McDonald v. Comm of PA ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-4-1995
    McDonald v Comm of PA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 95-3005
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995
    Recommended Citation
    "McDonald v Comm of PA" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 208.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/208
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 95-3005
    ____________
    BONITA McDONALD,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF
    PUBLIC WELFARE, POLK CENTER,
    Appellee
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civ. No. 94-cv-00009E)
    ____________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule LAR 34.1(a)
    June 30, 1995
    Before: HUTCHINSON, ROTH, and WEIS, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed August 4, 1995)
    ____________
    Michael L. Rosenfield, Esquire
    1808 Law & Finance Building
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Attorney for Appellant
    Gloria A. Tischuk, Esquire
    Deputy Attorney General
    Calvin R. Koons, Esquire
    Senior Deputy Attorney General
    John G. Knorr, III, Esquire
    Chief Deputy Attorney General
    Chief, Litigation Section
    OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
    4th Floor, Manor Complex
    564 Forbes Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Attorneys for Appellee
    1
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiff alleges a discriminatory discharge from
    employment caused by her inability to work for about two months
    while recuperating from surgery.     The district court concluded
    that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Americans
    With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.     We agree and
    will affirm.
    The relevant facts are those alleged in the plaintiff's
    complaint.   On September 8, 1992, plaintiff was hired as a charge
    nurse at the Polk Center in Venango County, a residential
    institution for the mentally retarded operated by the
    Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.     On December 24, 1992,
    during working hours, plaintiff became disabled because of severe
    abdominal pain.   She was admitted to a hospital on the following
    day and underwent surgery on December 31, 1992.
    On January 14, 1993, plaintiff requested that she be
    placed on unpaid sick leave until February 14, 1993, after which
    her physician reported that she could return to work.     Polk
    Center denied her request because she was still a probationary
    employee and, under the terms of the collective bargaining
    agreement, was not eligible for extended sick leave.     Because she
    was unable to attend to her duties, the Center discharged
    plaintiff as of December 31, 1992.
    2
    Plaintiff filed claims with the Pennsylvania Human
    Relations Commission and the EEOC, asserting that Polk Center had
    discriminated against her because of the disability resulting
    from her surgery.    In due course, the EEOC issued a right to sue
    letter and plaintiff filed her complaint in the district court
    alleging that the defendant had violated the Americans With
    Disabilities Act of 1990, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
    , the
    Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797
    (b), and the
    Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43,
    §§ 951-963.
    Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 12(b)(6), asserting that the complaint failed to state a
    claim.    Granting the defendant's motion, the district court
    dismissed the federal counts with prejudice and declined to
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law cause of
    action.
    The district court reasoned that the Disabilities and
    Rehabilitation Acts did not apply to the transitory disability
    that plaintiff had suffered, and that she was not "otherwise
    qualified" to work during the period in question.    As an
    alternative holding, the court concluded that plaintiff was
    discharged because of her probationary employee status and that
    the Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts hence were not
    applicable.
    In an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for
    failure to state a claim, we accept as true the facts alleged in
    the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
    3
    from them.    Our scope of review is plenary.   Unger v. National
    Residents Matching Program, 
    928 F.2d 1392
    , 1394 (3d Cir. 1991).
    Plaintiff did not seek to amend her complaint and does not
    request that relief on this appeal.    See 
    id. at 1401
    .
    Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    ,
    has been termed "the civil rights bill of the disabled."
    Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v.
    Skinner, 
    881 F.2d 1184
    , 1187 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).    The
    statutory language and the regulations adopted to implement the
    legislation have proved to be ambiguous and, as such, fruitful
    sources of litigation.     See Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v.
    Sykes, 
    833 F.2d 1113
    , 1117 (3d Cir. 1987).
    Partially because it recognized the problems caused by
    inconsistent interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, and
    intending to broaden coverage, Congress in 1990 enacted the
    Disabilities Act.    We reviewed the tortuous path of this
    legislation in Helen L. v. DiDario, 
    46 F.3d 325
    , 330-31 (3d Cir.
    1995), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Pennsylvania Secretary
    of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 
    63 U.S.L.W. 3861
     (U.S. May 25, 1995)
    (No. 94-1946), and need not repeat that discussion here.      Further
    amplification may be found in the legislative history reported in
    1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267-602, in S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Sess.
    (1989), and in a series of articles published in Volume 64,
    Number 2 of the Temple Law Review.
    These sources provide a helpful background for
    appreciating the purpose of the legislation.     However, they do
    not discuss the precise issue presented by this case -- whether a
    4
    disabling, but transitory, physical or mental condition is within
    the ambit of the Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts.
    Congress made clear its intention that identical
    standards were to be applied to both Acts.   
    42 U.S.C. § 12117
    (b)
    provided that enforcement agencies were to develop procedures to
    ensure that complaints are resolved in the same manner so as to
    avoid duplication of effort and imposition of inconsistent or
    conflicting standards under the Disabilities and Rehabilitation
    Acts.   Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or
    under the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for
    determining liability are the same.   Myers v. Hose, 
    50 F.3d 278
    ,
    281 (4th Cir. 1995).
    The legislative history demonstrates that the
    congressional committees drafting the Disabilities Act were
    conversant with regulations previously adopted to implement
    section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.   Indeed, in certain
    aspects the committee reports borrowed language from some of
    these regulations in explaining the meaning of the proposed
    Disabilities Act.   See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong.,
    2d Sess. 50-52, 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
    332-34, 337; Senate Report 116, supra at 21, 22.    Consequently,
    the regulations so utilized have more than usual force in
    providing guidance for interpretation of the Act.    The
    Committee's use of those regulations as they applied to the
    Rehabilitation Act in a sense assimilated them as a means of
    understanding the Disabilities Act.
    5
    The Rehabilitation Act provides that anyone receiving
    federal funds may not discriminate against an "otherwise
    qualified individual with a disability."      
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a). The
    Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in employment "against
    a qualified individual with a disability because of the
    disability . . . ."     
    42 U.S.C. § 12112
    (a).
    The two statutes have closely parallel definitions of
    disability.    The Rehabilitation Act terms an individual with a
    disability as one who "has a physical or mental impairment which
    substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
    activities."   
    29 U.S.C. § 706
    (8)(B).    Under the Disabilities Act,
    a disability is "a physical or mental impairment that
    substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
    such individual."     
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (2).
    
    29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
    (i) includes "working" as a major
    life activity.     Section 1630.2(j)(2) lists several factors to be
    considered "in determining whether an individual is substantially
    limited in a major life activity," including:
    "(i)      The nature and severity of the impairment;
    (ii)         The duration or expected duration of the
    impairment; and
    (iii)        The permanent or long term impact, or the
    expected permanent or long term impact of or
    resulting from the impairment."
    By way of illustration, the EEOC's "interpretative
    guidance" in the appendix to the regulation points out that a
    broken leg that takes eight weeks to heal is an impairment of
    6
    fairly brief duration.     "[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of
    short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
    are usually not disabilities.     Such limitations may include . . .
    broken limbs, . . . appendicitis, and influenza."     29 C.F.R. pt.
    1630 app.
    Similar regulations, promulgated pursuant to the
    Rehabilitation Act and in effect before the enactment of the
    Disabilities Act, may be found in 
    45 C.F.R. § 84.3
    (j); 45 C.F.R.
    pt. 84 app. A; 
    34 C.F.R. § 104.3
    ; 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 app. A.
    The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
    Resources states that:     "Persons with minor, trivial impairments,
    such as a simple infected finger are not impaired in a major life
    activity."     Senate Report 116, supra at 23.   See also House
    Report 485(II), supra at 52.
    In Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 
    36 F.3d 939
    , 943 (10th
    Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislative
    history of the ADA demonstrates that Congress intended that the
    caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally
    applicable to the term `disability' as used in the Disabilities
    Act.   See also Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 
    44 F.3d 538
    , 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
    An example of that guidance is found in Evans v. City
    of Dallas, 
    861 F.2d 846
    , 852-53 (5th Cir. 1988), where a worker
    discharged after excessive absenteeism attributable to a knee
    injury that required surgery was held not to be "disabled" within
    the terms of the Rehabilitation Act.     The Court of Appeals
    concluded that the Act contemplates an impairment of a permanent
    7
    nature.     
    Id. at 853
    .   Similarly, the Court in Vande Zande, 
    44 F.3d at 544
    , applying the Disabilities Act, commented:
    "Intermittent, episodic impairments are not disabilities, the
    standard example being a broken leg."       See also de la Torres v.
    Bolger, 
    781 F.2d 1134
    , 1137 (5th Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Stubbs,
    
    576 F. Supp. 1409
    , 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
    Against this background of applicable law, it is clear
    that the plaintiff in the case before us cannot qualify for
    relief under the Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act.         As
    the complaint reveals, her inability to work caused by the
    surgery was of limited duration.       She entered the hospital on
    December 25, 1992, and would have been able to return to her
    duties at Polk on February 15, 1993, a period of less than two
    months.   Although she was incapacitated for these weeks, her
    inability to work was not permanent, nor for such an extended
    time as to be of the type contemplated by the statutes she cites.
    To apply the Rehabilitation and Disabilities Acts to
    circumstances such as those presented here would be a massive
    expansion of the legislation and far beyond what Congress
    intended.    In the absence of statutory language, or even
    legislative history, indicating that the Acts are to cover an
    impairment of such limited duration, and not within the general
    concept of handicap, we cannot conclude that plaintiff was
    entitled to the benefits of the legislation.
    As an alternative ground for dismissal, the district
    court decided that plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified."
    Plaintiff argues that "with accommodation" in the form of a leave
    8
    without pay, she would have been qualified.     However, because
    plaintiff was not "disabled" as that condition is contemplated by
    the Rehabilitation and Disabilities Acts, Polk was not required
    to provide accommodation.
    This conclusion is consistent with the statute's
    language and case law.    The Rehabilitation Act bars
    discrimination against "otherwise qualified individuals," but
    does not define that phrase.    The Supreme Court, however, has
    provided guidance.    In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
    
    442 U.S. 397
    , 406 (1979), the Court said:     "An otherwise
    qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's
    requirements in spite of [her] handicap."     In another case, the
    Court noted:   "In the employment context, an otherwise qualified
    person is one who can perform `the essential functions' of the
    job in question."     School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline,
    
    480 U.S. 273
    , 287 n.17 (1987).
    The Disabilities Act defines "a qualified individual
    with a disability" as a person "who, with or without reasonable
    accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
    employment position that such individual holds or desires."
    
    42 U.S.C. § 12111
    (8).
    Some cases have held that in certain situations an
    employer may be required to grant extended leave without pay to
    disabled employees.    See Fuller v. Frank, 
    916 F.2d 558
     (9th Cir.
    1990) (alcoholic federal employee); Rodgers v. Lehman, 
    869 F.2d 253
     (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
    889 F.2d 869
     (9th Cir. 1989) (analogous state statute).     Rodgers and
    9
    Fuller were cases covered by regulations promulgated under
    section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, which requires federal
    agencies to adopt affirmative action programs for the disabled.
    See Fuller, 
    916 F.2d at
    561 & n.3.    Moreover, in Fuller, the
    Court assumed arguendo that the employee was otherwise qualified.
    
    Id.
     at 561 n.5.   See also House Report 485(II), supra at 63; 29
    C.F.R. pt. 32 app. A (Department of Labor suggestions: 29 C.F.R.
    pt. 1630 app. (EEOC "interpretive guidance").
    On the other hand, several courts have held that an
    employee with a history of sporadic, unpredictable absences may
    not be "otherwise qualified."   Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs.,
    Inc. of Cal., 
    31 F.3d 209
     (4th Cir. 1994); Carr v. Reno, 
    23 F.3d 525
     (D.C. Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 
    22 F.3d 277
    (11th Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 
    115 S. Ct. 657
     (1994); Magel
    v. Federal Reserve Bank of Phila., 
    776 F. Supp. 200
     (E.D. Pa.
    1991), aff'd 
    5 F.3d 1490
     (3d Cir. 1993); Santiago v. Temple
    Univ., 
    739 F. Supp. 974
     (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 
    928 F.2d 396
     (3d
    Cir. 1991).
    In Myers, 
    50 F.3d at 283
    , a case involving a county
    employee, the Court pointed out that an employer is not required
    to wait for an indefinite period to determine if an accommodation
    is achieving its intended effect.    "[R]easonable accommodation is
    by its terms most logically construed as that which presently, or
    in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the
    essential functions of the job in question."    
    Id.
    Although some case law might support the plaintiff's
    position that an unpaid leave of absence is an appropriate
    10
    accommodation in some circumstances, it does not aid her here
    because she fails to meet the threshold test of disability.    The
    Rehabilitation Act and the Disabilities Act do not apply to the
    transient, nonpermanent condition that she experienced, and
    consequently, the notion of accommodation under the statutes does
    not come into play.    We, therefore, do not decide that issue.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be
    affirmed.
    11