Eaves v. County of Cape May ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2001 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-24-2001
    Eaves v. Cape May County
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 00-5096
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    Recommended Citation
    "Eaves v. Cape May County" (2001). 2001 Decisions. Paper 11.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/11
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    Filed January 24, 2001
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 00-5096
    PAMELA D. EAVES
    v.
    COUNTY OF CAPE MAY;
    WILLIAM E. STURM, INDIVIDUALLY
    AND AS AN ELECTED MEMBER AND
    DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF CHOSEN
    FREEHOLDERS OF CAPE MAY COUNTY, NEW JERSEY;
    EDMUND GRANT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
    TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF CAPE MAY;
    BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF
    CAPE MAY COUNTY;
    JOHN DOES, I TO X; (fictitious names of
    persons or organizations more fully
    described herein); jointly severally
    and in the alternative
    County of Cape May,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. No. 95-cv-04574)
    District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
    Argued September 12, 2000
    Before: McKEE, RENDELL,
    and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 24, 2001)
    William M. Tambussi [ARGUED]
    Brown & Connery
    360 Haddon Avenue
    P.O. Box 539
    Westmont, NJ 08108
    Counsel for Appellee
    Pamela D. Eaves
    Marc I. Bressman [ARGUED]
    Budd, Larner, Gross,
    Rosenbaum, Greenberg & Sade
    200 Lake Drive East
    Woodland Falls Corporate Park
    Suite 100
    Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
    Counsel for Appellant
    County of Cape May
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    The County of Cape May ("the County") appeals the
    District Court's ruling awarding the plaintif f, Pamela Eaves
    ("Eaves"), post-judgment interest on the Court's award of
    $254,248.57 in attorney's fees and expenses fr om August
    11, 1998, the date that the District Court first stated that
    she was entitled to such an award "in an amount to be
    determined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)." The legal
    issue presented in this employment discrimination action is
    whether post-judgment interest on a judgment awarding
    attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
    S 2000e-5(k) runs from the date that the District Court
    rules initially that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees,
    or alternatively, from the date that the District Court
    actually quantifies the amount awarded, wher e those
    determinations are made at separate times.
    Based upon our construction of the applicable federal
    post-judgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a), we hold
    2
    that post-judgment interest on an attor ney's fee award runs
    from the date that the District Court actually quantifies the
    award. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's
    January 27, 2000 order insofar as it awar ded post-
    judgment interest from August 11, 1998, and will remand
    the matter to the District Court for the entry of an
    appropriate order. However, because we find no merit in the
    County's other challenges relating to certain rulings made
    in the Court's January 27, 2000 order, we will affirm those
    rulings without further discussion.1
    II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS
    Eaves is an American citizen of Chinese national origin.
    She was employed as the Treasurer of Cape May County,
    but was demoted to County Comptroller on July 8, 1994.
    After Eaves filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based on
    her demotion and an alleged hostile work envir onment, the
    County eliminated her County Comptroller position.
    Eaves then filed a Complaint in the District Court on
    August 30, 1995, alleging that the County, its Boar d of
    Freeholders, William E. Sturm and Edmund Grant violated
    the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
    SS 621-634 (1998) ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
    of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1998) ("Title VII"), and
    the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann.
    S 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993) ("NJLAD"). On May 1, 1998, a
    jury found in Eaves's favor on the Title VII and NJLAD
    retaliation claim against the County, but found for the
    defendants on the remaining claims.2 On May 11, 1998,
    Eaves filed post-trial motions seeking prejudgment interest
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. In this appeal, the County also challenged the District Court's rulings
    with respect to the (1) 25 percent downwar d adjustment of the lodestar
    amount given plaintiff 's limited success; and (2) 15 percent contingency
    enhancement applied pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against
    Discrimination.
    2. The jury deliberated only on Eaves's T itle VII and NJLAD claims based
    on the demotion, hostile work environment and r etaliation, because the
    Court dismissed the additional claims initially pleaded in the Complaint
    on defendants' motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict.
    3
    pursuant to Title VII, and attorney's fees under Title VII
    and the NJLAD. On August 11, 1998, the District Court
    entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of Eaves, and
    against the County, for $90,000, together with pr ejudgment
    interest in the amount of $12,602.46, "together with
    attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined
    pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." App. at 5. The order
    accompanying the judgment stated that "attor ney's fees and
    costs shall be awarded in an amount to be deter mined by
    the court upon plaintiff 's presently pending motion." App.
    at 8.
    On January 27, 2000, the District Court resolved the
    outstanding motion for attorney's fees.3 After reviewing
    Eaves's counsels' billing records, the Court calculated the
    lodestar, reduced it by 25 percent to account for Eaves's
    limited success, applied a contingency enhancement of 15
    percent under the NJLAD, and quantified the attorney's fee
    award. Ultimately, the Court awarded plaintiff 's counsel
    $254,248.57 in fees and expenses. It also addr essed the
    question of post-judgment interest on the awar d. We
    recount the Court's analysis on this point:
    In the Judgment entered on August 11, 1998, the
    Court entered "judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
    against the defendant, County of Cape May, in the
    amount of $90,000.00 together with attorney's fees and
    costs in an amount to be determined pursuant to Rule
    54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." The amount of fees and related
    expenses has, more than 16 months later , been
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. The motion actually sought attorney's fees, "expenses," and "costs of
    suit." The District Court described the "expenses" as including
    "deposition transcript fees, expert witness fees, medical reports,
    investigation fees, photocopying, and binding." Items designated as
    "costs" were those permitted under 28 U.S.C. S 1920, including the filing
    fee, trial transcript fees and witness fees. See App. at 10-11.
    Ultimately,
    the Court allowed post-judgment interest on the combined amount of
    attorney's fees and expenses, but not costs. Throughout this opinion, we
    will treat the attorney's fees and expenses aspect of the Court's order as
    a single attorney's fee award, as it is clear that the Court awarded those
    amounts designated as "expenses" as part of the "reasonable attorney's
    fee" allowable under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k). See Abrams v. Lightolier
    Inc.,
    
    50 F.3d 1204
    , 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1995).
    4
    determined. Since the attorney's fees were determined
    as of the judgment date (August 11, 1998), the plaintiff
    is also entitled to recover interest upon that sum since
    that date, as post-judgment interest accounting for
    delay in payment. It was the Court's intent, in entering
    the Judgment on August 11, 1998, that the plaintif f
    was found to be entitled to recover her attor ney's fees,
    with only the amount to be determined. The
    accompanying Order will therefore amend the August
    11, 1998, Judgment to insert this amount, together
    with post-judgment interest from August 11, 1998.
    This adjustment further recognizes that plaintiff and
    her counsel have been deprived of the benefit of the
    payment of this sum since it was due and that the fee
    award is calculated upon plaintiff 's counsel's 1998
    billing rates rather than current rates.
    App. at 56. On the same date, the Court enter ed the
    "Amended Judgment" which incorporated its quantification
    of the attorney's fee award, and its statement that post-
    judgment interest on the jury verdict and the fee award was
    to run from August 11, 1998. App. at 58. The County filed
    a timely notice of appeal.4
    III. DISCUSSION
    The County argues that the District Court err ed in
    "backdating" the post-judgment interest award on the fee
    amount to August 11, 1998, the date the Court or dered
    that attorney's fees and costs would be awar ded "in an
    amount to be determined" by the Court. It contends that
    the Court's decision to award post-judgment interest from
    that date ignores the fact that the amount of the award was
    not quantified until nearly a year and a half later, and
    unfairly penalizes the County because the delay was
    apparently caused by court backlog rather than dilatory
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the
    federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, 1343, and over the state
    law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. W e have appellate jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and exer cise plenary review over the
    challenged ruling. Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 
    6 F.3d 88
    ,
    97 (3d Cir. 1993) .
    5
    tactics on the County's part. The County cites Foley v. City
    of Lowell, 
    948 F.2d 10
    , 21-23 (1st Cir . 1991), and
    MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
    Shearson/American Express, Inc., 962 F .2d 1470, 1475
    (10th Cir. 1992), in support of its position, claiming that
    both decisions held that post-judgment inter est on an
    attorney's fee award accrues from the date the amount of
    the award is quantified. It further asserts that the Supreme
    Court's decision in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
    Bonjorno, 
    494 U.S. 827
    (1990), is consistent with the
    reasoning in Foley and MidAmerica . Appellant's Br. at 15-
    16.
    Eaves responds that "the majority rule among the circuit
    courts of appeals is that post-judgment `inter est accrues
    from the date that the party becomes unconditionally
    entitled to fees, even if those fees are not yet quantified.' "
    Appellee's Br. at 21 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 
    931 F.2d 1273
    , 1275 (8th Cir. 1991); Mathis v. Spears, 
    857 F.2d 749
    ,
    760 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Copper Liquor , Inc. v. Adolph Coors
    Co., 
    701 F.2d 542
    , 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per
    curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by Int'l
    Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp. 
    790 F.2d 1174
    (5th Cir. 1986), aff 'd sub nom. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
    Gibbons, Inc., 
    482 U.S. 437
    (1987)). In other words,
    according to Eaves, post-judgment inter est accrues on an
    attorney's fee award "from the date establishing the right to
    the award, not the date of the judgment establishing its
    quantum." Appellee's Br. at 21-22 (citing 
    Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760
    ). The justification for commencing the post-judgment
    interest period from the earlier of two judgments is
    grounded in equitable considerations:
    "[Postponing the accrual of post-judgment inter est]
    would effectively reduce the judgment for attorney's
    fees and costs, because a certain sum of money paid at
    a certain time in the future is worth less than the same
    sum of money paid today. Failing to allow awar ds of
    attorney's fees to bear interest would give parties
    against whom such awards have been enter ed an
    artificial and undesirable incentive to appeal or
    otherwise delay payment."
    6
    Appellee's Br. at 22 (quoting 
    Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1276
    ).
    Eaves claims that these same policy considerations should
    guide us in determining the date from which post-judgment
    interest should run in this case because the end result--
    the delay in receipt of funds rightfully due to her counsel--
    is the same, regardless of whether the delay was caused by
    the District Court or a litigious defendant.5
    Preliminarily, we point out that the County does not
    dispute that post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C.
    S 1961(a) accrues on a judgment awarding attorney's fees to
    a prevailing party such as Eaves just as it would any other
    "money judgment" to which S 1961(a) applies. R.W.T. v.
    Dalton, 
    712 F.2d 1225
    , 1234-35 (8th Cir . 1983), abrogated
    on other grounds by Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35
    ;
    Spain v. Mountanos, 
    690 F.2d 742
    , 748 (9th Cir. 1982); see
    Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. W elfare, 
    758 F.2d 897
    , 927 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing post-judgment interest to
    accrue on attorney's fee award; analysis proceeded on
    premise that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee
    award was available); Devex Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    749 F.2d 1020
    , 1026-27 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's
    holding that post-judgment interest statute applies to
    award of costs). Thus, our inquiry is dir ected only to the
    date from which post-judgment interest should run where
    there ostensibly are two "judgments" pertaining to an
    attorney's fee award.
    While we have interpreted and applied the federal post-
    judgment interest statute on several occasions, 6 we have
    _________________________________________________________________
    5. We note that the circumstances of this case are unusual in that the
    delay between the District Court's first and second orders spanned
    approximately seventeen months. Moreover , it is not disputed that the
    County did not attempt to delay the Court's quantification of the amount
    due, but instead asked the Court several times to enter a final judgment
    on Eaves's attorney's fee petition several times throughout the
    seventeen-month period.
    6. See, e.g., Christian v. Joseph, 
    15 F.3d 296
    , 298-99 (3d Cir. 1994)
    (finding that Virgin Islands post-judgment interest statute and 28 U.S.C.
    S 1961(a) were analogous and stating that, like S 1961(a), Virgin Islands
    statute provides for automatic accrual of post-judgment interest); Dunn
    v. Hovic, 
    13 F.3d 58
    , 60-62 (3d Cir . 1993) (allowing post-judgment
    7
    not yet confronted the precise question before us in this
    case. And, as is evident from the discussion that follows,
    there is no consensus among the Courts of Appeals that
    have addressed the issue. Eaves correctly states that the
    "majority view," which has been adopted by the Courts of
    Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and Federal
    Circuits, is that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee
    award runs from the date that the district court enters a
    judgment finding that the prevailing party is entitled to
    such an award, or from the date that, by operation of law,
    the prevailing plaintiff becomes entitled to fees, even if the
    amount of the award is not fixed in that judgment.
    Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 
    50 F.3d 319
    , 332
    _________________________________________________________________
    interest to accrue from date of district court's entry of judgment on jury
    verdict despite partial remittitur in district court and further
    remittitur
    of punitive damage award on appeal); 
    Loughman, 6 F.3d at 97-100
    (finding that plaintiffs were entitled to post-judgment interest accruing
    from date of original judgment rather than fr om date of judgment
    entered after damages retrial or fr om date of mandate issued after first
    appeal); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 
    998 F.2d 1144
    ,
    1177-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that S 1961 does not mandate that
    judgment from which interest is calculated be final judgment); Bonjorno
    v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 
    865 F.2d 566
    , 571-72 (3d Cir. 1989)
    (holding that post-judgment interest on damages award began to run as
    of date of second jury verdict on damages, which was then vacated and
    subsequently reinstated, rather than as of date that jury either delivered
    first liability verdict or first damages verdict, or date on which Court
    of
    Appeals issued mandate), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 827
    ; Poleto v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 
    826 F.2d 1270
    , 1280-81 (3d
    Cir. 1987) (holding that post-judgment inter est on jury verdict began to
    run from date of verdict rather than district court's entry of judgment),
    abrogated by Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 827
    ; Brock v. Richardson,
    
    812 F.2d 121
    , 125-26 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that back pay award under
    Fair Labor Standards Act should be presumed to carry post-judgment
    interest, unless equities in particular case r equire otherwise);
    Institutionalized 
    Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 927
    (allowing post-judgment
    interest to run from date that district court ruled that plaintiffs were
    entitled to fees and awarded quantified amount of fees where court of
    appeals affirmed award in part and vacated it in part for recalculation);
    Devex 
    Corp., 749 F.2d at 1026
    (holding that district court did not abuse
    its discretion in awarding post-judgment interest on award of taxable
    costs).
    8
    & n.24 (5th Cir. 1995); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 
    72 F.3d 1386
    , 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1995); BankAtlantic Inc. v. Blythe
    Eastman Paine Webber, 
    12 F.3d 1045
    , 1052-53 (11th Cir.
    1994); 
    Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1277
    ; Fox Indus. Inc. v.
    Structural Pres. Sys. Inc., 922 F .2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir.
    1991); 
    Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760
    ; Copper 
    Liquor, 701 F.2d at 545
    . In reaching their result, the leading cases have relied
    principally upon the policy underlying the post-judgment
    interest statute: compensation of the plaintif f (and the
    attorney) for the loss of the use of the money. By contrast,
    the "minority view," adopted by the Courts of Appeals for
    the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, is that, where the district
    court enters an order stating that the pr evailing party is
    entitled to a fee award but does not quantify the amount of
    the award until a later date, post-judgment interest does
    not begin to accrue until the Court fixes the amount of the
    award.7 
    MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1476
    (adopting rule that
    post-judgment interest begins to accrue when court enters
    judgment setting amount of fees owed based upon
    reasoning in Kaiser Aluminum); Fleming v. County of Kane,
    
    898 F.2d 553
    , 565 (7th Cir. 1990) (awarding interest from
    date amount was fixed, stating that "prior to the date the
    judgment on attorney's fees was entered, plaintiff 's
    attorney's claim for unpaid attorney's fees was unliquidated
    and, as such, not entitled to interest"). 8 We do not find the
    _________________________________________________________________
    7. While the County also cites the First Cir cuit's decision in Foley as
    having adopted the "minority view," the court expressly declined to reach
    the issue presented here. 
    Foley, 948 F.2d at 22
    n.16 ("We do not
    undertake to decide here whether postjudgment interest begins to accrue
    from the date a judgment expressly and unconditionally establishing a
    party's right to attorneys' fees is enter ed or from the date of a
    judgment
    that establishes the quantum of such fees (in a case where those dates
    differ).").
    8. Although the Seventh Circuit in Fleming allowed post-judgment
    interest to accrue from the date of the district court's quantification of
    the attorney's fee award rather than the date that the court ruled that
    the prevailing party was entitled to fees, its analysis is not all that
    helpful because it is not clear whether the court directly considered the
    issue presented in the instant case. The district court in Fleming entered
    an order in April 1988 stating that the plaintiff was entitled to
    attorney's
    fees, and also allowing, among other things, an adjustment to the billing
    rate in the form of "adding interest from a date 30 days after the end of
    9
    reasoning of the courts adopting the "majority view"
    persuasive, because they ignore a textual analysis of
    S 1961(a) and, instead, base their result on policies they
    find to underlie post-judgment interest and attorney's fee
    awards. In our view, the correct answer is dictated by the
    text of S 1961(a) and by our case law construing the
    meaning of the term "money judgment," a common legal
    term which we believe is critical to the outcome of this
    appeal.
    Because "[t]he starting point for interpr etation of
    [S 1961(a)] is the language itself," Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835
    , our analysis begins with the text of the statute,
    which provides in pertinent part that
    [i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a
    civil case recovered in a district court. Execution
    _________________________________________________________________
    the month in which the services were rendered." 
    Fleming, 898 F.2d at 563
    (emphasis added). The court subsequently enter ed an order quantifying
    the fees on June 24, 1988.
    On appeal, the court found that the district court erred in awarding
    interest from a date 30 days after the end of the month in which the
    services were rendered, reasoning that "[p]rior to the date the judgment
    on attorney's fees was entered, plaintif f 's attorney's claim for unpaid
    attorney's fees was unliquidated and, as such, not entitled to interest."
    
    Id. at 565.
    The court stated that because the r ecord "clearly indicated"
    that the award of attorney's fees was entered on June 24, 1988, post-
    judgment interest ran from that date.
    Fleming does not provide much guidance because it is not clear from
    the opinion whether the plaintiff argued that post-judgment interest
    should have been calculated from the April 1988 date on which the court
    first determined that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees.
    Moreover, although the court of appeals mentioned the fact that until the
    "judgment" on attorney's fees is enter ed, the claim for unpaid fees is
    "unliquidated," it seems that it made that observation in the context of
    rejecting the district court's allowance of interest from 30 days after
    the
    services were performed rather than from the entry of the "judgment" on
    attorney's fees. The court of appeals simply did not consider the
    subsidiary issue of which "judgment" that might be. At bottom, we do
    not rely on Fleming because, while the court reached a result consistent
    with our interpretation of S 1961(a) as applied in the attorney's fee
    context, it provided little substantive analysis and did not rely on the
    language of the statute to reach that r esult.
    10
    therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case
    where, by the law of the State in which such court is
    held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments
    recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall
    be calculated from the date of the entry of the
    judgment. . . .
    28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) (emphasis added). "Section 1961(a)
    dictates that interest be awarded." Dunn v. Hovic, 
    13 F.3d 58
    , 60 (3d Cir. 1993). Given the plain language and
    structure of the statute, it is clear that"the judgment"
    referred to in the third quoted sentence is the "money
    judgment" specified in the first. Thus, by its terms, post-
    judgment interest does not begin to run underS 1961(a)
    until the district court enters the judgment at issue, i.e.,
    the "money judgment."9
    This observation is not dispositive, because the pr oblem
    in this case is that we arguably have two"judgments," i.e.,
    (1) the August 11, 1998 order which stated that Eaves was
    entitled to an attorney's fee award, and (2) the January 27,
    2000 order which quantifies the amount of the award.
    Thus, the pivotal question is whether the August 11, 1998
    order qualifies as a "money judgment" such that its entry
    by the clerk of the District Court commences the period
    from which post-judgment interest begins to run.
    Section 1961 does not define the term "money judgment."
    Nevertheless, if a statute uses a legal term of art, we must
    _________________________________________________________________
    9. Although neither party has suggested it, we note that it could be
    argued, at least in theory, that the statute is ambiguous as to whether
    the "judgment" which triggers the post-judgment interest period has to
    have the characteristics of a "money judgment"--the term found in the
    first sentence of S 1961(a). However, the structure of S 1961(a) ties the
    "judgment" referred to in the thir d sentence back to the "money
    judgment . . . recovered in the district court," which, of course,
    provides
    the legal basis for the award of post-judgment interest under the statute.
    Thus in our view, the statute cannot be viewed as ambiguous on this
    point. See Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 
    898 F.2d 907
    , 910 (3d Cir.
    1990) ("[S]tatutory construction should halt at such time as the court
    determines the text at issue to be plain and unambiguous") (citing Rubin
    v. United States, 
    449 U.S. 424
    , 430 (1981)); see also In re Cohen, 
    106 F.3d 52
    , 57 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting construction of statute that, in its
    view, "strain[ed] the structure of the statute as a whole").
    11
    "presume Congress intended to adopt the term's ordinary
    legal meaning." Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
    181 F.3d 403
    , 407 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McDermott Intern. Inc.
    v. Wilander, 
    498 U.S. 337
    , 342 (1991)); see also Zubi v.
    AT&T Corp., 
    219 F.3d 220
    , 227 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.,
    dissenting) (citing, inter alia, 
    Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 407
    ,
    and Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
    Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947) ("[I]f a word is
    obviously transported from another legal sour ce, whether
    the common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with
    it.")). In Penn Terra Limited v. Department of Environmental
    Resources, 
    733 F.2d 267
    (3d Cir . 1984), we addressed the
    meaning of the term "money judgment" in the context of
    construing the phrase "enforcement of a money judgment"
    found in 11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
    Recognizing that Congress failed to provide any guidance as
    to the meaning to be afforded to the phrase "enforcement of
    a money judgment" as it was used in that pr ovision, we
    looked to the established meaning of the ter ms. 
    Id. at 274-
    75 ("Its meaning must therefore be gleaned from the
    commonly accepted usage and from whatever indications of
    congressional intent we find persuasive."). We defined
    "money judgment" in that context in the following manner:
    In common understanding, a money judgment is an
    order entered by the court or by the clerk, after a
    verdict has been rendered for [the] plaintiff, which
    adjudges that the defendant shall pay a sum of money
    to the plaintiff. Essentially, it need consist of only two
    elements: (1) an identification of the parties for and
    against whom judgment is being entered; and (2) a
    definite and certain designation of the amount which
    plaintiff is owed by defendant.
    
    Id. at 275
    (citing generally 49 C.J.S. Judgments SS 71-82,
    which "describ[ed] proper form of money judgments")
    (emphasis added).
    Since Penn Terra, our resear ch reveals that other courts
    have taken a similar approach in determining whether a
    particular judgment constituted a "money judgment," and,
    in various legal contexts have looked to whether the
    judgment at issue required a party to pay a fixed sum. See,
    e.g., EEOC v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 
    956 F.2d 146
    , 149 (7th Cir.
    12
    1992) (where district court entered judgment that awarded
    plaintiffs backpay in definite amounts, less applicable
    payroll deductions, and directed employer to deduct payroll
    taxes and deliver checks to plaintiffs, court rejected
    employer's argument that court's judgment was not "money
    judgment" under S 1961(a), stating that"the awards did not
    lose their character as sums certain simply because they
    were subject to the mechanical task of computing payroll
    deductions"); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 
    805 F.2d 1175
    , 1186 (5th Cir. 1986) (following Penn Terra's definition
    of "money judgment"); In re V alencia, 
    213 B.R. 594
    , 596 (D.
    Colo. 1997) (affirming bankruptcy court's entry of money
    judgment fixing amount of damages debtor owed in
    dischargeability proceeding and noting that bankruptcy
    court's equitable jurisdiction allowed it to "r ender a money
    judgment in an amount certain"); In r e Dow Corning Corp.,
    
    237 B.R. 380
    , 386 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (in determining
    whether order pursuant to S 502(b) of Bankruptcy Code
    constituted "money judgment" from which post-judgment
    interest would run, court stated "[a]s one might expect, a
    `money judgment' consists of three elements: it must be a
    judgment; entitling the plaintiff to a specified sum of
    money; and such entitlement must be against an
    identifiable party"); In re Devitt , 
    126 B.R. 212
    , 215 (Bankr.
    D. Md. 1991) (holding that bankruptcy court had
    jurisdiction to enter "money judgment," i.e., "judgment in
    an amount certain," in dischargeability pr oceeding).
    We further note that, although not cited by the parties,
    we find the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit's
    opinion in Happy Chef Systems, Inc. v. John Hancock
    Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
    933 F.2d 1433
    (8th Cir. 1991),
    instructive on this issue. There, as her e, the parties
    disputed which of two "judgments" commenced the post-
    judgment interest period applicable under S 1961(a). In
    Happy Chef Systems, the landlord sought a declaration
    that the tenant breached its lease with the landlord, and
    was obligated to perform its lease obligations. After the
    district court determined that the landlor d was entitled to
    a judgment requiring the tenant to perfor m its lease
    obligations, the landlord filed a motion seeking
    "supplemental relief " under 28 U.S.C.S 2202 in the form of
    money damages. On February 21, 1990, the district court
    13
    entered a judgment and order that the tenant was obligated
    to perform its lease obligations. It also granted the
    landlord's motion for supplemental relief, but did not
    quantify the amount of damages because it believed that
    the trial record was not adequate to enter a judgment on
    the amount to be awarded. Subsequently, on May 25, 1990,
    the district court entered an order which quantified the
    landlord's damage award, and awarded post-judgment
    interest from February 21, 1990--the date on which the
    court first determined that the landlor d was entitled to
    supplemental relief under S 2202. 
    Id. at 1435.
    On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit
    reversed the award of post-judgment inter est from February
    21, 1990. The court held that the district court err ed in
    awarding post-judgment interest fr om the date that it first
    determined that the landlord was entitled to damages
    under S 2202. It stated that "[s]ection 1961(a) does not
    provide for interest until a money judgment has been
    entered. Therefore, interest at the post-judgment interest
    rate should begin on May 25, 1990 [the date the amount
    was quantified], not February 21 of that year ." 
    Id. at 1437.
    The court's conclusion in Happy Chef Systems supports
    our construction of the phrase "any money judgment" in
    S 1961(a), which requires that the judgment at issue award
    a fixed amount of fees to the prevailing party in order to
    trigger the post-judgment interest period. Rather than
    finding that the post-judgment interest period commences
    from the date that the district court deter mined in a
    general sense that the landlord was entitled to a damages
    award, the court in Happy Chef Systems stated that
    S 1961(a) requires the entry of a money judgment, which, as
    we explained in Penn Terra, is commonly understood to
    require an award of a fixed sum to the prevailing party. Cf.
    In re Burlington N., Inc. Employment Pract. Litig., 
    810 F.2d 601
    , 609 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting ar gument that plaintiffs
    were entitled to post-judgment interest fr om date district
    court approved consent decree setting forth plaintiffs' right
    to recover reasonable attorney's fee, stating that S 1961(a)
    only authorized interest from date of entry of judgment).
    And because we read the reference to the "entry of the
    judgment" in the third sentence of S 1961(a) as referring
    14
    back to the "money judgment" specified in the   first
    sentence of S 1961(a), it necessarily follows   that post-
    judgment interest begins to run on a judgment   awarding
    attorney's fees where that judgment fixes the   amount owed
    to the prevailing party.
    We recognize that in Penn Terra, we did not define the
    term "money judgment" in the context of a dispute
    surrounding the meaning of the term as it is used in 28
    U.S.C. S 1961(a). Rather, we wer e interpreting the scope of
    11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(5). Nevertheless, given that our
    construction of "money judgment" was based on the
    common legal meaning ascribed to that term, our definition
    in Penn Terra certainly is instructive in ascertaining what
    Congress intended in using the same phrase inS 1961(a).
    Here, as in Penn Terra, Congr ess has not provided any
    definition for the term as it is used inS 1961(a), thus
    requiring us to look to the established meaning of that
    term. 
    Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 407
    (where statute uses legal
    terms of art, we must "presume Congr ess intended to adopt
    the term's ordinary legal meaning"); Penn 
    Terra, 733 F.2d at 275
    ("Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated
    settled meaning under either equity or common law, a court
    must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
    Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of
    these terms.").
    Thus, we are constrained to agree with the County that
    S 1961(a) simply does not permit post-judgment interest on
    an attorney's fee award to run fr om the date that the court
    initially determines that the prevailing party is entitled to
    an award if the amount was not also quantified and
    included in that judgment. It necessarily follows that the
    "money judgment" in this case was not enter ed until
    January 27, 2000--the date on which the court quantified
    the amount of the attorney's fees and awar ded plaintiff a
    fixed sum. Put differently, the August 11, 1998 judgment
    stating that Eaves was entitled to an award of attorney's
    fees could not have been the judgment triggering the post-
    judgment interest period because the Court's statement
    that Eaves was entitled to such an award cannot be
    considered the functional equivalent of a judicial finding
    that the County was liable to Eaves to pay a fixed sum of
    attorney's fees.
    15
    In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the
    fact that we stated in Penn Terra that the phrase "money
    judgment" commonly refers to a judgment entered upon a
    jury verdict, while our analysis in this case imports that
    definition into a situation where the "judgment" at issue
    actually resolved a motion for attorney's fees, an ancillary
    issue to the underlying dispute between the parties. We are
    not troubled by this distinction, however , because it is not
    disputed that a judgment awarding attor ney's fees
    theoretically could qualify as a "money judgment" on which
    post-judgment interest could be awarded under S 1961(a),
    provided that it has the requisite attributes of a "money
    judgment." Given that we treat judgments awarding
    attorney's fees as we would any other "money judgment,"
    we see no principled basis for according a dif ferent meaning
    to the term simply because the award at issue here involves
    attorney's fees rather than money damages stemming from
    a jury verdict. For our purposes, the essential aspect of our
    construction of the term "money judgment" in Penn Terra is
    that it must be comprised of "a definite and certain
    designation of the amount which plaintiff is owed by
    defendant." Thus, it makes no differ ence that the actual
    judgment at issue stemmed from a fee petition rather than
    a jury verdict.
    We further observe that our construction of the phrase
    "any money judgment" in S 1961(a) is consistent with the
    Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum . There the
    plaintiff, Bonjorno, initially secur ed a liability verdict
    against the defendant, Kaiser Aluminum, on August 16,
    1979. The jury then assessed damages against Kaiser
    Aluminum on August 21, 1979, and the district court
    entered judgment on the verdict on August 22, 1979.
    Ultimately, the district court concluded that the evidence
    did not support the damage award and granted Kaiser
    Aluminum's motion for a new trial as to damages only. On
    December 2, 1981, the jury found in favor of Bonjor no, and
    awarded damages. The district court enter ed a judgment on
    the second jury verdict on December 4, 1981. Kaiser
    
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 830-31
    .
    Shortly thereafter, the district court granted Kaiser
    Aluminum's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
    16
    verdict as to a portion of the second damages verdict.
    However, on appeal, we reversed the court's determination
    on that point and reinstated the December 4, 1981
    judgment on the second verdict. On remand, the district
    court awarded post-judgment interest on the damages
    award from December 2, 1981, the date of the second
    damages verdict after the retrial. That decision, in turn,
    was appealed, and one of the issues raised in the appeal
    was whether post-judgment interest ran fr om the date of
    the December 2, 1981 verdict or the December 4, 1981
    judgment on the verdict, albeit a differ ence of only two
    days. See Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 571-72
    & n.9.
    Following our previous opinion in Poleto v. Consolidated
    Rail Corp., 
    826 F.2d 1270
    (3d Cir . 1987), we held that post-
    judgment interest ran from the December 2, 1981 verdict.
    
    Id. Poleto had
    looked to the purpose of the post-judgment
    interest statute and the structure of Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 58, and found that both supported a broad
    reading of S 1961(a) that allowed post-judgment interest to
    run from the date of the verdict wher e there was a delay in
    the district court's entry of the judgment on the verdict.
    
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    .
    On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court r ejected the
    Poleto rule, grounding its analysis on the plain language of
    S 1961(a). In reaching its result, the Court explained:
    Those courts that have determined that inter est should
    run from the verdict have looked to the policy
    underlying the postjudgment interest statute--
    compensation of the plaintiff for the loss of the use of
    the money--in reaching their conclusion that interest
    should run from the date of the verdict despite the
    language of the statute.
    . . . .
    The starting point for interpretation of a statute is
    the language itself. . . . Both the original and the
    amended versions of S 1961 refer specifically to the
    "date of judgment," which indicates a date certain.
    Neither alludes to the date of the verdict, and there is
    no legislative history that would indicate a
    congressional intent that interest run fr om the date of
    17
    verdict rather than the date of judgment. Even though
    denial of interest from verdict to judgment may result
    in the plaintiff bearing the burden of the loss of the use
    of the money from verdict to judgment, the allocation
    of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the
    legislature, not the courts.
    Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35
    .
    In the instant case, Eaves makes a policy ar gument
    strikingly similar to the one we accepted in Poleto but the
    Supreme Court rejected in Kaiser Aluminum. She contends
    that we should hold that post-judgment inter est on her
    attorney's fee award began to accrue on August 11, 1998,
    because the District Court expressly deter mined on that
    date that she was legally entitled to a monetary award, and
    it ultimately fixed the amount in its January 27, 2000
    order. Put differently, Eaves urges that we find in her favor
    because, since August 11, 1998, the County has had the
    use of the money that the Court eventually fixed as her fee
    award on January 27, 2000.
    Given the tenor of the Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser
    Aluminum, we are unpersuaded by Eaves's ar gument. Her
    contention in this regard is bottomed on the concept that,
    beginning on August 11, 1998, the County had the use of
    monies to which she was legally entitled. But in Kaiser
    Aluminum, the Court was unmoved by the fact that its
    denial of post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict
    to the date of the entry of the judgment might r esult in the
    plaintiff bearing the burden of the loss of the use of his or
    her money during the interim. Moreover, the Court
    expressly rejected our analysis in Poleto, which, like Eaves's
    argument here, looked to the policies behind the award of
    post-judgment interest and found that they supported a
    broader interpretation of S 1961(a) than the plain language
    of the statute allowed.
    Here too, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the term
    "money judgment" and its implications in this case simply
    because our interpretation of S 1961(a) may result in the
    plaintiff 's bearing the burden of the loss of the use of the
    attorney's fee funds to which she was legally entitled from
    the date that the District Court declared her entitlement to
    18
    the date that the award was quantified. In our view, the
    Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum demonstrates that we
    are not at liberty to ignore the literal language of S 1961(a),
    notwithstanding the fact that the result might be that
    prevailing parties suffer adverse consequences from the
    district court's delay in fixing the amount of attorney's fees
    to be awarded. See MidAmerica, 962 F .2d at 1476 ("[W]e see
    no way to square MidAmerica's request for interest on an
    unliquidated attorneys' fees award with Kaiser."); see also
    Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F .2d 821, 823 (2d
    Cir. 1992) (pointing out that Kaiser Aluminum interpreted
    S 1961(a) literally, explaining that "[i]n Kaiser, the Supreme
    Court rejected the argument, which the district court
    herein apparently found persuasive, that under equitable
    principles post-judgment interest should be computed from
    the time that the court might have entered judgment, i.e.,
    promptly following the jury's verdict."). And reading the
    statute literally requires the entry of a"money judgment" to
    commence the period of post-judgment interest on an
    attorney's fee award, which here occurred on January 27,
    2000 when the District Court quantified the amount the
    County owed.
    In reaching our result, we also ar e informed by a portion
    of our analysis in Kaiser Aluminum that was not disturbed
    by the Supreme Court on appeal. In the pr oceedings before
    us, the plaintiff suggested several dates fr om which the
    accrual of post-judgment interest could have commenced,
    including August 16, 1979, the date the jury deliver ed its
    liability verdict. But as we previously mentioned, we
    followed Poleto and agreed with the district court that post-
    judgment interest ran from December 2, 1981, the date of
    the second damages verdict after retrial. In reaching that
    conclusion, we necessarily rejected Bonjor no's suggested
    date of August 16, 1979, and, moreover, ruled out the
    possibility that post-judgment interest would run from
    August 22, 1979, the date of the first damages judgment
    that was subsequently overturned on Kaiser Aluminum's
    post-trial motion. With respect to those two possibilities, we
    explained:
    Bonjorno argues that interest should accrue from the
    date of the original liability verdict--August 1979--
    19
    because liability was ultimately affirmed[by the Court
    of Appeals]. However, the August 16, 1979 verdict on
    liability alone was insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    54(c) to allow or require the court to enter judgment.
    Little if any authority supports the position that post-
    judgment interest accrues from the date of an
    unliquidated verdict or from a judgment vacated by a
    district court which is never reinstated, modified or
    even appealed. The vast majority of cases which
    construe section 1961 to allow interest to run from a
    verdict rather than a "judgment" involve verdicts which
    include an assessment of damages where judgment is
    later entered on the verdict amount. . . . This reasoning
    weighs against permitting Bonjorno to r ecover interest
    from August 16, 1979 (the date of the unliquidated
    liability verdict) or August 22, 1979 (the date of the
    first damage verdict which was vacated and never
    reinstated, increased, reduced, or even appealed).
    Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 570-71
    (emphasis added).10
    _________________________________________________________________
    10. This aspect of our holding in Kaiser Aluminum remains intact after
    Supreme Court's rejection of the rule we adopted in Poleto. The Supreme
    Court specifically rejected the plaintif f 's argument that post-judgment
    interest should have run from August 22, 1979, the date the court
    entered judgment on the first liability and damages verdicts, because the
    damages verdict subsequently was set aside as not supported by the
    evidence. Using language from Poleto and our opinion in Kaiser
    Aluminum, the Court reasoned that "wher e the judgment was not
    supported by the evidence, the damages have not been ascertained in
    any meaningful way." Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 836
    ; see also 
    id. (" `[T]he
    purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the
    successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from
    the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by
    the defendant.' ") (quoting 
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    ). The Court's
    reference to damages being "ascertained" is taken from Poleto and our
    opinion in Kaiser Aluminum, both of which r ecognized that damages are
    "meaningfully ascertained" once the amount owed to the prevailing party
    has been determined in a court proceeding. 
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    (citing Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 
    642 F.2d 514
    , 618-19 (D.C.
    Cir. 1980) (Mikva, J., dissenting)); see also Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 570
    (noting that, even under rule adopted in Poleto, verdicts which are
    sufficient to commence the post-judgment inter est period under
    S 1961(a) must include an "assessment of damages").
    20
    Our reasoning on this point in Kaiser Aluminum weighs
    against Eaves's assertion that post-judgment inter est
    should run from the date that the district court ruled she
    was entitled to fees. For purposes of determining the date
    from which post-judgment interest should run, the August
    11, 1998 order stating that Eaves was entitled to attorney's
    fees and costs is the functional equivalent of the August 16,
    1979 unliquidated liability verdict in Kaiser Aluminum
    which we found insufficient to commence the post-
    judgment interest period under S 1961(a). The import of the
    August 11, 1998 order was that the County was liable to
    Eaves for some unspecified portion of her attor ney's fees,
    but that, as of that date, her claim for those fees was not
    "liquidated" because it had not been r educed to a fixed
    amount.11 See 
    MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1477
    . Similarly, the
    August 16, 1979 liability verdict in Kaiser Aluminum
    amounted only to a finding that Kaiser Aluminum was
    liable to Bonjorno on the merits of the claim under the
    applicable law. Until the damages verdict occurred on
    August 21, 1979, the plaintiff 's claim against Kaiser
    Aluminum was unliquidated in the sense that the amount
    of monetary damages owed had not been fixed. See 
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    ("The verdict [of liability and damages]
    assesses damages up to the time that it is r endered;
    however, payment does not occur immediately upon return
    of the verdict. Post-judgment interest r epresents the cost of
    withholding the amount owed the plaintiff once that sum
    has been determined in a court proceeding.") (emphasis
    added).
    As the Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum
    confirms, the pivotal event for the commencement of the
    _________________________________________________________________
    11. Cf. Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 
    225 F.3d 379
    , 395-96 (3d Cir.
    2000) (explaining that a "fixed or liquidated claim" is one where the
    damages are "certain" and stating that pr ejudgment interest on
    liquidated claim carries interest at legal rate from time debt becomes
    due) (applying Pennsylvania law); E.C. Er nst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc.,
    
    626 F.2d 324
    , 332-33 (3d Cir. 1980) (determining whether award of
    prejudgment interest was appropriate, stating that "only question is
    whether the damages were sufficiently fixed to be liquidated," and
    finding in plaintiff 's favor because"the sum due could be fixed by fairly
    objective means") (applying Pennsylvania law).
    21
    post-judgment interest period is the entry of the
    "judgment," more specifically, the"money judgment" to
    which S 1961(a) applies. And, as our discussion in Kaiser
    Aluminum demonstrates, the operative judgment must set
    forth the court's (or jury's) assessment of monetary
    damages arising out of the claim or right giving rise to the
    defendant's liability for the amount awarded. Kaiser
    
    Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 570
    ; 
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    ; see
    In re Lower Lake 
    Erie, 998 F.2d at 1177
    (stating that post-
    judgment interest compensates plaintiff for loss between
    determination of damages and defendant's payment); see
    also Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F .2d 752, 756 (9th
    Cir. 1983) (explaining that prejudgment interest
    accommodates plaintiff for loss from time of breach or
    injury to date of ascertainment of damages, i.e. , damages
    verdict, and post-judgment interest accommodates plaintiff
    for period from date of ascertainment of damages until
    payment by defendant), abrogated on other grounds by
    Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35
    .
    We recognize, of course, that our appr oach in this case is
    different from that of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
    Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and Federal Circuits, and thus that
    the weight of authority is against our position. W e
    nevertheless reject the majority view because, in most
    cases, the courts predicated their result on a broader
    interpretation of S 1961(a) based primarily on policy
    considerations rather than the plain language of the statute.12
    _________________________________________________________________
    12. We say that "most cases" wer e grounded in policy in view of the fact
    that the Eleventh Circuit took a differ ent approach in BankAtlantic v.
    Blythe Eastman Paine Webber. Ther e the court held that post-judgment
    interest on an attorney's fee award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 ran from the
    date the district court entered the order establishing the plaintiff 's
    right
    to recover attorney's fees as a discovery sanction rather than the date
    that the district court quantified the amount. See 
    BankAtlantic, 12 F.3d at 1048
    . Without mentioning Copper Liquor , Mathis or Jenkins, the court
    reasoned that "[t]he proper date upon which interest shall be calculated
    for the sanction amount is July 10, 1989, the date of the sanction order"
    because Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) defined judgment as including "a decree
    and any order from which an appeal lies." 
    Id. at 1053.
    The court's
    analysis thus apparently was based on its view that the defendants
    could have appealed the initial order awar ding discovery sanctions.
    22
    Additionally, we find it significant that the initial two cases
    espousing the "majority view" preceded the Supreme
    Court's literal interpretation of S 1961(a) in Kaiser
    Aluminum, which we view as dictating our r esult. See
    
    MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1476
    .
    For example, in the initial decision addressing the
    question of accrual of post-judgment interest on an
    attorney's fee award, the Fifth Cir cuit in Copper Liquor v.
    Adolph Coors & Co., held that post-judgment interest on an
    award of fees and/or costs runs from the date of the
    "judgment establishing the right to fees or costs, as the
    case may be."13 See Copper 
    Liquor, 701 F.2d at 545
    .
    _________________________________________________________________
    We are unpersuaded by the Eleventh Cir cuit's analysis. First, although
    it is true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) defines "judgment," the definition
    provides that it is to be applied to the ter m "as used in these rules,"
    and
    states only that it "includes" a decree or any order from which an appeal
    lies. Thus, the Rule itself does not purport to define "judgment" as used
    in statutory provisions such as, for example,S 1961(a), and it thus
    leaves room for the possibility that the ter m "judgment" as used in
    S 1961(a) could include a district court or der that does not fall within
    the
    narrow class of a "decree and any or der from which an appeal lies." In
    re Lower Lake 
    Erie, 998 F.2d at 1177
    -78.
    Second, and perhaps more importantly, by fashioning a rule that ties
    the commencement of the post-judgment interest period to the entry of
    the "judgment" as defined in Rule 54(a), the BankAtlantic court
    overlooked the fact that S 1961(a)'s use of the term "judgment" in the
    third sentence is a shorthand refer ence back to the "money judgment"
    specified in the first sentence of that subsection. Thus, in looking only
    to Rule 54(a)'s definition of "judgment," the court did not consider what
    we see as the real issue--whether the district court's order resolving the
    motion for sanctions was, in actuality, a "money judgment," given that
    the order did not set a fixed amount of money to be paid to the plaintiff.
    While we recognize that the "money judgment" at issue in a given case
    also might qualify as a "judgment" for purposes of determining finality
    under Rule 54(a), there is no legal basis for concluding that S 1961(a)
    can be read as allowing post-judgment inter est only on "judgments" as
    defined exclusively by Rule 54(a). Cf. McDonald v. McCarthy, 
    966 F.2d 112
    , 115 (3d Cir. 1992) (looking to advisory committee's note to Fed. R.
    App. 39 which indicated that reference to"costs" found therein should
    be defined according to 28 U.S.C. S 1920).
    13. In Devex, we relied upon Copper Liquor to hold that a prevailing party
    who is awarded taxable costs is entitled to post-judgment interest on the
    23
    Notably, however, the court did not pr ovide any reasoning
    as to why it adopted the rule that it did, and seemed to rely
    on equitable considerations to justify the r esult.14 See id. at
    _________________________________________________________________
    costs award. 
    Devex, 749 F.2d at 1026
    . We note, however, that the issue
    presented in Devex was not the date fr om which post-judgment interest
    should run on an award of costs. Rather , the defendant argued
    unsuccessfully that post-judgment interest on an award of costs was not
    available at all under S 1961(a). We need not, and do not, address the
    open issue of the date from which post-judgment interest would run on
    costs taxed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1920, see, e.g., 
    BankAtlantic, 12 F.3d at 1047
    ; Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 
    855 F.2d 794
    , 799 (11th Cir. 1988), because the District Court's order in the
    instant case did not award post-judgment inter est on its $582 award of
    taxable costs, and Eaves has not challenged that ruling.
    14. We are aware that the Fifth Circuit has considered whether its ruling
    in Copper Liquor was overruled by Kaiser Aluminum, and has determined
    that Copper Liquor remains good law. Louisiana Power & Light 
    Co., 50 F.3d at 332
    . The Fifth Circuit r ead Kaiser Aluminum as consistent with
    the result in Copper Liquor based on the Supreme Court's statement that
    "where the judgment is not supported by the evidence, the damages have
    not been ascertained in any meaningful way." Kaiser 
    Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 836
    . The Fifth Circuit explained: "[b]ecause the earlier judgment in
    Kaiser was invalid, the party had no entitlement to damages on that
    date. Thus, the reasoning in Kaiser is consistent with Copper Liquor's
    mandate that interest should not accrue until the party becomes entitled
    to the award." Louisiana Power & Light , 50 F.3d at 332.
    We agree that on the surface, Copper Liquor can be reconciled with
    Kaiser Aluminum to the extent that the Court's statement in Kaiser
    Aluminum suggests that until the second damages judgment was
    entered, the plaintiff had not established, as an evidentiary matter, that
    she was "entitled" to any monetary damages. Nevertheless, our careful
    review of the entire discussion in Kaiser Aluminum confirms that, on
    balance, the result in that case must be viewed as undermining the
    analysis underlying the Copper Liquor rule. First, as we previously
    mentioned, the rule in Copper Liquor cannot be squared with the plain
    meaning of the term "any money judgment" found in S 1961(a). Second,
    and perhaps more importantly, as we indicated in note 10, the Court's
    reference to the point at which the damages are "meaningfully
    ascertained" came from Poleto, which in turn explained that damages are
    "ascertained" at the point at which the sum owed "has been determined
    in a court proceeding,"--in that case, by the damages verdict. 
    Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280
    . Against the backdrop of Poleto and our opinion in Kaiser
    24
    544 (observing, in overruling Carpa, Inc. v. W ard Foods,
    
    567 F.2d 1316
    (5th Cir. 1978), that"because a dollar today
    is worth more than a dollar in the futur e, the only way [a
    party] can be made whole is to award him interest from the
    time he should have received the money").
    Subsequently, in Mathis v. Spears, the Federal Circuit
    followed Copper Liquor because, in its view,"the provision
    for calculating interest from the entry of the judgment
    deters the use of the appellate process by the judgment
    debtor solely as a means of prolonging its fr ee use of money
    owed. . . ." See 
    Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760
    . However, the
    analysis in Mathis is inapposite given that the rule we have
    approved today would not encourage litigants tofile
    frivolous appeals of the attorney's fee awar d. Indeed, we
    already have held in Institutionalized Juveniles that in
    certain circumstances, post-judgment inter est on an
    attorney's fee award runs from the date of the original
    judgment even if that judgment was modified on appeal.
    See Institutionalized 
    Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 927
    . Thus, the
    equitable consideration identified in Mathis is not
    implicated, as we are not concerned in this case with the
    time period between the judgment in the district court and
    the judgment in the court of appeals, but, rather , must
    choose between two judgments entered in the district court
    for purposes of calculating the post-judgment inter est
    amount owed.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Aluminum, we read the Supreme Court's opinion in Kaiser Aluminum as
    simply having extended the "ascertainment of the damages" rationale
    first discussed in Poleto to the facts pr esented in that case. Therefore,
    rather than viewing that discussion in Kaiser Aluminum solely from the
    standpoint of when the plaintiff became "entitled" to damages as an
    evidentiary matter, it could be read as also predicated on the fact that
    the damages were not "ascertained" until the second judgment because
    the first damages verdict had been overtur ned, thus leaving no valid
    judicial determination of the sum actually owed to the plaintiff. At all
    events, when considered in light of Poleto and our discussion in Kaiser
    Aluminum, we are convinced that the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Power &
    Light Co. focused too narrowly on "entitlement" as the key to applying
    the "ascertainment of the damage" principle in Kaiser Aluminum in the
    attorney's fee context.
    25
    Moreover, the Eighth Circuit in Jenkins v. State of
    Missouri, and the Ninth Circuit in Friend v. Kolodzieczak,
    both relied on policy justifications to per mit post-judgment
    interest to accrue on an unquantified attor ney's fee
    judgment without considering the impact of the plain
    language of S 1961(a). See Kolodzieczak , 72 F.3d at 1386;
    
    Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1273
    . In Jenkins , for example, the
    court observed that the award of interest serves the "make
    whole" objective of fee awards in civil rights cases and
    cautioned that "if the accrual of post-judgment interest is
    delayed until fee awards are quantified,. . . attorneys are
    not fully compensated for their successful ef forts, [and]
    they may be reluctant to take on complex and expensive
    litigation." 
    Id. at 1276-77.
    The court in Kolodzieczak
    similarly observed that allowing post-judgment inter est to
    accrue from the judgment establishing the right to fees
    ensures that civil rights attorneys ar e fully compensated for
    the delay in payment. See Kolodzieczak, 72 F .3d at 1392.15
    In our view, however, the rule that we have adopted does
    not frustrate the "make whole" objective of attorney fee
    awards in civil rights cases. While we r ecognize that our
    construction of S 1961(a) limits the amount of post-
    judgment interest that accrues on an attor ney's fee
    judgment, we do not hold today that post-judgment interest
    on an attorney's fee award is not available in general.
    Rather, we find only that post-judgment interest does not
    begin to run until the court fixes the amount owed--in
    other words, it commences upon the entry of the"money
    judgment."
    Moreover, while the courts in Jenkins and Kolodzieczak
    correctly point out the importance of fully compensating
    civil rights attorneys who take on complex litigation, the
    courts did not consider the fact that the same r esult may
    be obtained if the district court applies an appr opriate form
    _________________________________________________________________
    15. The court in Kolodzieczak actually adopted the district court's
    analysis of the legal issues in its entirety. The district court, in turn,
    relied upon another district court decision in reaching its conclusion
    that post-judgment interest on an attor ney's fee award runs from the
    date of entitlement rather than the date of quantification. See
    
    Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d at 1392
    (citing,inter alia, Finkelstein v. Bergna,
    
    804 F. Supp. 1235
    , 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1992)).
    26
    of a delay-in-payment adjustment to the lodestar amount in
    calculating the fee award. The Supreme Court has equated
    the adjustment allowed for the delay in payment in civil
    rights cases with an award of prejudgment interest on the
    attorney's fee award. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 
    491 U.S. 274
    ,
    282 n.3 (1989); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 
    478 U.S. 310
    ,
    322 (1986). We similarly have explained that the delay-in-
    payment adjustment "is designed to compensate the
    attorney for the time gap between the actual expenditure of
    services and the fee award," and that post-judgment
    interest covers the delay in receipt during the period from
    the fee determination to payment. Black Grievance Comm.
    v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
    802 F.2d 648
    , 656 (3d Cir. 1986),
    vacated and remanded on other grounds , 
    483 U.S. 1015
    (1987). In Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 
    983 F.2d 459
    (3d
    Cir. 1992), we noted that "in granting plaintiffs
    compensation for delay, two methods may be used: basing
    the fee award on current rates or adjusting the fee based on
    historical rates to reflect its present value." 
    Id. at 476.
    Indeed, where the plaintiff presents adequate evidentiary
    support documenting the costs incurred because of the
    delay in receipt of funds, such enhancements ar e permitted
    for the very purpose of compensating counsel for the delay
    in receipt of the fees until the litigation has concluded. See
    Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 
    888 F.2d 975
    , 985 (3d Cir.
    1989); Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F .2d at 923
    (discussing factors informing court's discr etion when
    awarding delay in payment enhancement); cf. In re
    Burlington 
    N., 810 F.2d at 609
    (r ejecting plaintiffs' request
    for prejudgment interest to account for delay between filing
    of fee petition and judgment awarding attor ney's fees in
    part because "[i]n the absence of evidence, we have no basis
    on which to conclude that payment based on 1984 rates
    compensated lead counsel only for delay in payment up to
    that time") (emphasis added). Thus, an appr opriate
    adjustment for the delay in payment would ensur e that
    attorneys are fully compensated for their efforts and also
    would be consistent with S 1961(a)'s r equirement that post-
    judgment interest does not begin to accrue until the entry
    of the money judgment.16
    _________________________________________________________________
    16. Although the District Court did not addr ess it, but given its
    apparent
    concern as to who should bear the cost of delay, we leave open the
    27
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Given the foregoing analysis, we hold that pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. S 1961(a), post-judgment interest on an attorney's
    fee award runs from the date that the District Court enters
    a judgment quantifying the amount of fees owed to the
    prevailing party rather than the date that the Court finds
    that the party is entitled to recover fees, if those
    determinations are made separately. Her e, the District
    Court intended to compensate Eaves for the delay in
    payment occasioned by court backlog from August 11,
    1998, the date of the District Court's judgment stating that
    she was entitled to attorney's fees, to January 27, 2000,
    the date the Court fixed the amount owed. W e hold that the
    District Court erred in awarding post-judgment interest
    _________________________________________________________________
    possibility that on remand, the Court might consider compensating
    Eaves for the delay that occurred in this case by applying our precedents
    permitting an adjustment to the lodestar amount to account for the
    "delay in payment" factor often present in civil rights cases. See, e.g.
    Gulfstream III Assoc., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 
    995 F.2d 414
    ,
    425-26 (3d Cir. 1993); 
    Keenan, 983 F.2d at 476
    ; 
    Blum, 888 F.2d at 984
    -
    85; Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Bell
    Labs, 
    842 F.2d 1436
    , 1453-54 (3d Cir . 1988); Black Grievance 
    Comm., 802 F.2d at 655-56
    ; Institutionalized 
    Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 923-34
    . In
    pointing out the possibility for such an enhancement on remand, we
    have not overlooked the fact that the District Court, on January 27,
    2000, calculated the lodestar by using counsels'"current" billing rates
    (as of the date of the fee petition in May 1998) rather than their
    historical rates charged for services at the time they were rendered, and
    that the use of such rates may dictate that no enhancement is
    warranted. See 
    Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284
    ; Institutionalized 
    Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 923
    n.41 (dicta); Copeland v. Marshall, 
    641 F.2d 880
    , 893 n.23
    (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). But see In re Cont'l Illinois Sec. Litig., 
    962 F.2d 566
    , 571 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 
    17 F.3d 219
    , 221 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover , while we realize that the District
    Court did award a 15 percent contingency enhancement under the
    NJLAD, we note that such an enhancement is distinct from an
    adjustment to account for a delay in payment. See Pennsylvania v.
    Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 
    483 U.S. 711
    , 716 (1987)
    ("Although delay and the risk of nonpayment ar e often mentioned in the
    same breadth, adjusting for the former is a distinct issue that is not
    involved in this case. We do not suggest . . . that adjustments for delay
    are inconsistent with the typical fee shifting statute.").
    28
    under S 1961(a) from the entry of the August 11, 1998
    order to accomplish that goal, because that or der did not
    constitute a "money judgment" from which post-judgment
    interest could run.
    Accordingly, we will VACATE the District Court's January
    27, 2000 order and remand the matter to the District Court
    for the entry of an appropriate order consistent with this
    opinion. We will also AFFIRM the District Court's rulings
    with respect to the other issues the County pr esented in
    this appeal.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    29
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-5096

Judges: McKEE, Rendell, Stapleton

Filed Date: 1/24/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/1/2023

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