Jerome Reid v. Exelon Corp ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-3008
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JEROME REID,
Appellant
v.
EXELON CORP; PSEG SERVICES CORPORATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 17-cv-04043)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 26, 2019
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed November 29, 2019)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Jerome Reid appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint against the
Exelon Generation Company and PSEG Nuclear LLC. We will dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
Reid initially filed his complaint in June 2017. Both defendants moved to dismiss, but
then Reid was granted leave to amend his complaint. Reid’s amended complaint against
both defendants alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Additionally, his
amended complaint included a state common-law claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. PSEG answered the complaint; Exelon filed another motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In an order entered May 31, 2018, the District Court granted defendant Exelon’s motion
to dismiss and dismissed Reid’s amended complaint without prejudice. Dkt. #47. The
order provided that “he may file an amended complaint within 30 DAYS.” Id. Reid did
not file an additional amended complaint.1 On August 9, 2018, the District Court, noting
that Reid had not filed an amended complaint, ordered the Clerk to close the case. On
September 10, 2018, Reid filed a notice of appeal.
This Court has “an independent duty to satisfy [itself] of [its] appellate jurisdiction
regardless of the parties’ positions.” Bedrosian v. United States of Am., Dep’t of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 912 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2018). “Federal courts are
1
Earlier in the proceedings, Reid had submitted a second amended complaint, Dkt. #36,
but the District Court ordered it to be stricken, as Reid had not sought leave to amend,
Dkt. #41.
2
courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution
and statute.” See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is limited to review of final orders of the District Court.
Unless a District Court has certified an order under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures, an order that “terminates fewer than all claims pending in an action or
claims against fewer than all the parties to an action” generally is not final. See Elliott v.
Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, the District Court’s
May 31, 2018 order and opinion did not address Reid’s claims against PSEG. See Dkt.
#46, Dist. Ct. Op. at 1 (“We only address those portions [of the complaint] that are
relevant to Exelon’s motion to dismiss.”).
The Court’s August 9, 2018 order did not cure the lack of finality, as it did not address
Reid’s claims against PSEG, either. Although the District Court ordered the Clerk to
close the case, an order closing a case for lack of activity does not render a judgment final
where “[t]he court never mentioned a dismissal—either with or without prejudice.” See
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2013); see also
Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470, 481–82 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
that “a district court does not render a matter final for purposes of appeal merely by
marking the docket in the case with the notation ‘Case closed.’”).
Appellees both construe the District Court’s August 9, 2018 order as one dismissing
Reid’s complaint as a penalty, for failure to prosecute. We find that a strained reading of
the order, as the order does not give any indication that the dismissal is a sanction. See
3
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting
that dismissal with prejudice is a “drastic sanction[]” and that a District Court should
analyze six factors before dismissing a complaint on that basis).2
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
2
Dismissal as a sanction may not have been proper here, as Reid may have been waiting
for the District Court to address his claims against PSEG.
4