Mitchell Garraway v. Harley Lappin , 490 F. App'x 440 ( 2012 )

CLD-232 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1867
___________
MITCHELL THEOPHILUS GARRAWAY,
Appellant
v.
HARLEY G. LAPPIN, Federal Bureau of Prisons; TROY WILLIAMSON, former
Warden, USP Lewisburg; KERSTETTER, Captain, Inmate Systems Manager, former
Warden, USP Lewisburg; SALVADORE IRIZZARY, Chaplain, USP Lewisburg; R.
ROGERS, Food Service Administrator, USP Lewisburg; FRANK STRADA, former
Assistant Warden, USP Lewisburg; KEVIN KELLEY, Chaplain, USP Lewisburg;
JOHNSON, Inmate Trust Fund Manager, USP Lewisburg; JOHN JOHNSON, Chaplain,
USP Canaan; RONNIE HOLT, Warden Executive Officer, USP Canaan; ANGELA
DUNBAR, Assistant Warden, USP Canaan; D. MRAD, USP Canaan; R. SORENSON,
USP Canaan; THOMAS DIEHL, Inmate Trust Fund, Manager, USP Canaan; R.
GUNDRUM, Food Service Administrator, USP Canaan; M. NOVAK, Lieutenant,
USP Canaan
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 4-10-cv-01697)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 19, 2012
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2012 )
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Mitchell Theophilus Garraway, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in
Lewisburg (“USP-Lewisburg”), appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the District
Court‟s order granting the Defendants‟ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District
Court‟s order.
I.
In August 2010, Garraway commenced a Bivens action1 claiming that certain rules
and policies instituted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “severely and
unnecessarily” burdened his ability to practice his Muslim faith, in violation of his First
Amendment free exercise rights. He brought statutory claims under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.
He named as Defendants several current and former employees of USP-Lewisburg and
the United States Penitentiary in Canaan (“USP-Canaan”), having been an inmate at both
facilities during the time period set forth in his complaint.
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388(1971).
2
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment,
with respect to all of Garraway‟s claims. The District Court granted the motion on March
21, 2012, and entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. Garraway timely filed a
Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2012.
II.
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will summarily affirm the
District Court‟s judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
We exercise plenary review over an order dismissing claims under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).
“Reviewing such an order, we accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff‟s complaint as
well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we construe them in a
light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. (citation omitted).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This pleading standard “does
not require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that
offers „labels and conclusions‟ or „a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.‟” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Id.; see also Twombly,
3
550 U.S. at 556 (explaining that a plaintiff must “identify[] facts that are suggestive
enough to render [his claim] plausible.”) “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
We also exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment and “employ
the same standard as applied below.” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).
That is, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we must
affirm if the record evidence submitted by the non-movant is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative.” DeHart, 390 F.3d at 267-68 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Claims under the First Amendment and claims under the RFRA are analyzed
separately.2 When a prisoner asserts a First Amendment free exercise claim that “a
prison policy is impinging on [his] constitutional rights,” the court must then apply the
four factor test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the
curtailment at issue is “reasonably related to penological interests.” DeHart v. Horn, 227
F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). As this Court has explained,
2
The District Court properly dismissed Garraway‟s RLUIPA claims because RLUIPA
does not apply to a federal government action. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535
F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008); Rogers v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 2d 472, 486
(W.D. Pa. 2010); see also Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that RLUIPA applies to actions against state and local governments).
4
[Turner] directs courts to assess the overall reasonableness of
such regulations by weighing four factors. “First, there must
be a „valid, rational connection‟ between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it,” and this connection must not be “so remote as to render
the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Second, a court must
consider whether inmates retain alternative means of
exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take
into account the costs that accommodating the right would
impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources
generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are
alternatives to the regulation that “fully accommodate[ ] the
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological
interests.”
Id. (citing Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted)).
In contrast, a challenged restraint on the freedom of religion does not fall within
the scope of the RFRA unless the inmate can establish that a “substantial burden” is
placed on his ability to exercise said freedom. Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 767 (3d
Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).3
This Court has said that a substantial burden exists where:
(1) a follower is forced to choose between following the
precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise
generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of
the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; or
3
Though the Supreme Court held the RFRA unconstitutional as to state and local
governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, RFRA claims against the federal government
“remain viable,” Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 172 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
5
(2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.
Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). It is only once a substantial
burden on religion has been established by the prisoner that the government must then
establish “that it has a „compelling interest‟ in its actions and is furthering that interest by
the „least restrictive means.‟” Small, 98 F.3d at 767 (citations omitted).
III.
The District Court addressed Garraway‟s numerous claims by subject matter. In
his argument in support of appeal, Garraway highlighted the following issues as violative
of his First Amendment free exercise rights and the RFRA: (1) prison policies limiting
group prayer; (2) the lack of a full-time Sunni Muslim chaplain; (3) prison policies
regarding an Islamic Halal diet; (4) prison policies limiting the number of books he can
keep in his cell; and (5) the availability of ceremonial religious items. We will first
consider these claims before turning to the remainder of those addressed in the District
Court‟s Memorandum.
1. Prison Policies Limiting Group Prayer
Garraway claimed that the prison regulation regarding congregational worship
violated his First Amendment free exercise rights. The regulation in question, BOP
Program Statement 5360.09.7.a, states, in pertinent part:
The level of scheduled activities is expected to be
commensurate with the institution‟s mission/need.
Authorized congregate services will be made available for all
inmates weekly with the exception of those detained in any
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Special Housing Units (SHUs). If a state of emergency exists
(e.g. fog, institution lock down, food strike), the warden or
designee will determine the appropriate level of chapel
programming.
(Dkt. No. 39, Ex. 1, Attach. B.)
“When a prison regulation impinges on inmates‟ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner,
482 U.S. at 89. The District Court aptly applied the four-part Turner analysis in
determining that Garraway‟s First Amendment right to free exercise was not
impermissibly impinged by this regulation. (Dkt. No. 65, pp. 20-29.) That analysis need
not be repeated here. Garraway did not allege that the policy substantially burdened his
ability to exercise his religion. Without establishing a substantial burden, his claim under
the RFRA fails.
2. Lack of a Full-Time Sunni Muslim Chaplain
Garraway claimed that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights and the
RFRA “by refusing to provide a full-time Sunni Muslim chaplain … while providing …
two to three Christian chaplains for Christian inmates.” (Dkt. No. 27, ¶¶ 22, 44.)
“A special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith
regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to
the extent of the demand.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam); see
also Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970) (no affirmative duty to provide
an inmate with a clergyman of his choice). Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Defendants
7
provided Muslim chaplains as they became available. (Dkt. No. 40, ¶¶ 16-17; Dkt. No.
50, Attach. 3, ¶¶ 16-17.) Garraway has not alleged that there is a prison policy impinging
on his First Amendment rights. Therefore, it is not necessary to undertake a Turner
analysis. Nor has Garraway alleged that the lack of a full-time Sunni Muslim chaplain
substantially burdens the exercise of his religion. Without establishing a substantial
burden, his claim under the RFRA fails.
3. Prison Policies Regarding an Islamic Halal Diet
Garraway claimed that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by failing
to provide an Islamic Halal diet. Religious diets are provided in accordance with the
following BOP policy:
The Bureau provides inmates requesting a religious diet
reasonable and equitable opportunity to observe their
religious dietary practice within the constraints of budget
limitations and the security and orderly running of the
institution and the Bureau through a religious diet menu.
28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a).
Again, the District Court ably applied the requisite four-part Turner analysis,
concluding that the regulation in question did not impermissibly curtail Garraway‟s right
to free exercise of his religion. (Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 35-39); see also Williams v. Morton,
343 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting inmates‟ claim that failure to provide Halal
meat in lieu of vegetarian meals violated their First Amendment rights).
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4. Prison Policies Limiting the Number of Books Kept in an Inmate‟s Cell
Garraway claimed that the BOP regulation limiting the number of books an inmate
may have as personal property in his cell substantially burdened his ability to exercise his
religion. The regulation in question, BOP Program Statement 5580.07, instituted a
national limit of five books per inmate, regardless of topic. (Dkt. No. 39, Ex. 1, Attach.
C.) According to Defendants, this limit was imposed in the interest of security, fire
safety, and sanitation, as it allowed proper cell searches and limited the places inmates
could store contraband. (Dkt. No. 40, ¶ 51-52.) Garraway did not dispute that the BOP
provided him with religious texts. (Dkt. No. 40, ¶¶ 42-43; Dkt No. 50, Attach. 3, ¶¶ 42-
43.) However, he claimed that Defendants “exaggerated” the security concerns
addressed by BOP Program Statement 5580.07. (Dkt. No. 50, Attach. 3, ¶¶ 51-52.)
The District Court correctly considered the Turner factors in reaching the
conclusion that the BOP regulation did not impermissibly impinge on Garraway‟s free
exercise of his religion. (Dkt. No. 65 at 45-46.) Further, no facts supported Garraway‟s
claim that the five book national limit substantially burdened his ability to practice his
religion. This Court‟s decision in Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2007), is
distinguishable. There, an inmate argued that his religion required “a daily reading of
four Afro-centric books,” id. at 281, and that the prison‟s ten-book limitation
substantially burdened the practice of his religion, id. at 282-83. Garraway makes no
such claim. Without establishing a substantial burden, his claim under the RFRA fails.
9
5. Availability of Ceremonial Religious Items
Garraway claimed his First Amendment rights were violated because Islamic
ceremonial religious items were sold in the BOP commissary with marked-up prices, in
violation of BOP policy. Defendants provided evidence that the items were not sold with
a mark-up. (Dkt. No. 39, Ex. 1, Attach. E and Attach. F.) Garraway responded with an
unsupported assertion that the evidence provided by Defendants contained “false and
misleading” information. (Dkt. No. 50-4, ¶ 16.) There being no genuine issue of
material fact, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants. We will affirm. See DeHart, 390 F.3d at 267-68 (“In reviewing the grant of
summary judgment, we must affirm if the record evidence submitted by the non-movant
is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”).
6. Garraway‟s Remaining Claims
We have thoroughly reviewed the District Court‟s Memorandum and Order,
together with the record below. Garraway‟s remaining claims were either properly
dismissed4 or summary judgment was properly entered5 in favor of the Defendants.
4
These include Garraway‟s claims under the RLUIPA (Dkt. No. 65, pp. 7-8), those
barred by the statute of limitations (id., pp. 8-10), and his claims with respect to a
standardized chapel library (id., pp. 47-48), the distribution of Bible quotes (id., p. 50),
and alleged verbal harassment (id., pp. 62-64).
5
These include Garraway‟s claims with respect to a delay in receiving mail (Dkt. No. 65,
pp. 31-33), dress and clothing issues (id., pp. 39-43), allocation of funds (id., p. 50),
teaching Arabic in chapel (id., pp. 55-57), participation in Muslim observances (id., pp.
57-59), and rejection of his administrative remedies (id., pp. 60-62).
10
Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will summarily
affirm the order of the District Court granting Defendants‟ motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment6, pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
6
It is unclear from the District Court‟s opinion whether certain claims were dismissed or
whether summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendants. In any case, it is
harmless error where, as here, “the judgment may be affirmed if it appears that there is no
set of facts on which plaintiff[] could possibly recover.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,
342 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,
240 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the
record.”).
11