Christy v. PA Turnpike Comm ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-27-1995
    Christy v PA Turnpike Comm
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 94-1386
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995
    Recommended Citation
    "Christy v PA Turnpike Comm" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 83.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/83
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 94-1386 and 94-1398
    ___________
    CHARLES A. CHRISTY,
    vs.
    PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, A DULY
    ORGANIZED AND EXISTING AGENCY OF THE
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; ROBERT BRADY,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    JAMES J. DODARO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; HOWARD YERUSALIM,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    FRANK S. URSOMARSO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JAMES F. MALONE, III,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    JOHN L. SOKOL, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; S. MICHAEL PALERMO,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    JOSEPH L. DIRIENZO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; SAMUEL S. CARNABUCI,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    MELVIN M. SHELTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DEBORAH KOVAL,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    JOHN A. BOSCHI, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; VINCENT J. GRECO,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    JOHN A. STEWART, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY; GEORGE PILECKI,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    SEAN PILECKI, INDIVIDUALLY
    Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, Robert
    Brady, Vincent Greco and John Stewart
    Appellants No. 94-1386
    John A. Boschi,
    Appellant No. 94-1398
    ___________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civil No. 93-cv-03346)
    ___________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 1994
    BEFORE:   STAPLETON, ALITO and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed     March 27, l995)
    ___________
    Michael M. Baylson (ARGUED)
    Duane, Morris & Heckscher
    4200 One Liberty Place
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-7396
    Attorney for Appellants, Pennsylvania
    Turnpike Commission, Robert Brady, Vincent
    Greco and John Stewart
    David S. Fortney (ARGUED)
    Lisa G. DiPietro
    Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay
    1650 Market Street
    2500 One Liberty Place
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-7301
    Attorney for Appellant, John A. Boschi
    Joseph F. Lawless, Jr. (ARGUED)
    6 Harvey Lane
    Newtown Square, PA 19073
    John P. Hickey
    Imogene E. Hughes
    Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker
    1900 Market Street
    Suite 700
    Philadelphia, PA   19103
    Attorneys for Appellee
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ___________
    LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
    In this case, we must determine whether the
    Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission ("Commission") is an "arm" or
    "alter ego" of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus entitled
    to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
    Because we conclude that the Commission is not an arm or alter
    ego of Pennsylvania we will affirm the district court's finding
    that the Commission does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign
    immunity.
    I.
    The appellee, Charles Christy ("Christy"), has been an
    employee of the Commission since 1976.1    In November of 1992,
    Christy made application for the position of Paint Crew Foreman.
    He was interviewed for this position in early 1993 by the
    appellants John Boschi, Vincent Greco and John Stewart.2    Christy
    was then chosen as one of three final candidates for the Paint
    Crew Foreman position.    The names of the three final candidates
    were passed to the Commission's personnel committee for final
    1
    .    Since 1983, Christy has been employed as an Auto
    Mechanic 1.
    2
    .    John Boschi is currently the Commission's Deputy Executive
    Director of Maintenance; Vincent Greco is Eastern Division
    Superintendent of the Commission; and John Stewart is Assistant
    Deputy Executive Director of Maintenance for the Commission. The
    other individual defendant in this appeal, Robert Brady, is a
    Turnpike Commissioner.
    review.    The personnel committee then recommended that the
    position be awarded to one Sean Pilecki, a Commission employee
    during the preceding four and a half years.    The Commission
    adopted the personnel committee's recommendation and hired Mr.
    Pilecki.    Christy subsequently applied and was turned down for
    the position of Eastern Division Equipment Supervisor.
    Christy then sued the Commission and its individual
    commissioners and personnel committee members pursuant to
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, claiming that he was not promoted due
    to political bias against him.    In response to Christy's claims
    of political bias, the Commission and individual defendants
    Brady, Greco and Stewart filed a joint motion for summary
    judgment, while the defendant Boschi filed a separate summary
    judgment motion.    The district court denied the defendants'
    motions, ruling as a matter of law that the Commission was not
    entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and rejecting the
    individual defendants' claims of qualified immunity.    These
    appeals followed.
    II.
    The district court had jurisdiction in this case
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1367(a).3   We have
    3
    .    The Commission argues that the district court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction over it because Christy had elected
    to drop the Commission as a party by the time the district court
    ruled on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Putting aside the
    question whether or not Christy in fact effectively dropped the
    Commission as a party, the Commission is incorrect in asserting
    that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
    it at the time the court ruled on the Eleventh Amendment issue.
    Christy sued the individual defendants in both their individual
    and official capacities. A suit against an individual in his or
    appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the
    district court's denial of the defendants' motions seeking
    summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds.   See Puerto Rico
    Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 
    113 S. Ct. 684
    , 687-89, 
    121 L. Ed. 2d 605
    (1993) (holding that district
    court orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity claims by states
    or putative "arms of the state" are immediately appealable under
    the collateral order doctrine).4   We exercise plenary review of
    (..continued)
    her official capacity is no different from a suit against that
    individual's office. "As such, it is no different from a suit
    against" the office itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
    Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989) (citations omitted); see also
    Kentucky v. Graham, 
    473 U.S. 159
    (1985) (emphasizing that
    official capacity suits "``generally represent only another way of
    pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
    agent.'" (citation omitted)). In this case, a suit against the
    individual defendants in their official capacities is the same as
    a suit against the Commission. The individual defendants have
    asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity in relation to Christy's
    official capacity claims, and pressed that immunity in their
    summary judgment motions before the district court. Thus, the
    issue of the Commission's entitlement to sovereign immunity was
    properly before the district court at the time the court ruled on
    the issue.
    4
    .    We will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction the
    individual defendants' appeals from the district court's denial
    of their motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity
    grounds. While we have appellate jurisdiction to consider the
    denial of summary judgment when such denial is based on the
    district's conclusion that the movant is not entitled to
    qualified immunity, see, e.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 
    922 F.2d 1097
    ,
    1105 (3d Cir. 1990), the district court in this case did not rule
    that the individual defendants were not entitled to qualified
    immunity. Rather, it ruled that it could not find qualified
    immunity based on the facts at summary judgment. The district
    court could still find at the close of evidence at trial that the
    individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in
    relation to Christy's claims brought against them in their
    individual capacities.
    the district court's denial of the defendants' motions for
    summary judgment.     Rappa v. New Castle County, 
    18 F.3d 1043
    , 1050
    (3d Cir. 1994).
    III.
    We must determine whether the district court correctly
    concluded that the Commission is not an "arm" of Pennsylvania and
    therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
    Amendment.5   The question whether the Commission is an "arm" of
    the State is one of federal law.     Blake v. Kline, 
    612 F.2d 718
    ,
    722 (3d Cir. 1979).    However, before undertaking our Eleventh
    Amendment analysis, we must decide a question of apparent first
    impression in this Circuit:    who bears the burden of production
    and persuasion with respect to factual questions when a putative
    state entity claims immunity under the Eleventh Amendment?      We
    conclude that the party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity
    (and standing to benefit from its acceptance) bears the burden of
    proving its applicability.     In so concluding, we adopt the
    reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    in ITSI TV Productions v. Agricultural Associations, 
    3 F.3d 1289
    (9th Cir. 1993).    Because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be
    5
    .    The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
    of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
    in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
    United States by Citizens of another State . . . ." U.S. Const.
    amend. XI. Its explicit terms notwithstanding, the Eleventh
    Amendment has consistently been interpreted to immunize an
    unconsenting state "``from suits brought in federal courts by her
    own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.'"
    Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
    465 U.S. 89
    , 100
    (1984) (citation omitted).
    expressly waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion,
    it does not implicate federal subject matter jurisdiction in the
    ordinary sense.   
    Id. at 1291.
      We agree with the Ninth Circuit
    that "whatever its jurisdictional attributes, [Eleventh Amendment
    immunity] should be treated as an affirmative defense[,]" and
    "[l]ike any other such defense, that which is promised by the
    Eleventh Amendment must be proved by the party that asserts it
    and would benefit from its acceptance."   
    Id. We also
    agree with
    the Ninth Circuit that considerations of fairness support this
    conclusion. As the court noted in ITSI TV Productions:
    In general, a claim of Eleventh Amendment
    immunity will occasion serious dispute only
    where a relatively complex institutional
    arrangement makes it unclear whether a given
    entity ought to be treated as an arm of the
    state. In such cases, the "true facts" as to
    the particulars of this arrangement will
    presumably "lie particularly within the
    knowledge of" the party claiming immunity.
    
    Id. at 1292
    (citations omitted).
    Having concluded that the party asserting Eleventh
    Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving entitlement to it,
    we turn now to the merits of the immunity question.   We have on
    numerous occasions set forth the criteria to be considered in
    determining whether an entity is an "alter ego" or "arm" of a
    state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.   See e.g., Peters
    v. Delaware River Port Authority, 
    16 F.3d 1346
    , 1350 (3d Cir.
    1994); Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 
    953 F.2d 807
    , 816-818 (3d Cir. 1991) (in banc); Fitchik v. New Jersey
    Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 
    873 F.2d 655
    , 659 (3d Cir. 1989)
    (in banc).   Our oft-reiterated test entails three distinct
    inquiries:   (1) whether, in the event the plaintiff prevails, the
    payment of the judgment would come from the state (this includes
    three considerations:    whether the payment will come from the
    state's treasury, whether the agency has sufficient funds to
    satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized
    itself from responsibility for the agency's debts); (2) the
    status of the agency under state law (this includes four
    considerations:   how state law treats the agency generally,
    whether the agency is separately incorporated, whether the agency
    can sue and be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune
    from state taxation); and (3) what degree of autonomy the agency
    enjoys.   Peters v. Del. River Port Authority, 
    16 F.3d 1346
    , 1350
    (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
    
    953 F.2d 807
    , 816 (3d Cir. 1991) (in banc)).   We turn now to this
    three-pronged inquiry.
    A.   Funding
    We have explained that although no single factor is
    dispositive of the Eleventh Amendment inquiry, the "most
    important" factor is whether a judgment against the entity in
    question, in this case the Commission, would be paid out of the
    state treasury.   See, e.g., Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail
    Operations, Inc., 
    873 F.2d 655
    , 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc).
    The special emphasis we place upon the funding factor is
    supported by the Eleventh Amendment's central goal:    the
    prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of
    the State's treasury.    See 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659-60
    (citing
    Edelman v. Jordan, 
    415 U.S. 651
    (1974)).    The Supreme Court has
    recently reiterated the significance accorded this factor in
    relation to other Eleventh Amendment considerations.     In Hess v.
    Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 
    115 S. Ct. 394
    (1994),
    the Court explained that "prevention of federal court judgments
    that must be paid out of a State's treasury" formed the "impetus"
    for the Eleventh Amendment. 
    Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404
    .
    Accordingly, Courts of Appeals have
    recognized the vulnerability of the State's
    purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh
    Amendment determinations . . . . "[T]he vast
    majority of Circuits have concluded that the
    state treasury factor is the most important
    factor to be considered and, in practice,
    have generally accorded this factor
    dispositive weight."
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
         1.   Whether Payment Will Come from the State's Treasury
    Pursuant to the Turnpike Organization, Extension and
    Toll Road Conversion Act ("The Act"), 36 P.S. §§ 651.1 et. seq.,
    the Commission is authorized to obtain funds through the
    collection of tolls for the use of the Pennsylvania Turnpike
    System.   36 P.S. § 651.16.    The Commission is also authorized to
    collect rents and charges for telephone and electric lines, gas
    stations, garages, stores, hotels, restaurants and advertising
    signs.    
    Id. The Act
    also authorizes the Commission to obtain
    funds through the issuance of bonds, notes and other obligations.
    
    Id. at §
    651.12.    In addition, the Act authorizes the Commission
    to obtain funds from the federal government.    
    Id. at §
    651.19.
    Finally, the Commission receives some funding out of
    Pennsylvania's oil company franchise tax collections.     75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9511(h).
    The Commission notes that only one of these funding
    sources -- tolls -- is not subject to state control.    According
    to the Commission, the state's regulation and control of the
    Commission's funding is crucial to our analysis of the funding
    factor.   Also significant, according to the Commission, is the
    fact that upon retiring its debts, or setting aside funds
    sufficient to do so, the Commission is to be dissolved and all of
    the Commission's property is to be vested in the Department of
    Highways.   See 36 P.S. § 652o.
    We do not know what percentage of the Commission's
    funding might be attributed to each of the funding sources
    identified above.    We are, of course, able to observe that only
    one of the five available sources of funding -- the oil company
    franchise tax -- is obtained from the state.   The other four
    sources -- tolls, rents, bond and note revenues, and federal
    funding -- are not state-derived.    That four of the five
    established sources of the Commission's funding are not state-
    derived is, we think, even in the absence of additional
    information, some support for the conclusion that the Commission
    is not the alter ego of Pennsylvania.6
    6
    .    Although the figure does not appear in the record, the
    Commission has represented to us that it has received "more than
    $112,000,000" in oil company franchise tax revenues. (Commission
    brief at 36 n.18). We fail to see, however, how we can draw any
    conclusion from this representation, given that the Commission
    has failed to provide information regarding the percentage of its
    annual revenues received in this form. See 
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819-20
    (without knowing what percentage of SEPTA's total revenue
    The degree of state regulation of the Commission's
    funding does not alter our conclusion that the funding factor
    weighs against according immunity to the Commission.     We have
    explained that state control is only significant to the funding
    analysis where such control indicates state ownership of the
    funds.    
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661
    .   In other words, state control
    over an entity's ability to obtain funds is inadequate to
    demonstrate state ownership of the funds where the state is not
    shown to have a financial interest that would be directly and
    adversely affected by the diminution of the funds in question.
    See 
    id. Otherwise, the
    degree of state control over the entity's
    funding is relevant to the autonomy inquiry, which we discuss
    below.    
    Id. Here, the
    state's control over the Commission's
    authority to issue bonds, notes and other obligations falls short
    of indicating state ownership of the funds obtained through the
    issuance of such bonds, notes and other obligations.     Likewise,
    state control over the Commission's ability to obtain federal
    funding falls short of indicating state ownership of the federal
    funds obtained.     The Commission's evidence of state control over
    its ability to obtain funds simply fails to show a financial
    interest on the part of Pennsylvania that would be directly and
    adversely affected by the diminution of the Commission's funds
    obtained through the issuance of bonds or from the federal
    government.
    (..continued)
    comes from state funds under a particular new law, we held that
    the impact of the law on SEPTA's funding was too uncertain to be
    given significant weight in the funding analysis).
    Nor is our conclusion with respect to the funding
    factor altered by the fact that the Commission will one day be
    dissolved and all its remaining funds and property vest in the
    Department of Highways. Pursuant to 36 P.S. § 652o:
    When all bonds and the interest thereon
    shall have been paid or a sufficient amount
    for the payment of all bonds and the interest
    to maturity thereon, shall have been set
    aside in trust for the benefit of the
    bondholders, and shall continue to be held
    for that purpose, the turnpike and the
    connecting tunnels and bridges shall become a
    part of the system of State highways, and
    shall be maintained by the Department of
    Highways free of tolls, and thereupon the
    commission shall be dissolved, and all funds
    of the commission not required for the
    payment of the bonds and all machinery,
    equipment and other property belonging to the
    commission, shall be vested in the Department
    of Highways.
    36. P.S. § 652o.   Thus, the dissolution of the Commission is
    statutorily contingent upon the Commission satisfying, or being
    able to satisfy, all of its debts and obligations.    If anything,
    this provision provides further support for our conclusion by
    illustrating the state's reluctance to take on the Commission's
    financial obligations as its own.
    2.   Whether the Commission Could Satisfy a Judgment Against It
    We do not know how much money the Commission has or
    would have available to it to satisfy a potential judgment
    against it.   According to the Commission, the lack of record
    evidence on this point renders this second funding inquiry
    "irrelevant."   We do not agree.    Since the Commission bears the
    burden of proving its entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity,
    the Commission's failure to provide pertinent information
    regarding its ability, or lack thereof, to satisfy a potential
    judgment against it simply means that the Commission has failed
    to sustain its burden of proof on this important question.
    Moreover, even in the absence of such evidence, our cases enable
    us to draw certain conclusions, with respect to the Commission's
    ability to pay a judgment against it.     In both Bolden and
    Fitchik, we suggested that an entity with power to raise revenues
    by raising fares need not request funds from the state to meet
    shortfalls caused by adverse judgments.    See 
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819
    ; 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661
    .7    The Commission is authorized "to
    fix, and to revise, from time to time," tolls for the use of the
    Pennsylvania Turnpike System.     36 P.S. § 651.16(a).   In fact, the
    Commission's authority to set the toll rate "shall not be subject
    to supervision or regulation by any other State commission,
    board, bureau or agency."   
    Id. at §
    651.16(b).    In light of
    Bolden and Fitchik, we think the Commission's power to raise
    revenue levels by increasing the toll rates, even in the absence
    of information regarding the Commission's financial condition and
    consequent ability to pay a judgment against it, supports the
    view that the Commission need not seek assistance from the state
    to satisfy a judgment against it.
    3.   Whether the Sovereign has Immunized Itself
    7
    .    We also noted in Fitchik, alternatively, that the entity
    could cover a shortfall by reducing its expenses or capital
    budget. 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661
    . Similarly, the Commission
    would, we imagine, be able to cover a shortfall by reducing its
    expenses or capital budget.
    The Act provides that "[a]ll compensation and salaries
    and all expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this
    act shall be paid solely from funds provided under the authority
    of this act . . . ."   36 P.S. § 651.8(a).   Furthermore, the Act
    provides that all bonds, notes and other obligations issued by
    the Commission under the Act
    shall not be deemed to be a debt of the
    Commonwealth or a pledge of the faith and
    credit of the Commonwealth, but such bonds,
    notes or other obligations shall be payable
    solely from the revenues of the commission
    . . . . All such bonds, notes or other
    obligations shall contain a statement on
    their face that the Commonwealth is not
    obligated to pay the same or the interest
    thereon except from revenues of the
    commission . . . and that the faith and
    credit of the Commonwealth is not pledged to
    the payment of the principal or interest of
    such bonds, notes or other obligations. The
    issuance of turnpike revenue bonds, notes or
    other obligations under the provisions of
    this act shall not directly or indirectly or
    contingently obligate the Commonwealth to
    levy or to pledge any form of taxation
    whatever therefor or to make any
    appropriation for their payment.
    36 P.S. § 651.4.
    The Commission observes that the General Assembly of
    Pennsylvania has not expressly immunized the state from
    responsibility for all of the Commission's possible debts and
    liabilities.   Nowhere in the Commission's original or subsequent
    enabling acts, the Commission notes, is there a provision
    disclaiming Pennsylvania's responsibility for the Commission's
    unassumed liabilities and obligations.   One can imagine, the
    Commission suggests, numerous situations in which the Commission
    would face unassumed liabilities or debts large enough to exhaust
    the Commission's funds and necessitate the Commission's rescue by
    the Commonwealth.
    In light of our case law, we do not agree that the
    absence of a blanket disclaimer is significant.    What is
    significant under our case law is the fact that the Commission
    has failed to establish that Pennsylvania is under any
    affirmative obligation to pay the Commission's unassumed
    liabilities in the first place.    See 
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819
    ("A
    state legislature might feel compelled as a practical matter to
    subsidize a variety of entities that provide necessary services,
    including financially pressed municipalities.    Such discretionary
    subsidies committed in reaction to a judgment, however, would not
    necessarily transform the recipients into alter egos of the
    state.").    Although the Commonwealth might well choose to
    appropriate money to the Commission to enable it to meet a
    shortfall caused by an adverse judgment, such voluntary payments
    by a state simply "``do not trigger [Eleventh Amendment]
    immunity.'"    Id. (quoting 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661
    ).8
    8
    .    Christy contends that the Commission is able to self-insure
    and to purchase liability insurance, and that the Commission in
    fact self-insures at least part of its contingent liabilities
    under the Commonwealth's Employee Liability Self-Insurance
    Program. We have in cases past considered an entity's ability to
    obtain insurance as evidence of that entity's financial self-
    sufficiency and independence from the state. See 
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819
    ; 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661
    . The Commission counters
    that the alleged fact of the Commission's self-insurance is not
    in evidence noting that "[n]o record reference is offered [by
    Christy], nor does any affidavit, deposition excerpt, or document
    included in the record support this statement." (Commission
    reply at 19 n.14). But the Commission overlooks the fact that it
    The Commission has failed to establish that (1) a
    judgment against it would be tantamount to a judgment against the
    Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; (2) the Commission
    lacks financial resources sufficient to pay a potential judgment
    against it; or (3) Pennsylvania would be under any obligation to
    cover any such potential judgment against the Commission.
    Accordingly, on the record as it stands before us, the funding
    factor, the most important of the three, weighs heavily in
    support of the conclusion that the Commission is not an arm of
    the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and does not enjoy Eleventh
    Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
    B.   Status at State Law
    The second general factor we must consider in
    determining whether the Commission is an arm or alter ego of the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the status of the Commission
    under Pennsylvania law.    Our purpose here is to determine whether
    Pennsylvania law treats the Commission as an independent entity,
    or as a surrogate for the state.    See 
    Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662
    .
    In Specter v. Commonwealth, 
    341 A.2d 481
    (1975), a
    plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
    Commission is not an arm of the Commonwealth and not entitled to
    sovereign immunity.   After examining the legislative acts
    creating the Commission and defining its purposes and powers, as
    (..continued)
    bears the burden of proving entitlement to Eleventh Amendment
    immunity; its failure to provide evidence of an inability to
    obtain insurance is our primary concern, not Christy's failure to
    cite record evidence to the contrary.
    well as judicial decisions in which the Commission's status was
    at issue, the court explained that:
    There is, of course, no doubt that the
    Commonwealth itself could have constructed
    the Turnpike in the same manner that it
    constructs and operates its State highways.
    Had it done so, the State's immunity from
    suit would encompass actions arising in
    connection with the Turnpike. But the
    Commonwealth itself did not build this
    highway and does not maintain it. The
    legislature created this separate body and at
    the same time disclaimed any responsibility
    on the part of the Commonwealth for
    liabilities which it, the Commission, might
    incur. It is clear that the Commission is
    not an integral part of the Commonwealth, and
    cannot share the attributes of sovereignty
    which inhere in the state. It follows that
    the Commission is not immune from suit in
    tort for the acts of its servants and agents
    acting in the course of their employment or
    agency.
    
    Id. at 491
    (emphasis in original).
    The Commission does, we recognize, possess certain
    attributes associated with sovereignty.   For example, the
    Commission (1) may exercise the power of eminent domain; see 36
    P.S. §§ 651.9 - .11; (2) enjoys statutory immunity from suit in
    state court; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(a); and (3) is exempt from
    all state property taxation; see 36 P.S. § 651.15.   On the other
    hand, the Commission possesses certain traits not at all
    characteristic of an arm of the state; for example, the
    Commission may sue and be sued in its own name; see 36 P.S.
    § 651.7(a)(3); and has the power to enter into contracts in its
    own name; see 36 P.S. § 651.7(a)(2).
    On balance, the "status under state law" factors weigh
    slightly in favor of the conclusion that the Commission is not an
    arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.   This is true,
    especially in light of the plurality holding of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court in Specter that the Commission is not an integral
    part of the Commonwealth, and thus cannot share the attributes of
    sovereignty which inhere in the state.   Cf. 
    Peters, 16 F.3d at 1351
    (holding that the Delaware River Port Authority's status
    under state law weighs in favor of the conclusion that the agency
    does not enjoy sovereign immunity, especially in light of a
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court case holding that the DRPA is not "``an
    integral part of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania'" (citation
    omitted)).
    The Commission contends that in enacting Pennsylvania's
    sovereign immunity statute, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8501 et seq., the
    Pennsylvania legislature "conclusively repudiated" Specter's
    conclusion that the Commission is separate and apart from the
    Commonwealth.   The Commission further notes that in two
    unanimous, post-Specter, decisions, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
    Court confirmed that the Commission enjoys sovereign immunity.
    See Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Jellig, 
    563 A.2d 202
    (Pa.Cmwlth. 1989); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,
    
    550 A.2d 261
    (Pa.Cmwlth. 1988).   To accord Specter any deference,
    the Commission argues, is to give Specter value already taken
    away by the Pennsylvania legislature and judiciary.
    We do not share the Commission's appraisal of Specter's
    continued vitality.   Passage of the Pennsylvania sovereign
    immunity statute has not diminished the significance of Specter's
    analysis to our assessment of the Commission's claim of
    entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity.    By enacting an
    immunity statute pursuant to which the Commission is accorded
    sovereign immunity, the Pennsylvania legislature did not
    "conclusively repudiate" Specter's conclusion that the Commission
    is not an integral part of the Commonwealth and does not share
    the attributes of sovereignty inhering in the state.      In enacting
    the sovereign immunity statute, the Pennsylvania legislature
    merely conferred upon entities such as the Commission by way of
    statute that which they otherwise lacked, namely, immunity from
    suit in state court.    We implied as much in Toombs v. Manning,
    
    835 F.2d 453
    (3d Cir. 1987), in which we explained that
    [t]he significance to our analysis of the
    legislature's inclusion of the . . .
    Commission as an immune agency is that it is
    clear that the General Assembly intended to
    provide sovereign immunity protection not
    only for those entities which before Mayle[
    v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 
    388 A.2d 709
    (1978) (in which the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court abrogated sovereign immunity)]
    had been immune as sovereigns, but also for
    those entities not previously immune, but
    which now came within the statute's scope.
    
    Toombs, 835 F.2d at 459
    (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
    Nor do Jellig and Bradley undermine the continuing validity of
    Specter's analysis.    In those cases, the Pennsylvania
    Commonwealth Court merely applied the Pennsylvania sovereign
    immunity statute to find, unremarkably, that the Commission
    enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in state court.     See 
    Jellig, 563 A.2d at 205
    ; 
    Bradley, 550 A.2d at 263
    .9
    C.   Autonomy
    The Commission's membership is controlled by the
    executive and legislative branches of the Commonwealth.    One
    member of the five-person Commission must always be the Secretary
    of Transportation, a cabinet-level position appointed by the
    Governor and confirmed by the Pennsylvania Senate.    See 36 P.S.
    §§ 651.5(d), 652d; see also 71 P.S. § 67.1(d)(1) (Gubernatorial
    appointment and senatorial confirmation of Secretary of
    Transportation).   The four remaining Commission members are also
    appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.    See 36
    P.S. §§ 651.5(b), 652d; see also 71 P.S. § 67.1(c)(2)
    9
    .    We recognize that the Pennsylvania sovereign immunity
    statute itself is some evidence of the Commission's status before
    the law of Pennsylvania. And as some evidence of the
    Commission's status at state law, it is relevant to our Eleventh
    Amendment inquiry. However, it is far from determinative of that
    inquiry. We have explained that state law extending sovereign
    immunity to an agency is "relevant to the Eleventh Amendment
    determination, but it is not dispositive." 
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 815
    n.8 (citations omitted).
    Thus, a state law determination of sovereign
    immunity may coincide with and influence the
    federal law determination of Eleventh
    Amendment status, but the former does not
    conclusively determine the latter . . . .
    [Otherwise], each state legislature
    apparently could confer Eleventh Amendment
    protection on any entity it wished, including
    counties and cities, by enacting a statute
    clothing these entities with "sovereign
    immunity" from suit on state claims.
    
    Id. at 815
    n.8, 817.
    (Gubernatorial appointment and senatorial confirmation of
    Commission members).    State authority over the appointment of
    Commission members lends obvious support to a finding of
    sovereignty.    See 
    Peters, 16 F.3d at 1351
    -52.
    On the other hand, weighing in favor of a finding of
    autonomy are the facts that the Commission may fix and revise
    tolls; enter contracts in its own name; issue bonds and notes;
    sue in its own name; purchase and own property; and promulgate
    rules and regulations for its own governance.     See 36 P.S.
    § 651.16 (fix and revise tolls); 36 P.S. § 651.7 (enter
    contracts, sue in its own name, purchase and own property, and
    promulgate rules and regulations for its own governance); 36 P.S.
    § 651.12 (issue bonds and notes).    Of course, several of these
    powers are subject to a degree of state control.     For example,
    the Pennsylvania Attorney General must review the form and
    legality of each contract and rule or regulation the Commission
    proposes.   See 71 P.S. § 732-204(b) (review of rules and
    regulations); 71 P.S. § 732-204(f) (review of contracts).
    Moreover, Commission issuance of bonds and notes is subject to
    state approval.   See 36 P.S. § 652u.1
    On balance, the significant control the Commonwealth
    exercises through the power to appoint all the members of the
    Commission weighs slightly in favor of Commission immunity from
    suit.   Cf. 
    Peters, 16 F.3d at 1351
    -52 (where separately
    incorporated agency was found to have power to enter contracts,
    hold property, and set and collect tolls, we held that the
    autonomy factor weighed "slightly" in favor of affording immunity
    in light of the states' power to appoint the members of the board
    of the agency in question).
    D.   The Totality of Factors
    Having considered each of the three factors above, we
    now must consider the three factors in their totality.   See
    
    Bolden, 953 F.2d at 821
    .   Since the most important factor,
    funding, weighs heavily against the Commission and only one
    factor weighs, even slightly, in favor of the Commission, the
    balance is clearly struck against a finding that the Commission
    enjoys sovereign immunity as an arm of the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania.   Consequently, we find that the Commission is
    subject to suit in federal court.    We will affirm the district
    court's conclusion to this effect.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the
    district court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary
    judgment on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and will dismiss
    for lack of appellate jurisdiction the defendants' appeals from
    the district court's denial of their motions for summary judgment
    on qualified immunity grounds.
    ________________________