Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2002 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-7-2002
    Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 99-3980
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    Filed June 7, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 99-3980
    NORMAN GRAYSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    MAYVIEW STATE HOSPITAL; ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL;
    CAMP HILL PRISON
    *United States of America,
    Intervenor
    *(Pursuant to Court Order dated 4/4/01)
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-479)
    District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
    Argued: April 6, 2001
    Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and GIBSON,
    Circuit Judges**
    (Filed: June 7, 2002)
    _________________________________________________________________
    ** The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Nancy Winkelman
    J. Denny Shupe (Argued)
    Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis
    1600 Market Street, Suite 3600
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Appellant
    John G. Knorr, III
    Calvin R. Koons
    J. Bart DeLone (Argued)
    Office of the Attorney General
    of Pennsylvania
    Department of Justice
    Strawberry Square, 15th Floor
    Harrisburg, PA 17120
    Counsel for Appellees
    Mayview State Hospital and
    Camp Hill Prison
    David W. Gray
    Jeanette H. Ho (Argued)
    Pietragallo, Bosick & Gordon
    301 Grant Street
    One Oxford Centre, 38th Floor
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Counsel for Appellee
    Allegheny County Jail
    Richard A. Olderman
    United States Department of Justice
    Civil Division, Appellate Staff
    601 D Street, N.W., Room 9128
    Washington, DC 20530
    Counsel for Intervenor
    United States of America
    2
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge:
    Norman Grayson, an inmate at various times of the three
    institutions named as defendants, brought this pro se
    damages action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging the
    defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
    needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The District
    Court granted Grayson leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
    but denied his further request for appointed legal counsel.
    Upon the defendants’ motions, the Court dismissed
    Grayson’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6).
    Although the Court found that his claims had possible
    substantive merit if pled adequately, it did not provide leave
    to amend before dismissing the action. This was contrary to
    our Court’s rule, established before Congress enacted the
    Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),1 that such leave must
    be granted when amendment could cure the deficiency and
    would not be inequitable. See Dist. Council 47 v. Bradley,
    
    795 F.2d 310
    , 316 (3d Cir. 1986); Darr v. Wolfe , 
    767 F.2d 79
    , 81 (3d Cir. 1985); Borelli v. City of Reading, 
    532 F.2d 950
    , 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Shane v. Fauver, 
    213 F.3d 113
    , 116 (3d Cir. 2000)(discussing pre-PLRA law).
    The primary question presented on appeal is whether
    S 804(a)(5) of the PLRA, codified at 28 U.S.C.S 1915(e)(2),
    altered the legal landscape so that the District Court did
    not need to grant leave to amend before dismissing
    Grayson’s deficient in forma pauperis complaint. We
    addressed a similar provision of the PLRA in Shane, a non-
    in-forma-pauperis case. There we held that S 803(d) of the
    PLRA, codified in part at 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(1), did not
    alter our rule that inadequate complaints should be
    dismissed without granting leave to amend only if
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. Despite its name, the PLRA was actually passed in 1996 as Title VIII
    of the Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996.
    See Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, SS 801-10, 
    110 Stat. 1321
     (1996)
    (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code).
    3
    amendment would be inequitable or futile. Shane , 
    213 F.3d at 116-17
    . However, we reserved the question of whether
    the nearly identical S 1915(e)(2) should be interpreted
    differently. 
    Id. at 117
    . Today we reach that question and
    hold that S 1915(e)(2) requires the same response.2
    I.
    Grayson’s complaint alleges that surgery was performed
    on his knee in early 1998 at the Mayview State Hospital to
    correct an injury he sustained playing basketball. While the
    complaint names the Hospital, it does not allege that he
    received negligent or inadequate care there. Later in 1998,
    Grayson was transferred to the Allegheny County Jail,
    where he claims his "leg ropes"3 were confiscated and his
    requests for medical assistance were refused. While
    incarcerated there, Grayson’s knee injury worsened after a
    fall in a stairwell occasioned by a defective handrail, which
    fell out of the wall while he was handcuffed to another
    prisoner for transport to a court hearing. He claims that he
    requested medical assistance after the fall, but received
    none. Grayson was later transferred to a third facility and
    eventually to the Camp Hill Prison ("SCI-Camp Hill"), where
    he alleges three or four weeks passed before he received
    treatment for his knee. Grayson’s complaint does not name
    any individual defendants. It also fails to allege that any of
    the facilities where he was kept maintains a pattern or
    practice of denying medical assistance to inmates.
    The defendants responded to Grayson’s complaint by
    moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Hospital
    and SCI-Camp Hill, both agencies of the Commonwealth of
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. In this context, we need not consider Grayson’s contentions that (1) an
    in forma pauperis plaintiff ’s fundamental right of access to the courts is
    violated if he is denied leave to amend an inadequate complaint, (2) it
    would violate equal protection to deny in forma pauperis plaintiffs the
    procedural safeguards afforded prisoner plaintiffs under Shane, and (3)
    that the District Court erred under Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 153 (3d
    Cir. 1993), by not requesting counsel to represent him under 28 U.S.C.
    S 1915(e)(1).
    3. Though we have no further explanation of this term, we assume
    Grayson refers to a knee brace of some sort.
    4
    Pennsylvania, argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred
    Grayson’s claims against them. The Jail, an agency of
    Allegheny County, argued that Grayson failed to plead that
    it had a policy, practice, or custom of deliberate indifference
    toward prisoners’ requests for medical treatment. The
    District Court referred the action to a Magistrate Judge,
    who recommended granting the motions to dismiss. In the
    course of these proceedings Grayson filed a self-styled
    "Memorandum Order" that further explained the factual
    basis for his suit and identified allegedly responsible
    individuals. Other than invoking the term "deliberate
    indifference" to describe the conduct of the defendants, the
    "Memorandum Order" was not responsive to the arguments
    made in the motions to dismiss.
    The District Court considered Grayson’s "Memorandum
    Order" and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. In a
    brief statement, the Court adopted the recommendation
    and dismissed Grayson’s action without further comment.
    Grayson appealed4 and our Court appointed pro bono
    counsel.5
    II.
    Before considering the effect of S 1915(e)(2) on in forma
    pauperis complaints, we address whether Grayson’s
    complaint should have been dismissed under pre-PLRA law.
    Grayson does not dispute that his claims against the two
    Commonwealth defendants, Mayview State Hospital and
    SCI-Camp Hill, were properly dismissed on Eleventh
    Amendment grounds under Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
    Halderman, 
    465 U.S. 89
    , 100 (1984). Rather, he contests
    only the dismissal of his claim against the Allegheny
    County Jail. Grayson maintains that his "Memorandum
    Order," submitted in response to the defendants’ motions to
    dismiss, contained sufficient factual statements to meet the
    pleading requirements of a "short and plain statement of
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331,
    1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291.
    5. We acknowledge with appreciation the able and zealous pro bono
    representation of Grayson by Nancy Winkelman and J. Denny Shupe.
    5
    the claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). According to Grayson, his
    allegations support a claim of deliberate indifference to his
    medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
    Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 104 (1976); Rouse v.
    Plantier, 
    182 F.3d 192
    , 197 (3d Cir. 1999); Monmouth
    County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 
    834 F.2d 326
    , 346
    (3d Cir. 1987).
    Were Grayson’s claims made against an individual
    defendant, the contents of his complaint and
    "Memorandum Order" would adequately place that
    defendant on notice that he alleges deliberate indifference
    to his medical needs. But Grayson is not suing any
    individual;6 he seeks relief only from the Jail. Hence the
    stringent requirements for municipal liability apply:
    Grayson must allege that a "policy or custom" of the Jail
    was the "moving force" behind a violation of his Eighth
    Amendment rights. See Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan
    County v. Oklahoma, 
    520 U.S. 397
    , 404 (1997); Berg v.
    County of Allegheny, 
    219 F.3d 261
    , 276 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Because Grayson alleges a constitutional violation was
    committed by the Jail’s employees, rather than by the Jail
    itself, to satisfy the "moving force" requirement he must
    allege that the Jail was deliberately indifferent to the
    possibility that such a violation would occur. Bryan County,
    
    520 U.S. at 407
    ; Berg, 
    219 F.3d at 276
    .
    Neither Grayson’s complaint nor his "Memorandum
    Order" alleges that the Jail had a policy of denying medical
    treatment to inmates. Nor does he allege that other inmates
    suffered similar deprivations of medical attention that
    might establish a custom. See Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 
    915 F.2d 845
    , 850 (3d Cir. 1990). Lacking any indication from
    Grayson’s filings of what policy or custom he seeks to
    challenge under S 1983, we cannot say that the Jail had
    "fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds
    upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 47
    (1957).
    Having determined that the District Court correctly
    concluded that Grayson’s filings were inadequate, we turn
    _________________________________________________________________
    6. Grayson’s "Memorandum Order" erroneously states that he is suing
    various individuals, even though none was joined as a defendant.
    6
    to the manner in which the Court dismissed his action.
    Under Rule 15(a), if a plaintiff requests leave to amend a
    complaint vulnerable to dismissal before a responsive
    pleading is filed, such leave must be granted in the absence
    of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice,
    or futility of amendment. Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    ,
    182 (1962); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 
    114 F.3d 1410
    , 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). The first four of these
    reasons devolve to instances where permitting amendment
    would be inequitable.7 Thus amendment must be permitted
    in this context unless it would be inequitable or futile. "Of
    course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is
    within the discretion of the District Court, but outright
    refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason [i.e.,
    inequity or futility] appearing for the denial is not an
    exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion
    and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules."
    Foman, 
    371 U.S. at 182
    .
    When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient
    complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court
    must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within
    a set period of time, unless amendment would be
    inequitable or futile. See Shane, 
    213 F.3d at 116
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Dist. Council 47, 
    795 F.2d at 316
    ; Darr, 
    767 F.2d at 81
    ; Borelli, 
    532 F.2d at
    951
    n.1. Indeed, "we have never required plaintiffs to request
    leave to amend" in this context. Dist. Council 47, 
    795 F.2d at 316
    .
    The District Court did not follow these principles. Before
    it dismissed the case, the Court should have--absent
    inequity or futility of amendment--specifically advised
    Grayson that he could amend his complaint and given him
    a chance to do so. Neither inequity nor futility of
    amendment is present. There is no suggestion that Grayson
    lacks good faith or proper motives. As noted above, a
    properly amended complaint would state a claim upon
    which Grayson could obtain relief, and none of the
    defendants suggests otherwise.
    _________________________________________________________________
    7. Moreover, some of them overlap (e.g., dilatory motive is but an
    example of bad faith).
    7
    Finally, we cannot say that Grayson’s receipt of the
    defendants’ motions to dismiss and the Magistrate Judge’s
    recommendation constitutes the functional equivalent of
    the procedure outlined in our cases. See, e.g. , Shane, 
    213 F.3d at 116
    . The motions and recommendation apprised
    Grayson of his pleadings’ deficiencies, but failed to inform
    him "expressly" that he could amend his complaint to fix
    the problem.8 Borelli, 
    532 F.2d at
    951 n.1. Therefore, under
    our pre-PLRA precedent, the District Court erred. It should
    have told Grayson that he had leave to amend his
    complaint to cure its deficiencies and granted him a set
    period of time in which to do so.9
    III.
    The defendants contend that 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)
    required the District Court to dismiss Grayson’s complaint
    without providing leave to amend. While the Court did not
    rely on the PLRA, we can affirm on any ground supported
    by the record. Hughes v. Long, 
    242 F.3d 121
    , 122 n.1 (3d
    Cir. 2001).
    As amended by the PLRA, S 1915(e)(2) states the
    following:
    _________________________________________________________________
    8. Indeed, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation may have contributed
    to Grayson’s confusion on what was required to survive dismissal. It
    states that, to make a showing of municipal liability on Grayson’s
    claims, he "must demonstrate reckless or intentional indifference . . . or
    a policy or custom on the part of the defendant resulting in injury."
    However, both deliberate indifference and a policy or custom of the
    defendant municipality are necessary to maintain aS 1983 suit such as
    Grayson’s. See Bryan County, 
    520 U.S. at 403-07
    ; Berg, 
    219 F.3d at 276
    . While Grayson’s subsequently filed "Memorandum Order"
    mentioned deliberate indifference, it did not identify a "policy or custom,"
    perhaps in reliance on the recommendation’s disjunctive phrasing.
    9. We cannot say that Grayson’s "Memorandum Order" is properly
    construed as a motion to supplement his complaint or declaration that
    he will stand on his pleadings. Indeed, the District Court characterized
    the "Memorandum Order" as "objections" to the Magistrate’s
    recommendation, not as an amended pleading. For the sake of clarity, a
    prisoner plaintiff (or any other plaintiff) should not be able effectively to
    amend a complaint through any document short of an amended
    pleading.
    8
    Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,
    that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the
    case at any time if the court determines that--
    (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
    (B) the action or appeal--
    (i)   is frivolous or malicious;
    (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
    granted; or
    (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
    is immune from such relief.
    While this provision is limited to in forma pauperis plaintiffs,10
    at least two other provisions of the PLRA contain similar
    dismissal requirements. For prisoners seeking relief from "a
    governmental entity or [its] officer or employee," PLRA
    S 805(a), codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1915A, provides a screening
    process to separate cognizable claims from those lacking
    merit.11 Like S 1915(e)(2), the screening process of S 1915A
    _________________________________________________________________
    10. Although the language of S 1915(e)(2) does not expressly limit the
    provision’s reach to in forma pauperis claims, we believe Congress
    intended it to be so limited. See Benson v. O’Brian, 
    179 F.3d 1014
    ,
    1016-17 (6th Cir. 1999). The provision is located within S 1915, entitled
    "Proceedings in forma pauperis," and it replaces S 1915(d), which only
    applied to in forma pauperis claims. 
    Id. at 1016
    . Further, a contrary
    interpretation expanding S 1915(e)(2) to all suits would both alter
    radically the process of civil litigation in federal courts and make similar
    provisions of the PLRA superfluous. 
    Id. at 1017
    . Indeed, we have
    previously stated that "Section 804 of the PLRA, which amends 28
    U.S.C. S 1915, redefines the rights and obligations of litigants who are
    granted in forma pauperis status." Santana v. United States, 
    98 F.3d 752
    , 753-54 (3d Cir. 1996).
    11. The relationship between the screening provision in 28 U.S.C.
    S 1915A and the other dismissal provisions, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2) and
    42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c), was well explained in McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 
    114 F.3d 601
    , 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Section 1915A "is applicable at the initial
    stage of the litigation, while S 1915(e)(2)[and 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c) are]
    . . . applicable throughout the entire litigation process." 
    Id.
     Thus, the
    PLRA sets up a two-step dismissal process by which dismissal can occur
    early for the facially inadequate complaints pursuant to the screening
    statute or can occur later by either of the remaining provisions "should
    it become apparent that the case satisfies [one of these] sections." 
    Id.
    9
    targets claims that are "frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to
    state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or .. .
    seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
    from such relief." 28 U.S.C. S 1915A. Similarly, pursuant to
    PLRA S 803(d), codified in part at 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(c)(1),
    prisoners challenging prison conditions will have their
    complaints dismissed for the same reasons.
    Because Grayson is a prisoner proceeding in forma
    pauperis and challenging the conditions of his confinement,
    all three of these PLRA provisions could apply to his case.
    However, S 1915A is not at issue because the District Court
    did not implement a screening process. Moreover, under
    Shane S 1997e(c)(1) does not support the Court’s failure to
    grant leave to amend. See 
    213 F.3d at 117
    . Therefore, to
    prevail the defendants must convince us to treat
    S 1915(e)(2) differently from the similar provision,
    S 1997e(c)(1), at issue in Shane. 12
    Sections 1915(e)(2) and 1997e(c)(1) apply to different
    (though often overlapping) sets of claimants, but the
    differences end there. Section 1997e(c)(1), the provision at
    issue in Shane, states that a district court
    shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party
    dismiss any action brought with respect to prison
    conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . if the court is satisfied
    that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
    monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
    such relief.
    42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(1). We concluded in Shane that
    S 1997e(c)(1) did not affect our pre-PLRA requirement that,
    where a defendant moves to dismiss a deficient complaint,
    the court should grant leave to amend unless amendment
    _________________________________________________________________
    12. The parties’ discussion is limited to S 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which
    mandates dismissal when a complaint "fails to state a claim upon which
    relief may be granted." Because Grayson also sued the Hospital and SCI-
    Camp Hill, both of which are immune from liability, subsection (iii)--
    which applies to actions seeking "monetary relief against a defendant
    who is immune"--is also implicated. Because this does not change our
    analysis, we will discuss S 1915(e)(2) generally and not parse its
    subsections further.
    10
    would be inequitable or futile. Shane, 
    213 F.3d at 116-17
    .
    The most natural reading of S 1915(e)(2) is no different.
    Both provisions employ the same language, borrowed from
    Rule 12(b)(6), to require that district courts shall dismiss
    complaints that fail to state a claim.
    Defendants suggest that the words "shall dismiss" in
    S 1915(e)(2) should be read to require district courts to
    dismiss deficient complaints without granting leave to
    amend. We rejected an identical argument in Shane.
    We acknowledge that the words of the statute do not
    foreclose the following, more expansive reading: if a
    complaint fails to state a claim for any reason,
    including a pleading error that could be cured by
    amendment, the court "shall . . . dismiss" forthwith
    and without permitting a curative amendment. But we
    believe that this reading is more strained and would
    produce results that we doubt Congress wanted. If
    "shall . . . dismiss" were interpreted to mean"shall
    dismiss forthwith and without permitting a curative
    amendment," it would seem that a court would be
    required to grant a motion to dismiss a technically
    defective claim even if a request for leave to amend to
    cure the defect were pending. We doubt that Congress
    wanted to require such a harsh, and seemingly
    pointless, result. We are also hesitant to conclude that
    Congress meant to change established procedures
    without a clearer indication than we have here.
    
    Id. at 117
    . We continue to subscribe to this reasoning.
    Neither the provision at issue in Shane,S 1997e(c)(1), nor
    the in forma pauperis provision applicable here,
    S 1915(e)(2), says anything about when to permit
    amendment. Thus, there is no reason to depart from our
    rule that plaintiffs whose complaints fail to state a cause of
    action are entitled to amend their complaint unless doing
    so would be inequitable or futile.
    The great majority of other courts of appeals which have
    interpreted S 1915(e)(2) concur with our interpretation. See
    Lopez v. Smith, 
    203 F.3d 1122
    , 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
    banc); Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 
    171 F.3d 794
    , 796
    (2d Cir. 1999); Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165
    
    11 F.3d 803
    , 806 (10th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit noted, as
    we do, that S 1915(e)(2) "says only that a court ‘shall
    dismiss’ a complaint. It does not say that such a dismissal
    may be without leave to amend." Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at 1127
    .
    Similarly, both the Second and Tenth Circuits found that
    the "shall dismiss" language of S 1915(e)(2) did not modify
    district courts’ responsibility to grant leave to amend.
    Gomez, 
    171 F.3d at 796
    ; Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806.13 The
    Ninth and Tenth Circuits further observed that the
    statutory language of the three PLRA dismissal provisions
    mirrors that found in Rule 12(b)(6). Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at 1127
    ; Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. Thus, there is no reason
    that a district court should fail to retain its pre-existing
    authority under that rule to permit plaintiffs leave to
    amend.
    The defendants urge us to adopt the position of the Sixth
    Circuit, see Benson v. O’Brian, 
    179 F.3d 1014
    , 1016 (6th
    Cir. 1999); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 
    114 F.3d 601
    , 612
    (6th Cir. 1997), and the dissent in Lopez, see 
    203 F.3d at 1136
     (Sneed, J., dissenting).14 We find these authorities
    unpersuasive. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, because the
    PLRA authorizes sua sponte dismissals, it must also remove
    district courts’ "discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend
    a complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal." McGore, 
    114 F.3d at 612
    . But it failed to cite any authority explaining
    why sua sponte dismissals must be without leave to amend.
    Section 1915(e)(2) does not require dismissal to proceed so
    _________________________________________________________________
    13. Two additional courts of appeals have adopted our interpretation
    with respect to the PLRA’s other dismissal provisions. See Davis v. Dist.
    of Columbia, 
    158 F.3d 1342
    , 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that district
    court should have provided leave to replead before dismissing action
    under S 1915A, but that remand was unnecessary because amendment
    was futile); Bazrowx v. Scott, 
    136 F.3d 1053
    , 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (holding that district court should have given plaintiff chance to amend
    before dismissing his claims under S 1997e(c), but that error was
    harmless because dismissal was without prejudice).
    14. Contrary to the defendants’ claim, the Eighth Circuit did not take
    this view in Christiansen v. Clarke, 
    147 F.3d 655
    , 658 (8th Cir. 1998),
    which addressed a prisoner’s constitutional objections to S 1915(e)(2),
    not the issue of statutory interpretation presented here.
    12
    immediately that leave to amend is foreclosed, and we will
    not read such a harsh result into the statute.15
    Nor do we find the Lopez dissent persuasive. 
    203 F.3d at 1136
     (Sneed, J., dissenting). It relied on a statement in
    Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
     (1989), characterizing
    S 1915(e)(2)’s predecessor, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d) (1995).
    Section 1915(d) provided that a court "may dismiss [an in
    forma pauperis] case . . . if satisfied that the action is
    frivolous or malicious." Neitzke explained that complaints
    that fail to state a claim are not necessarily "frivolous," and
    that the term applies to "a more limited set of claims" than
    Rule 12(b)(6). 
    490 U.S. at 329
    . The Court proceeded to
    describe the interaction between Rule 12(b)(6) and
    S 1915(d).
    Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim
    is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to
    dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity
    to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled
    upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory
    underlying the defendant’s challenge, and enable him
    meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to
    dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual
    allegations so as to conform with the requirements of a
    valid legal cause of action. . . . By contrast, the sua
    sponte dismissals permitted by, and frequently
    employed under, S 1915(d), necessary though they may
    sometimes be to shield defendants from vexatious
    lawsuits, involve no such procedural protections.
    
    Id. at 329-30
     (emphasis added). The Lopez dissent insisted
    that, after Neitzke, Congress knew S 1915(d) afforded no
    _________________________________________________________________
    15. This is not to say the PLRA has no effect beyond what Rule 12(b)(6)
    already provides. We have held that district courts may dismiss
    complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) sua sponte where appropriate, but only
    after service of process. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 
    914 F.2d 428
    , 430 n.5
    (3d Cir. 1990). The PLRA provides authority for dismissals without
    regard to whether the opposing party was served with process. Given the
    emphasis in the PLRA’s legislative history on the cost to state and local
    governments of defending prisoner litigation, see 141 Cong. Rec. S14413
    (1995) (statement of Senator Dole), we have no doubt that this
    distinction was meant to serve an important purpose.
    13
    procedural protections for frivolous complaints. Therefore,
    the dissent claimed, by enacting S 1915(e)(2)--which
    contains language similar to S 1915(d) but adds that the
    district court shall dismiss not only frivolous complaints,
    but also those that fail to state a claim or seek relief from
    a defendant immune from suit--Congress intended that in
    forma pauperis complaints inadequate under any of these
    standards be immediately dismissed without leave to
    amend. Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at 1138-39
    .
    We are unconvinced by this argument because we believe
    it rests on an erroneous reading of both the oldS 1915(d)
    and its current manifestation, S 1915(e)(2). Neitzke did not
    describe S 1915(d) as involving "no such procedural
    protections," as the Lopez dissent and the defendants here
    would have us believe. Its language was more precise. It
    said "the sua sponte dismissals permitted by, and
    frequently employed under, S 1915(d) . . . involve no such
    procedural protections." Neitzke, 
    490 U.S. at 330
     (emphasis
    added). Put differently, the Court stated two propositions:
    S 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissals, and those
    dismissals did not require leave to amend.16 The latter
    proposition is not based on the authority in S 1915(d).
    Instead, dismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave
    to amend due to the long tradition of denying leave to
    amend under Rule 15(a) when amendment is inequitable or
    futile. See Foman, 
    371 U.S. at 182
    ; In re Burlington Coat
    Factory Sec. Litig., 
    114 F.3d at 1434
    . Thus when Congress
    substituted S 1915(e)(2) for the old S 1915(d), thereby
    _________________________________________________________________
    16. The Lopez dissent further argues that the PLRA mandates immediate
    dismissal because former United States Senator Robert Dole once used
    the word "immediate" in describing the dismissal provisions. Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at 1141
    . The majority points out, however, that Senator Dole’s full
    statement is that the "dismissal provisions would allow federal courts to
    immediately dismiss a complaint" that fails to state a claim. Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at
    1130 n.11 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01, *S14414 (1995)
    (emphasis added)). The Senator did not state that immediate dismissal
    was required in all cases, regardless whether the complaint could be
    amended to state a claim, and thus this passage does not support
    defendants’ reading of S 1915(e)(2). Moreover, in context it is apparent
    that Senator Dole is speaking of the screening provision, S 1915A, not
    the dismissal provision at issue in Shane,S 1997e(c)(1), or the one at
    issue here, S 1915(e)(2).
    14
    adding failure to state a claim and naming immune
    defendants as bases for dismissal, it did not mandate
    dismissal without leave to amend whenever those
    inadequacies arise.17
    Nor is the defendants’ reliance on the legislative history
    of the PLRA helpful to their interpretation of S 1915(e)(2).
    We note initially that there is no legislative history for the
    proposition that Congress wanted to deny plaintiffs the
    opportunity to amend technically inadequate but potentially
    meritorious complaints. Shane, 
    213 F.3d at 117
     ("[W]e are
    not aware of any specific support in the legislative history
    for the proposition that Congress also wanted the courts to
    dismiss claims that may have substantive merit but were
    inartfully pled."). Indeed, the legislative history refutes the
    defendants’ position. Senator Orrin Hatch stated that "I do
    not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.
    This legislation will not prevent those claims from being
    raised." 141 Cong. Rec. S14267 (1995). Were we to adopt
    the defendants’ interpretation, however, we would require
    courts to reject an in forma pauperis claim without further
    process not because it lacks merit, but because the litigant
    could not afford counsel to draft it better. As we said in
    Shane, "[w]e doubt that Congress wanted to require such a
    harsh, and seemingly pointless, result." 
    213 F.3d at 117
    .
    Moreover, Shane interpreted one of the PLRA’s prisoner
    dismissal provisions, S 1997e(c)(1), but the defendants rely
    upon the in forma pauperis dismissal provisions, SS 1915(e)
    & 1915A, on which evidence of congressional intent is
    _________________________________________________________________
    17. The Ninth Circuit in Lopez would distinguish the Neitzke holding on
    the basis that S 1915(d) did not require dismissal, but only permitted it.
    "Neitzke did not state that courts were barred from granting leave to
    amend under [S] 1915(d), only that courts were not required to grant
    leave to amend." Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at
    1128 n.8. This argument, however,
    loses its force in light of two ways that the PLRA changed S 1915(d)--
    first, it added the "failure to state a claim" language and, second, it
    converted the "may dismiss" of S 1915(d) into "shall dismiss" in
    S 1915(e)(2). That second change, which madeS 1915(e)(2) dismissals
    mandatory for deficient complaints, could be interpreted to require
    dismissal without leave to amend under S 1915(e)(2) if one accepts the
    dissent’s initial proposition that S 1915(d) required dismissal without
    leave to amend.
    15
    sparse. While the legislative history is rife with pejorative
    commentary on overly litigious prisoners,18 it makes only
    passing reference to the dismissal of in forma pauperis
    complaints.19 The legislative history lacks any clear
    expression that Congress intended in forma pauperis
    plaintiffs, imprisoned and free alike, to be denied the
    opportunity to amend their complaints when that
    amendment would neither be inequitable nor futile.
    Lastly, in seeking to distinguish the in forma pauperis
    dismissal provision from the provision at issue in Shane,
    the defendants cite legislative history discussing the need
    for economic disincentives to deter litigation by prisoners
    who do not pay filing fees.20 The defendants would have us
    believe that S 1915(e)(2)’s dismissal provision was intended
    to limit the flood of prisoner lawsuits, and that extending
    Shane to in forma pauperis complaints would defeat that
    purpose.
    While Congress intended the PLRA as a whole to reduce
    prisoner litigation, S 1915(e)(2) was not necessarily meant to
    deter prisoners from filing lawsuits. That objective is
    promoted via a separate provision, S 1915(b), which
    "establishes an elaborate deferred payment schedule by
    which litigants may fulfill their filing fee obligations."
    Santana v. United States, 
    98 F.3d 752
    , 754 (3d Cir. 1996).
    Moreover, we doubt that requiring district courts to deny
    leave to amend would lead many prisoners to eschew
    _________________________________________________________________
    18. For example, Senator Dole stated that "[f]rivolous lawsuits filed by
    prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable judicial resources, and affect
    the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding population." 141 Cong.
    Rec. S14413 (1995).
    19. Indeed, the Lopez majority concluded that there was no evidence in
    the legislative history that Congress intended to change the dismissal
    procedures for non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs, even though that group
    is clearly within the scope of S 1915(e)(2). See Lopez, 
    203 F.3d at
    1129
    n.10 (holding that the defendants’ reading "would have harsh
    consequences on a group of plaintiffs -- indigent non-prisoners -- not
    even intended to be affected by the statute").
    20. For instance, Senator Dole said, "As indigents, prisoners are
    generally not required to pay the fees that normally accompany the filing
    of a lawsuit. In other words, there is no economic disincentive to going
    to court." 141 Cong. Rec. S14413 (1995).
    16
    litigation. Prisoners are unlikely to consider post-filing legal
    disincentives in the same way they consider the economic
    disincentive created by the payment (albeit gradual) of filing
    fees. Furthermore, even if the defendants’ speculation
    about prisoners’ cost-benefit assessments is accurate, the
    resulting incentive would be to plead facts more specifically,
    not to refrain from suing. While this might conserve judicial
    resources, a goal of the PLRA, see 141 Cong. Rec. S14413
    (1995) (statement of Senator Dole), it would not reduce the
    number of lawsuits.
    IV.
    Lacking any authority to the contrary either in statutory
    text or legislative history, we hold that S 1915(e)(2) did not
    alter our preexisting rule that in forma pauperis plaintiffs
    who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
    should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
    inequitable or futile. Because the District Court dismissed
    Grayson’s complaint in contravention of this rule, we
    reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.21
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    _________________________________________________________________
    21. Though we do not reach the question of whether the Magistrate
    Judge abused his discretion in failing to request counsel to represent
    Grayson under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(1) and this Court’s holding in Tabron
    v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
     (3d Cir. 1993), we note that the Court should
    reconsider its analysis of the Tabron factors following remand. Should
    Grayson submit an amended complaint that does not suffer from the
    same inadequacies of his initial one, both the threshold question of
    whether "the plaintiff ’s claim [has] some merit in fact and law" and the
    six Tabron factors likely require reconsideration. See Parham v. Johnson,
    
    126 F.3d 454
    , 457 (3d Cir. 1997).
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-3980

Filed Date: 6/7/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016

Authorities (26)

Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown , 117 S. Ct. 1382 ( 1997 )

41-fair-emplpraccas-273-40-empl-prac-dec-p-36251-district-council , 795 F.2d 310 ( 1986 )

raymond-a-berg-jr-v-county-of-allegheny-allegheny-county-adult , 219 F.3d 261 ( 2000 )

Louis Gomez v. Usaa Federal Savings Bank and Janette Adger ... , 171 F.3d 794 ( 1999 )

Estelle v. Gamble , 97 S. Ct. 285 ( 1976 )

Neitzke v. Williams , 109 S. Ct. 1827 ( 1989 )

Peter J. Hughes, Jr. v. Lynn E. Long Kathleen Lacey Patrick ... , 242 F.3d 121 ( 2001 )

larry-l-christiansen-v-harold-w-clarke-director-department-of , 147 F.3d 655 ( 1998 )

Stanford Shane Otis Terrell Robert Stewart v. William ... , 213 F.3d 113 ( 2000 )

Geoffrey Benson v. Greg O'Brian , 179 F.3d 1014 ( 1999 )

Bazrowx v. Scott , 136 F.3d 1053 ( 1998 )

max-lopez-jr-v-ga-smith-warden-larry-loo-chief-medical-officer-a , 203 F.3d 1122 ( 2000 )

dale-oatess-v-nancy-m-sobolevitch-philip-b-friedman-honorable-william , 914 F.2d 428 ( 1990 )

Darryl McGore v. Gene L. Wrigglesworth, Chief Sheriff ... , 114 F.3d 601 ( 1997 )

Davis v. District of Columbia , 158 F.3d 1342 ( 1998 )

Paul Lamont Parham v. Marshall Johnson, Jr., Medical Doctor ... , 126 F.3d 454 ( 1997 )

harvey-tabron-v-lt-grace-lieutenant-major-price-correct-officer-gross , 6 F.3d 147 ( 1993 )

Ernesto Santana v. United States of America, Ernesto Santana , 98 F.3d 752 ( 1996 )

Mrs. Carmella M. Borelli v. City of Reading , 532 F.2d 950 ( 1976 )

Conley v. Gibson , 78 S. Ct. 99 ( 1957 )

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