Sandra Rumanek v. ( 2019 )

CLD-107 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1341
___________
In re: SANDRA RUMANEK,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware
(Related to D. Del. Civ. No. 1:17-cv-00123 & D. Del. Civ. No. 1:12-cv-00759)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
February 21, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion: March 13, 2019)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Sandra Rumanek has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, in which she
requests appellate review of her pleadings and the District Court’s orders in Rumanek v.
Fallon, DC Civ. No. 1:17-cv-00123 (D. Del.). In addition, she requests: serial appellate
review for Rumanek v. Independent School Management, DC Civ. No. 1:12-cv-00759
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
(D. Del.); reconsideration of certain prior judgments by this Court; an award of over
$4,000,000 in damages; and relief from a state court judgment.
We have been presented with no basis to do any of those things. See, e.g., In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991)
(explaining that mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that “the peremptory writ of
mandamus has generally been used to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it has a duty to do
so”). Perhaps to some degree recognizing as much, Rumanek asks that, if we are inclined
to deny relief, we at least “inform her . . . how she must proceed in order to vindicate and
cease the trampling of her fundamental civil rights and right to equal protection of the
laws by those charged with upholding those rights and laws.” Corr. Pet’n at 4.
While we recognize and appreciate the challenges faced by pro se litigants
untrained in the law, such litigants “do not have a right—constitutional, statutory, or
otherwise—to receive how-to legal manuals from judges.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2013). That said, we previously explained to Rumanek
that interlocutory orders in Rumanek v. Fallon, DC Civ. No. 1:17-cv-00123 (D. Del.), for
example, “would be reviewable by this Court after final judgment and a properly filed
notice of appeal.” In re Rumanek, 740 F. App’x 20, 22 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (emphasis
added).
2
In the end, Rumanek has not shown that mandamus relief is appropriate or warranted.
Accordingly, her petition will be denied.1
1
Rumanek requests that this Court, in the alternative to dismissing her petition, “consider
it an appeal.” Corr. Pet’n at 4. An appeal of ‘what,’ however, she does not specify. And
it would be imprudent and improper for this Court to make a guess—even an educated
one—particularly given Rumanek’s sweeping prayer for relief in the mandamus petition
and her demonstrated ability to successfully file notices of appeal.
3