United States v. Harple ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2000 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-21-2000
    United States v Harple
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 99-1040
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    Recommended Citation
    "United States v Harple" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 12.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/12
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    Filed September 10, 1999
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 99-1040
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    WILLIAM HARPLE,
    Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (No. 98-cr-00125)
    District Judge: The Honorable Raymond J. Broderick
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 16, 1999
    Before: GREENBERG and ALITO, Circuit Judges, and
    STAFFORD, District Judge*
    (Opinion Filed: September 10, 1999)
    _________________________________________________________________
    * The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior Judge of the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by
    designation.
    MICHAEL R. STILES, Esq.
    United States Attorney
    WALTER S. BATTY, JR., Esq.
    Chief of Appeals
    HOWARD L. PERZAN
    Assistant U.S. Attorney
    U.S. Attorney's Office
    615 Chestnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Counsel for Appellee
    PAUL M. MESSING, Esq.
    Kairys, Rudovsky, Espstein,
    Messing & Rau
    924 Cherry Street, 5th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Counsel for Appellant
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ALITO, Circuit Judge:
    William Harple appeals from a judgment in a criminal
    case. A jury convicted Harple of conspiracy to commit
    arson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, arson, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. S 844(i), and aiding and abetting arson, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2. This appeal raises two questions:
    first, whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion
    under Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968), to effect a stop of
    the automobile in which Harple was a passenger, and
    second, whether the officers subsequently had probable
    cause to arrest Harple and conduct a search of the
    automobile and its occupants. This latter question requires
    us to compare the facts of this case to those in United
    States v. Kithcart, 
    134 F.3d 529
    (3d Cir. 1998), in which we
    held that probable cause was lacking under somewhat
    similar circumstances. Here, we hold that the officers based
    their investigatory stop upon reasonable suspicion and that
    unlike in Kithcart, the officers then obtained probable cause
    to arrest the occupants of the automobile, including Harple,
    and to conduct a search of the automobile and its
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    occupants. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
    District Court.
    I.
    On the night of April 9, 1996, Officers McCullough and
    Postowski of the Philadelphia Police Department were
    working in the 24th district's burglary detail, an
    assignment that required them to dress in plainclothes and
    drive an unmarked car. App. at 15. Their supervisor,
    Sergeant Neiman, informed them of previous fires in the
    vicinity of 2500 Butler Street and instructed them to "be on
    the lookout for a blue over white vehicle with a third brake
    light with a group of white males inside of it that were last
    seen leaving that area the night before on a previous fire."
    App. at 16. Sergeant Neiman also told the officers that the
    group consisted of five or more young individuals. App. at
    17.
    At approximately 12:15 a.m., April 10, 1996, Officers
    McCullough and Postowski received a radio transmission
    reporting a fire at 2500 Butler Street. App. at 18. Because
    their vehicle was only about two or three blocks away from
    the fire, they arrived at the scene within a minute of
    receiving the call. App. at 48. Approximately one minute
    after arriving at the scene, Officers McCullough and
    Postowski began to survey the area in their unmarked
    vehicle. App. at 18-19, 48. Within approximately another
    minute, they discovered a white Oldsmobile with a blue
    pinstripe and a third brake light. App. at 20-22, 41, 48. The
    car contained a group of white males. App. at 21. The white
    Oldsmobile was less than three blocks away from thefire in
    an area that was not heavily traveled at that time of night.
    App. at 24, 48, 54. According to Officer McCullough, the
    driver of the white Oldsmobile was "excessively obeying
    traffic signal[s]."1 App. at 23. Officer McCullough also
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. Officer McCullough explained: "it has been my experience, on patrol,
    that people do not tend to stay at the stop sign for more than a short
    period of time like the driver of that vehicle [i.e., the white
    Oldsmobile].
    They came to a complete stop, stayed there for approximately 15 to 30
    seconds and then moved. To me, in my past experience, that is excessive
    and not normal for everyday drivers[.]" App. at 24.
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    testified that he could see the fire department trucks at the
    2500 Butler Street fire from that location. App. at 55.
    Officers McCullough and Postowski called for assistance
    and continued to follow the Oldsmobile. App. at 25-26. A
    police wagon soon arrived and pulled over the Oldsmobile.
    App. at 25. The officers then asked the Oldsmobile's driver
    for his license and registration. App. at 26. When the driver
    stated that he did not have these documents, the officers
    instructed the driver and the other passengers to step out
    of the vehicle. App. at 26, 28. There were five individuals in
    the vehicle. App. at 30.
    Officer McCullough then used his portable radio to
    inform other police officers that he had stopped the vehicle.
    At that point, he heard his radio transmission projected
    back at him from inside the Oldsmobile. When he stopped
    transmitting his message, he heard the fire department's
    radio frequency coming from inside the automobile. App. at
    27. Upon looking inside the automobile, Officer McCullough
    discovered a hand-held scanner that was tuned to the
    police and the fire departments' radio frequencies. 
    Id. Following the
    discovery of the hand-held scanner, the
    officers then proceeded to frisk the occupants and
    discovered lighters, matches, and rolled-up paper towels.
    App. at 28. The officers then searched the inside of the
    Oldsmobile and found a flashlight and a set of walkie-
    talkies. App. at 29.
    Harple moved to suppress all the physical evidence
    recovered by the police officers. The District Court denied
    Harple's motion. The District Court held that "the totality of
    circumstances support a finding that, at the time Officers
    Postowski and McCullough stopped the white Oldsmobile
    carrying Defendant Harple, the officers had a reasonable
    suspicion that criminal activity was afoot which justified
    the officers in making a stop under Terry." Dist. Ct. Op. at
    8. The District Court also held that "[o]nce[the police
    officers] discovered the police and fire scanner in the
    automobile -- after the officers stopped the automobile, but
    before they effected a search of the automobile or its
    occupants -- the officers had probable cause to believe that
    the occupants of the Oldsmobile had committed or were
    committing arson." Dist. Ct. Op. at 10.
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    On appeal, Harple contends that the District Court erred
    in making both legal determinations. Harple makes two
    arguments. First, he claims that "the information possessed
    by the officers was insufficient to establish reasonable
    suspicion to warrant an investigative stop." Appellant's Br.
    at 15. Second, he argues that if the information possessed
    by the police officer in United States v. Kithcart, 
    134 F.3d 529
    (3d Cir. 1998), was inadequate to support afinding of
    probable cause to arrest and search the appellant in that
    case, then it follows that the police officers lacked probable
    cause here. See Appellant's Br. at 13. We will address each
    argument in turn.
    II.
    We review a district court's determinations of reasonable
    suspicion and probable cause de novo. See Ornelas v.
    United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 697 (1996); United States v.
    Brown, 
    159 F.3d 147
    , 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (reasonable
    suspicion); United States v. Kithcart, 
    134 F.3d 529
    , 531 (3d
    Cir. 1998) (probable cause). We review a district court's
    factual findings for clear error. 
    Brown, 159 F.3d at 148
    .
    A.
    Terry v. Ohio created a narrow exception to the general
    warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution. 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 20-21 (1968). In
    Kithcart, we commented that "[a]lthough Terry allows an
    investigative stop, it still requires reasonable suspicion
    before the government can justify even this limited
    
    intrusion." 134 F.3d at 532
    . In United States v. Rickus, 
    737 F.2d 360
    , 365 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
    Terry, 392 U.S. at 21
    ), we noted that "[r]easonable suspicion must be based
    upon ``specific and articulable facts which, taken together
    with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
    warrant that intrusion.' "
    The District Court supported its holding that the officers
    had reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop
    by citing the following factors:
    the temporal and geographic proximity of the
    Oldsmobile to the Butler Street fire, the fact that the
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    Oldsmobile was driving in an otherwise desolate area,
    the fact that the Oldsmobile substantially matched the
    description which the officers had received from Sgt.
    Nieman [sic] (including the automobile having the
    brake light in the rear window area), the fact that the
    Oldsmobile started moving in an unusually careful
    manner, and the fact that, consistent with the briefing
    the officers had received that night, the Oldsmobile
    carried several white males who appeared young.
    Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10. We agree with the District Court's
    analysis, and we accordingly reject Harple's contention that
    Officers McCullough and Postowski did not have reasonable
    suspicion to effect an investigatory stop.
    B.
    We now turn to Harple's second argument, viz., that in
    view of our opinion in Kithcart, we should hold that Officers
    McCullough and Postowski did not have probable cause to
    arrest the Oldsmobile's occupants and to search them and
    the automobile.2 In Kithcart, a police officer in a patrol car
    received three radio transmissions within the course of an
    hour, each of which reported an armed robbery. 
    Id. at 529.
    The first two robberies occurred in Bensalem Township, the
    township where the police officer worked. 
    Id. The last
    robbery occurred in neighboring Bristol Township, and the
    transmission reporting it did not specify where or when it
    occurred. 
    Id. at 529-30.
    The radio transmissions described the alleged
    perpetrators of these robberies as "two black males in a
    black sports car." 
    Id. at 530.
    Among other things, the
    transmissions described the vehicle that the alleged
    perpetrators were driving as a "possible Z-28, possible
    Camaro." 
    Id. (footnote omitted).
    Approximately ten minutes
    after receiving the final transmission, a police officer
    spotted a black Nissan 300ZX approximately a mile from
    the boundary of Bristol Township. 
    Id. The police
    officer
    discerned that an African-American male was driving the
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. The government has not attempted to justify the frisk of the occupants
    under Terry.
    6
    automobile, and she believed that he was the only person
    in the car. 
    Id. The police
    officer then observed the Nissan
    drive through a red light. 
    Id. At that
    point, she turned on
    her dome lights, and the Nissan pulled over. 
    Id. The police
    officer then called for backup. 
    Id. After two
    backup police
    officers arrived, the officers conducted a search and
    discovered a gun in Kithcart's white nylon waist pouch and
    another gun under the driver's seat. 
    Id. The District
    Court held "that the officers had ``probable
    cause' to arrest Kithcart and to search him incident to the
    arrest." 
    Id. at 531.
    We reversed the District Court, noting
    that "[t]he mere fact that Kithcart is black and the
    perpetrators had been described as two black males is
    plainly insufficient" to support a finding of probable cause.
    
    Id. In addition,
    we stated that "[a]lthough the Camaro Z-28
    and the Nissan 300ZX could be considered ``sports cars,'
    there was no evidence offered at the suppression hearing
    that the shapes of the two cars were sufficiently similar so
    as to warrant an inference that a 300ZX could be mistaken
    for a Z-28." 
    Id. Lastly, we
    noted that "[t]here was no
    evidence presented as to where in Bristol Township the
    final robbery occurred; nor was there evidence presented
    that the Bristol robbery occurred shortly before Officer
    Nelson stopped the car carrying Kithcart." 
    Id. We reject
    Harple's contention that Kithcart requires us to
    reverse the District Court's determination that Officers
    McCullough and Postowski had probable cause to arrest
    the Oldsmobile's occupants and to search them and the
    automobile. Unlike in Kithcart -- where the officer
    essentially relied upon a description of the perpetrators as
    two black males driving a black sports car -- the officers
    here did not rely solely upon Sergeant Neiman's description
    of the alleged arsonists as a young group of white males
    driving a blue on white automobile. Rather, there was other
    evidence linking Harple to the arson at 2500 Butler Street.
    In contrast to Kithcart, the record here shows that the
    officers had knowledge of where the arson happened and
    that the officers stopped the car carrying Harple shortly
    after the arson occurred. Moreover, the officers spotted the
    white Oldsmobile moving in an abnormally cautious
    manner less than three blocks away from the fire. From
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    that location, the occupants of the Oldsmobile could see the
    fire trucks that had arrived at the scene of thefire. After
    the stop, the officers discovered hand-held scanners tuned
    to police and fire department frequencies, behavior that
    tended to show that the occupants of the Oldsmobile were
    monitoring police and fire department activity. In light of
    this evidence, we hold that the District Court did not err in
    concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest
    the occupants of the Oldsmobile, including Harple, and to
    search the automobile.
    III.
    For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District
    Court.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
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