United States v. Trala ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-26-2004
USA v. Trala
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 02-4524
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PRECEDENTIAL 704 King Street
First Federal Plaza, Suite 110
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS Wilmington, DE 19801
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Attorney for Appellant
No: 02-4524
Keith M. Rosen, Esq. (Argued)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Office of United States Attorney
v.
1007 Orange Street, Suite 700
JOHN WALTER TRALA Wilmington, DE 19899
a/k/a Sonny
Attorney for the Appellee
a/k/a Walter John Trala
JOHN WALTER TRALA,
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
John Walter Trala appeals his
Appellant conviction for bank robbery, conspiracy to
commit bank robbery, and use of a firearm
Appeal from the United States District during a crime of violence. For the
Court reasons below, we will affirm.
for the District of Delaware
I
(Crim. No. 00-cr-00023-1)
District Court: Hon. Gregory M. Sleet A.Background of the Robbery
Trala’s conviction stems from his
Argued: December 15, 2003
participation in the armed robbery of the
PNC bank branch in the Eden Square
Before: ROTH and M cKEE, Circuit
Shopping Center in Bear, Delaware (the
Judges,
“Bank”). However, events began in the
and ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge.
spring of 1999 when the Bank’s head
teller, Melissa Bailey, began stealing
(Filed October 26, 2004)
money from the Bank’s vault to support
her husband’s drug habit. App. 1248-51.
OPINION
By November 1999, Mrs. Bailey had
stolen approximately $100,000. App.
Penny Marshall, Esq. (Argued)
1250.
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Around that time, the Bank
1
received $400,000 in cash from the The bank was robbed at
Federal Reserve to cover an increase in approximately 8:00 AM on January 14,
customer withdraws that was anticipated 2000. App. 1031-33. As planned, Mrs.
as a result of the “Y2K” computer scare. Bailey was present, as was Bank manager,
App. 1251-52, 1254. Mrs. Bailey, as head Brian Warnock. Id. Another Bank teller,
teller, had sole responsibility for these Lillian Foley, arrived while the robbery
funds, which were kept in a separate safe was in progress. App. 1053. After the
inside the Bank’s vault. App. 1252. The robber fled, Foley drove to a nearby store
influx of Y2K funds afforded Bailey an and asked someone to call the police.
opportunity to replace the $100,000 she App. 1056-57. When Delaware police
had stolen from the Bank. However, arrived, an officer found a red sweatshirt
Bailey knew that any shortfall in the Y2K and black knit cap on a sidewalk near the
funds would eventually be discovered Bank. Those garments matched the Bank
because those funds had to be returned to employees’ descriptions of the garments
the Federal Reserve on January 19, 2000. worn by the robber. App. 1073.2 Warnock
App. 1255-56. and Foley described the robber as 5’6”-
5’9,” 150-160 pounds, 3 and wearing a red
Mrs. Bailey’s husband, Philip
hooded sweatshirt. App. 1033, 1054.
Bailey, operated a concrete business where
Warnock also indicated that the perpetrator
Trala worked as a concrete finisher. App.
was wearing a dark stocking cap and
1119. In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Bailey and
sunglasses. See App. 1033. When
Trala began discussing the possibility of
questioned, Mrs. Bailey denied any
robbing the Bank to create an explanation
involvement in the robbery and indicated
for the missing Y2K funds. The robbery
that $400,000 had been stolen from the
would account for any shortfall in the Y2K
vault. App. 1274-75.
funds, thereby preventing the detection of
Mrs. Bailey’s prior embezzlement when Mr. Bailey was sick at home on the
those funds were returned to the Federal morning of the robbery. App. 1143. He
Reserve. App. 1136-37, 1258-59. Mrs. testified at Trala’s trial that Trala came
Bailey informed Trala about the “Y2K” into Mr. Bailey’s room the morning of the
funds, told him where the money was robbery, pulled money out of a brown
located, and informed him that she would
have to be present during the robbery they
were planning because she was the only 2
Trala admitted at trial that the red
person with the second half of the
sweatshirt was his, and that he owned a
combination to the vault. App. 1259-60.1 number of black knit caps like the one found
B. The Robbery near the scene of the robbery. App. 1762.
3
During a routine processing interview,
1
Any other Bank employee would have Trala stated that he was approximately 5’8”
the first half of the combination. App. 1259. and 155 pounds. App. 1564.
2
paper bag, and asked Bailey how much he driver’s license, Officer Guthrie asked him
wanted. App. 1144-45. Bailey further for his name and date of birth. Trala
testified that Trala told him that he would replied that his name was “Natt Albert
put the money in Mr. Bailey’s shop. Id.4 Allen, Jr.” App. 1441. Prince also told
Later that day, Trala returned home to Officer Guthrie that Trala’s name was
Elkton, Maryland and paid his landlord for “Natt Allen, Jr.” App. 1449. In speaking
two weeks’ rent. He paid in $100 bills, with the Officer, Trala stated that he had
which the landlord testified was unusual. over $10,000 in cash in the car, and said it
App. 1104-05. Trala then left Maryland was proceeds from a recent property deal.
and drove to North Carolina with his App. 1444.
girlfriend, Vicky Prince, and her daughter.
When Sergeant Felicia Long
App. 1776-77.
arrived on the scene, she spoke to Trala at
On February 10, 2000, Mrs. Bailey the “rear of the vehicle” and he repeated
was interviewed by an FBI agent and what he had just told Officer Guthrie.
confessed her involvement in the Bank App. 1963-64. Sgt. Long then spoke to
robbery, as well as the 1999 thefts. App. Prince “at the front of the vehicle.” Prince
1360-61. initially identified herself as “Michele
Trala,” but later said that her name was
C.Trala’s Arrest in North
actually Vicky Prince. App. 1465, 1470.
Carolina
When asked about the cash, Prince initially
On the morning of February 10, stated that the money came from “working
2000, Moorehead City, North Carolina and saving.” App. 1468. When asked the
Patrol Officer, Timothy Guthrie, stopped a same question later in the conversation,
1990 Ford Taurus. Trala was driving and she stated that Trala “won it at the races in
Prince was a passenger. App. 1440, 1464- Delaware.” App. 1970. However, Prince
70. When Trala could not produce a changed her story after police told her that
there would be a record of any winnings at
the race track. Prince then said that Trala
4
Trala had a different version of the events “won the money at the slots.” App. 1471.
that took place on the day of the robbery. He
testified that he showed up for work that Prince and Trala were placed under
morning, but found the shop empty. App. arrest and police eventually searched the
1766. While he was cleaning towels, Mr. car where they found $35,123 in cash.
Bailey arrived and went into the office area of App. 1487-89. Trala was subsequently
the shop. App. 1766-67. When Trala finished turned over to federal authorities in
his work, he went into the office and noticed Delaware and charged with: (1) bank
that Mr. Bailey had a large amount of cash. robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
App. 1767. When he questioned Mr. Bailey 2113(a) and (d), and 2 (Count I); (2)
about the money, Mr. Bailey gave him conspiracy to commit bank robbery in
approximately $30,000 dollars and told him to
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count II);
stay quiet about what he had seen. Id.3
and (3) use of a firearm during a crime of matched Trala’s DNA to a reasonable
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § degree of scientific certainty. App. 1640.
924(c)(1) (Count III). App. 36-38.5
Prior to trial, Trala filed a motion in
D.DNA and Trace Evidence limine challenging the admissibility of the
DNA evidence. He argued that the
The sweatshirt and knit cap that
evidence should be excluded because
police found just outside the Bank were
PCR/STR typing, as applied to mixed
sent to the FBI laboratory in Washington,
DNA samples, did not satisfy the standard
D.C. App. 1498-99. FBI agents also
for scientific reliability under Federal Rule
collected hair and saliva samples from
of Evidence 702 or Daubert v. Merrell
Trala and took carpet samples from his
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579motel home. App. 1492-93, 1504-05.
(1993). After conducting a three-day
These samples were sent to the FBI
evidentiary hearing, the district court
laboratory for comparison with the
issued a well reasoned and comprehensive
samples from the sweatshirt and knit cap.
opinion explaining its conclusion that the
App. 1493-94, 1506.
expert testimony was admissible.
Forensic examination determined
E.Jury Deliberations
that the hairs taken from the garments
e x h i b i te d th e s a m e m i c r o s co p ic The trial began on Monday,
characteristics as the hairs taken from November 26, 2001. App. 899. By
Trala and the fibers taken from his carpet. Friday, November 30, both sides had
App. 1591-92. The FBI laboratory also rested, and the jury began deliberations at
compared DNA taken from hairs on the approximately 1:00 PM. App. 1919. The
knit cap found near the Bank following the first day of deliberations ended at 4:30 PM
robbery with DNA taken from Trala’s due to a juror’s previously scheduled
saliva sample. The forensic examiner used weekend trip. App. 1919, 1931-3. The
a method of DNA typing known as following Mon day, Decem ber 3 ,
“PCR/STR” typing. App. 1630, 1633. deliberations did not beg in until
The results revealed that the sample taken approximately 1:00 PM because the same
from the knit cap was mixed, i.e., it juror was late returning from her trip.
contained DNA from more than one App. 1966. Shortly after 5:00 PM on the
person. App. 1639-40. The examiner second day of deliberations, the court
determined, however, that there was a asked the deputy clerk to find out if the
clear majority contributor to the sample, jurors wanted to order dinner and continue
and that the DNA of the major contributor their deliberations. App. 1965. The jury
responded with the following question:
“The jury wants to know if they can’t
5
In addition to these three counts, Mrs. come to [a] unanimous decision, and this
Bailey was charged with embezzlement in is before they decide about dinner, is it
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656. App. 38.
4
over or will they have to come back?” Id. not answering their question.
The following exchange then took
THE COURT:I feel like we’re
place between the court and defense
answering their question. If they have a
counsel:
further question to the Court’s response,
THE COURT:[M]y inclination at we’ll respond at that time.
this time at 5:05 is to advise the jury that
we’re prepared to order dinner.
App. 1966-67. When informed of the
...
court’s response, the jurors decided to
order dinner. At approximately 8:00 PM,
they returned with a verdict finding Trala
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your
guilty on all charges.6 App. 1967, 1969-
Honor, the difficulty is that [this] is some
72.
expression of . . . possibly not being able
to reach a verdict. This appeal followed.
II
THE COURT:The jury hasn’t A. Expert Testimony Relating to
deliberated long enough to even be close PCR/STR DNA Typing
to that point. They didn’t commence their
Trala’s primary argument is that the
deliberations until 1:00 o’clock today.
district court erred by admitting DNA
They didn’t start their deliberations until
evidence linking him to the knit cap found
1:00 o’clock on the day that they got the
near the scene of the robbery. He argues
case . . . .
that PCR/STR DNA typing does not meet
the standard for scientific reliability under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:Here is
when applied to mixed DNA samples.
my problem, your Honor. If they asked the
“We review the decision to admit or reject
question and we give no response to it one
expert testimony under an abuse of
way or the other, then we put them in a
discretion standard.” Schneider ex rel.
position.
Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396,
THE COURT:Of ordering dinner
and continuing their deliberations. 6
Trala was eventually sentenced to a total
of 322 months imprisonment, five years of
supervised release, a $300 special assessment,
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:But we’re and restitution in the amount of $144,457.
App. 1974-80.
5
404 (3d Cir. 2003).7 rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand.” Id. at 597. In
After careful examination of the
light of this, we note that the district
record, we conclude that there was no
court’s painstaking opinion provides a
abuse of discretion. We hold that the
thorough and compelling analysis of the
PCR/STR DNA typing utilized in this case
court’s rejection of Trala’s challenges to
does in fact meet the standards for
the DNA evidence. We conclude that the
reliability and admissibility set forth in
court did not abuse its discretion in
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
admitting the DNA evidence substantially
Daubert. In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme
for the reasons Judge Sleet sets forth in his
Court interpreted and applied Rule 702,
opinion. See 162 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Del.
which replaced the common law rule
2001).
requiring “general acceptance” for the
admissibility of scientific evidence with aB. The Jury’s Question about Continuing
standard requiring an “assessment of Deliberations
whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or Trala also argues that the district
methodology properly can be applied to court coerced the jury into reaching a
the facts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow verdict by giving them a “non-responsive
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. at 586, 592-3. directive to order dinner” in response to
The Court held that “the Rules of their inquiry about whether they would
Evidence—especially Rule 702 —do have to continue deliberations the
assign to the trial judge the task of following day if they were deadlocked.
ensuring that an expert’s testimony both Br. at 35 (internal quotation marks
omitted). He argues that “[a] reasonable
impression was given to the jurors that
7
Trala suggests that we should apply the they needed to stay until they reached a
plenary standard of review to the district verdict, no matter how long that took.” Id.court’s “interpretation of Rule 702’s
application to DNA evidence.” Br. at 64. Although a district court may not
However, the court did not interpret Rule 702; coerce a jury into reaching a unanimous
it merely applied the rule in accordance with verdict, it is well-established that it has
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent. broad discretion to determine how long
Compare Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d jury deliberations should continue. See,
734, 745 (3d Cir. 2000) (exercising plenary e.g., Govt. of V.I. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914,
review of the district court’s decision not to 935-36 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, “[a]bsent
conduct a Daubert hearing, but noting that we peculiar evidence indicative of coercion, it
“ordinarily review a district court’s is proper for a judge to instruct a
application of Rule 702, as well as the deadlocked jury to continue deliberations
decision whether to grant a Daubert hearing,
and attempt to arrive at a verdict.” Id.; see
for abuse of discretion . . . ”).
6
also United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d a matter within the discretion of the trial
154, 159 (3d Cir. 1966), overruled on judge, and his action in requiring further
other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). In deliberation after the jury has reported a
Gereau, we affirmed a guilty verdict disagreement does not, without more,
where the jurors were instructed to constitute coercion.” Id. at 160; compare
continue deliberations for at least one U.S. v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
more afternoon after they had already 1969) (holding that the Allen charge,
deliberated for nearly 40 hours. Despite where the court instructs jurors in the
the length of the deliberations, we found minority to question their own judgment in
that there “was no threat that the jury light of the contrary view held by the
would be locked up indefinitely unless a majority, was coercive).
verdict was reached . . . .” Id. at 936;
Here, the court did not require the
compare Jenkins v. U. S., 380 U.S. 445,
jurors to stay and order dinner as Trala
446 (1965) (per curiam) (finding coercion
suggests. Rather, the judge gave jurors the
where, after two hours of deliberations, the
option of ordering dinner and continuing
court told a deadlocked jury: “You have
their deliberations into the evening. App.
got to reach a decision in this case.”)
1965 (“I’ve asked our courtroom deputy to
(internal quotation marks omitted).
find out if the jury wants to order dinner.
Our decision in Gereau was based They’re discussing it.”). The jury then
in part on the fact that the court there responded with the following question:
advised the jury that it did not have to “[I]f they can’t come to [a] unanimous
reach a unanimous verdict. Id. However, decision, and this is before they decide
such an instruction is not required unless about dinner, is it over or will they have to
there is some evidence of coercion. come back?” App. 1965. After a brief
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 725 discussion with defense counsel, the court
(3d Cir. 1994) (“The mere absence of . . . simply reiterated that it was “prepared to
an instruction [that the jury can return a order dinner.” App. 1966. At that point,
hung verdict] does not in and of itself the jury, which had only deliberated for
suggest coercion.”). Nor does the court four hours that day (and a total of seven
have to set a particular time limit on and a half hours), chose to order dinner
deliberations, even after the jury has and continue deliberations. App. 1966-67.
expressed that it is hopelessly deadlocked. Three hours later, they reached a verdict.
In Grosso, for instance, we affirmed a This does not suggest a “threat that the
guilty verdict where the court simply jury would be locked up indefinitely unless
instructed a deadlocked jury to “keep on a verdict was reached, nor was there any
working.” 358 F.2d at 159 (internal indication that jurors should doubt the
quotation marks omitted). We held that judg men ts t h e y h a d a r r iv e d a t
“[t]he length of time a jury may be kept independently.” Gereau, 502 F.2d at 936.
together for the purpose of deliberation is The court merely implied that it was not
7
convinced of a deadlocked jury after only 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004):
seven and a half hours of deliberations.
This was a proper exercise of the court’s
discretion. Leaving the regulation of
out-of-court statements to
C.Prince’s Statements to Sgt.
the law of evidence would
Long
render the Confrontation
Finally, Trala argues that the court Clause powerless to prevent
erred in admitting Prince’s conflicting even the most flagrant
statements to Sgt. Long regarding her inquisitorial practices. . . .
identity, and the source of money in his Where testimonial
car. He challenges Long’s testimony that statements are involved, we
Prince said: (1) that her name was do not think the Framers
“Michele Trala”; (2) that her name was meant to leave the Sixth
actually Vicky Prince; (3) that the money Amendment's protection to
in the car was from working and saving; the vagaries of the rules of
(4) that Trala won the money at the evidence, much less to
racetrack; and (5) that he won the money amorphous notions of
playing slot machines. See App. 1465-71. "reliability." 124 S.Ct. at
Trala argues that the admission of these 1364, 1370.
statements violated the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and
Federal Rule of Evidence 402. We will We exercise plenary review over
address each of these arguments in turn. Confrontation Clause challenges. United
States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d
1.Th e Confronta tion Cir. 1998).8
Clause
The right of cross-examination is
Trala concedes that Prince’s secured by the Confrontation Clause.
statements were not hearsay because they Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. at
were not offered to prove the truth of the 1357; see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380
matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). U.S. 415, 418 (1965). In Crawford, the
Rather, the statements were offered in an Court held that witnesses’ out-of-court
attempt to establish Trala’s consciousness
of guilt. App. 1466. Yet this does not end
8
our inquiry under the Confrontation Clause The government argues that Trala did not
of the Sixth Amendment. As the Supreme preserve his Confrontation Clause claim at
Court noted recently in Crawford v. trial. We disagree. At trial, defense counsel
Washington, specifically objected to Sgt. Long’s testimony
regarding Prince’s statements during the
traffic stop on grounds that it violated the
Confrontation Clause. App. 1466-67.
8
statements that are testimonial are barred of the statement. Id. After he was
by the Confrontation Clause, regardless of convicted, the defendant challenged the
determinations of reliability, unless the admission of the confession on grounds
witnesses are unavailable and the that it violated the Confrontation Clause.
defendant has had a prior opportunity for The Supreme Court held that “[t]he
cross-examination. Though Crawford Clause’s fundamental role in protecting the
bears generally on the present case because right of cross-examination . . . was
the evidence in question is testimonial satisfied by [the Sheriff’s] presence on the
(“[s]tatements taken by police officers in stand.” Id. at 414. It further noted that
the course of interrogations are also “[i]f [the defendant’s] counsel doubted
testimonial under ev en a narro w that [the] confession was accurately
standard”), its principles are not recounted, he was free to cross-examine
contravened because the reliability of the Sheriff . . . .” Id. The Court
Prince’s out of court statements is not at acknowledged the possibility that the jury
issue here. Crawford v. Washington, 124 might improperly consider the truthfulness
S.Ct. at 1364. Crawford restates the of the confession, as in Bruton v. United
constitutional requirement of cross- States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), despite the
examination, or confrontation, as the district court’s instruction to the contrary.
primary—and indeed, the Id.9 Nevertheless, despite its Bruton
necessary—means of establishing the concerns, the Court found that the
reliability of testimonial evidence. “Where probative value of the confession
testimonial statements are at issue, the only outweighed the possibility of misuse, and
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy that “there were no alternatives that would
constitutional demands is the one the have both assured the integrity of the
C o n s t i t u ti o n a c t u al l y p r e s c ri b e s: trial’s truth-seeking function and
confrontation.” Id. at 1374. eliminated the risk of the jury’s improper
Crawford does not apply where the
reliability of testimonial evidence is not at
issue, and a defendant’s right of
confrontation may be satisfied even though
the declarant does not testify. For
9
example, in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. In Bruton, the Court reversed the
409, 411-12 (1985), the confession of a defendant’s conviction based on the admission
co-conspirator was read into the record of a co-defendant’s confession, despite the
during defendant’s murder trial. It was fact that the court instructed the jury “that
introduced through the sheriff who had although [the co-defendant’s] confession was
obtained it and it was admitted solely to competent evidence against [him] it was
rebut the defendant’s testimony. Id. inadmissible hearsay against [defendant] and
therefore had to be disregarded in determining
Significantly, the jury was specifically
[defendant’s] guilt or innocence. 391 U.S. at
instructed not to consider the truthfulness
125.
9
use of evidence.” Id. at 414-416.10 existence of any fact that is of
Although the court here did not consequence to the determination of the
expressly caution the jury against action more probable or less probable than
considering the truthfulness of Prince’s it would be without the evidence.”). The
statements, it is clear that no such warning district court found that Prince’s
was required because, unlike the situation statements were relevant to show Trala’s
in Street, there was absolutely no risk that consciousness of guilt under United States
the jury would mistakenly assume the truth v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841 (3d Cir.
of Prince’s statements. In fact, the 1997), overruled on other grounds, United
statements were admitted because they States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275were so obviously false. They established (1999). App. 1466. Our review of the
that Prince was lying to the police about court’s interpretation of Rule 402 is
her identity, as well as the source of the plenary. Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576.11
money in Trala’s car. Moreover, Trala’s In Palma-Ruedas, a detective came
testimony was not to the contrary. Even he to the house where the defendant was
testified that Prince’s name was not located and a woman named Alvarez
“Michele Trala,” and that the money did answered the door along with defendant,
not come from savings, the racetrack, or whose actual name was Omar Torres-
playing slot machines. See App. 1767, Montalvo. Id. at 856. At trial, the
1771. Furthermore, Sgt. Long was detective testified that Alvarez told him
available for cross-examination, so defense that Montalvo’s name was “Carlos
counsel therefore had an opportunity to Torres.” We held that the statement was
question her account of the conversation not being introduced to prove the truth of
with Prince. Under these circumstances, the matter asserted, but rather to “show
we find that Trala’s rights under the consciousness of guilt . . . .” Id. We
Confrontation Clause were satisfied.
2.Federal Rule of Evidence 11
The government also argues that Trala
402
did not properly preserve his relevance
Trala also challenges the relevancy
objection at trial. However, defense counsel
of Prince’s statements under Federal Rule raised a relevance objection when the
of Evidence 402 (“Evidence which is not government attempted to elicit similar
relevant is not admissible.”); see also Fed. testimony from Officer Guthrie, but was
R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means overruled by the court. App. 1445-1448. In a
evidence having any tendency to make the subsequent sidebar conference to discuss
defense counsel’s objections to Sgt. Long’s
testimony regarding Prince’s statements
10
In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, during the stop, the court stated that it was
394 n.5 (1986), the Supreme Court cites “not going to allow [defense counsel] to
Green for the proposition that there is not a reargue . . . the same objection.” App. 1466.
complete overlap between hearsay rules and Therefore, the issue of relevance was properly
the Confrontation Clause. preserved at trial.
10
explained: admitted.12 However, as we explain
Even though M ontalvo did below, we also conclude that the error was
not offer the information harmless.
himself, he allowed Alvarez There was an overwhelming
to offer the false statement amount of objective evidence linking Trala
without correcting her. The to the robbery, including: (1) the similarity
s t a te m e n t w a s t h us between his build and the description of
p r o b a t iv e regard in g the robber; (2) his admission that he
cons ciousness of g uilt owned the sweatshirt found near the scene
because the jury could have of the robbery; (3) his admission that he
reasonably inferred that also owned a number of black knit caps
M o n t a lvo w e lc o m ed like the one found near the scene of the
Alvarez’s misidentification robbery; (4) the DNA evidence linking
of him. him to the garments found near the scene
of the crime; (5) Mrs. Bailey’s testimony
Id. Here, however, Sgt. Long testified that regarding her discussions with Trala about
she questioned Prince at “the front of the robbing the bank and the location of the
vehicle” after she questioned Trala near Y2K funds; (6) her testimony that she
“the rear of the vehicle.” (App. 1463, recognized Trala during the course of the
1465). Trala and Prince were therefore robbery, including the red sweatshirt that
separated by at least a car-length when she he wore; (7) Mr. Bailey’s testimony that he
made the comments. In Palma-Ruedas, saw Trala on the morning of the robbery
Montalvo was standing next to the with a brown paper bag full of money; 13
declarant when she falsely identified him. and (8) the unexplained cash in Trala’s
Without more than was developed on this car. In addition, Trala himself lied to
record about the respective positions of police about his name and the source of
Trala and Prince when Prince made the the money in his car, and those statements
challenged statements, the jury could only were clearly relevant and admissible. See
speculate as to whether Trala heard Prince
so that he could have corrected Prince’s
12
misstatements. Absent such additional Because we find that the admission of
evidence tying Trala to Prin ce’s Prince’s statements constituted legal error, we
statements, her statement regarding Trala’s need not consider Trala’s additional challenge
identity was not relevant to show Trala’s under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
consciousness of guilt. Because the
evidence was not relevant for any other 13
This is consistent with eyewitnesses
purpose, we find that it was improperly
who said the robber put the stolen money
in a paper bag, and who saw the robber
leave the bank carrying a brown paper bag.
App. 1036, 1054, 1272.
11
United States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 558 requires a new trial.14
(3d. Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“[D]efendants’ III
attempt to conceal their true identities by For the reasons set forth herein, we
providing aliases to the police upon arrest will affirm Trala’s judgment of conviction
is relevant as consciousness of guilt.”). and sentence.15
Thus, Prince’s statements about his name
and the source of the funds added little if
14
anything to the evidence against him. In fact, given the additional evidence of
It is also significant that Prince and Trala’s guilt, the prosecutor’s insistence on
Trala both independently told Officer admitting what Prince said at the rear of the
car was nothing more than “gilding the lily.”
Guthrie that Trala’s name was “Nate
Allen, Jr.” App. 1449. Although it is also 15
After this matter was submitted, Trala
unclear from the record whether Prince filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
was near Trala when she made this Briefing in Light of Blakely v. Washington,
statement, this is still relevant to show 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). In it he first argues
consciousness of guilt. The jury could that the Career Offender Enhancement that he
reasonably infer that Trala and Prince received “requires a district court’s findings as
agreed to lie about Trala’s true identity, to both the nature of the instant offense and
and that they did so to help him avoid prior convictions, i.e., whether such
apprehension. This is much stronger convictions qualify as crimes of violence.”
evidence of consciousness of guilt than in See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (“A defendant is a
Levy, where we held that “the use of false career offender if [inter alia] the instant
identities by all three conspirators . . . offense of conviction is a felony that is either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance
tended to show joint planning and
offense [and] the defendant has at least two
coordination by the defendants in an
prior felony convictions of either a crime of
attempt to protect themselves from future violence or a controlled substance offense.”).
investigation and pursuit.” 865 F.2d at However, whether an offense is a “crime of
558. Under the facts of Levy, it was violence or a controlled substance offense” is
possible that the use of false names by all a legal determination, which does not raise an
three defendants was merely coincidence. issue of fact under Blakely or Apprendi v. New
Here, there is no question that the parties Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
agreed beforehand that they would refer to Trala also challenges the district court’s
Trala as “Natt Allen, Jr.” Thus, even order of restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e),
though Prince’s statements to Sgt. Long provides: “Any dispute as to the proper
were inadmissible, the jury heard similar, amount or type of restitution shall be resolved
a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e o f T r a l a ’s by the court by the preponderance of the
consciousness of guilt. There is therefore evidence.” However, Blakely and Apprendi
no merit to Tala’s claim that this error apply only where there is a resolution of
disputed issues of fact that results in a
sentencing enhancement beyond the statutory
maximum. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537
12
(“Our precedents make clear, however, that
the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” (citations omitted). Here, there
was no contested evidence about the amount
of money that was taken. Therefore, the
amount of restitution was not a disputed issue
of fact under Blakely.
13