Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F.3d 220 ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2000 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-28-2000
    Allah v. Seiverling
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 97-3627
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000
    Recommended Citation
    "Allah v. Seiverling" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 208.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/208
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    Filed September 28, 2000
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 97-3627
    MICHAEL MALIK ALLAH,
    Appellant
    v.
    THOMAS SEIVERLING; ROBERT SPARBANIE;
    JOHN D'ELETTO; BEN VARNER
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
    Amicus Curiae
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Intervenor
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-01696)
    District Judge: Hon. Robert J. Cindrich
    Argued July 20, 2000
    Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and FUENTES,
    Circuit Judges
    (Filed September 28, 2000)
    Deena Jo Schneider
    Joseph T. Lukens (Argued)
    S. Jnatel Simmons
    Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellant
    D. Michael Fisher
    Attorney General
    J. Bart DeLone (Argued)
    Calvin R. Koons
    Senior Deputy Attorney General
    John G. Knorr, III
    Chief Deputy Attorney General
    Chief, Appellate Litigation Section
    Office of Attorney General
    Appellate Litigation Section
    Harrisburg, PA 17120
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
    on behalf of Appellees
    David W. Ogden
    Acting Asistant Attorney General
    Michael R. Stiles
    United States Attorney
    John C. Hoyle
    Susan L. Pacholski
    Attorney for Intervenor
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
    Michael Malik Allah appeals the District Court's order
    dismissing Allah's complaint before service on the ground
    that his claims are barred by the Supreme Court's decision
    in Sandin v. Connor, 
    515 U.S. 472
    (1995). The appeal
    requires us to consider the effect of the Sandin decision on
    Allah's access-to-courts claims, including his claim that he
    was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for
    filing civil rights lawsuits.
    I.
    Allah, who was granted leave to proceed in forma
    pauperis, filed his pro se complaint on September 19, 1997
    alleging that he was being kept in administrative
    segregation at S.C.I. Greene in retaliation forfiling civil
    2
    rights lawsuits against prison officials at S.C.I. Frackville
    and S.C.I. Graterford, two prisons where he had earlier
    been housed, and that while he was kept in administrative
    segregation he was denied meaningful access to the courts.
    According to his complaint, Allah was transferred from
    S.C.I. Frackville to S.C.I. Greene on July 9, 1997 and was
    placed in administrative segregation. He was told by the
    officer in charge that the officer "had not had a chance to
    review [his] records" but that Allah would be brought before
    the Program Review Committee ("PRC") the next day, July
    10. App. at 10. Allah was brought before the PRC on July
    15 and was told that the PRC still did not have his records
    but that he would be seen every 30 days. Allah alleges the
    PRC did have his records but kept him in administrative
    segregation in retaliation for filing lawsuits when he was
    housed at other prisons. He was again brought before the
    PRC on August 12, 1998 and denied release to the general
    population, with "[n]o valid reason given." App. at 11. On
    September 9, 1997, he was again brought before the PRC
    and denied release to the general population.
    Allah alleges in his complaint that he is "unable to file
    and product [sic] briefs" in his criminal case and unable to
    conduct discovery in his civil rights cases while in
    administrative segregation at S.C.I. Greene. App. at 10. His
    complaint seeks relief in the form of compensation damages
    and punitive damages. In his briefs he asserts that he also
    seeks injunctive and declaratory relief.
    On September 29, 1997, before service of the complaint,
    the Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be
    dismissed for failure to state a claim, stating:
    In Sandin v. Connor, 
    115 S. Ct. 2293
    (1995), the Court
    held that housing an inmate in disciplinary custody did
    not impose such atypical and significant hardships on
    the inmate so as to invoke Constitutional protection.
    Thus, the plaintiff 's complaint here is without merit
    . . .
    Report and Recommendation, Doc. # 6 (Sept. 29, 1997) at
    2. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report
    and Recommendation as the opinion of the court and
    ordered the complaint dismissed. Allah timely appealed.
    3
    This court appointed counsel to represent Allah on appeal.1
    We also requested that the Commonwealth submit a brief
    and argue as amicus curiae.2 The appeal was consolidated
    with another brought by Allah in a separate case captioned
    Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 98-1385. The two consolidated
    appeals present distinct legal issues, and we address the
    issues in separate opinions.
    Our review of the District Court's sua sponte dismissal
    for failure to state a claim, which was authorized by 28
    U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(2), like
    that for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is plenary.
    See Tourscher v. McCullough, 
    184 F.3d 236
    , 240 (3d Cir.
    1999). "[W]e must accept as true the factual allegations in
    the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be
    drawn therefrom." Nami v. Fauver, 
    82 F.2d 63
    , 65 (3d Cir.
    1996).
    II.
    Allah alleges two claims in his complaint: that he was
    denied meaningful access to the courts while he was kept
    in administrative segregation and that he was kept in
    administrative segregation in retaliation for filing civil rights
    claims against prison officials at S.C.I. Frackville and S.C.I.
    Graterford. The District Court interpreted Sandin to
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. We expressed our appreciation to this firm and others in note 4 of the
    companion opinion in Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 98-1385.
    2. A motions panel of this court requested that the parties address
    several additional issues in their briefs, including, inter alia, whether
    any
    or all of Allah's claims are moot, whether Allah has exhausted available
    administrative remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(a),
    whether Allah's claims seeking monetary damages are barred by 42
    U.S.C. S 1997e(e), and what standard should be applied to a claim
    alleging retaliation for exercising the right to petition the courts. For
    the
    most part, those issues are not directly presented by this appeal, and we
    accordingly do not decide them here. As for mootness, a jurisdictional
    issue, it is clear, and the parties do not dispute, that at least Allah's
    claims for damages survive his release from administrative segregation.
    See Weaver v. Wilcox, 
    650 F.2d 22
    , 27 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that
    prisoner's transfer from the prison moots claim for injunctive and
    declaratory relief with respect to prison conditions but not claim for
    damages).
    4
    preclude both of these claims, apparently in the belief that
    Sandin stands for the principle that no claim arising out of
    administrative segregation can form the basis for a
    constitutional violation. We cannot agree with that
    interpretation of Sandin.
    Sandin involved a S 1983 suit brought by a state prisoner
    against several prison officials alleging that they had
    violated his constitutional right to procedural due process
    by sentencing him to disciplinary segregation without
    permitting him to call certain witnesses. 
    See 515 U.S. at 476
    . The Supreme Court noted in Sandin that under the
    procedure previously followed, if the Due Process Clause
    itself did not confer a liberty interest in a particular prison
    situation,3 the federal courts would proceed to "examin[e]
    . . . the possibility that the State had created a liberty
    interest by virtue of its prison regulations. . . ." 
    Id. at 480
    (explaining the approach taken by the Court in Hewitt v.
    Helms, 
    459 U.S. 460
    (1983)). The Supreme Court
    substantially modified that analysis in Sandin , holding that
    an examination of a state statute or regulation should not
    be conducted unless the challenged restraint on freedom
    "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
    relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 
    Id. at 484.
    As the Court explained:
    States may under certain circumstances create liberty
    interests which are protected by the Due Process
    Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to
    freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
    sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise
    to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
    force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
    hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
    incidents of prison life.
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. The Court has held that the Due Process Clause confers a liberty
    interest in certain situations. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 
    494 U.S. 210
    (1990) (holding that an inmate has a liberty interest in being
    protected from the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs);
    Vitek v. Jones, 
    445 U.S. 480
    (1980) (holding that an inmate has a liberty
    interest in being free from involuntary transfer to mental hospital for
    treatment).
    5
    
    Id. at 483-84
    (citations omitted). Applying this approach to
    the facts of the case before it, the Court held that"[the
    prisoner's] discipline in segregated confinement did not
    present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which
    a State might conceivably create a liberty interest,"
    inasmuch as "[t]he regime to which [the prisoner] was
    subjected . . . was within the range of confinement to be
    normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of
    30 years to life." 
    Id. at 486-87.
    The Court's opinion makes clear that the decision does
    not foreclose other claims challenging the constitutionality
    of official actions. Specifically, it states:
    Prisoners . . . , of course, retain other protection from
    arbitrary state action even within the expected
    conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First
    and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection
    Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where
    appropriate, and may draw upon internal prison
    grievance procedures and state judicial review where
    available.
    
    Id. at 487
    n.11.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Allah's claim alleging
    denial of his constitutional right to meaningful access to
    the courts is not foreclosed by Sandin. In fact, the
    Commonwealth concedes as much in its brief, stating that
    the District Court "should have" considered that claim. See
    Amicus Br. at 27. It is well settled that prisoners have a
    constitutional right to access to the courts, which requires
    access to "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
    from persons trained in the law" for filing challenges to
    criminal sentences, both direct and collateral, and civil
    rights actions. Bounds v. Smith, 
    430 U.S. 817
    , 828 (1977);
    see also Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 355 (1996)
    (recognizing that the Constitution requires that prisoners
    be provided the tools "that the inmates need in order to
    attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order
    to challenge the conditions of their confinement"); Wolff v.
    McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 579 (1974) (extending right of
    access to the courts, founded on the Due Process Clause,
    to prisoners filing actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 to
    6
    vindicate "basic constitutional rights"). 4 This right to access
    to the courts is distinct from any liberty interest in
    remaining free from administrative or disciplinary
    segregation. A claim founded on the right of access remains
    viable after Sandin.5
    Nor does Sandin preclude Allah's claim alleging that he
    was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for
    filing civil rights suits against prison officials. We have
    recognized that "[t]he right of access to the courts . . . must
    be freely exercisable without hindrance or fear of
    retaliation." Milhouse v. Carlson, 
    652 F.2d 371
    , 374 (3d Cir.
    1981) (locating right to access the courts in a retaliation
    case in the First Amendment right to petition for redress of
    grievances); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 
    523 U.S. 574
    ,
    588 n.10 (1998) (stating that "[t]he reason why . . .
    retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to
    inhibit exercise of the protected right").
    Sandin instructs that placement in administrative
    confinement will generally not create a liberty interest. See
    Griffin v. Vaughn, 
    112 F.3d 703
    , 706 (3d Cir. 1997)
    (applying Sandin and holding that conditions experienced
    by prisoner in administrative custody did not implicate
    liberty interest). Retaliation may be actionable, however,
    even when the retaliatory action does not involve a liberty
    interest. See, e.g., Stanley v. Litscher , 
    213 F.3d 340
    , 343
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. The right to access to the courts has a number of constitutional roots,
    including the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. See
    generally Peterkin v. Jeffes, 
    855 F.2d 1021
    , 1036 n.18 (3d Cir. 1988)
    (chronicling sources of the right).
    5. At argument, the Commonwealth suggested that Allah's access to
    courts claim should be dismissed for failure to allege actual injury, as
    required by Casey. Under Casey, in order to have standing to challenge
    prison conditions as denying meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner
    must plead facts to "demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings . . .
    hindered his efforts to pursue a legal 
    claim." 518 U.S. at 351
    . Allah
    alleges, inter alia, that while he was in administrative segregation he
    did
    not have access to trained legal aids and as a result was unable to file
    a brief in his post-conviction appeal, which he alleges was due on
    September 10, 1997, the day after the date of his complaint. Construing
    Allah's complaint liberally, that allegation is sufficient to state a
    claim
    under Casey.
    7
    (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff stated claim for
    retaliatory transfer even though no liberty interest involved
    in transfer); Rouse v. Benson, 
    193 F.3d 936
    , 939 (8th Cir.
    1999) (same). "[G]overnment actions, which standing alone
    do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be
    constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a
    desire to punish an individual for exercise of a
    constitutional right." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 
    175 F.3d 378
    ,
    386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
    Our holding that claims alleging retaliation for the
    exercise of First Amendment rights survive Sandin is
    consistent with those circuits that have considered the
    issue. In Pratt v. Rowland, 
    65 F.3d 802
    , 806-07 (9th Cir.
    1995), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
    Sandin did not bar a claim alleging that a prisoner-plaintiff
    had been transferred and placed in a double cell in
    retaliation for a television interview that he had given. The
    court stated:
    To succeed on his retaliation claim, [the plaintiff] need
    not establish an independent constitutional interest in
    either assignment to a given prison or placement in a
    single cell, because the crux of his claim is that state
    officials violated his First Amendment rights by
    retaliating against him for his protected speech
    activities.
    
    Id. at 806.
    In Babcock v. White, 
    102 F.3d 267
    , 274-75 (7th
    Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    agreed, holding that a prisoner-plaintiff 's claim that a
    prison official had prevented an expeditious transfer in
    retaliation for his filing lawsuits against prison officials was
    actionable "even if [the prison official's] actions did not
    independently violate the Constitution" and thus was not
    barred by Sandin.
    The Commonwealth argues that "the sense of the Sandin
    opinion" counsels us to hold that continued placement in
    administrative confinement can never amount to adverse
    action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Amicus Br.
    at 18. As the Supreme Court recognized in its footnote in
    Sandin, however, "[p]risoners . . . retain other protection
    from arbitrary state action even within the expected
    8
    conditions of confinement." 
    515 U.S. 487
    n.11 (emphasis
    added).
    We recently explained this court's position on the adverse
    action prong of a retaliation claim in Suppan v. Dadonna,
    
    203 F.3d 228
    (3d Cir. 2000). There, we considered whether
    the defendants' action of placing plaintiffs lower on
    promotion ranking lists in retaliation for the exercise of
    their First Amendment free speech rights was sufficiently
    adverse to state a claim for retaliation. We held that it was,
    stating that a fact finder could conclude that"the alleged
    retaliatory conduct was sufficient `to deter a person of
    ordinary firmness' from exercising his First Amendment
    rights." 
    Id. at 235
    (quoting Bart v. Telford, 
    677 F.2d 622
    ,
    625 (7th Cir. 1982)). This same test has been applied in the
    prison context. See 
    Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396-99
    ;
    Crawford-El v. Britton, 
    93 F.3d 813
    , 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (en banc) (approving the Bart standard in the prison
    context), reversed on other grounds, 
    523 U.S. 574
    (1998).
    Although it is possible that in some cases placement in
    administrative segregation would not deter a prisoner of
    ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First
    Amendment rights, we cannot say that such action can
    never amount to adverse action. On the contrary, whether
    a prisoner-plaintiff has met that prong of his or her
    retaliation claim will depend on the facts of the particular
    case.
    Here, Allah alleges that his confinement in administrative
    segregation resulted, inter alia, in reduced access to phone
    calls, reduced access to the commissary, reduced access to
    recreation, confinement in his cell for all butfive hours per
    week, denial of access to rehabilitative programs and,
    significantly, inadequate access to legal research materials
    and assistance. A fact finder could conclude from those
    facts that retaliatory continued placement in administrative
    confinement would "deter a person of ordinaryfirmness
    from exercising his First Amendment rights." 
    Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235
    (internal quotations omitted); see 
    Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396
    ("[A]n action comparable to transfer to
    administrative segregation would certainly be adverse.").
    9
    III.
    For the reasons stated, we will vacate the order of the
    District Court sua sponte dismissing Allah's complaint as
    barred by Sandin and will remand for further proceedings
    not inconsistent with this opinion.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-3627

Citation Numbers: 229 F.3d 220

Filed Date: 9/28/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (21)

peterkin-otis-h-albrecht-alfred-f-truesdale-mack-maxwell-frederick , 855 F.2d 1021 ( 1988 )

richard-suppan-glenn-kerrigan-gerald-dieter-james-bowser-v-joseph-dadonna , 203 F.3d 228 ( 2000 )

Mark D. Tourscher v. Martin Horn, Secretary of the Pa. Dept.... , 184 F.3d 236 ( 1999 )

jerome-griffin-v-don-vaughn-hugh-owens-bk-smith-r-johnson-joseph , 112 F.3d 703 ( 1997 )

weaver-francis-eugene-and-the-inmates-of-tioga-county-prison-v-wilcox , 650 F.2d 22 ( 1981 )

milhouse-lester-d-aka-milhouse-bey-lester-d-v-carlson-norman-b , 652 F.2d 371 ( 1981 )

Elmer PRATT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James K. ROWLAND; James ... , 65 F.3d 802 ( 1995 )

Howard Dean Rouse v. Dennis L. Benson David Crist Steve C. ... , 193 F.3d 936 ( 1999 )

Thaddeus-X and Earnest Bell, Jr. v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378 ( 1999 )

Mary A. Bart v. William C. Telford , 677 F.2d 622 ( 1982 )

John C. Babcock v. R.L. White and G. McDaniel , 102 F.3d 267 ( 1996 )

Leonard Rollon Crawford-El v. Patricia Britton and the ... , 93 F.3d 813 ( 1996 )

Hershel R. Stanley v. Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Wisconsin ... , 213 F.3d 340 ( 2000 )

Vitek v. Jones , 100 S. Ct. 1254 ( 1980 )

Wolff v. McDonnell , 94 S. Ct. 2963 ( 1974 )

Bounds v. Smith , 97 S. Ct. 1491 ( 1977 )

Washington v. Harper , 110 S. Ct. 1028 ( 1990 )

Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293 ( 1995 )

Lewis v. Casey , 116 S. Ct. 2174 ( 1996 )

Crawford-El v. Britton , 118 S. Ct. 1584 ( 1998 )

View All Authorities »