Jackson v. Comm Social Security , 36 F. App'x 498 ( 2002 )

Opinions of the United
2002 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-13-2002
Jackson v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 01-4251
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Recommended Citation
"Jackson v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 356.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 01-4251
_______________
JOYCE R. JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. No. 00-cv-03203)
District Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 7, 2002
BEFORE: NYGAARD, BARRY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed June 13, 2002)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Joyce Jackson seeks review of the District Court’s determination that the
Administrative Law Judge’s ("ALJ") ruling was supported by substantial evidence when
he found that Jackson was not disabled in accordance with the Social Security Act.
Jackson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 18, 1993, and alleges
that she became disabled in February 1993 due to a severe fracture of the scapula.
Our role as a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation and citation omitted); see
also 42 U.S.C. 405(g), 1383(c)(3). We are bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact if they
are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
427 (3d Cir. 1999).
Jackson challenges the ALJ’s decision on essentially two grounds. We have
carefully considered Jackson’s arguments and find that they lack merit. In particular, we
agree with the District Court that the ALJ does not bear the burden of establishing that
Jackson’s past relevant work is "substantial gainful activity" or that she performed the job
for a significant period of time. See Wallace v. Sec’y of HHS, 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d
Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Further, it is well within the discretion of the ALJ to discount
the opinion of Dr. Mylod, who did not examine Jackson, in relation to the testimony of
Dr. Ahamed and Dr. Schwartz, both of whom did examine Jackson and reached the same
conclusion, i.e., that Jackson was capable of performing her past relevant work. See 20
C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(1).
For the reasons substantially stated in the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of
the District Court, we find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and we therefore affirm.
_________________
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Frank Magill
United States Circuit Judg