Jamil Cooper v. Pennsylvania Department of Cor ( 2018 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 16-1958
______________
JAMIL COOPER,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
JOHN WETZEL
MARIROSA LAMAS;
KURT GRANLUND;
SERGEANT STROHM;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHEMAN, all in their official capacities
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. No. 1-12-cv-01186)
District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane
______________
Argued October 3, 2018
______________
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 21, 2018)
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OPINION*
______________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
Selby P. Brown, Esq. [ARGUED]
Stephen D. Brown, Esq.
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
18th Floor, Cira Centre
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellant**
Joseph G. Fulginiti, Esq. [ARGUED]
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Office of Chief Counsel
1920 Technology Parkway
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050
Counsel for Appellees
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Jamil Cooper appeals the District Court’s orders granting summary
judgment to Defendants and denying Plaintiff’s motions to postpone consideration of the
summary judgment motion and to compel answers to interrogatories. For the reasons that
follow, we will vacate in part and affirm in part.
I
A
Cooper was an inmate at State Correctional Institution Rockville (“SCI-
Rockville”), where he served as Block Representative for housing A Block. On
September 6, 2011, an officer ordered Cooper to assist inmate Kristian Diaz Cruz. Diaz
Cruz is blind and wanted to file a grievance with the prison superintendent regarding how
**
Attorneys for Appellant appeared pro bono, and their service is in the highest
traditions of our profession. We thank them for their representation in this case.
2
the officers were treating him and handling his insulin injections. While Cooper and
Diaz Cruz were seated together, Correctional Officer Sherman walked by and called out
to Cooper, “So you think you know how to write people up!” App. 0153, 0176.
The same day, Sherman completed a misconduct report charging Cooper with
refusing to obey an order and being present in an unauthorized area. According to the
report, Sergeant Strohm ordered all inmates to return to their cells, but Cooper continued
to loiter. Sherman again ordered him to his cell, but Cooper instead went to the control
bubble seeking a pass to go to the library. Sherman’s report states that Cooper committed
the same offenses on August 13, 2011. Nothing indicates that Cooper was served with
the September 6, 2011 report.
On September 7, 2011, Sherman wrote another misconduct report, charging
Cooper with refusing to obey another one of Strohm’s orders to return to his cell and
being present in an unauthorized area. The September 7, 2011 report referenced
Cooper’s alleged misconduct on September 6, 2011. Cooper was served with the
September 7, 2011 report. That day, Sherman called Cooper names, cursed at him in
front of other inmates, and implied that he was a snitch. In response, on September 8,
2011, Cooper filed a grievance against Sherman and met with Unit Manager Kurt
Granlund.
Cooper states that during 2011 he had complained to prison officials that Granlund
acted unprofessionally, was biased, and did not intervene in housing matters. With
respect to the misconduct reports, Cooper asserts that Granlund did not permit him to see
the September 6, 2011 misconduct report until Cooper signed an Informal Resolution
3
Action Form. After Cooper signed the form, Granlund told Cooper he was guilty of
misconduct without providing any findings of fact or giving Cooper a chance to explain
his version of the events. Granlund gave Cooper fourteen days’ cell restriction. Cooper
unsuccessfully appealed the misconduct. A few weeks later, Granlund dismissed
Cooper’s grievance against Sherman.
B
Cooper filed a pro se complaint and an amended complaint in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Defendants Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, John Wetzel, Marirosa Lamas, Kurt Granlund, Sergeant
Strohm, and Correctional Officer Sherman. Cooper claims that Defendants retaliated
against him for assisting Diaz Cruz and complaining about Granlund, and that he was
denied procedural due process in his misconduct proceedings.1
Pursuant to the Standing Practice Order and the Middle District’s local rules,
discovery was scheduled to begin the day the last pleading was filed and would run six
months from that date. Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and the District Court stayed discovery pending the resolution of that
motion. The Court dismissed all but Cooper’s First Amendment and Due Process
retaliation claims, Defendants filed their answer, and the six-month discovery period
commenced on May 9, 2014.
1
Cooper also brought conspiracy and defamation claims, which have been
dismissed. See generally Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 1:CV–12–1186, 2014
WL 1600037 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2014). Cooper does not challenge that ruling.
4
After discovery ended, Defendants moved for summary judgment. In response,
Cooper moved the District Court to postpone consideration of the summary judgment
motion and thereafter filed an opposition brief, together with a response to Defendants’
statement of undisputed material facts, affidavits, and supporting exhibits. The Court
considered Cooper’s untimely materials but denied his motion to postpone consideration
of the summary judgment motion, concluding that, based on his response to the motion, it
appeared he no longer needed time to obtain evidence and/or the evidence he claimed to
need was not “essential to justify his opposition.” Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No.
1:12-CV-01186, 2015 WL 9268425, at *1-3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2015).
On the day the District Court denied Cooper’s motion to postpone, it docketed his
motion to compel answers to interrogatories. The District Court denied Cooper’s motion
to compel and granted summary judgment for Defendants. On the motion to compel, the
Court found that Cooper took no action to cure his dissatisfaction with Defendants’
interrogatory answers for more than a year after discovery closed and more than nineteen
months after receiving the responses.
With respect to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the Court concluded that
Cooper had “not established that he had a constitutional right to assist other inmates,” and
thus no jury could conclude that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising a
constitutional right.” Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 1:12-CV-01186, 2016 WL
1271327, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016). Cooper appeals.
5
II2
A
Our review of an order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary. Mylan
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013). We apply the same
standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making reasonable inferences in the non-
movant’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir.
2005). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material
only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. County
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
We review case management orders, like orders denying motions to withhold
consideration of summary judgment and orders denying motions to compel discovery, for
abuse of discretion. See Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 354 (3d
Cir. 2003) (motions to compel and scope of discovery). Therefore, we will not disturb
the District Court’s rulings on these motions unless they were “arbitrary, fanciful or
2
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6
clearly unreasonable,” and “no reasonable person would adopt [its] view.” Stecyk v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
B
1
We will first consider whether the District Court properly granted Defendants
summary judgment on Cooper’s retaliation claim. A prisoner alleging retaliation must
establish a prima facie case that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct;
“(2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
discipline him.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom., Coutts v. Watson, 137 S. Ct. 2295 (2017). If the prisoner establishes each of these
elements, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it “would have made the
same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).
2
With respect to the first element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct at
issue is constitutionally protected. Cooper asserts that he has a constitutional right to
assist a fellow inmate to file a grievance. Generally, prisoners do not have a First
Amendment right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners. See Shaw v. Murphy,
532 U.S. 223, 230-32 (2001) (declining to extend constitutional protection to inmate-
inmate legal communications, instead applying the test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89 (1987), under which prisons can limit conduct if the regulation is reasonably
7
related to a legitimate penological interest). After the District Court ruled on Defendants’
motion, our Court held that where prisoner-to-prisoner legal assistance “was both
pursuant to [the plaintiff’s] job duties [at the prison] and in accordance with prison
regulations, [and] was not inconsistent with legitimate penological interests,” such
assistance “could fall within the limited First Amendment rights that prisoners retain.”
Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2017).
In Wisniewski, we concluded that an Inmate Legal Reference Aide, who was
responsible for assisting other inmates with the filing of legal documents and grievances,
had engaged in constitutionally protected conduct pursuant to his job duties. See id. at
155-56. Cooper asserts that his role as a Block Representative is analogous to the role of
an Inmate Legal Reference Aide. Cooper submitted an affidavit stating that as a Block
Representative, it was his
responsibility to be some what [of a] go between to try and resolve matters
if possible informally between staff or corrections officers and inmates or
inmates with inmates specifically on [his] housing area (A Block) without
causing friction by bringing matters up before the Unit Manager.
App. 0151. If Cooper’s role as a Block Representative is similar to the Inmate Legal
Reference Aide in Wisniewski, then his actions assisting Diaz Cruz may be entitled to
constitutional protection. Because neither the District Court nor the parties had an
opportunity to consider whether the role of Block Representative is similar to an Inmate
Legal Reference Aide, we will vacate the order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s
retaliation claim based on his assistance to Diaz Cruz and remand for consideration of his
claim in light of Wisniewski.
8
2
Cooper also asserts that he engaged in protected conduct, for which he was
retaliated against, when he raised complaints about Granlund. Granlund was Unit
Manager for A Block. Cooper, the A Block representative, complained to prison officials
that: (1) officers under Granlund’s supervision were stealing from cells, (2) Granlund
failed to intervene in housing matters, (3) Granlund acted unprofessionally, and (4)
Granlund was biased in his investigations.3
Assuming Cooper’s complaints about Granlund constitute protected conduct and
that he suffered adverse consequences, this claim nonetheless fails. Cooper must
demonstrate a causal link between his complaints about Granlund and the adverse action
he suffered. Cooper stated that he raised complaints about Granlund multiple times
throughout 2011, but provided no greater specificity concerning the timing of those
complaints. Although Cooper asserts that Granlund addressed him aggressively at the
Informal Resolution hearing that followed the September 2011 misconduct reports,
allegedly ordering him to sign the form, denying him the proper procedures under DC-
ADM 801, and denying his September 8, 2011 grievance against Sherman as “frivolous”
3
Appellees assert that these claims are improperly predicated on self-serving
affidavits filed years after the incidents occurred. While “conclusory, self-serving
affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment,” an affidavit with
“specific facts that reveal a genuine issue of material fact” is sufficient. Paladino v.
Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey &
Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009)). Cooper’s detailed affidavit is not
conclusory. Moreover, while Appellees chastise Cooper’s failure to produce
corroborating evidence, they have not denied the facts contained in those affidavits.
Therefore, his affidavits may be considered in determining whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact.
9
a few weeks later, Cooper presents insufficient evidence to show a link between his
complaints about Granlund and Granlund’s September 2011 actions. Thus, no reasonable
jury could find that Granlund acted in retaliation for Cooper’s complaints about him. We
will therefore affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s
retaliation claim for complaints against Granlund.
C
We next address Cooper’s procedural due process retaliation claim. “Prison
disciplinary proceedings may . . . constitute a denial of due process in the context of a
civil rights action under § 1983 when they are instituted for the sole purpose of retaliating
against an inmate for his/her exercise of a constitutional right.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002). Such a procedural due process claim requires threshold
proof of constitutionally protected conduct. Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
486 (1995)); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). Even if the
discipline is initiated in retaliation for a protected act, however, due process is satisfied
where the plaintiff has an opportunity to confront and challenge the retaliatory
misconduct reports. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 653-54.
The District Court did not address Cooper’s procedural due process claim because
it found he had not engaged in protected conduct. See Cooper, 2016 WL 1271327, at *3-
5. Because we will vacate the Court’s ruling on Cooper’s retaliation claim based on his
assistance to Diaz Cruz for it to determine whether Cooper’s actions constitute
10
constitutionally protected conduct under Wisniewski,4 we will also vacate the order
granting summary judgment on his due process claim.5
D
Cooper filed a motion to compel responses to interrogatories while Defendants’
summary judgment motion was pending. Defendants lodged objections to every
interrogatory Cooper served and provided at best minimal responses to very few. The
District Court denied Cooper’s motion because it was filed over a year after discovery
closed and nineteen months after receiving Defendants’ responses.
Pursuant to the Standing Practice Order and Local Rule 26.4, discovery closed six
months from the date of the last pleading. Cooper first served his interrogatories on June
6, 2013. On January 24, 2014, the District Court stayed discovery pending the resolution
of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court resolved the motion, and thereafter
Defendants answered Cooper’s amended complaint on May 9, 2014. Their answer
4
On remand, the District Court may consider whether there are disputed material
facts concerning this determination and the other elements of his First Amendment and
due process retaliation claims.
5
Cooper also appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to postpone
consideration of Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Consistent with Cooper’s
representations at argument, Oral Argument at 10:22-11:10, Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 16-1958 (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings,
because we are vacating the order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s retaliation
and procedural due process claims arising from his assistance to Diaz Cruz and these
claims will be subject to renewed summary judgment motions, the appeal of the order
denying his motion to postpone is deemed withdrawn. If, in the District Court’s
judgment, limited discovery is warranted to address the applicability of Wisniewski, then
it may permit the parties to engage in such discovery, including serving a discrete number
of interrogatories, document demands, and/or conducting depositions.
11
triggered the six-month discovery period, which closed on November 9, 2014.6 Cooper
re-served his interrogatories on May 17, 2014 and Defendants served their responses on
May 19, 2014. Cooper’s motion to compel responses was filed nineteen months later, on
December 21, 2015. Cooper asserts that his delay in filing his motion was in part due to
his transfer to a New Jersey prison to face other charges. Even though Cooper was in
New Jersey from June to November 2014, and even assuming he could take no action in
this case while there, he waited more than a year after his return from New Jersey to take
action concerning Defendants’ discovery responses.
Applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we cannot conclude that the
District Court abused its discretion in denying Cooper’s motion when he inexplicably
waited over nineteen months to address the deficient responses. Furthermore, because we
have vacated the Court’s order granting summary judgment on his due process and
retaliation claims based upon his assistance to Diaz Cruz, Cooper has faced no “actual
and substantial prejudice” from not having the responses he sought. In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817, 818 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, we will affirm the order
denying his motion to compel.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part and affirm in part and remand for
further proceedings.7
6
In its opinion denying Cooper’s motion to compel, the District Court stated that
discovery closed on December 9, 2014.
7
The District Court granted summary judgment for all individual Defendants.
Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:12-CV-01186, 2016 WL 1294591 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
12
2016). Cooper made no arguments regarding Lamas and Wetzel in the District Court,
and “arguments not raised in the district courts are waived on appeal.” United States v.
Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 2010).
13