
    200 Park Avenue
    New York, NY 10166
    Counsel for Appellees
    2
    ________________
    OPINION
    ________________
    McKEE, Circuit Judge
    Section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and
    Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
    1968, creates a private right of action for a plaintiff that “is
    injured in his [or her] business or property” as a result of
    conduct that is proscribed by the statute. In RJR Nabisco, Inc.
    v. European Community, the Supreme Court determined that,
    although a litigant may file a civil suit against parties for
    racketeering activity committed abroad, § 1964(c)’s private
    right of action is only available to a litigant that can “allege and
    prove a domestic injury to its business or property.”1
    In this case of first impression for this court, we must
    decide whether Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to establish that
    they suffered a domestic injury under § 1964(c). For the
    reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s
    judgment that they have not.
    I.
    A.      Factual Background
    Plaintiffs Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng are co-
    founders of ChinaWhys, an investigations firm that assists
    foreign companies doing business in China with American
    anti-bribery regulations compliance. Although Plaintiffs
    resided in Beijing during the events alleged in their complaint,
    much of ChinaWhys’ business was conducted with American
    companies.
    Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, GlaxoSmithKline plc
    (“GSK PLC”) and GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK LLC”),
    engaged in widespread bribery in China in order to obtain
    improper commercial advantages and that they did so with the
    approval of Mark Reilly. Reilly was the Chief Executive
    Officer of GlaxoSmithKline Investment Co., Ltd. (“GSK
    China”). GlaxoSmithKline is a multinational healthcare
    1
    
    136 S. Ct. 2090
    , 2106 (2016).
    3
    company that has offices in England and the United States.
    Sometime in 2011, a whistleblower who had worked for
    Defendants sent Chinese regulators correspondence accusing
    GlaxoSmithKline of bribery. Those allegations of corruption
    included a claim that GSK China maintained a policy of paying
    off doctors to increase sales. Thereafter, Defendants tried to
    uncover the whistleblower’s identity.
    As part of the ensuing inquiry, Humphrey and Yingzeng
    met with Reilly and other members of GSK China’s senior
    management in GSK China’s Shanghai office to discuss
    GlaxoSmithKline’s internal investigation into the source of the
    whistleblower reports. According to Plaintiffs, GSK China
    representatives told ChinaWhys that it believed Vivian Shi, a
    GSK China employee who had been fired, orchestrated a
    “smear campaign” against GlaxoSmithKline by falsely
    accusing the pharmaceutical company of engaging in corrupt
    practices. ChinaWhys agreed to conduct a background
    investigation of Shi in what Plaintiffs describe as an attempt to
    limit the “efficacy of her extortion.”2 The details of that
    understanding were memorialized in a “Consultancy
    Agreement.”3 That agreement provided that, among other
    things, the arrangement was to be governed by Chinese law and
    that all disputes arising out of, or in connection to, it were
    subject to arbitration in China.4
    GlaxoSmithKline later learned of additional
    whistleblower emails and GSK China asked ChinaWhys to
    also identify the source of those communications. In addition,
    GSK China personnel asked ChinaWhys to investigate certain
    Chinese agencies to find out who was conducting the
    investigation into GSK China’s alleged misconduct.
    In July 2013, Plaintiffs were arrested when police raided
    ChinaWhys’ Shanghai office and Plaintiffs’ Beijing home.
    The arrests resulted in Plaintiffs’ conviction and imprisonment.
    They were deported from China upon their release from prison.
    Reilly was subsequently convicted of bribing
    physicians and was also imprisoned and deported from China
    upon his release. The Chinese government fined GSK PLC
    $492 million for its bribery practices in the region, and GSK
    2
    Plaintiffs’ Br. 13, 16.
    3
    Joint App’x A69.
    4
    Joint App’x A74.
    4
    PLC entered a settlement agreement with the United States
    Securities Exchange Commission.
    Plaintiffs brought this suit in the United States District
    Court, alleging, inter alia, RICO claims and pendent state law
    claims. GSK China was not named as a party.5 Plaintiffs
    contend that their business was “destroyed and their
    prospective business ventures eviscerated” as a result of
    Defendants’ misconduct.6 They also contended that “GSK
    officials” knew that the accusations of corruption were true and
    that the bribery had been carried out at Reilly’s direction.
    Defendants moved to compel arbitration, or, in the
    alternative, to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter
    jurisdiction. They argued that subject-matter jurisdiction was
    lacking because, even though Plaintiffs may have had
    numerous clients in the United States, their alleged injuries
    were foreign because Plaintiffs’ business was in China, their
    only offices were in China, no work was done outside of China,
    Plaintiffs resided in China, and because any destruction of
    Plaintiffs’ business occurred while Plaintiffs were imprisoned
    in China by Chinese authorities. The District Court agreed and
    granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This timely appeal
    followed.
    B.      Legal Background
    RICO “creates a private civil cause of action that allows
    ‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
    violation of section 1962 to sue in federal district court . . . .”7
    5
    GSK China was not named a defendant even though it is the
    arm of GlaxoSmithKline that ChinaWhys entered into the
    Consultancy Agreement with. Moreover, as the District
    Court observed, “all of Plaintiffs’ contacts were with
    employees of either GSK China or GSK Pte Ltd., a
    Singaporean entity, and none were with Defendants. From
    the complaint, it is apparent that it was GSK China employees
    and GSK China’s CEO who requested that Plaintiffs
    investigate Shi . . . .” Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC.,
    No. CV 16-5924, 
    2017 WL 4347587
    , at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29,
    2017). The decision not to name GSK China as a defendant
    is likely an attempt to downplay ties to China.
    6
    Plaintiffs’ Br. 8.
    7
    RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 
    136 S. Ct. 2090
    , 2097
    (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
    5
    A successful plaintiff may “recover threefold the damages. . .
    .”8
    RICO is implicated when defendants have engaged in a
    “pattern of racketeering activity.”9 That pattern consists of
    certain statutorily defined predicate acts “encompass[ing]
    dozens of state and federal offenses” “that together
    demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal
    activity.”10 The statute “sets forth four specific prohibitions
    aimed at different ways in which a pattern of racketeering
    activity may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate a[n]
    enterprise[’s]” criminal misconduct.11 Plaintiffs allege that
    Defendants violated two of those prohibitions—§§ 1962(c) and
    (d). Section 1962(c) proscribes participating in the conduct of
    an interstate enterprise’s affairs through a “pattern of
    racketeering activity,”12 which RICO defines as “at least two
    acts of racketeering activity.”13 Section 1962(d) makes it
    unlawful to conspire to violate subsections (a) through (c).14
    8
    18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
    9
    18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
    10
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2096
    –97.
    11
    
    Id. at 2097
    (brackets in original) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    12
    18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
    13
    18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
    14
    
    Id. (citing 18
    U.S.C. § 1962). 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides:
    (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who
    has received any income derived, directly or
    indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
    activity or through collection of an unlawful
    debt in which such person has participated as
    a principal within the meaning of section 2,
    title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
    directly or indirectly, any part of such
    income, or the proceeds of such income, in
    acquisition of any interest in, or the
    establishment or operation of, any enterprise
    which is engaged in, or the activities of
    which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
    A purchase of securities on the open market
    for purposes of investment, and without the
    intention of controlling or participating in the
    6
    To prove a violation under §1962(c), Plaintiffs must
    show:
    (1) that two or more persons agreed to conduct
    or to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
    conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a
    pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the
    defendant was a party to or member of that
    agreement; and (3) that the defendant joined
    control of the issuer, or of assisting another
    to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
    subsection if the securities of the issuer held
    by the purchaser, the members of his
    immediate family, and his or their
    accomplices in any pattern or racketeering
    activity or the collection of an unlawful debt
    after such purchase do not amount in the
    aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
    securities of any one class, and do not confer,
    either in law or in fact, the power to elect one
    or more directors of the issuer.
    (b) It shall be unlawful for any person
    through a pattern of racketeering activity or
    through collection of an unlawful debt to
    acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
    any interest in or control of any enterprise
    which is engaged in, or the activities of
    which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
    (c) It shall be unlawful for any person
    employed by or associated with any
    enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
    which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
    to conduct or participate, directly or
    indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
    affairs through a pattern of racketeering
    activity or collection of unlawful debt.
    (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to
    conspire to violate any of the provisions of
    subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
    7
    the agreement or conspiracy knowing of its
    objective to conduct or participate, directly or
    indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise’s
    affairs through a pattern of racketeering
    activity.15
    To establish liability pursuant to § 1962(c), a plaintiff
    must establish the existence of an enterprise that exists
    “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which [the
    enterprise] engages.”16 RICO defines “enterprise” as “any
    individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
    entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
    although not a legal entity.”17 Plaintiffs can show the presence
    of an enterprise by pointing to a “group of persons associated
    together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
    conduct.”18
    The complaint alleges that the enterprise here is an
    association of, inter alia, Defendants, “others convicted of
    crimes related to GSK activities,” “and other countries who
    accepted bribes and kickbacks from GSK.”19 Plaintiffs further
    allege that Defendants participated in the following
    racketeering activity: mail fraud; wire fraud; obstruction of a
    criminal investigation; tampering with witnesses; retaliating
    against a witness, victim, or an informant; use of interstate
    facilities to conduct unlawful activity; and money laundering.20
    Plaintiffs contend they lost their business as a result of these
    alleged predicate racketeering acts.21
    In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court considered
    “whether RICO applies extraterritorially—that is, to events
    15
    United States v. John-Baptiste, 
    747 F.3d 186
    , 207 (3d Cir.
    2014) (citation omitted); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
    Co., 
    473 U.S. 479
    , 496 (1985) (“A violation of § 1962(c) . . .
    requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
    (4) of racketeering activity.”).
    16
    United States v. Turkette, 
    452 U.S. 576
    , 583 (1981).
    17
    18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
    18
    
    Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583
    .
    19
    Joint App’x A54.
    20
    Joint App’x A56.
    21
    Joint App’x A59.
    8
    occurring and injuries suffered outside the United States.”22
    The relevant inquiry involves two separate questions: first,
    whether RICO’s substantive provisions apply to extraterritorial
    conduct, and second, whether RICO’s private right of action
    affords relief for “injuries that are suffered” outside the United
    States. 23
    The Court explained that “[a]bsent clearly expressed
    congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be
    construed to have only domestic application.”24              This
    presumption against extraterritoriality “avoid[s] the
    international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied
    to conduct in foreign countries[.]”25 It also ensures that
    Congress—rather than the judiciary—is responsible for
    navigating the “delicate field of international relations.”26
    Nevertheless, the Court concluded that RICO can reach
    extraterritorial conduct.27 However, the Court held that 18
    U.S.C. § 1964(c) does not allow recovery for injuries suffered
    in foreign territories.28 The Court explained that “[n]othing in
    § 1964(c) provides a clear indication that Congress intended to
    create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of
    the United States.”29 Thus, although RICO creates a cause of
    action for misconduct committed abroad, § 1964(c) requires a
    “domestic injury.”
    However, since the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco had
    waived their claims for domestic injuries,30 the Court did not
    need to explain how courts should determine whether an
    alleged injury has been suffered domestically or abroad.31
    Moreover, as the District Court observed here, there is a dearth
    22
    RJR Nabisco, 
    Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2096
    .
    23
    
    Id. at 2099
    (emphasis added).
    24
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    25
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
    26
    Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
    133 S. Ct. 1659
    ,
    1664 (2013).
    27
    RJR Nabisco, 
    Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2103
    .
    28
    See 
    id. at 2106.
    29
    
    Id. at 2108.
    30
    
    Id. at 2111.
    31
    Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 
    874 F.3d 806
    , 809 (2d Cir. 2017)
    (“The Supreme Court did not explain, however, how to
    determine whether an alleged injury is domestic or foreign.”).
    9
    of case law grappling with the RJR Nabisco decision.32 In
    addition, those courts that have considered whether an alleged
    injury was suffered in the United States have applied varying
    standards.33 Thus, there is no consensus on what specific
    factors must be considered when deciding whether an injury is
    domestic or foreign.
    RJR Nabisco did advise courts to proceed cautiously
    when deciding if RICO plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient
    domestic injury to recover under § 1964(c). “[P]roviding a
    private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for
    international friction beyond that presented by merely applying
    U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”34 The Court
    observed that the domestic injury requirement promotes
    comity and avoids international friction because it, inter alia,
    creates less of an opportunity for litigants in foreign countries
    to bypass those territories’ “less generous remedial
    schemes.”35 The Supreme Court also warned that allowing
    litigants who are abroad to sidestep foreign remedies only to
    seek those available under domestic law would upset the
    balance of competing considerations embodied in the laws of
    foreign countries.36 The Court cautioned that “the need to
    enforce the presumption [against extraterritoriality] is at its
    32
    Humphrey, 
    2017 WL 4347587
    at *5 (“Neither the Third
    Circuit Court of Appeals, other Appellate Circuits, nor the
    District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have
    addressed what constitutes a domestic or foreign injury for
    civil RICO purposes subsequent to the RJR Nabisco decision
    . . . .”).
    33
    Compare Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry
    Co. v. Hu., No. 15 CIV. 10015 (KPF), 
    2017 WL 3328239
    , at
    *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (considering the totality of the
    circumstances without relying on any single circumstance),
    with Union Commercial Servs., 
    2016 WL 6650399
    , at *4
    (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2016) (considering whether the
    defendant’s conduct was intended to have effects in the
    United States).
    34
    
    Id. at 2106.
    35
    
    Id. at 2106–07
    & n. 9.
    36
    
    Id. 10 apex”
    when extraterritorial application of U.S. law raises the
    “risk” of international friction.37
    II.
    Because this case does not involve Article III standing,
    but rather presents an issue of statutory standing, subject matter
    jurisdiction is not implicated, and the parties incorrectly relied
    on Rule 12(b)(1). Our precedent makes clear that “[c]ivil
    RICO standing is usually viewed as a 12(b)(6) question of
    stating an actionable claim, rather than as a 12(b)(1) question
    of subject matter jurisdiction.”38 Moreover, given that Rule
    12(b)(6) provides a plaintiff with “significantly more
    protections,”39 and because we may affirm on any ground
    supported by the record and “there is no prejudice to appellants
    in our reviewing the district court’s dismissal as if it were
    grounded on Rule 12(b)(6),”40 we will review this matter under
    Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we “consider only the allegations
    contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint
    and matters of public record.”41 In evaluating whether the
    complaint adequately pleads the elements of standing, we
    accept as true all material allegations set forth in the complaint
    and construe those facts in favor of Plaintiffs, the nonmoving
    party.42
    III.
    Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’
    racketeering activity, Plaintiffs lost “numerous ongoing
    contracts and engagements with U.S. law firms and
    companies”—purportedly destroying “Plaintiffs’ business . . .
    and their prospective business ventures.”43 Plaintiffs thus seek
    redress under § 1964(c). However, as we stated above, §
    37
    
    Id. at 2107.
    38
    Anderson v. Ayling, 
    396 F.3d 265
    (2005) (citing Maio v.
    Aetna, Inc., 
    221 F.3d 472
    , 482 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000)).
    39
    Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,
    
    836 F.3d 261
    , 270 (3d Cir. 2016).
    40
    
    Maio, 221 F.3d at 481
    n.7.
    41
    Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
    
    998 F.2d 1192
    , 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). No documents were
    attached for the District Court’s consideration.
    42
    
    Maio, 221 F.3d at 481
    –82 (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    43
    Joint App’x A59.
    11
    1964(c) creates no private cause of action for injuries “suffered
    outside the United States.”44 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ civil
    RICO suit can survive a motion to dismiss only if they
    sufficiently allege domestic injuries.45 As we will explain,
    there is no bright-line rule that we can apply in assessing
    whether the alleged injuries are domestic or foreign. Rather,
    we must engage in a fact-intensive inquiry that will ordinarily
    include consideration of multiple factors that vary from case to
    case.
    A.      The Domestic Injury Requirement
    The District Court recognized that two “schools of
    thought” have emerged regarding proof of domestic injury for
    civil RICO claims. The “locus of effects” test looks only to
    where the plaintiff felt the effects of the alleged injury and not
    where the injurious acts were allegedly committed.46 Courts
    applying this approach have largely focused upon the
    plaintiffs’ place of residency or principal place of business.47
    Other courts are guided by where the alleged misconduct was
    “targeted” or “directed” and focus largely, though not
    exclusively, on that location.48 Although the District Court
    44
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108
    (“Nothing in § 1964(c)
    provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a
    private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the
    United States.”).
    45
    
    Id. 46 Humphrey,
    2017 WL 4347587 
    at *6.
    47
    See, e.g., Bascuñan v. Daniel Yarur ELS Amended
    ComplaintA, No. 15-CV-2009 (GBD), 
    2016 WL 5475998
    , at
    *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (“All of the funds at issue, even
    those distributed among the Corporate Plaintiffs, were
    purportedly owned by Bascuñan, and thus, he is the person
    that ultimately suffered the loss. And as a Chilean citizen and
    resident, he suffered the losses in Chile.” (citations omitted)),
    rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bascuñan v. Elsaca,
    
    874 F.3d 806
    (2d Cir. 2017).
    48
    See, e.g., Akishev v. Kapustin, No. CV 13-7152, 
    2016 WL 7165714
    , at *1–2, 7– 8 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016); Union
    Commercial Servs. Ltd. v. FCA Int’l Operations LLC, No. 16-
    CV-10925, 
    2016 WL 6650399
    , at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10,
    2016); Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 
    217 F. Supp. 3d 1138
    , 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
    12
    found the former school of thought more persuasive, it
    ultimately did not have to adopt either approach because
    Plaintiffs were unable to prevail under either test.49
    This case presents an excellent example of why the
    inquiry required under § 1964(c) must be undertaken in the
    context of the specific injuries alleged in a given case rather
    than relying on a one-size-fits-all approach or bright-line rule.
    Plaintiffs allege injuries to intangible business interests,
    including reputation and goodwill. Accordingly, relying on
    such tangible factors as the location of lost funds, damaged
    property or plaintiff’s residence is not only of little use, but it
    could also be very misleading. Instead, we must consider
    multiple factors in determining whether the injuries in question
    were suffered in the United States or abroad.
    Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among the
    courts that have had to apply RJR Nabisco that the location of
    a RICO injury depends on where the plaintiff “suffered the
    injury”—not where the injurious conduct took place.50 That
    may result from the Court’s framing of the issue in RJR
    Nabisco. The Court specifically framed the question before it
    as whether: “RICO’s private right of action, contained in §
    1964(c), applies to injuries that are suffered in foreign
    countries?”51
    The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of
    only two federal appellate courts that have grappled with RJR
    Nabisco’s domestic injury instruction. In Bascuñán v. Elsaca,
    the court considered whether a Chilean resident suffered a
    domestic injury although he was not located in the United
    States during the events in question.52 The plaintiff there
    alleged that the defendant had fraudulently caused banks to
    wire the plaintiff’s funds from the plaintiff’s U.S. bank
    49
    Humphrey, 
    2017 WL 4347587
    at *6. (“[T]his Court need
    not decide whether the focus is entirely on where the injury
    occurred or if the location of the conduct is relevant, because
    under any of the injury-focused tests employed by other
    district courts, and under a conduct-focused test, it is clear to
    this Court that the alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are
    foreign, and not domestic.”).
    50
    See 
    id. (collecting cases).
    51
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2099
    .
    52
    
    874 F.3d 809
    (2d Cir. 2017).
    13
    accounts to the defendant’s accounts.53 The plaintiff also
    alleged that the defendant or his agent physically removed
    bank shares from the plaintiff’s New York safety deposit box.54
    The district court held that the plaintiff could not allege a
    domestic injury because he was a resident of Chile, and the
    injuries alleged were necessarily suffered at the plaintiff’s
    place of residence.55 Two questions guided the court’s inquiry:
    who became poorer as a result of the alleged conduct and
    where did that individual become poorer?56 “Its holding set
    forth, in sum and substance, the following rule: a foreign
    plaintiff who suffered an ‘economic loss’ due to a RICO
    violation cannot, absent extraordinary circumstances, allege a
    domestic injury.”57
    On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
    rejected the district court’s “residency-based” approach and
    held that “a plaintiff who is a foreign resident may [in fact]
    allege a civil RICO injury that is domestic.”58 It noted that the
    district court’s focus on the plaintiff’s place of residence
    improperly disregards RJR Nabisco’s attempt “to make plain
    that its opinion should not be taken to ‘mean that foreign
    plaintiffs may not sue under RICO.’”59 The Second Circuit
    opined that the focus of the domestic injury analysis should be
    the location of the alleged injuries as opposed to the location
    of the plaintiff’s residence or of the defendant’s alleged
    misconduct. The court explained: “[i]n order to determine
    where the [injuries] alleged by a civil RICO plaintiff are
    located geographically, courts must examine more closely the
    specific type of injuries alleged.”60 It then categorized the
    alleged injury as an injury to tangible property, which “can be
    fairly said to exist in a precise location.”61 Taking that
    approach, the court easily concluded that “[w]here the injury is
    53
    
    Id. at 811.
    54
    
    Id. at 810.
    55
    
    Id. at 809.
    56
    
    Id. at 813–14.
    57
    
    Id. 809–10. 58
       
    Id. at 814.
    59
    
    Id. at 821
    (emphasis omitted) (citing RJR Nabisco, 136 S.
    Ct. at 2110 n. 12).
    60
    
    Id. at 817.
    61
    
    Id. at 820.
    14
    to tangible property . . . absent some extraordinary
    circumstance, the injury is domestic if the plaintiff’s property
    was located in the United States when it was stolen or harmed,
    even if the plaintiff himself resides abroad.”62
    Thus, the court held that when a defendant’s conduct is
    alleged to effect tangible property, the location of that property
    usually constitutes the place of the injury. Since the plaintiff’s
    money and bank shares were in the United States when stolen,
    the court reasoned that the injury occurred in New York and
    the plaintiff therefore properly alleged a domestic RICO
    injury.63 Several considerations counseled that conclusion.
    The court reasoned that plaintiffs who are injured as a result of
    harm done to their domestically located tangible property are
    entitled to the remedial benefits conferred by a RICO private
    right of action because such litigants “expect that our laws will
    protect them in the event of damage to that property.”64 That
    “expectation [was] entirely justified, especially when we
    consider that a foreign resident’s property located in the United
    States is otherwise subject to all of the regulations imposed on
    private property by American state and federal law.”65 The
    rule thus “ensures that both foreign and domestic plaintiffs can
    obtain civil RICO’s remedy for damage to their property[.]”66
    Although this approach, which focuses on the location
    of the property giving rise to the harm, is useful where the
    alleged injury is to tangible property, it is not helpful where, as
    here, harm to intangible business interests is alleged. The
    location of such injuries simply cannot be identified with the
    same geographic certainty that is endemic in the very concept
    of tangible property. Thus, courts grappling with alleged
    injuries to intangible property have largely tried to trace the
    location of the effects of the alleged injurious conduct to
    determine the place of injury. In other words, these courts have
    aligned themselves with the locus of effects approach and
    focus on where the plaintiff felt the effects of the injury-
    inducing predicate acts, no matter where they occurred.
    62
    
    Id. at 820–21.
    63
    Id.
    64
    
    Id. at 821
    .
    65
    
    Id. at 821
    .
    66
    
    Id. 15 For
    example, in Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti. v.
    Cavusoglu, the district court found that a plaintiff’s principal
    place of business and the location of its operations were merely
    helpful considerations in determining whether the effects of an
    alleged injury were domestic or foreign.67 There, a Turkish
    corporation “assert[ed] that its domestic business was injured
    because it had . . . annual sales to customers in the United States
    prior to transacting with the RICO enterprise.”68 The court
    held that, even if it were to assume that the plaintiff lost
    earnings from customers located in the United States, it
    nonetheless could ascertain no “domestic injury to [the
    plaintiff’s] business because its business [was] entirely located
    in and operated out of Turkey.”69 The “plaintiff’s injury was
    felt in the only place it had ever been located, in Turkey.”70
    Although the Cevdet court found the physical location of the
    plaintiff’s corporation to be relevant, it did not announce the
    same kind of residency-based rule that was rejected by the
    Court of Appeals in Bascuñán. Instead, it declared that a
    foreign corporation with “substantial business operations
    within the United States” could, hypothetically, assert a RICO
    domestic injury because the injury could be felt in the United
    States.71
    Picking up where Cevdet left off, the district court in
    Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman (Elsevier II) held that, in assessing
    whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic RICO injury to its
    intangible business operations, courts should determine where
    the “substantial negative business consequences occurred.”72
    The court suggested that a plaintiff might be able to show a
    domestic injury by alleging “some effect on Plaintiffs’
    67
    
    245 F. Supp. 3d 650
    (D.N.J. 2017).
    68
    
    Id. at 653.
    69
    
    Id. at 659.
    70
    
    Id. at 660.
    71
    
    Id. at 659.
    72
    
    199 F. Supp. 3d 768
    , 786 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“If the plaintiff
    has suffered an injury to his or her business, the court should
    ask where substantial negative business consequences
    occurred. By contrast, if the plaintiff has suffered an injury to
    his or her property, the court should ask where the plaintiff
    parted with the property or where the property was
    damaged.”).
    16
    relationships with actual or prospective U.S. customers.”73
    The court, however, found that the plaintiff had made no such
    allegation. Elsevier, the plaintiff, had sued to recover after it
    sold academic journals to the defendants at discounted rates
    because of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations that they
    were buying the journals for “valid personal use.”74 The
    plaintiff argued that he suffered a domestic injury simply
    because the defendants ordered the subscriptions from the
    United States and paid for them with checks drawn on a U.S.
    bank account. First, the court held that this was insufficient to
    show that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred in the United States.
    The trial court noted “that it is possible for fraudulent conduct
    to take place in one location, but cause injury in another
    location.”75 While resolving post-trial motions, though, the
    district court found that, as alleged, “48 of the 51 fraudulent
    subscriptions were either physically shipped from the United
    States or were authorized for shipment by an Elsevier
    employee located in the United States.”76 Accordingly, the
    district court reversed course and found that the plaintiff
    “relinquished control of the journals in the United States under
    false pretenses and thereby suffered the effects of [the
    defendant’s fraudulent] conduct in the States.”77 The court
    therefore found that the plaintiff’s harm constituted a domestic
    injury “even if [the plaintiff] were a foreign entity.”78
    Despite Elsevier II’s earlier indication that, in
    determining whether an injury is domestic, “court[s] should
    ask where substantial negative business consequences
    occurred,”79 its post-trial opinion was based on its finding that
    the alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff’s property
    occurred in the United States. That is consistent with the
    approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Bascuñán.
    73
    
    Id. at 788.
    74
    Elsevier Inc. v. Pierre Grossmann, IBIS Corp. (Elsevier
    III), 
    2017 WL 5135992
    , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017).
    75
    Elsevier 
    II, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 788
    .
    76
    Elsevier III, 
    2017 WL 5135992
    , at *4.
    77
    
    Id. 78 Id.
    79
    Elsevier 
    II, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 786
    .
    17
    Nevertheless, since Elsevier involved an alleged injury to
    tangible property, it is not helpful to our inquiry here.80
    The court’s analysis in Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. &
    Animal Husbandry Co. v. Hu is more analogous to our
    inquiry.81 The plaintiff there was a Chinese company that was
    one of the largest purchasers of soybeans produced in the
    United States.82 It alleged, inter alia, that the defendant’s
    RICO misconduct caused the plaintiff to lose contracts with
    soybean suppliers in the United States.83 The plaintiff claimed
    the loss of much of its market share and that its business
    operations slowed as a result of its inability to receive soybeans
    from U.S. suppliers at the same volume as before the
    defendant’s alleged misconduct.84 The plaintiff also alleged
    that it was forced to terminate 90 of its China-based
    employees.85 The court disregarded the location of the
    predicate acts that were alleged and instead focused only on
    where the plaintiff felt the effects of the alleged injury.86 That
    analysis caused the court to conclude that the plaintiff failed to
    establish a domestic injury. The trial court found that “[a]ny
    deprivation of [the] [p]laintiff’s money was felt in China. And,
    in sharp contrast to Elsevier, [the] Plaintiff was not deprived of
    its property in the United States[] [because,] indeed, [the]
    Plaintiff received all of the soybeans for which it contracted
    with U.S. suppliers.”87
    80
    Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co., 
    2017 WL 3328239
    at *6 (clarifying that Elsevier “focused on
    where the plaintiff had been deprived of money or property
    [and] . . . found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a
    domestic injury by asserting that nearly all of the
    subscriptions at issue had been shipped from within the
    United States—and thus, that the plaintiff had been deprived
    of its property (i.e., the scientific journals) in the United
    States” (citing Elsevier III, 
    2017 WL 1843298
    , at *6)).
    81
    
    Id. *13 82
       
    Id. at *1.
    83
    
    Id. at *3.
    84
    
    Id. 85 Id.
    86
    
    Id. at *11.
    87
    
    Id. at *13.
    18
    The plaintiff’s principal place of business was in China,
    all the terminated employees were fired in China, any expenses
    resulting from the alleged misconduct were paid from China,
    and the plaintiff’s business operated only out of China.88 The
    court found that the foreign plaintiff’s allegation that it lost
    prospective business opportunities from U.S. suppliers
    insufficient to establish that the plaintiff experienced a
    domestic injury because such a claim, without more, “is far too
    attenuated to suffice as a domestic injury under RICO.”89 For
    these reasons, the Dandong court ultimately held that
    “[r]egardless of where the conspirators’ conduct took place,
    [the p]laintiff’s injury was felt in China, the only place its
    business had ever been located.”90 Although other courts have
    reached similar results,91 Dandong’s approach to determining
    the location of the alleged injury is particularly helpful because
    it is nuanced and the court considered the totality of the
    circumstances without relying on any single circumstance.
    As we will explain, a focus upon where the alleged
    injuries were felt best guides our inquiry. However, unlike
    courts that have taken this “locus of effects” approach, we do
    not view a plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business
    as detemintive. Although it will almost always be an important
    88
    
    Id. at *14.
    89
    
    Id. at *13.
    90
    
    Id. at *14.
    91
    In City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Ablyazov for example, the
    plaintiff alleged that the defendant (who was the former
    mayor) stole city funds and invested those funds in New York
    City real estate projects. 
    226 F. Supp. 3d 272
    , 275 (S.D.N.Y
    2016). The court held that even though the mayor and his co-
    conspirators used the funds in the United States, the plaintiff
    did not suffer a domestic injury. 
    Id. at 284.
    In other words,
    because the plaintiff suffered economic harm to its business,
    the place of injury was “the state of plaintiff’s residence, and
    foreign corporations are recognized to reside either in their
    principal place of business or their place of incorporation.”
    
    Id. at 282
    (citation and internal quotations omitted). Unlike
    Plaintiffs here, the plaintiff in City of Almaty alleged no
    additional contacts with the United States. The case therefore
    offers limited guidance here.
    19
    factor, allegations in a given case will ususally necessitate
    consideration of additional factors as well.
    B.      Merits
    With this background as our guide, we must determine
    if Plaintiffs here have alleged a plausible domestic injury under
    § 1964(c). We begin with RJR Nabisco’s clear command: the
    analysis of whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury
    must focus principally on where the plaintiff has suffered the
    alleged injury.92 “Nothing in § 1964(c) provides a clear
    indication that Congress intended to create a private right of
    action for injuries suffered outside of the United States.”93
    As noted above, the Court in RJR Nabisco cautioned
    against applying U.S. law in the absence of a domestic injury
    for the substantial practical and policy reasons the Court
    explained. Thus, we must decide if Plaintiffs’ alleged domestic
    injuries justify allowing a civil remedy under RICO. There
    may well be cases where plaintiffs do, in fact, suffer some
    injury in the United States and courts must determine whether
    those domestic injuries are sufficient to justify application of
    domestic law despite the concerns the Supreme Court has
    explained. As with any standard that is not susceptible to
    mechanical application, “few answers will be written in black
    and white.”94 We therefore appreciate that some cases will be
    so close that courts may have to split jurisdictional hairs to
    determine if a domestic injury has been alleged. As we
    explain, the Plaintiffs here have not really alleged any domestic
    injury, so we have no trouble concluding that they have not
    alleged a sufficient injury to defeat that presumption and justify
    the extraterritorial application of domestic law.
    Given the intangible nature of the alleged injuries here,
    our inquiry must focus primarily upon where the effects of the
    predicate acts were experienced. This will better allow for
    appropriate consideration of the nuanced nature of intangible
    interests.
    Whether an alleged injury to an intangible interest was
    suffered domestically is a particularly fact-sensitive question
    requiring consideration of multiple factors. These include, but
    are not limited to, where the injury itself arose; the location of
    92
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108
    .
    93
    
    Id. 94 Kulko
    v. Superior Court of California, 
    436 U.S. 84
    , 92
    (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    20
    the plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business; where
    any alleged services were provided; where the plaintiff
    received or expected to receive the benefits associated with
    providing such services; where any relevant business
    agreements were entered into and the laws binding such
    agreements; and the location of the activities giving rise to the
    underlying dispute.
    As we have already explained, the applicable factors
    depend on the plaintiff’s allegations; no one factor is
    presumptively dispositive.95      A domestic injury under §
    1964(c) is found where the relevant factors, appropriately
    weighed, establish that the alleged harm was suffered in the
    United States.96 Although they have rarely done so explicitly,
    the courts that have applied RJR Nabisco—including the
    District Court here—have largely engaged in this kind of
    multi-factor inquiry.97
    Applying these principles to the allegations here, we
    have no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs have not alleged a
    domestic injury. Rather, it is clear that the alleged injuries
    were suffered in China. As the District Court noted, at all
    relevant times, Plaintiffs lived in China; had their principal
    place of business in China; provided services in China (albeit
    to some American companies – but even they were operating
    in China); entered the Consultancy Agreement in China and
    agreed to have Chinese law govern it;98 met with Defendants’
    95
    See, e.g., 
    Bascuñán, 874 F.3d at 824
    (noting that “[a]
    plaintiff’s residence may often be relevant—perhaps even
    dispositive—in determining whether certain types of business
    or property injuries constitute a domestic injury”); Dandong,
    
    2017 WL 3328239
    , at *13–14 (considering a plethora of
    factors to determine whether the alleged intangible injuries
    constitute a domestic injury).
    96
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108
    (“Nothing in § 1964(c)
    provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a
    private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the
    United States.”).
    97
    See, e.g., Dandong, 
    2017 WL 3328239
    at *13–14; Tatung
    Co., 
    Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1155
    –56.
    98
    We recognize that our review of a motion to dismiss is
    generally limited to the face of the complaint and documents
    attached to it. However, we may consider the Consultancy
    21
    representatives only in China; and themselves indicated on the
    civil cover sheet that the underlying incident arose in China.99
    “[C]ompanies came to [ChinaWhys] when they sought to do
    business in China.”100 Plaintiffs have not alleged that they
    possess offices, assets, or any other property in the United
    States. Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged a domestic injury
    pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), even though they do allege
    loss of goodwill and some unidentified number of actual and
    prospective U.S. customers.101 To the extent that these
    intangible assets were injured, it is not enough to overcome the
    Supreme Court’s caution against extraterritorial application of
    domestic law in RJR Nabisco. Consequently, the District
    Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.
    Dismissal of those claims is consistent with RJR
    Nabisco’s policy considerations. As noted earlier, the
    Supreme Court cautioned against the risks of “international
    friction” associated with allowing foreign entities to “bypass”
    potentially “less generous remedial schemes” available in their
    home jurisdictions and pursue treble damages for injuries
    suffered abroad through civil RICO actions in the United
    States.102 Plaintiffs seek redress here for Defendants’ alleged
    racketeering activity although Plaintiffs were prosecuted and
    imprisoned in China. “Allowing [Plaintiff’s] RICO claims to
    Agreement because Defendants attached the undisputed
    document as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs
    claims are based on the document. See Pension Ben. Guar.
    Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
    998 F.2d 1192
    , 1196 (3d
    Cir. 1993); see also Schuchardt, 
    839 F.3d 336
    , 343 (3d Cir.
    2016) (“If . . . the defendant contests the pleaded
    jurisdictional facts, “the court must permit the plaintiff to
    respond with evidence supporting jurisdiction.” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    99
    Humphrey, 
    2017 WL 4347587
    , at *6 n.14.
    100
    
    Id. at *6.
    101
    It is unclear whether an allegation of harm to goodwill
    constitutes a showing of “a concrete financial loss and not
    mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.” 
    Maio, 221 F.3d at 483
    (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    102
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106
    –07 (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    22
    proceed under these circumstances would be at odds with the
    Supreme Court’s directive that the need to enforce the
    presumption against extraterritoriality is ‘at its apex’ when
    remedies available in United States courts may conflict with
    those available abroad.”103 Indeed, it would be odd to permit
    Plaintiffs to seek civil redress for alleged harm arising from the
    very crimes they were convicted of in China and that arose
    from China’s application of its own criminal laws, absent
    allegations that would give rise to a domestic injury in the
    United States.
    We realize that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
    Circuit rejected the analytical approach that we today adopt, in
    Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp.104 But we
    do not find that analysis particularly helpful or persuasive here.
    There, that court held that “a party experiences or sustains
    injuries to its intangible property at its residence.”105 The
    Armada plaintiff was a Singapore shipping company that
    alleged that the Illinois-based defendant violated RICO by
    thwarting the plaintiff’s attempt to recover on its breach of
    contract claim. The court held, without much discussion, that
    the plaintiff’s “principal place of business [was] in Singapore,
    so any harm to [the plaintiff’s] intangible bundle of litigation
    rights was suffered in Singapore.”106 It therefore concluded
    that the “injury [was] not domestic, and [that the plaintiff had]
    failed to plead a plausible claim under civil RICO.”107
    Although the ease with which such a bright-line rule can
    be applied gives it some surface appeal, we resist the
    temptation to adopt it as the law of this circuit. While courts
    have generally noted that a company suffers economic injuries
    103
    City of 
    Almaty, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 287
    (citing RJR
    
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107
    ).
    104
    
    885 F.3d 1090
    (7th Cir. 2018).
    105
    
    Armada, 885 F.3d at 1094
    –95 (citing Kamel v. Hill-Rom
    Co., Inc., 
    108 F.3d 799
    , 805 (7th Cir. 1997). Although we
    reject the analytical framework used in Armada, we note that
    it would not necessarily lead to a different result here because
    Plaintiffs resided in China when Defendants are alleged to
    have engaged in the conduct Plaintiffs rely upon for RICO
    liability.
    106
    
    Id. at 1095.
    107
    
    Id. 23 at
    its principal place of business, few have done so in the
    context of a RICO claim that would extend beyond the borders
    of the United States. 108 Even fewer have done so where the
    alleged conduct had an effect on intangible property. Although
    a litigant’s residence or principal place of business is obviously
    a relevant consideration, and perhaps a useful place to begin a
    § 1964(c) inquiry, it does not necessarily determine the
    ultimate question of whether there has been a domestic injury.
    It is merely one factor that informs our inquiry.
    The Supreme Court anticipated that the RICO domestic
    injury inquiry would not always be susceptible to easy
    resolution. The Court explained that “[t]he application of [the
    domestic injury rule] in any given case will not always be self-
    evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged
    injury is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’” 109 Moreover, we think the
    Armada rule is too inflexible to be useful in resolving cases
    where the nature of the injured property interest is not “self-
    evident.”110
    Armada’s residency-based rule also effectively
    precludes all foreign plaintiffs alleging intangible injuries from
    recovering under § 1964(c) regardless of their alleged
    connection with the United States. “It cannot be the case that
    the mere fact that a loss is economic means that foreign
    corporations are unable to avail themselves of the protections
    of civil RICO, even in cases where all of the actions causing
    the injury took place in the United States.”111 There is no
    evidence that Congress meant to so preclude foreign
    corporations from the protection offered by § 1964(c) and
    doing so conflicts with the Supreme Court’s recognition that
    “Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises.”112
    We next address Plaintiffs’ contention that,
    notwithstanding factors supporting a finding that the alleged
    108
    See, e.g., 
    id. (collecting cases);
    see also Global Fin. Corp.
    v. Triarc Corp., 
    715 N.E.2d 482
    , 485 (N.Y. 1999) (“When an
    alleged injury is purely economic, the place of injury usually
    is where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic
    impact of the loss.”).
    109
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111
    .
    110
    
    Id. 111 Tatung
    Co., 
    Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1155
    .
    112
    RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2104
    .
    24
    injury was foreign, they have nonetheless alleged a domestic
    injury because “the alleged underlying RICO conduct plainly
    was both targeted at, and was intended to have substantial
    effects in, the United States.”113 We disagree.
    As we mentioned at the outset, a minority of courts have
    suggested that a plaintiff can show that it has suffered a
    domestic injury by merely pointing to misconduct that
    occurred in, or was directed to, the United States. However,
    those cases are also not helpful here and do not establish the
    domestic injury that Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiffs contend
    Akishev v. Kapustin114 relied on this so-called “location of the
    injury-inducing conduct” test.115 The plaintiffs there were
    citizens of multiple foreign countries who were fraudulently
    induced to make online purchases of used cars from the
    defendant’s U.S. dealership.116 The plaintiffs alleged no other
    connection to the United States. The court found that the
    location of the fraudulent conduct was an important factor in
    determining whether there was a “domestic injury,” because
    the case arose in the context of an online sale. The court
    reasoned that “[i]f [the] plaintiffs [had] traveled to the United
    States, went to the physical location of [the defendant’s]
    purported car dealerships . . . chose a car, paid for it on the spot,
    and arranged for the car to be shipped to Eastern Europe, [the]
    plaintiffs would have suffered from a clear domestic injury
    when [the defendant] failed to deliver the car and failed to
    return plaintiffs their money.”117 The case may well be helpful
    when allegations involve the tenaciously difficult question of
    where misconduct in cyberspace occurs. However, it is of
    limited assistance here.
    We do note, however, that “the court [ultimately]
    appeared to focus on where plaintiffs’ injuries were felt—i.e.,
    on defendant’s United States-based website and, therefore, in
    the United States.”118 To this extent, Akishev’s actual holding
    relies on the “locus of effects” approach discussed above and
    113
    Plaintiffs’ Br. 35.
    114
    
    2016 WL 7165714
    at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016).
    115
    Plaintiffs’ Br. 32–33.
    116
    Akishev, 
    2016 WL 7165714
    at *7.
    117
    
    Id. 118 Cevdet
    Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti, 245 F. 3d Supp. at 657
    (citing Akishev, 
    2016 WL 7165714
    at 8*).
    25
    does not itself compel the adoption of an approach that places
    undue emphasis on the location of the alleged injury-inducing
    misconduct.
    Plaintiffs also rely on Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu119
    and claim that it emphasizes that the location of a defendant’s
    conduct is important in determining whether a domestic injury
    has been alleged. Even so viewed, Tatung does not support
    Plaintiffs’ contention. The foreign plaintiff maintained a “hub”
    of business in the United States and extended credit and
    delivered goods to one of the defendants within the United
    States.120 When the defendant defaulted on its credit
    obligation, the plaintiff was awarded a judgment through
    arbitration in California.121 The plaintiff subsequently alleged
    a RICO conspiracy to siphon funds from the defendant’s
    corporation and render it an empty shell in order to avoid the
    judgment.122 The court found that RICO civil liability was
    appropriate because “the defendants specifically targeted their
    conduct at California with the aim of thwarting [the plaintiff’s]
    rights in California.”123 The court found a domestic injury
    because the plaintiff had a domestic judgment entitled to the
    protection of United States law.124 The Tatung plaintiff also
    maintained substantial business operations within the United
    States and contractually availed itself of dispute resolution via
    arbitration within the United States.125 Consequently, the
    plaintiff in that case could plausibly argue that its United
    States-based business was harmed by the defendants’ RICO
    conduct and that it suffered a domestic injury because it felt the
    impact of that injury within the United States.
    Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon Union Commercial
    Services. Ltd. v. FCA International Operations LLC’s
    suggestion that a plaintiff could allege a domestic injury under
    RICO by simply pointing to injurious conduct intended to
    119
    
    217 F. Supp. 3d 1138
    , 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
    120
    
    Id. at 1155.
    121
    
    Id. at 1156.
    122
    
    Id. at 1158.
    123
    
    Id. at 1157.
    124
    
    Id. at 1156.
    125
    
    Id. at 1155–56.
    26
    produce effects in the United States.126 They contend that “the
    alleged underlying RICO conduct [here] plainly was both
    targeted at, and was intended to have substantial effects in, the
    United States” because “[a] central goal of the alleged
    racketeering conduct was to avoid detection and further
    sanctions from U.S. regulators and criminal authorities . . . .”127
    In Union Commercial, the court relied upon cases decided in
    the context of antitrust law and concluded that courts must ask
    “whether a defendant’s conduct is intended to or has produced
    ‘substantial effects’ in the United States.”128, 129 The court
    found that the plaintiff suffered no “domestic injury” because
    the “defendants’ alleged conduct was directed at, and any
    effects were felt by, plaintiff’s business or property interests
    outside of the United States.”130 Here again, even though the
    court emphasized the nature of the defendant’s conduct, it
    focused on the fact that the effects of the alleged harm were
    felt outside the United States.
    Given the numerous factors we have discussed that
    converge to paint a picture of an injury in China and not in the
    United States, the individual circumstances that Plaintiffs rely
    on cannot establish a domestic injury.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment
    of the District Court.
    126
    No. 16-CV-10925, 
    2016 WL 6650399
    , at *4 (E.D. Mich.
    Nov. 10, 2016).
    127
    Plaintiffs’ Br. 35.
    128
    Union Commercial Servs. Ltd., 
    2016 WL 6650399
    at *4.
    129
    RJR Nabisco observed that “[t]here is good reason not to
    interpret § 1964(c) to cover foreign injuries just because the
    Clayton Act[, a federal antitrust statute,] does so.” RJR
    
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2109
    . First, the Clayton Act explicitly
    authorizes foreign entities to bring suit under the statute. 
    Id. Further, and
    as the Court described in F. Hoffmann-La Roche
    Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
    542 U.S. 155
    (2004), the Foreign
    Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 excludes from the
    reach of antitrust laws “most conduct that ‘causes only
    foreign injury.’” RJR 
    Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2109
    (citing
    
    Empagran, 542 U.S. at 158
    ).
    130
    Union Commercial Servs., 
    2016 WL 6650399
    , at *5.
    27