United States v. Woods ( 1994 )

Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-17-1994
United States of America v. Woods
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-1432
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994
Recommended Citation
"United States of America v. Woods" (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 18.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/18
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
NO. 93-1432
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.
ALAN WOODS,
Appellant
_________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 91-00441-01)
_________________________________
Submitted Under 3rd Cir. LAR 34.1(a)
April 11, 1994
Before: BECKER, MANSMANN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 17, l994 )
_________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________________
MICHAEL R. STILES
United States Attorney
WALTER S. BATTY, JR.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief of Appeals
TERRI A. MARINARI
FREDERICK A. TECCE
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorneys for Appellee
1
ROBERT J. O'SHEA, JR.
George W. Howard, III, P.C
1608 Walnut St.
Suite 1700
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Appellant
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This is a Guidelines Sentencing appeal. Appellant Alan
Woods was sentenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
for his involvement in two armored truck robberies. At
sentencing, the district court gave Woods a two level increase in
his sentence for obstruction of justice because Woods had given
the government misleading information in an effort to avoid
implicating two friends in a third armored truck robbery. Woods
argues that because the misleading information did not impede or
obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the offenses for
which he was convicted, neither an upward adjustment for
"obstruction of justice" under § 3C1.1 nor a departure under
§5K2.0 was permissible under the Guidelines. Because of the
manner in which the Guidelines are written in this area, we feel
constrained to agree with Woods, and hence, albeit reluctantly,
we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
From August 1990 until July 1991, Woods took part in a
series of robberies of armored trucks in and around Philadelphia.
In September 1991, a grand jury indicted Woods for the robbery of
2
a Brooks armored truck outside the Temple University Hospital in
Philadelphia (the "Temple robbery").1 On February 7, 1992, one
day after the trial began, Woods entered a guilty plea in which
he admitted participating not only in the Temple robbery but also
in another armored truck robbery at Amtrak 30th Street Station
(the "Amtrak robbery"), also in Philadelphia.
The plea agreement provided that Woods would provide
the government information about any other person who was
involved in the Temple robbery, the Amtrak robbery, and "any
other robberies or crimes [of] which he has knowledge." The
agreement also provided that "if the government determines that
the defendant has not provided full and truthful cooperation . .
. the agreement may be voided by the government and the defendant
shall be subject to prosecution for any federal crime which the
government has knowledge including . . . perjury, obstruction of
justice, and the substantive offenses arising from this
investigation."
Woods then began supplying the FBI with information
about the Temple and Amtrak robberies. He also told the FBI
about two other armored truck robberies, one at a branch of the
Liberty Bank and another at a Pathmark Supermarket. He later
gave this same information during his testimony before a grand
jury.
1
The indictment alleged both a substantive violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (conduct that "obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery"), and conspiracy.
3
Woods' descriptions of the Temple, Amtrak, and Pathmark
robberies were substantially the same as those given by other
cooperating witnesses. Woods' description of the Liberty Bank
robbery, however, was significantly different. To begin with,
Woods denied his involvement in the Liberty Bank robbery,
claiming that he had been at home when it occurred. In fact,
Woods had been in a vehicle circling the vicinity of the robbery
and was at the "switch site" acting as a lookout. More
importantly for purposes of this appeal, however, Woods
consistently denied that two friends of his, William Edney and
Earl Glenn, were involved in the crime. The FBI later found out,
however, that both Edney and Glenn had participated in the
robbery, eventually gathering enough evidence to prosecute them.
But Woods' conduct delayed that prosecution for eight months.
At Woods' sentencing hearing the district court heard
testimony about Woods' conduct during the investigation of the
Liberty Bank robbery. The district court found that Woods had
made materially false statements to the FBI and grand jury,
whereupon it concluded that "the defendant 'obstructed justice'
by providing materially false statements to the FBI and by
committing perjury before the grand jury." The court then
increased the defendant's offense level two levels "pursuant to
either § 5K2.0 or § 3C1.1." This appeal followed, in which Woods
argues that the two level increase was inappropriate either as an
upward adjustment pursuant to § 3C1.1 or as an upward departure
pursuant to § 5K2.0.
II. DISCUSSION
4
A. Section 3C1.1, "Obstruction of Justice"
Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines provides:
If the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede
the administration of justice during the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
the instant offense, increase the offense
level by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1993) (emphasis added). Although this language
could be read to allow an upward adjustment whenever the
defendant obstructs the investigation or prosecution of any
offense during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
the offense for which the defendant was convicted, we have
squarely held that this adjustment applies only when the
defendant has made efforts to obstruct the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the offense of conviction. United
States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Section
3C1.1 applies to willful obstruction or attempt to obstruct 'the
administration of justice during the . . . sentencing of the
instant offense.' 'Any interpretation other than that § 3C1.1
refers to efforts to obstruct the prosecution of the conviction
offense would only render this modifier meaningless.'" (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original)); accord United States v. Levy,
992 F.2d 1081, 1084 (10th Cir. 1993) (obstruction must be of the
offense of conviction).
Woods pled guilty to the Temple and Amtrak robberies.
He did not, however, plead guilty to the Liberty Bank robbery.
5
Indeed, he was never even indicted for that crime. Thus Woods
made no efforts to obstruct the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the offense of conviction, and any enhancement
pursuant to § 3C1.1 was inappropriate.2 We therefore turn to the
question whether an upward departure was appropriate.
B. Section 5K2.0 Upward Departure
Section 5K2.0 provides that the sentencing court may
depart from the guidelines if it finds:
that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described.
2
The district court tried to avoid Belletiere by stating that
[t]he language of § 3C1.1 makes it clear that it does
apply to obstruction of justice "during . . .
sentencing of the instant offense." There appears to
be at least three cases which make it clear that a
defendant who perjures himself at the sentencing
hearing, triggers an increase in offense level of two
levels for willfully obstructing justice. [United
States v. Goldfaden, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir.
1991); and United States v. Hassan, 927 F.2d 303 (7th
Cir. 1991)]. The issue presented in this case is
whether this defendant willfully obstructed justice
during the sentencing of the instant offense by
providing materially false statements to the FBI and
the grand jury in violation of his plea agreement . . .
.
The cases cited by the district court, however, all involved
situations in which the defendant interfered with the prosecution
and sentencing of the offense of conviction. Goldfaden, 987 F.2d
at 227; Hamilton, 929 F.2d at 1130; Hassan, 927 F.2d at 309. They
do not stand for the proposition that any false statement made
during sentencing may trigger the adjustment.
6
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)) (internal
quotations omitted). Woods' obstruction of justice, relating as
it did to serious crimes, was itself quite serious, and it would
seem that he deserved the two-level upward adjustment
notwithstanding that it did not fall within the ambit of § 3C1.1.
The putative (and quite plausible) ground for an upward departure
would be his false statements to the government, resulting in
obstruction of justice in connection with an investigation other
than for the offense of conviction but related to it.
The problem with this approach, however, is that the
Commission ostensibly considered such situations when fashioning
§ 3C1.1 of the Guidelines. The Application Notes of § 3C1.1
contain a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct to which the
adjustment applies, including:
(b) committing, suborning, or attempting to
suborn perjury; [and]
. . .
(g) providing a materially false statement
to a law enforcement officer that
significantly obstructed or impeded the
official investigation or prosecution of the
instant offense[.]
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 3(b) & (g). Application Note
4 supplements that list with "a non-exhaustive list of examples
of the types of conduct that, absent a separate count of
conviction for such conduct, do not warrant application of this
enhancement, but ordinarily can appropriately be sanctioned by
the determination of the particular sentence within the otherwise
applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note
7
4 (emphasis added). One example of conduct that does not warrant
an obstruction of justice adjustment is "making false statements,
not under oath, to law enforcement officers, unless Application
Note 3(g) above applies." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note
4(b). The Commission thus appears to have considered false
statements like those involved here, and elected not to punish
them as part of the conviction for the instant offense.
Woods basically made two types of false statements when
he tried to throw the FBI off the trail of his friends: ones to
the grand jury, and ones to the FBI agents in interviews during
their investigation of the crimes. His lies to the grand jury
were, of course, perjury, but perjury is adequately taken into
account by Application Note 3(b). His lies to the FBI agents
during the interviews were not perjury, but fell into the
category of statements considered by Application Notes 3(g) and
4(b), both of which consider the appropriateness of an upward
adjustment when the defendant makes false statements to
investigating officers. Together they demonstrate that an
adjustment is appropriate only when the statements made by the
defendant obstruct the prosecution of the "instant offense,"
which, as we have said in Belletiere, is limited to the offense
of conviction. The Commission has apparently decided that an
upward adjustment for false statements to law enforcement
officers not pertaining to the offense of conviction would not be
appropriate. The district court's departure was therefore
impermissible.
8
The result we reach is regrettable. We believe that
Woods should have been punished for the harm that he caused in
misleading the government and the grand jury. Woods cut a deal
with the government apparently to avoid prosecution for the five
or six other armored truck robberies in which he may have been
involved. As a critical part of his plea bargain, he agreed to
cooperate with the FBI's investigation into the other robberies,
including the Liberty Bank robbery. He not only provided little
help as part of the agreement, but his false statements held up a
government investigation eight months and potentially shielded
two members of the robbery ring from prosecution. By all
accounts, Woods' conduct amounted to an obstruction of justice.
But we are bound by the language of § 3C1.1 and its
application notes. We do not fully understand the basis for the
Commission's limitation on the use of obstruction of justice.3 We
3
As far as we can tell, the obstruction of justice adjustment
appears to be limited to conduct obstructing the "instant
offense" because the Commission wanted to protect the defendant's
right against self incrimination, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
Application Note 1, and believed that minor lies about other
crimes could be adequately into account within the applicable
guideline range, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 2.
Neither of these concerns would be implicated when a defendant
misleads police officers about crimes for which he might have
used a plea agreement to insulate himself from prosecution. As a
result, there seems to be little reason not to give an
enhancement under such circumstances.
One possible explanation for the outcome in this case
would be that § 3C1.1 is not meant to affect the plea bargaining
process and therefore is not meant to remedy breaches of plea
agreements. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 1 (refusal to
enter a plea is not a basis for application of this provision).
The Commission might have felt that breaches of plea agreements
are best dealt with in other ways. For example, the government
could have rescinded the agreement and prosecuted Woods on the
crimes mentioned in the plea agreement as well as for the other
9
urge the Commission to redraft the section to make the adjustment
applicable in a case such as this one, or, at the very least, to
clarify why it should not be applicable.4
The judgment of the district court will be reversed,
and the case remanded for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.
_________________________
robberies, perjury, and obstruction of justice. In this case the
government chose not to take such action and instead sought only
the upward departure. See Government's Sentencing Memorandum at
11 ("the government has decided to merely seek the upward
departure described herein rather than pursue additional
prosecutions"). But such an option was possible (and indeed may
remain).
4
We note that this suggestion accords with the clear import of
the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines themselves. The
Guidelines are part of an evolutionary process, see United States
Sentencing Commission Annual Report 5 (1991), and should be
informed by rulings of the District Courts and Court of Appeals,
particularly in the area of departures, for they play a critical
role in the ongoing process begun by the Sentencing Reform Act.
The Commission has invited the federal bench to comment on
glitches in the Guidelines and the need for revision so that it
may amend the guidelines appropriately. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A
§§ 4(b), 5 (emphasizing that the Commission will review cases to
pinpoint where revisions are appropriate); cf. United States v.
Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir. 1991) (pointing out that
the Commission sought feedback from judges with respect to the
question of revocation of probation and supervised release),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 611, 116 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1991); see also
28 U.S.C. § 994(o) ("the Commission shall consult with
authorities on . . . various aspects of the Federal criminal
justice system").
10