United Steelworkers of Americ. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. ( 1994 )

Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-10-1994
United Steelworkers of Americ. v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., Inc.
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-2008, 93-7618
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 93-2008 and 93-7613
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO-CLC
v.
CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC.
Appellant
(in No. 93-2008)
CHARLES A. THOMAS; DARREN BOOP; ROBERT W. BOWER;
WILLIAM D. BRIDGE; JAMES CLINGAN; NEAL B. HOUSNER;
JONATHAN L. NOAKER; WAYNE D. ORNER;
GERALD W. RANCK; HAROLD E. VAN SICKLE, JR.;
RICHARD A. WINTER; EUGENE L. WITMER, SR.,
Appellants
(in No. 93-7613)
v.
NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 92-cv-05968)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 92-cv-01507)
Argued May 24, 1994
Before: Cowen and Roth, Circuit Judges
Ackerman, District Judge*
(Filed August 10, 1994)
* Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, United States District Judge for
the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
Alan D. Berkowitz (argued)
Dechert, Price & Rhoads
1717 Arch Street
4000 Bell Atlantic Tower
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant (in No. 93-2008)
Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc.
David I. Goldman (argued)
United Steelworkers of America
5 Gateway Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellee (in No. 93-2008)
United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC
Robin S. Conrad
National Chambers Litigation Center
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
Counsel for Amicus-appellant
Chamber Commerce US
(in No. 93-2008)
Counsel for Amicus-appellee
Chamber Commerce US
(in No. 93-7613)
Paul A. Levy (argued)
Public Citizen Litigation Group
2000 P Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Appellants (in No. 93-7613)
Charles A. Thomas
Darren S. Boop
Robert W. Bower
William D. Bridge
James Clingan
Neal B. Housner
Jonathan L. Noaker (whose name
is misspelled in some pleadings as
"Nooker")
Wayne D. Orner
Gerald W. Ranck
Harold E. Van Sickle, Jr.
Richard A. Winter
Eugene L. Witmer, Sr.
Vincent Candiello (argued)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
417 Walnut Street
One Commerce Square
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Appellee (in No. 93-7613)
North Star Steel Co., Inc.
Joseph S. Hornack
Cynthia s. Akers
Healey, Davidson & Hornack
Law & Finance Building
5th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Amicus-appellants (in No. 93-7613)
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO
United Mine Workers of America,
International Union
NLG/Sugar Law Center for
Economic & Social Justice
International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW
OPINION
ACKERMAN, District Judge.
These two cases present the following discrete issue: In an
action brought pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §2101 et seq. ("WARN"), a statute
which, like so many others, fails to explicitly provide a statute
of limitations, should we follow the general rule and borrow a
state statute of limitations or should we instead opt for the
six-month statute of limitations set forth in section 10(b) of
the federal National Labor Relations Act. The two cases present
the identical issue for review and we will consider both cases in
this Opinion.
For the reasons detailed below, we find that for cases
arising under WARN, courts should apply the most closely
analogous state statute of limitations. Thus, we will reverse
the decision in Thomas v. North Star Steel and will affirm the
decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal.
Background
Both of the underlying cases were filed pursuant to WARN, a
federal statute which requires companies with one hundred or more
employees to provide their workers with a minimum of sixty days
written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.1 Employers
who fail to provide the requisite notice must compensate
employees suffering an employment loss for each day of the
violation. The statute creates a private civil action for
damages in federal court.
1 The statute defines "plant closing" as the permanent or
temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, which results
in an employment loss to a certain minimum number of employees.
29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2). "Mass layoff" is defined as a reduction-
in-force, resulting from a plant closing, which results in a
certain minimum employment loss. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3). A
layoff must last more than six months before it qualifies as
actionable under WARN. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(6)(B).
On September 9, 1991, the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC, filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the
North Star Steel Company ("North Star") had violated the WARN Act
by failing to give the union sixty days advance notice of a
February 25, 1991 layoff of about 270 people, at the company's
Milton, Pennsylvania plant. Although the suit was filed more
than six months after the layoff occurred, North Star did not
raise the statute of limitations as a defense. On April 9, 1992,
the district court granted the union's motion for summary
judgment on liability, holding that the layoff constituted a
"plant closing" subject to WARN. In a separate Order, dated
December 11, 1992, the district judge determined the number of
days for which the company was required to pay WARN damages.
United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5, 6-7
(M.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd 5 F.3d 39 (1993).
Appellants were non-unionized employees of North Star,
unrepresented by the union and hence unaffected by the union's
successful lawsuit against North Star. They therefore filed a
separate action, the instant case, also seeking damages pursuant
to WARN. On May 25, 1993, the district court granted North
Star's motion for summary judgment, finding that the action was
barred under what it deemed to be the applicable statute of
limitations. The employees' motion for reconsideration was
denied on August 26, 1993. This appeal followed.
United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
Inc. ("Crown Cork"), arises out of an event that took place on
September 30, 1991. On that day, the company ordered a
reduction- in-force and shutdown of its Perry, Georgia plant. As
a result of this reduction in force, about 85 employees were
terminated. On October 15, 1992, the United Steelworkers of
America (the union) filed a complaint, alleging that the company
violated WARN by failing to give it 60 days notice prior to the
shutdown. Crown, Cork & Seal then moved for summary judgment,
contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. The district court denied the motion on August
24, 1993 but in an order dated September 26, 1993, certified the
August order for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1292.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal in Thomas v. North Star
Steel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. Our jurisdiction over United
Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal arises from our
October 13, 1993 Order granting the company permission to appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). Our review over both cases is
plenary.
Discussion
In this case we visit a general question of federal law that
we have repeatedly addressed: When a federal statute does not
contain an explicit statute of limitations, when is it
appropriate to borrow a statute of limitations from elsewhere in
federal law rather than adopting the most closely analogous state
statute of limitations.
The companies argue that in this case, a federal statute --
the six-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b)
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") for filing a claim
of an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") -- provides the most appropriate limitations
period. The employees and the union exhort us to borrow one of
various state statutes. Courts addressing the question have
adopted both approaches. Some have borrowed the six-month §10(b)
statute; see, e.g., Newspaper and Mail Delivers' Union of N.Y.
and Vicinity v. United Magazine Co., 809 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (adopting NLRA statute); Staudt v. Glastron, Inc., No. SA-
92-CA-1174, 1993 WL 85356, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090 (W.D.Tex.
February 23, 1993) (same). Other courts, including the only
Court of Appeals to reach the question, have expressly considered
and rejected the section 10(b) six-month period, instead opting
for various state law limitations periods. See, e.g. United
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter United Paperworkers); Wallace v.
Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (rejecting
NLRA statute and adopting six-year state contract statute);
Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701 of the Int'l Assoc. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Santa Fe Terminal Services,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting NLRA statute
and adopting, without specifying, most analogous state statute).
The two district court opinions before us now reached
contrary conclusions. The district court in North Star Steel
adopted the six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b);
the court in Crown, Cork & Seal rejected the §10(b) statute, and
without deciding the appropriate statute of limitations, found
the action timely under all of the possibilities.
Our analysis must begin with the general assumption that
when a federal statute is silent as to a statute of limitations,
the court should apply "the most closely analogous statute of
limitations under state law." DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); see also
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, ____, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991); Haggerty v. USAIR, Inc.,
952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 1992). This general rule is not set
in stone, however. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that, in order to prevent frustration of federal
policy, it is sometimes more appropriate to borrow a limitations
period from an analogous area of federal law. DelCostello, 462
U.S. at 162. This exception is "closely circumscribed", see Reed
v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), and should
only be applied "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes,
and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking". DelCostello, 462 U.S. at
172.
In following the principles enunciated in DelCostello and
Reed, we repeatedly have recognized our duty "to take seriously
[the Supreme Court's admonition] that analogous state statutes of
limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly
interfere with federal policies." Reed, 488 U.S. at 327. For
instance, the mere fact that a statute touches upon issues of
labor law does not mean that the Court must resort to the statute
of limitations contained in §10(b) of the NLRA. Thus, in
Eichleay Corp. v. Intern. Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1991), we applied
a state statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards to
an action to enforce an arbitration awards pursuant to §301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185. Similarly,
in Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 F.2d
1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we remanded the case to the district court
to apply the most closely analogous state statute of limitations
to a §301 claim of retaliation against internal union activities.
In Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 828
F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988), we
applied Pennsylvania's four-year breach of contract statute of
limitations to a union member's claim that the union failed to
rebate dues and improperly charged disabled workers. In this
case, as in those, the federal statute may be borrowed only if it
clearly provides a closer analogy than the available state
statutes. Answering this question requires us to focus on the
respective policies behind the NLRA and WARN.
The primary purpose of the NLRA is "to protect the right of
workers to join together in labor organizations and collectively
bargain for the terms and conditions of employment." United
Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 54; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1987). The statute "is
concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with
the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining."
Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)). More specifically, as
the Supreme Court noted in Reed, the NLRA has "effects upon the
formation and operation of the collective-bargaining agreement
between the employer and the bargaining representative, and upon
the private settlement of disputes under that agreement through
grievance-and-arbitration procedures". Reed, 488 U.S. at 329.
The NLRA, then, is concerned with the importance and integrity of
a process. From the NLRA's perspective, "minimum terms of
employment" that may arise from another federal statute -- or
from the process of collective bargaining itself -- are
irrelevant so long as the process is fair.
The six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b)
represents Congress's view of the proper balancing of the various
interests involved in the process of collective bargaining. The
six-month period takes into account "the national interests in
stable bargaining relationships and finality of private
settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he
views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining
system." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 70-71 (1980) (opinion
concurring in the judgment)). In DelCostello itself, it was
precisely this direct effect on the collective bargaining process
that led the Court to invoke the §10(b) statute of limitations.
That case involved a §301 hybrid suit (1) against an employer for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the
LMRDA, and (2) against a labor union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. Such a hybrid action really alleges that
the process of collective bargaining has broken down. Thus, the
NLRA policies applied: "The employee's interest in setting aside
the 'final and binding' determination of a grievance through the
method established by the collective-bargaining agreement
unquestionably implicates 'those consensual processes that
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote -- the formation
of the . . . agreement and the private settlement of disputes
under it.'" DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting Mitchell, 451
U.S. at 70-71 (opinion concurring in judgment)).
In DelCostello, the parallels between the cause of action
and the policies behind the NLRA were unmistakable. In Reed,
however, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that many
employment-related statutes affecting labor will in some way
affect the collective bargaining process, cautioned that even
plausible "tangential and remote" effects upon collective
bargaining are insufficient to warrant departure from the general
rule. Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 331. Thus, the Court refused to
borrow the §10(b) NLRA statute of limitations to govern a union
member's free speech claim against the union.
WARN falls into this latter category -- any effects it has
on collective bargaining are tangential at best. The benefits of
WARN accrue not only to unionized workers but to all workers
alike. WARN, like dozens of other employment statutes which
bestow substantive rights simply "gives employees something for
which they otherwise might have to bargain." Fort Halifax, 482
U.S. at 21 (addressing Maine plant closing law). That is why in
that case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did not preempt a
Maine statute providing protection to workers from plant
closings. Unlike the NLRA, the Maine regulation "provide[d]
protection to individual union and nonunion workers alike, and
thus 'neither encourage[d] nor discourage[d] the collective
bargaining processes . . . ." Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21
(quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 755). The WARN
protections, like the Maine plant closing law discussed in Fort
Halifax, is also properly understood as establishing part of the
"backdrop" of rights that the parties bring to the collective
bargaining table, and not as affecting the substantive rights
that may emerge from the collective bargaining discussions. Fort
Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21.
WARN serves a broader purpose as well, that goes beyond the
employer-employee relationship addressed by the NLRA. The
statute mandates that employers planning a plant closing or mass
lay-off must notify the "chief elected official of the unit of
local government within which such closing or layoff is to
occur". 29 U.S.C. §2102(a)(2) Employers who fail to comply with
the provision are subject to civil penalties of $500 per day. 29
U.S.C. §2104(a)(3). Thus, WARN serves very broad societal goals
-- to protect workers, their families and their communities in
the wake of potentially harmful employment decisions. Its
remedial nature really has very little to do with the day to day
process of collective bargaining.
To be sure, it cannot be said that WARN has no effect on
collective bargaining. The companies point out, for example,
that under the NLRA, an employer must provide notice to
represented workers, in order to give the workers the opportunity
for meaningful bargaining. See, e.g. First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981). This fact does present
a superficial resemblance between the NLRA and WARN, but on
closer inspection, it highlights the difference. The rights
bestowed by the NLRA focus solely on the need for a meaningful
collective bargaining process; WARN provides an across-the-board
substantive right. The implementing regulations of the statute
highlight this crucial distinction by providing that
"[c]ollective bargaining agreements may be used to clarify or
[to] amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but may not reduce
WARN rights." 20 C.F.R. §639.1(g) (emphasis added). In other
words, the NLRA requires notice to protect the meaningfulness of
the collective-bargaining process; WARN's purpose is to
substantively protect employees and their communities.
The fact that courts have looked to NLRA cases in
interpreting WARN, and the fact that there are some definitional
overlaps, does not change this fundamental distinction between
the two statutes. At best, WARN has a family resemblance to the
NLRA. In Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927
F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we rejected the proposition that a
family resemblance is sufficient to justify adopting the §10(b)
statute of limitations. There, we held that a claim against a
union for breach of the duty of fair representation, while having
some effect upon the collective bargaining atmosphere, did not
have an effect sufficient enough to counsel adoption of the
federal statute. Id. at 1295. In order to justify departing from
the general rule, the analogy must be more direct.2
As the Second Circuit pointed out in United Paperworkers,
courts adopting the section 10(b) statute of limitations for WARN
actions "have failed to grasp this crucial distinction between
statutes which specifically regulate the collective bargaining
relationship and those which remain peripheral to that concern."
United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55.
Nonetheless, despite the vast gulf between the respective
policies behind the NLRA and WARN, the companies look for relief
in our own prior decision of Haggerty v. USAir. Their reliance
is misplaced. That case addressed the Employee Protection
Program of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1552(d)(1)
(1988) ("EPP"), a federal statute which provided certain air
carrier employees with a right of first hire against other air
carriers. The EPP directly affected the collective bargaining
environment by impacting on "the seniority relationships of other
2
The lack of similarity between the NLRA and WARN becomes
even starker when one looks at the remedies afforded by the
respective statutes. Under the NLRA, the National Labor
Relations Board has broad discretion to "'take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees . . . as will
effectuate the policies of [the Act]' to remedy an employer's
unfair labor practices." Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d
451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992). WARN by its very terms precludes such
broad equitable relief; "[A] Federal court shall not have
authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff." (emphasis
added). Similarly, the NLRB's discretion in awarding back pay is
broad. See Tubari, 959 F.2d at 453. WARN, though, provides a
strict statutory mechanism for computing damages.
employees . . . ." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 787. As in
DelCostello, this direct impact on the collective bargaining
environment required a statute of limitations that furthered the
need for the rapid resolution of labor disputes. And since, as
we noted in Haggerty itself, the airline industry was nearly 90%
unionized and the right-to-hire program was inserted into the
statute at the insistence of unions, the six-month section 10(b)
statute of limitations was the obvious choice.3
In determining whether to apply a federal statute of
limitations, we also have considered whether the federal policies
at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the NLRA
statute "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking". DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172; Haggerty,
952 F.2d at 786. The companies argue that WARN requires a single
federal statute of limitations, because subjecting the companies
to multiple state statutes of limitations would make it difficult
for employers to calculate their contingent liabilities.
This case simply does not present serious uniformity
concerns. The need for uniformity becomes real only when the
federal statute at issue contains numerous types of claims and
legal theories or when the prospect of multiple state statutes of
limitation presents serious practical problems. Uniformity
concerns motivated the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471
3
We also found that "as with the NLRA, the Department of
Labor has had a role in administering the EPP as the agency
charged with maintaining a listing of airline vacancies for the
use of protected employees under the EPP." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at
787.
U.S. 261 (1985), to apply a uniform limitations period (a state
limitations period in that case) to claims arising under 42
U.S.C. §1983. As the Court pointed out, claims under the broad
civil rights statute "would encompass numerous and diverse topics
and subtopics." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273. Thus, "[i]f the choice
of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the particular
facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could
almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more
periods of limitations should apply to each §1983 claim." Id. at
273-74. The Court used similar reasoning in Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987): Since
RICO "encompass[es] numerous diverse topics and subtopics . . . a
uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable
'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation.'" Id. at 149-50
(quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273, 272).
In Haggerty, we relied on uniformity concerns in deciding to
apply the section 10(b) statute. Under the EPP, a protected
employee who had been terminated or furloughed could claim a
right of first hire with any other carrier that was hiring
employees. We noted that airline carriers would have difficulty
"managing a cohesive policy with respect to the EPP were they
subject to the varying limitations periods of each of the states
in which they operate." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 786. Thus,
without a uniform federal statute of limitations, the entire
airline industry faced constant and protracted uncertainty.
Unlike RICO and Section 1983, WARN contains but a single
cause of action, and all WARN claims involve nearly identical
fact patterns and discrete inquiries. And unlike the EPP, under
which an airline may be the fortuitous victim of events involving
other air carriers all across the country, WARN's obligations
simply do not implicate such geographic concerns favoring
uniformity. As the Second Circuit put it:
"The term 'plant closing' as defined by the Act is limited
to single sites of employment, and venue is limited to the
district where the violation is alleged to have occurred or
where the employer does business; unless a single plant site
straddles the boundary between two states, it is unlikely
prospective plaintiffs will have a broad choice of fora in
which to bring their claims or that doubt will arise as to
in which state triggering events occurred. Therefore,
geographic considerations do not counsel for the application
of a uniform federal limitations period for WARN Act
claims." United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56 (quoting
district court opinion).
Because of these same factors, "courts will have little
difficulty in determining which state's law to apply and workers
will gain few advantages by suing in a court far from the site of
injury." United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.4
4
Since the Crown, Cork & Seal action occurred in Perry,
Georgia, there is a question as to whether the statute of
limitations should be borrowed from Georgia or Pennsylvania law.
We have previously held that "as a general rule the governing
statute of limitations should be that of the state in which the
federal court sits, unless a party can make a compelling showing
that the application of that statutory time bar would seriously
frustrate federal labor policy or work severe hardship to the
litigants." Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping
Association, Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated
on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). We need not decide
whether the statute of limitations should be borrowed from
Pennsylvania or Georgia law, since no party has brought to the
lower courts' attention a statute of limitations, from either
state, under which the instant actions would be untimely.
The companies' further concern about the effect of a plant
closing on service of process, and on the mechanics of
litigation, simply do not implicate federal concerns; rather,
they are the same concerns at issue in every cause of action,
whenever the statute of limitations is longer then a year or so.
On the other hand, a short statute of limitations could very
well frustrate the policies behind WARN. As the Second Circuit
found, under the complex administrative scheme of the NLRA, in
which the NLRB plays a large and active role in prosecuting
claims, "[t]he burden on complainants in pursuing a claim is
minimal, justifying the short statute of limitations." United
Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. WARN does not contain those
administrative safeguards, and a six-month statute could very
well constitute too great a burden on the claimants.
Finally, cases finding that the practicalities of litigation
favor adoption of a federal statute of limitations have focused
on the problems with the potential state statutes. For example,
in DelCostello, the Court pointed out that the two possible state
statutes were inconsistent with the relevant federal policy
favoring the finality of settlements and the opportunity to
attack an unfair result under collective bargaining. The
extremely short time periods in state arbitration statutes "fail
to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity
to vindicate his rights under §301 and the fair representation
doctrine." Id. at 166. Conversely, the relatively lengthy time
period governing legal malpractice claims "would preclude the
relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by
federal law -- a problem not present when a party to a commercial
arbitration sues his lawyer." Id. at 168.
Here, the state statutes of limitations brought to the lower
courts' attention -- which range from the two-year period for
enforcing civil penalties under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5524(5)
to Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of limitations, 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5527 -- do not interfere with federal
policy.5 Because of WARN's remedial nature and its limited
effect on collective bargaining, a short statute of limitations
is unnecessary. And none of the state statutes are so short as
to interfere with a worker's potential for seeking or gaining
relief. While we acknowledge that none of the possible state
laws provide perfect analogies to WARN, the absence of a perfect
analogy is an insufficient reason to depart from the general
rule, particularly when federal law does not provide a
satisfactory alternative. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at
171; Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir.
1987).
Here, we need not decide which state statute applies, since
the actions would be timely under any of the possible statutes of
limitations brought to the court's attention.
CONCLUSION
5
Other possible state statutes of limitations include the
three year period set forth in 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §260.9a(g) for
bringing claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, and the four year limitations period for breach
of an implied contract, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5525(4).
We conclude that, for the reasons detailed above, for
actions arising under WARN, courts must apply the most closely
analogous state statute of limitations. We therefore will affirm
the district court's Order in United Steelworkers of America v.
Crown, Cork & Seal denying Crown, Cork & Seal's motion for
summary judgment. We will reverse the Order of the district
court in Thomas v. North Star Steel granting North Star's motion
for summary judgment in favor of North Star. These cases will be
remanded to the respective district courts for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against
the appellant in 93-2008. Costs taxed against the appellee in
93-7613.