Sean Donahue v. R. Alexander Acosta ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-3841
__________
SEAN M. DONAHUE,
Appellant
v.
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, IN ITS CAPACITY AS A SOVEREIGN SIGNATORY TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION; THE LUZERNE/SCHUYLKILL COUNTIES WORKFORCE
INVESTMENT BOARD, INC.; PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-01759)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 21, 2019
Before: MCKEE, COWEN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 17, 2019)
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O P I N I O N*
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PER CURIAM
Sean M. Donahue appeals an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his amended complaint for failure to state a
claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
Donahue is a pro se litigant who has filed several federal lawsuits arising out of
his state court convictions for harassment. Those convictions stemmed from threatening
emails that Donahue sent to state employees complaining that he had been improperly
denied services at state employment offices. In September 2017, he filed in the District
Court another such lawsuit, captioned “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.” Donahue
claimed that a state court criminal sentence that prohibits him from entering certain
employment services offices interferes with his ability to utilize preferential job
placement benefits that are afforded to veterans. He named as defendants the United
States Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and the Luzerne and Schuylkill Counties Workforce Investment Board.
The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who granted Donahue’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but concluded that he was not entitled to mandamus
relief and that his claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, the Rooker-Feldman
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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doctrine, and the Younger abstention doctrine.1 Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the action be dismissed without prejudice so that Donahue could
amend his claims. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and
provided Donahue with 21 days to file an amended complaint.
Donahue filed a timely amended pleading, adding President Trump as a defendant,
and asking the District Court to “intervene” and direct the defendants to provide him with
“veterans priority job referrals under the US Jobs for Veterans Act ….” (ECF #6, p. 4-5,
8). The Magistrate Judge again concluded that mandamus relief was not warranted
because Donahue did “not describe a plainly non-discretionary duty on the defendants’
part” and did not “set forth well-pleaded facts giving [him] an absolute entitlement to the
particular form of relief which he seeks.” In addition, the Magistrate Judge stated that
Heck barred Donahue’s attempt to seek relief from his conviction in a civil rights action.
To the extent that Donahue sought an order “quash[ing]” portions of the state court
sentencing order, the Magistrate Judge concluded that his claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the
amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Over Donahue’s objections, the District
Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint
with prejudice. Donahue appealed.2
1
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Donahue has filed a notice of new evidence and motion to strike his state court
conviction and trial testimony.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s order dismissing the complaint is de novo. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).
Donahue’s claims lack merit. In his amended submission, he purported to
“correct[] defects” in his initial pleading. (ECF #6, p. 2). But, at bottom, Donahue again
asked the District Court to order the defendants to vacate his state court sentence and
provide him with “veterans priority job referrals.” (Id. at p. 4, 10). According to
Donahue, the Department of Labor has a “nondiscretionary duty” to provide him with
those referrals. (Id. at p. 6). But, pursuant to the sentences in his criminal cases,
Donahue was prohibited from visiting certain career services offices. He asked the
District Court to “intentionally disturb and overturn the outcome of both state criminal
trials.” (Id. at 10).
As the Magistrate Judge explained, Donahue is not entitled to mandamus relief.
Such relief is available only in extraordinary circumstances. See In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). A petitioner seeking the writ “must have
no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to
issuance is clear and indisputable.” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).
Donahue did not demonstrate that he is clearly entitled to have the Department of Labor
provide him with job placement services or to have the state courts overturn his
conviction. Notably, Donahue has not meaningfully challenged the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that a “substantial element of discretion … is an inherent part of many
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Department of Labor job placement programs.” Bartlett Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Thompson, 347 F.3d 828, 831 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Because we find that the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] did not owe any clear, non-discretionary duty to Plaintiffs,
we hold that mandamus jurisdiction does not lie[.]”). And, of course, Donahue had other
means of challenging his criminal sentences. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485-
86 (3d Cir. 2001) (providing that the proper avenue for challenging a state conviction in
federal court is 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
To the extent that Donahue sought to use a civil rights action to obtain equitable
relief – i.e., to have the District Court overturn his state court sentences – his claim is
barred by Heck. Heck holds that, where success in a § 1983 action would necessarily
imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, an individual’s suit for damages or
equitable relief is barred unless he can demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has
been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 81-82 (2005). Donahue sought to challenge his sentence on the ground that the “State
had no legal decision making jurisdiction regarding whether or not an honorably
discharged veteran … received first priority use of resources.” (ECF #6, p. 3). But,
because an order overturning Donahue’s state court sentences would necessarily imply
the invalidity of those sentences, his claim is Heck-barred.
Moreover, if, as Donahue asserts, an “underlying criminal case is on appeal in the
state system,” Appellant’s Br., p. 18, it would be inappropriate to interfere with those
ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. And, to the extent that
Donahue sought to challenge a final state court conviction, his claim is barred by the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine deprives lower federal courts of jurisdiction
over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments. Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). “[F]our
requirements . . . must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-
court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed;
and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”
Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)) (alterations in original). Those requirements have been met here. Donahue was
convicted in state court before bringing the underlying action, he complained that his
sentence prevents him from obtaining veterans job benefits, and he asked the District
Court to overturn the sentence. See Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct., 528 F.3d 785,
788-90 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred challenge in
federal district court to municipal court conviction and fine).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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