Amer Cyanmid v. Fermenta ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-8-1995
    Amer Cyanmid v Fermenta
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 94-5413
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    Recommended Citation
    "Amer Cyanmid v Fermenta" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 124.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/124
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    N0. 94-5413
    AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY,
    Appellant
    v.
    FERMENTA ANIMAL HEALTH COMPANY,
    a Delaware corporation
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 93-cv-04936)
    ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 1994
    OPINION VACATED APRIL 26, 1995
    SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO LAR 34.1(a)
    ON PANEL REHEARING MARCH 28, 1995
    BEFORE:   STAPLETON, HUTCHINSON and ROSENN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed    May 8, 1995)
    John Vanderstar (Argued)
    Christopher N. Sipes
    Covington & Burling
    1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
    P. O. Box 7566
    Washington, D.C. 20044
    and
    Donald A. Robinson
    Robinson, St. John & Wayne
    Two Penn Plaza East
    Newark, N.J. 07105-2249
    Of Counsel:
    Ronald J. Cracas
    Jane Y.C. Mathews
    American Cyanamid Company
    One Cyanamid Plaza
    Wayne, N.J. 07470-8426
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Clinton R. Batterton (Argued)
    Edward John Allera
    Naomi Joy Levan
    Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld
    1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
    Suite 400
    Washington, D.C. 20036-1511
    Of Counsel:
    James B. Daniels
    Friedman Siegelbaum
    7 Becker Farm Road
    Roseland, N.J. 07068
    and
    Lars H. Liebeler
    The Robinson Law Firm
    717 D Street, N.W., #400
    Washington, D.C. 20004
    Attorneys for Appellee
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
    The issue in this case is whether a 1980 contract
    between the parties and a 1983 amendment thereto conveyed to
    American Cyanamid Company ("Cyanamid") perpetual rights to use
    the federal regulatory authority of Fermenta Animal Health
    Company ("Fermenta") to market an animal feed supplement.
    Cyanamid marketed the drug under the trademark Aureozol.    Before
    the district court, both sides maintained that these documents
    are unambiguous, although each side differed on what was
    unambiguously stated therein. The district court held that "the
    plain language of the 1980 agreement and the 1983 amendment,"
    when read against the background of the parties' pre-contract
    negotiations and post-contract conduct, did not convey that
    right.   We will affirm.
    I.
    This dispute arises from a contract that was signed
    between Cyanamid, a chemical and pharmaceutical conglomerate, and
    Diamond Shamrock Corporation ("Diamond Shamrock") in 1980.
    Fermenta, the defendant in this case, became the successor in
    interest to Diamond Shamrock through an acquisition in 1985.     The
    purpose of the contract was to enable Cyanamid to produce and
    sell an animal feed drug that Diamond Shamrock had developed and
    was marketing.   The drug was an antibiotic animal feed supplement
    consisting of chlortetracycline, sulfathiazole and penicillin,
    known as CSP 250.   As consideration, Diamond Shamrock would
    receive an advance royalty and future royalties from Cyanamid's
    sales.
    In order for Cyanamid to manufacture and sell Diamond
    Shamrock's product, the contract granted it two distinct rights.
    First, Cyanamid was given access to Diamond Shamrock's
    proprietary information about its animal feed drug for the
    purpose of manufacturing and selling it.   Equally important, the
    agreement obligated Diamond Shamrock to seek federal regulatory
    authority to enable Cyanamid to sell the drug by applying for a
    "supplemental NADA" designating Cyanamid as a distributor of the
    drug.
    The FDA licenses the sale in interstate commerce of
    animal drugs by approving a manufacturer's New Animal Drug
    Application (NADA), which remains on file with the FDA.     Through
    the NADA, the FDA approves both the properties of the drug and
    its place and method of manufacture.    See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a).
    In 1971, Diamond Shamrock had obtained FDA approval of a NADA for
    its animal feed drug.1
    Obtaining a NADA can be an expensive and lengthy
    process because of the amount of resources that must be expended
    on researching and demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the
    proposed animal drug.    However, a company may be able to avoid
    the costs associated with obtaining its own NADA if it wishes to
    market a drug identical to that already marketed by another
    company which has obtained federal regulatory approval for the
    sale of the drug.   The company seeking to enter the market may
    request the current NADA holder to apply to the FDA for a
    "supplemental NADA" which designates the new market entrant as a
    distributor of the product.    See 
    21 C.F.R. § 514.8
    (a)(4)(v).2
    1
    . When Fermenta became the successor in interest to Diamond
    Shamrock's animal drug business, it acquired Diamond Shamrock's
    NADA authority, as noted in 
    21 C.F.R. § 558.15
    (g)(1).
    2
    .   
    21 C.F.R. § 514.8
    (a)(4)(v) provides in part:
    A communication proposing a change in a new
    animal drug application should provide for
    any one of the following kinds of changes:
    . . . .
    (v) Provision for outside firm to
    participate in the preparation, distribution,
    or packaging of a new animal drug (new
    Cyanamid entered into this contract with Diamond
    Shamrock because its own animal drug, which competed in the
    market with Diamond Shamrock's CSP 250, was under scrutiny by the
    FDA for the possible carcinogenic effects of one of its
    components, sulfamethazine.   Cyanamid sought to "insure" itself
    in the event the FDA took adverse action against its existing
    animal product by expanding its own product line to include
    Diamond Shamrock's animal feed supplement.   Thus, in 1979, it
    entered negotiations with Diamond Shamrock, hoping to obtain the
    right to develop and sell Diamond Shamrock's product.     Since
    Cyanamid could not sell Diamond Shamrock's drug without federal
    regulatory authority, the agreement required Diamond Shamrock to
    prepare and file a supplemental NADA establishing Cyanamid's
    facility as an alternate manufacturing site and designating
    Cyanamid as a distributor of the drug.   In addition to pursuing
    an agreement with Diamond Shamrock, Cyanamid was formulating
    plans to obtain its own NADA for an animal product consisting of
    aureomycin, sulfathiazole and penicillin, a combination similar
    to CSP 250.   This was reflected in a letter sent from Cyanamid to
    Diamond Shamrock during the course of negotiations in December of
    1979.
    Cyanamid and Diamond Shamrock executed their contract
    on July 23, 1980.   Diamond Shamrock obtained the supplemental
    NADA in June of 1982 and the original five year contract period
    (..continued)
    distributor, packer, supplier, manufacturer,
    etc.).
    commenced on that date.    Cyanamid thus enjoyed both commercial
    and regulatory rights to manufacture and sell the animal feed
    drug through June of 1987.
    The contract also gave Cyanamid an option at the
    expiration of the agreement to purchase a perpetual license from
    Diamond Shamrock. Article 9.2 provides in part:
    Upon expiration of the full term of this
    Agreement . . . CYANAMID shall have the right
    to obtain a perpetual, paid-up, non-exclusive
    license, without right to sublicense, under
    TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall have been
    licensed hereunder to CYANAMID upon the
    payment of twenty-five thousand ($25,000)
    dollars to DIAMOND SHAMROCK for such
    perpetual rights.
    App. 158.
    The option described in Article 9.2 was exercised
    prematurely by the parties in 1983 in the form of an amendment to
    the agreement.    The amendment provides in part:
    You will grant to us [Cyanamid] a
    perpetual paid-up nonexclusive license
    without right to sub-license under TECHNICAL
    INFORMATION as shall have been licensed under
    the Agreement upon our payment to you of
    $87,500 for such perpetual rights. . . .
    All other terms and conditions of the
    Agreement will remain in effect.
    App. 165.
    The dispute before the district court turned on whether
    this 1983 amendment, when read together with the original
    contract, gives Cyanamid a perpetual right to use the
    supplemental NADA to sell CSP 250.    Cyanamid argued that the 1983
    amendment gave it such a right, but Fermenta insisted that such a
    right ceased in 1987 with the expiration of the original
    contract.
    Fermenta acquired Diamond Shamrock's interest in the
    contract in October of 1985, and from then through 1993, Fermenta
    monitored Cyanamid's regulatory compliance with the NADA.     Prior
    to 1993, Fermenta never informed Cyanamid that its right to
    reference its NADA had expired with the termination of the
    original contract in 1987.    Fermenta claims not to have realized
    that the contract expired in June of 1987 until 1993, when
    Fermenta more closely examined the entire contract because of
    Cyanamid's alleged regulatory breaches associated with the
    supplemental NADA.    Fermenta thereupon demanded that Cyanamid pay
    it $500,000, agree to pay a 10 percent royalty on all sales, and
    grant it a paid-up, royalty-free license under any patent or NADA
    which Cyanamid may have obtained on any related product.    When
    Cyanamid refused to comply, Fermenta sent a letter to the FDA
    informing it that Cyanamid was no longer authorized to use the
    supplemental NADA that accessed Fermenta's NADA.
    In response to Fermenta's action, Cyanamid filed a
    complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
    Jersey seeking a preliminary injunction and a declaration that it
    held a perpetual, royalty-free license to use the supplemental
    NADA so that it could continue to sell the product.    Fermenta
    counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that Cyanamid's right to
    use the supplemental NADA had expired in 1987.    The jurisdiction
    of the district court was based on diversity, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    .
    After a one day evidentiary hearing at which it
    listened to extrinsic evidence of intent tendered by each side,
    the district court entered a declaratory judgment that Cyanamid
    "did not purchase a perpetual right to use the NADA or
    supplemental NADA."    Dist. Ct. Order, No. 93-4936 (D. N.J.,
    entered June 22, 1994).    In its opinion, the district court
    analyzed the structure and text of the original agreement and the
    amendment and concluded that they could not reasonably be read to
    convey to Cyanamid a perpetual right to utilize Diamond
    Shamrock's regulatory authority.       The court also concluded that
    the   extrinsic evidence provided no basis for interpreting the
    scope of the rights conveyed by the agreements more broadly than
    the parameters of those rights as defined by its analysis of the
    structure and text.
    We have conducted a plenary review of the district
    court's conclusions.    Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v.
    Pitterich, 
    805 F.2d 96
    , 101 (3d Cir. 1986) (plenary review
    conducted of district court's conclusion that term of contract
    read against the background of the relevant extrinsic evidence
    was unambiguous).     While our analysis of the structure and text
    of the agreement differs in one respect from that of the district
    court, that difference is not material for present purposes and
    our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district
    court.
    II.
    The district court exercised its diversity
    jurisdiction.   This means that the law to be applied is that of
    the forum state -- New Jersey.    While the state law to which we
    look includes New Jersey's choice of law rules, Klaxon Co. v.
    Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 
    313 U.S. 487
    , 496 (1941), neither party
    suggests any reason why a New Jersey court would apply other than
    its own law to this dispute and both, by the case law cited in
    their briefs, implicitly recognize New Jersey as providing the
    controlling law of contracts.    The parties do not contend,
    moreover, that New Jersey's contract law differs in any material
    way from the generally accepted principles of contract law
    reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts or from the
    "traditional rules of contract interpretation" that we described
    in Teamsters Indus. Emp. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars,
    Inc., 
    989 F.2d 132
    , 135 (3d Cir. 1993).    Cyanamid successfully
    urged the district court to follow the principles which we
    articulated in Rolls-Royce and Fermenta relies heavily on those
    principles before us.   We there observed in the context of a
    collective bargaining agreement alleged to be ambiguous:
    Although federal law governs the
    construction of collective bargaining
    agreements, traditional rules of contract
    interpretation apply when not inconsistent
    with federal law. To decide whether a
    contract is ambiguous, we do not simply
    determine whether, from our point of view,
    the language is clear. Rather, we "hear the
    proffer of the parties and determine if there
    [are] objective indicia that, from the
    linguistic reference point of the parties,
    the terms of the contract are susceptible of
    different meanings." Sheet Metal Workers,
    949 F.2d at 1284 (brackets in original)
    (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business
    Credit, Inc., 
    619 F.2d 1001
    , 1011 (3d Cir.
    1980)). Before making a finding concerning
    the existence or absence of ambiguity, we
    consider the contract language, the meanings
    suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic
    evidence offered in support of each
    interpretation. Id.; Mack Trucks, 917 F.2d
    at 111; see also Restatement (Second) of
    Contracts § 223 cmt. b (1981) ("There is no
    requirement that an agreement be ambiguous
    before evidence of a course of dealing can be
    shown. . . ."). Extrinsic evidence may
    include the structure of the contract, the
    bargaining history, and the conduct of the
    parties that reflects their understanding of
    the contract's meaning.
    Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
    These teachings appear to us to be consistent with
    those of New Jersey law.   In Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v.
    Schwimmer, 
    96 A.2d 652
     (N.J. 1953), the Supreme Court of New
    Jersey summarized this area of the law in the following terms:
    Evidence of the circumstances is always
    admissible in aid of the interpretation of an
    integrated agreement. This is so even when
    the contract on its face is free from
    ambiguity. The polestar of construction is
    the intention of the parties to the contract
    as revealed by the language used, taken as an
    entirety; and, in the quest for the
    intention, the situation of the parties, the
    attendant circumstances, and the objects they
    were thereby striving to attain are
    necessarily to be regarded. The admission of
    evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the
    purpose of changing the writing, but to
    secure light by which to measure its actual
    significance. Such evidence is adducible
    only for the purpose of interpreting the
    writing--not for the purpose of modifying or
    enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid
    in determining the meaning of what has been
    said. So far as the evidence tends to show,
    not the meaning of the writing, but an
    intention wholly unexpressed in the writing,
    it is irrelevant. The judicial interpretive
    function is to consider what was written in
    the context of the circumstances under which
    it was written, and accord to the language a
    rational meaning in keeping with the
    expressed general purpose. Casriel v. King,
    
    2 N.J. 45
    , 
    65 A.2d 514
     (1949).
    Id. at 656.
    It is important for present purposes to note that
    extrinsic evidence of the negotiations, conduct and other
    circumstances of the parties is important to a court's analysis
    of whether an agreement is ambiguous only to the extent, if any,
    that such evidence provides "objective indicia that, from the
    linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the
    contract are susceptible of different meanings."    Mellon Bank,
    N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 
    619 F.2d 1001
    , 1011 (3d Cir.
    1980).   That is, extrinsic evidence is permitted because the law
    recognizes that the meaning of words can depend on context, and
    what may seem unambiguous without context (or in the context that
    the judge may hypothesize, based on his or her own experience)
    may be ambiguous when understood from "the linguistic reference
    point of the parties."    
    Id.
       See 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
    Contracts § 542 (1960).    Cf. 4 Samuel Williston & Walter H. E.
    Jaeger, A Treatise on the Laws of Contracts § 601, at 310-11 (3d
    ed. 1961).    But the focus must remain on the language chosen by
    the parties, and a text unambiguous when accorded the commonly
    understood meaning of its words cannot be disregarded unless the
    extrinsic evidence is such as might cause a reasonable fact
    finder to understand the text differently.    See Mellon Bank, 
    619 F.2d at
    1011 & 1012 n.13.
    The point is well illustrated by Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
    Aetna Business Credit, Inc., a case to which we looked in Rolls-
    Royce for the "traditional rules of contract interpretation."
    Rolls-Royce, 
    989 F.2d at 135
    .   There, Mellon Bank and Aetna
    Business Credit were commercial lending institutions.      In the
    transaction giving rise to the dispute, Mellon was the
    construction lender and Aetna was the permanent lender.      Mellon
    alleged that Aetna breached their contract by refusing to
    purchase the construction loan held by Mellon.      Under the
    agreement, Aetna had "no obligation to acquire the construction
    loan from the construction lender in the event of . . .
    insolvency of the Borrower."    Mellon Bank, 
    619 F.2d at 1006
    .
    Mellon contended that the parties intended "insolvency"
    to mean that the borrower's liabilities exceeded its assets
    without reference to the liabilities or assets of the borrower
    that accrued from the particular project being financed.        The
    district court heard extrinsic evidence and held, based on the
    conduct of the parties during their negotiations, that Mellon's
    reading was "required by the clear allocation of lending risks
    between" the contracting parties.    
    Id. at 1008
    .    We described the
    district court's reasoning and the issue before us in the
    following terms:
    The district court found that Aetna in
    analyzing the security for its permanent loan
    did not consider the borrowers' cash flow,
    did not condition its obligation upon any
    occupancy level, and therefore concluded
    "Aetna recognized that the financial
    transaction in question was not a basis for
    finding insolvency." The district court
    cited no basis in the contract document or
    wording of the insolvency clause for its
    conclusion. Our task is to decide if the
    district court permissibly used extrinsic
    evidence to interpret the contract and, if
    so, whether it drew the proper legal
    conclusions therefrom.
    
    Id. at 1009
    .
    We reversed, holding as follows:
    Although extrinsic evidence may be considered
    under proper circumstances, the parties
    remain bound by the appropriate objective
    definition of the words they use to express
    their intent. . . .
    We have concluded that the district
    court here exceeded the permissible boundary
    of interpretation. . . . When the district
    judge received Mellon's evidence it should
    have rejected it as insufficient to vary the
    meaning of a commercial term as well
    established as "insolvent." In this case the
    district court added a term which made the
    condition a nullity. It ruled that, although
    the solvency of the borrowers was a condition
    in the written contract, the fact that the
    borrowers' solvency was not significantly
    considered by Aetna in evaluating the take-
    out loan minimized or nullified this clause
    of the contract.
    . . . The fact that the insolvency of the
    borrowers was not significantly considered by
    Aetna in evaluating the take-out loan is
    immaterial given the expression of that
    concern in the written words of the contract.
    
    Id. at 1013-14
    .
    Our approach in Mellon Bank is consistent with the law
    of New Jersey.    Although the New Jersey Supreme Court in Atlantic
    Northern Airlines extolled the use of extrinsic evidence to aid
    in ascertaining the intent of the parties, even when the terms of
    the instrument are otherwise unambiguous, it cautioned that such
    evidence may not be used "for the purpose of modifying or
    enlarging or curtailing" the terms of the contract.   With this
    understanding of the controlling law, we turn to examine the
    structure and text of the agreements and then to consider the
    extrinsic evidence offered by the parties.
    III.
    The preamble of the 1980 agreement clearly and tersely
    states Cyanamid's two objectives in entering the agreement --
    access to Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information and the
    right to sell the drug under a supplemental NADA:
    DIAMOND SHAMROCK has developed or otherwise
    acquired certain proprietary information
    relating to the manufacture of an animal feed
    supplement and is the owner of an approved
    New Animal Drug Application (NADA) which
    permits the sale of such animal feed
    supplement; and
    . . . CYANAMID desires to manufacture and
    sell such animal feed supplement and would
    like to obtain the right to utilize DIAMOND
    SHAMROCK's proprietary information and have
    DIAMOND SHAMROCK file supplemental NADA's to
    establish CYANAMID as an alternate
    manufacturing site and to designate CYANAMID
    as a distributor pursuant to 21 CFR 514.8.
    App. 151.
    Two separate sections of the contract implement the
    transfer to Cyanamid of the commercial and regulatory rights it
    sought.   The first is Article 2.1, which is the focal point of
    this controversy.
    Article 2.1 provides:
    DIAMOND SHAMROCK grants to CYANAMID a
    non-exclusive license to use TECHNICAL
    INFORMATION to practice the LICENSED PROCESS
    and to make, use and sell PRODUCT under its
    own name and trademarks.
    App. 153-54.   The terms used in Article 2.1 are defined in
    Article 1.   "TECHNICAL INFORMATION" is defined as meaning "all
    information licensable by DIAMOND SHAMROCK as of the effective
    date of this Agreement and which relates to the practice of the
    LICENSED PROCESS or to the production and use of PRODUCT."
    "Licensed process" is defined as "DIAMOND SHAMROCK's process for
    the manufacture of an animal feed supplement presently sold under
    the trademark CSP 250 and comprising chlortetracycline,
    sulfathiazole and penicillin."   The term "product" refers to CSP
    250.   App. 152.   Thus, Article 2.1 grants commercial authority to
    Cyanamid to use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information to
    manufacture, distribute and sell CSP 250.
    Article 11.1, on the other hand, commits Diamond
    Shamrock to seek regulatory authority for Cyanamid to market CSP
    250.   That clause provides in part:
    Promptly upon execution of this
    Agreement, DIAMOND SHAMROCK shall prepare and
    submit to the FDA supplemental new animal
    drug applications to establish CYANAMID's
    facility as an alternate manufacturing site
    and to designate CYANAMID as a distributor of
    PRODUCT under 21 CFR 514.8.
    App. 160.    This provision was, of course, a critical term of the
    agreement.   If Diamond Shamrock failed to obtain a supplemental
    NADA by December 31, 1982, Article 11.2 entitled Cyanamid to
    terminate the agreement.
    The dichotomy between commercial and regulatory rights
    reflected in the preamble and in Articles 2.1 and 11.1 is
    important for present purposes because the scope of the perpetual
    license Cyanamid claims to have received by virtue of the 1983
    amendment is defined in that amendment and Article 9.2 of the
    original agreement solely by reference to the rights conferred by
    Article 2.   As we have noted, Article 9.2 grants Cyanamid an
    option to obtain upon the termination of the agreement a
    perpetual "license . . . under TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall
    have been licensed hereunder to CYANAMID."   It was this perpetual
    license that Cyanamid acquired in 1983 when it was granted a
    perpetual "license . . . under TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall
    have been licensed under the Agreement," i.e., a perpetual
    license to use "all information licensable by Diamond Shamrock as
    of [July 23, 1980] which relates to the practice of [its
    manufacturing process for CSP 250] or to the production and use
    of [CSP 250]."
    The 1983 amendment provides that, save for the grant of
    this perpetual license of Diamond Shamrock's proprietary
    information, all other terms and conditions of the original
    agreement were to remain unchanged.   Since one such term and
    condition was the five year limit on the rights originally
    conveyed, this meant that only the perpetual license of
    proprietary information was to survive beyond June of 1987.   It
    necessarily follows that any right Cyanamid had under the 1983
    amendment after 1987 had to be a right conferred by Article 2.1.
    Before the district court, Cyanamid insisted that, when
    Diamond Shamrock conveyed in Article 2.1 a "license to use
    TECHNICAL INFORMATION to practice the LICENSED PROCESS and to
    make, use and sell PRODUCT under its own name and trademarks,"
    Diamond Shamrock conveyed a right to use the supplemental NADA.3
    We agree with the district court, however.   If the quoted words
    and those of the remainder of the agreement are given their
    commonly understood meaning, Article 2.1 simply does not make
    such a grant.
    When the definitions of the defined terms are inserted
    in the grant evidenced by Article 2.1, one has a straightforward
    conveyance of a license to use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary
    information to practice its process and make, use and sell its
    product -- such proprietary information consisting of "all
    information licensable by Diamond Shamrock as of [July 23, 1980]
    which relates to the practice of [its manufacturing process for
    CSP 250] or to the production and use of [CSP 250]."   This
    conveyance is consistent with the dichotomy we have previously
    3
    . As we discuss in part V, infra, Cyanamid now argues that
    Article 2.1 conveys the commercial license to sell the product,
    and that once this right was perpetually conveyed through the
    1983 amendment, Cyanamid enjoyed clear commercial and regulatory
    authority to sell the product, since only the FDA could terminate
    its right to use the supplemental NADA. However, Cyanamid did
    not argue before the district court that Fermenta could not
    terminate its right to use the supplemental NADA. Indeed, it
    proceeded on the contrary assumption.
    identified in the preamble and between the grants made in
    Articles 2.1 and 11.1.   As the district court stressed, if
    Article 2.1 gave Cyanamid not only a commercial license to make,
    use and sell CSP 250 using Diamond Shamrock's proprietary
    information, but also a right to use the supplemental NADA that
    Diamond Shamrock hoped to obtain for Cyanamid, Article 11 would
    serve no purpose.   It is a well settled principle, however, that
    a court should read a contract so as to give all its terms their
    intended effect.    J. L. Davis & Associates v. Heidler, 
    622 A.2d 923
    , 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (disapproving of a
    "reading of [a] contract [which] would nullify its very terms and
    render [a] provision useless"); Goldberg v. Commercial Union Ins.
    Co. of New York, 
    188 A.2d 188
    , 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
    1963) ("Effect, if possible, will be given to all parts of the
    instrument . . . .); 3 Corbin, supra, § 549, at 183 (stating that
    the "legal effects" of the terms of a contract are to be
    "determined as a whole").
    Moreover, as the district court also noted, an
    understanding of Article 2.1 that includes a conveyance of
    regulatory rights as well as a commercial license to use
    proprietary information is inconsistent with its time focus.
    Article 2.1 effects a conveyance of rights Diamond Shamrock
    possessed as of July 23, 1980.   As is recognized in Article 11,
    Diamond Shamrock had no authority on that date to give Cyanamid
    the right to legally sell CSP 250 in the United States.     This
    could be accomplished only by Diamond Shamrock's taking the steps
    necessary to secure authority for Cyanamid from the FDA,
    authority which, as the escape clause demonstrates, the parties
    knew might be obtained, if at all, only after the passage of a
    substantial period of time.
    Cyanamid correctly points out that the reading of
    Article 2.1 which Fermenta champions and we adopt is not entirely
    consistent with the district court's reading of that provision.
    The district court interpreted Article 2.1 to convey two rights,
    a "license to use TECHNICAL INFORMATION to practice the LICENSED
    PROCESS" and a license "to make, use and sell PRODUCT under its
    own name and trademarks."    As previously indicated, we, on the
    other hand, read both the "to practice" clause and the "to make,
    use and sell" clause as modifying "license to use TECHNICAL
    INFORMATION."   The latter reading seems to us the more natural
    one since Cyanamid was going to use its own name and trademarks,
    Diamond Shamrock had no patent on CSP 250, and the only non-
    regulatory basis for excluding Cyanamid from competing in the CSP
    250 market was the rights Diamond Shamrock possessed in its
    proprietary information.    We do not, however, regard our
    difference with the district court as material in the present
    context.   Even if there be an ambiguity as to what the "make, use
    and sell" clause modifies, that ambiguity does not render the
    text of the agreement and the 1983 amendment ambiguous as to
    whether Cyanamid possesses a perpetual right to use the
    supplemental NADA.   As the district court's opinion demonstrates,
    this is so because the scope of the only perpetual license
    acquired by Cyanamid is defined solely by reference to the
    "TECHNICAL INFORMATION . . . licensed under the Agreement."
    Thus, even if, like the district court, one breaks Article 2.1's
    conveyance up into two segments, it is only the first, TECHNICAL
    INFORMATION segment that is the subject of the perpetual license.
    TECHNICAL INFORMATION is a defined term and, as we have
    demonstrated, its meaning cannot be stretched to include a
    commitment on Diamond Shamrock's part to seek FDA authority for
    Cyanamid in the future.
    IV.
    The extrinsic evidence of intent heard by the district
    court does not transform Article 2.1's straightforward grant of a
    license to make, use and sell CSP 250 utilizing proprietary
    information into something else.      Indeed, that evidence tends to
    support the reading of the agreements that accords the words
    their ordinarily accepted meaning.
    When one who is unfamiliar with the background reads
    the agreement and the 1983 amendment, an important question
    arises: Why would Cyanamid want to pay for a perpetual license to
    use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information concerning CSP 250
    if it anticipated that its right to market CSP 250 under the
    supplemental NADA would expire in mid-1987?      The extrinsic
    evidence supplies the answer.   Cyanamid could apply for its own
    NADA and sell a product that was similar to CSP 250, and it
    intended to do so.   Both the correspondence between the parties
    during the negotiation of the agreement and the testimony of
    Cyanamid's employees indicate that during the relevant period it
    was pursuing its own plan to secure independent marketing
    authority from the FDA for a product consisting of aureomycin,
    sulfathiazole and penicillin.   Thus, Cyanamid did not contemplate
    having to use the supplemental NADA indefinitely.   It was buying
    time through these agreements insofar as regulatory authority was
    concerned, but it wanted continuing commercial authority to use
    the proprietary information regarding CSP 250 (which contained
    sulfathiazole, a component of the drug that Cyanamid was
    developing).4
    The record also establishes that prosecution of an
    application for a NADA is time consuming and costs well in excess
    of $1,000,000.   Against this background, the structure of the
    consideration to be paid by Cyanamid provides further evidence
    that the agreement was deliberately drafted to treat the
    supplemental NADA as a right separate and apart from the
    TECHNICAL INFORMATION.   The single most important part of the
    agreement was the commitment to seek regulatory authority,
    without which Cyanamid could terminate the agreement.   Under
    Article 3 of the agreement, in addition to the $150,000 advance
    royalty (which was creditable against 50 percent of earned
    royalties), Cyanamid was committed to pay earned royalties out of
    4
    . Cyanamid's former manager of animal regulatory affairs
    testified that prior to 1980, Cyanamid had been selling a product
    containing chlortetracycline, penicillin and sulfamethazine, and
    that Cyanamid had become interested in Diamond Shamrock's
    product, which contained sulfathiazole instead of sulfamethazine,
    because "[s]ulfamethazine was coming under a great deal of
    scrutiny by FDA" and "sulfamethazine was retained in the tissues
    longer than sulfathiazole." App. 16-17. Thus, even if Cyanamid
    did not intend to market CSP 250 in the future, the information
    about sulfathiazole could be relevant with respect to future
    product development.
    the proceeds of its sales.    Diamond Shamrock was entitled to a
    minimum earned royalty of $62,500, in addition to the full
    advance royalty (for a total of a minimum of $212,500), within
    three years of the approval of the supplemental NADA; if it did
    not receive this sum, it could terminate the agreement under
    Article 8.    Of course, given the potential volume of Cyanamid's
    sales, Diamond Shamrock could earn a much larger sum in
    royalties.    Under Article 9.2, however, the costs to Cyanamid for
    a permanent license to use the TECHNICAL INFORMATION was only
    $25,000.5    Based both on the parties' understanding of the time
    and expense of prosecuting a NADA application and on the amount
    of the royalties specified in the agreement for the rights
    Cyanamid was to possess over the limited period of the agreement,
    it seems highly unlikely that Diamond Shamrock would have been
    willing to convey for $25,000 a perpetual license that would
    include both the right to use its proprietary information and the
    right to use the supplemental NADA.    Stated conversely, the
    5
    . The $87,500 price paid by Cyanamid as consideration for the
    Amendment consisted of two components: (1) the $25,000 provided
    for by Article 9.2 of the Agreement in exchange for a perpetual
    license to the TECHNICAL INFORMATION, and (2) $62,500 for the
    royalties which Cyanamid would have owed under Article 8 of the
    Agreement on its minimum sales obligation of $5 million. The
    $62,500 was calculated as follows: Article 3 of the Agreement
    provided that earned royalties were to be calculated at the rate
    of 2.5 percent on the first $10,000,000 of net sales, and at the
    rate of one percent thereafter. Therefore, on $5,000,000, the
    royalty would be $125,000 ($5,000,000 x 2.5%). However, Article
    3 also provided for an advance royalty of $150,000 creditable
    against 50 percent of earned royalties. Accounting for that
    credit, the royalty remaining to be paid on $5,000,000 minimum
    sales would be $62,500.
    economics of the matter at least suggest that the option to buy a
    perpetual license to use TECHNICAL INFORMATION for $25,000 did
    not include the use of the supplemental NADA in perpetuity.
    In these respects, the extrinsic evidence confirms that
    according the terms of the agreements their plain meaning makes
    commercial sense.
    The extrinsic evidence stressed most heavily by
    Cyanamid as throwing light on the intention of the parties is the
    conduct of Fermenta's employees in the period following July of
    1987.   Shortly after the execution of the 1983 amendment, SDS
    Biotech acquired Diamond Shamrock's animal health business.    SDS
    Biotech, in turn, was acquired by Fermenta in October of 1985,
    after the perpetual, paid-up license had been purchased with a
    lump sum payment, but still during the five year term of the
    original agreement.     Thus, after Fermenta succeeded to Diamond
    Shamrock's rights, it was never entitled to receive royalties
    under the agreement and it received none.     When June of 1987 came
    and the original five year term of the agreement expired,
    Cyanamid continued to sell CSP 250 under its own name and
    trademark.     Over the six years from June of 1987 to October of
    1993, Fermenta did not protest Cyanamid's continuing sales.        The
    explanation for this failure to protest, which was uncontradicted
    in the record and accepted by the district court, was given by
    Fermenta's general counsel.     He testified that over the years, he
    and others were aware of the existence of the contract and of
    Cyanamid's use of the supplemental NADA because of inquiries from
    the FDA about that use.     However, no one at Fermenta read the
    contract and focused on its terms until a more serious regulatory
    problem arose in the Fall of 1993, at which point Fermenta's
    general counsel reviewed the contract in its entirety.
    The significance of Fermenta's failure to protest is
    diminished by the fact that Diamond Shamrock, rather than
    Fermenta, negotiated the original agreement and the 1983
    amendment and oversaw its execution during the period when
    Cyanamid was paying royalties.    Nevertheless, we acknowledge that
    the evidence does not rule out the possibility that the failure
    to protest may have been attributable in part to someone at
    Fermenta having read the agreements at some point after June of
    1987 and having concluded that they conveyed to Cyanamid the
    right to continue to use the supplemental NADA.   Even if this
    occurred, however, we would not regard it as a justification for
    us to read the agreements of the parties in a different way.
    Like the parties in Mellon Bank, the parties here used words
    quite common in agreements of this kind with generally accepted
    meanings.    Like Aetna's pre-contract conduct in Mellon Bank,
    Fermenta's post-contract conduct does not suggest that the
    parties had an unusual "linguistic reference."    As a result, we
    agree with the district court that a reasonable person reading
    the agreements against the background of the extrinsic evidence
    could not find them susceptible of a reading that would bestow
    upon Cyanamid a perpetual right to use the supplemental NADA.
    V.
    On appeal, Cyanamid advances an additional argument
    that it insists provides an "independent reason" for us to
    reverse the declaratory judgment of the district court.
    According to Cyanamid, although the holder of a NADA has the sole
    right to apply for authority to permit others to manufacture its
    product at "alternate manufacturing sites," the issuance of the
    supplemental NADA, by operation of law, permanently deprives the
    holder of control over the continued manufacture of its product
    at those facilities.   It is apparent from an examination of the
    transcript of the proceedings before the district court and the
    brief Cyanamid submitted to it that Cyanamid did not advance this
    legal argument before the district court.   "It is well
    established that failure to raise an issue in the district court
    constitutes a waiver of the argument."   Brenner v. Local 514,
    United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 
    927 F.2d 1283
    , 1298 (3d Cir. 1991).   We will not depart from this well
    established principle of appellate review to consider the merits
    of Cyanamid's regulatory argument, and we accordingly express no
    view with respect to it.
    VI.
    For these reasons, the judgment of the district court
    will be affirmed.