Sylvester v. Inland Bay ( 1996 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1996 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-4-1996
    Sylvester v. Inland Bay
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 96-3699
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996
    Recommended Citation
    "Sylvester v. Inland Bay" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 5.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/5
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 95-3699
    ____________
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED
    STATES OF AMERICA
    ___________________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    ____________________
    (D.C. Civil No. 94-01689)
    Argued September 30, 1996
    Before: ALITO and McKEE, Circuit Judges,
    and GREEN Senior District Judge*
    (Opinion Filed: December 4, 1996)
    ____________________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________________
    John A. Kane
    Chief Counsel
    Jason W. Manne (Argued)
    Assistant Counsel
    Office of Attorney General
    of Pennsylvania
    Department of Public Welfare
    300 Liberty Avenue
    1403 State Office Building
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellant
    * The Honorable Clifford Scott Green, Senior District Judge for
    the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    Frank W. Hunger
    Assistant Attorney General
    Frederick W. Thieman
    United States Attorney
    Barbara C. Biddle
    Irene M. Solet (Argued)
    Attorneys, Appellate Staff
    United States Department
    Of Justice
    Civil Division, Room 3617
    10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
    Counsel for Appellees
    ALITO, Circuit Judge:
    This case arises out of a debt of $800,885 that the
    Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("Pennsylvania") owed
    the United States Department of Health and Human Services
    ("HHS"). HHS notified Pennsylvania of the debt in June 1991.
    (App. 235a-239a) Pennsylvania initially balked at having to pay,
    but eventually, in June 1993, paid the entire principal amount.
    (App. 16a) The dispute that remains is over the interest on the
    debt. HHS charged Pennsylvania interest at the private consumer
    rate of 15.125%, which was significantly higher than the rate
    usually charged by federal agencies to states, the current value
    of funds rate of 8%. Pennsylvania refused to pay the allegedly
    exorbitant interest and brought this action, claiming primarily:
    (a) that HHS's use of the private consumer rate was not only
    arbitrary and capricious but inconsistent with the common law and
    (b) that HHS did not follow the proper procedures in enacting its
    interest rate regulation. The district court found
    Pennsylvania's substantive claims to be without merit and its
    procedural challenges to be time-barred. We affirm.
    I.
    Until January 1987, HHS had a policy of not charging
    states interest on disallowances under the Aid to Families with
    Dependent Children program ("AFDC"). (Dist. Ct. Op. at 2) On
    January 5, 1987, however, HHS repealed the existing regulation
    and put in place a new policy under which all of its debtors,
    including states and local governments, were to be charged a rate
    of interest based on the prevailing private consumer rates.
    (App. 202a & Dist. Ct. Op. at 2) HHS's action was in response to
    congressional enactment of the Debt Collection Act of 1982
    ("DCA"), which aimed at increasing the efficiency of government
    efforts to collect debts owed to the United States. See S. Rep.
    No. 378, 97th Cong. 378, 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 3377. Although the DCA expressly excluded states
    and local governments from its ambit, see 31 U.S.C. § 3701
    (1983), it did not limit HHS's ability to assess interest under
    the common law, see United States v. Texas, 
    507 U.S. 529
    , 530
    (1993). Accordingly, with certain exceptions not at issue here,
    HHS's regulations called for the imposition of interest on debts
    owed by states and local agencies in the same way as it was
    imposed on other debtors. (App. 202a) See 52 Fed. Reg. 261
    (1987) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 30.13).
    Under the HHS regulations at issue, interest on debts
    owed to HHS accrues from the date notice of the debt is mailed to
    the debtor, unless the debt is paid within 30 days of the notice.
    See 45 C.F.R. § 30.13(a). The regulations provide that the rate
    to be charged shall be the "rate of interest as fixed by the
    Secretary of the Treasury after taking into consideration private
    consumer rates of interest." 
    Id. The regulations
    do not
    provide for administrative review of the imposition of interest,
    but allow the Secretary to waive the interest if: (i) the debt or
    interest "resulted from the agency's error, action or inaction .
    . . and [is] without fault on the part of the debtors" or (ii)
    collection "would defeat the overall objectives of a Departmental
    program." 45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h).
    At issue is interest on a sum of $800,885 that was owed
    by Pennsylvania to HHS. HHS gave Pennsylvania notice of the debt
    in June 1991. (App. 235a-239a) Pennsylvania, however, chose not
    to reimburse the federal government within 30 days, which would
    have enabled it to avoid any and all interest payments. (App.
    10a) By the time Pennsylvania paid the principal amount in July
    1993, $232,173.22 in interest charges had accumulated, and
    interest was continuing to accrue at 15.125% per annum. (App.
    14a & Dist. Ct. Op. at 2).
    Pennsylvania sought administrative review of the
    interest assessment, but HHS's Departmental Appeals Board
    informed it that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interest
    assessment. (App. 18a-21a) The Board noted, however, that the
    form of administrative review available to Pennsylvania was a
    request to the Secretary for a waiver of interest, but
    Pennsylvania had not sought such a waiver. (App. 21a).
    Pennsylvania commenced this action in October 1994,
    alleging that HHS's imposition of interest on it was arbitrary
    and violative of the common law. (App. 9a-13a) Pennsylvania
    also attacked the procedures by which HHS promulgated its
    interest rate regulations as inadequate. (App. 9a-13a) In
    February 1995, HHS responded with a motion for partial dismissal
    and summary judgment, arguing that Pennsylvania's substantive
    challenges were meritless and that its procedural challenges were
    time-barred. The district court granted the motion, adopting as
    its own opinion the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate
    Judge Mitchell. Pennsylvania appeals.
    II.
    A. Challenges to the Application of the Regulation
    Pennsylvania makes three attacks on HHS's application
    of the interest rate regulation. It argues: (i) that charging it
    interest without making an individualized determination as to the
    appropriateness of the charge was violative of the common law;
    (ii) that charging it the private consumer rate as opposed to the
    current value of funds rate was arbitrary and violative of
    government-wide policies; and (iii) that the use of a rate
    certified by the Treasury for a different federal program
    contravened HHS's own regulations on how the applicable interest
    rate should be determined.
    (i) Violation of the Common Law
    Pennsylvania argues that HHS's interest rate regulation
    violates the common law because it fails to require a case-by-
    case determination of whether or not interest is appropriate and,
    if so, how much interest should be charged. We find no support
    for this argument in the law that Pennsylvania cites.
    The parties do not dispute that the federal government
    is permitted to charge states interest on their debts. SeeUnited States
    v. Texas, 
    507 U.S. 529
    , 530 (1993) (United States
    has a federal common law right to collect prejudgment interest on
    debts owed to it by the states). Instead, the dispute is over
    the process by which interest can be charged. Pennsylvania
    points to the Supreme Court's decision in Texas as support for
    its argument. Specifically, Pennsylvania points to language in
    Texas that says that "courts," in awarding prejudgment interest,
    are to "weigh competing federal and state interests." 
    Id. at 536.
             But Texas does not help Pennsylvania. In that case,
    where there was an "individual case" in front of a district
    court, the Supreme Court said that the court considering the
    question "should weigh the federal and state interests involved."
    
    Id. at 533.
    But the Court neither said, nor implied, anything
    about whether or not an agency could pre-specify the rate it was
    going to charge states that were delinquent on a particular class
    of debts.
    Pennsylvania asserts that the general holding of Texaswas that
    Congress, in enacting the DCA, intended to hold states
    to a more lenient standard than private debtors. However, the
    mere fact that Congress intended to exempt states from
    mandatorily having to pay at least the minimum rate specified by
    the DCA does not show that Congress either intended to exempt
    states from interest payments altogether, an argument rejected in
    Texas, see 
    id. at 539,
    or that Congress intended to impose on
    federal agencies the costly task of an individualized
    consideration of the appropriateness of the rate to be applied in
    every case where a state is delinquent on its payments. Cf. 
    id. at 537-38
    ("[I]t does not at all follow that because Congress did
    not tighten the screws on the States, it therefore intended that
    the screws be entirely removed").
    In sum, Pennsylvania has not given us a basis to read
    into the federal government's common law right to charge the
    states interest the costly and cumbersome obligation that a
    federal agency make an individualized determination as to the
    appropriate interest rate in every case where a state owes a
    debt. To impose such additional costs on federal agencies would
    undermine their right to charge interest by significantly
    increasing the cost of charging such interest.
    In addition, the regulation in question allows the
    state to ask for a waiver of the interest charged. It states:
    Waivers. The Secretary may waive collecting
    all or part of interest, administrative costs
    or late payment penalties, if-
    (1) The debt or the charges resulted from the
    agency's error, action or inaction (other
    than normal processing delays) and without
    fault on the part of the debtors; or
    (2) Collection in any manner authorized under
    this regulation would defeat the overall
    objectives of a Departmental program.
    45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h).
    Even assuming that there is an obligation on the part
    of a federal agency to allow room for discretionary
    determinations as to how much interest to charge, the waiver
    provision would appear to satisfy such a requirement. Under
    Section 30.13(h)(2), the Secretary has the ability to choose not
    to charge any or part of the interest due (especially if the
    state presents a compelling case). 45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h)(2).
    Pennsylvania, however, has explicitly stipulated that it does not
    meet the requirements for a waiver, (Pennsylvania Br. at 10) even
    though, to us, the class of cases that could fit into the waiver
    category appears very broad.
    (ii) Arbitrary and Inconsistent with Government-Wide Policies
    Pennsylvania argues that government-wide policies
    require the use of the current value of funds rate, and that HHS
    acted arbitrarily and capriciously in charging the private
    consumer rate. We are not empowered to substitute our judgment
    for that of the agency unless its action was irrational, not
    based on relevant factors, or outside statutory authority. SeeCitizens to
    Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 416
    (1971). We find none of those conditions present here.
    The government-wide policy specific to interest rates
    is set out in the Federal Claims Collection Standards, which
    state in relevant part:
    The rate of interest assessed shall be the
    rate of the current value of funds to the
    U.S. Treasury (i.e., the Treasury tax and
    loan account rate), as prescribed and
    published by the Secretary of the Treasury in
    the Federal Register and the Treasury Fiscal
    Requirements Manual Bulletins annually or
    quarterly, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. [§]
    3717. An agency may assess a higher rate if
    it reasonably determines that a higher rate
    is necessary to protect the interests of the
    United States.
    4 C.F.R. § 102.13 (emphasis added).
    The language of the regulation unambiguously allows HHS
    to charge a rate higher than the current value of funds rate, so
    long as it is reasonably in the government's interest. In this
    case, HHS charged the market rate of interest. That is almost
    per se reasonable, but is doubly so where the agency in question
    is seeking to provide its debtors with incentives to clear their
    debts promptly.
    (iii) Inconsistent with Internal Regulations
    Pennsylvania's next argument is that HHS's charging it
    the private consumer rate was inconsistent with HHS's own
    regulations authorizing that the private rate be charged. At
    issue is the language in the regulation that "the Secretary shall
    charge an annual rate of interest as fixed by Secretary of the
    Treasury after taking into consideration private consumer rates
    of interest prevailing on the date that the Department becomes
    entitled to recovery." 45 C.F.R. 30.13(a)(1). Here, HHS did use
    a rate fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury. But Pennsylvania
    argues that HHS was not permitted to use a rate determined in
    conjunction with a different federal program.
    Pennsylvania's argument is unavailing. We owe
    "substantial deference to an agency's construction of its own
    regulation." Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center For Women v.
    Knoll, 
    61 F.3d 170
    , 183 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 816
    (1996) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health
    Review Comm'n, 
    499 U.S. 144
    , 150-51 (1991)). We "must defer to
    the Secretary's interpretation unless an ``alternative reading is
    compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other
    indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the
    regulation's promulgation.'" Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
    
    114 S. Ct. 2381
    , 2386-87 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins,
    
    485 U.S. 415
    , 430 (1988)). The plain language of the regulation
    here does not compel Pennsylvania's suggested reading. Nor has
    Pennsylvania pointed to any indications of the Secretary's intent
    at the time of promulgation that support its reading. Relying on
    an approximation of the private interest rate on the market that
    was determined for a different federal program was reasonable
    under the regulation. We cannot say that HHS violated its own
    regulation.
    B. Procedural Challenges to the Regulation
    Statute of Limitations
    Pennsylvania asserts that HHS's interest rate
    regulation, adopted over eight years ago, is invalid because it
    was adopted pursuant to inadequate notice and comment procedures.
    The applicable statute of limitations for civil actions against
    the United States under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA")
    is six years. See, e.g., Dougherty v. United States Navy Bd.,
    
    784 F.2d 499
    , 500-01 (3d Cir. 1986). The regulation at issue was
    promulgated in final form in January 1987, and this suit was
    brought in October 1994. Hence, Pennsylvania has to demonstrate
    that the statute of limitations was tolled for its claim to
    survive. We agree with the district court that Pennsylvania
    failed this task.
    The essence of Pennsylvania's argument that the statute
    of limitations has not run is that its claim was not "ripe" until
    less than six years before suit was filed. Ripeness is largely a
    prudential doctrine designed "to prevent the courts, through
    avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
    in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also
    to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
    administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt
    in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott
    Laboratories v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 148-49 (1967). In
    conducting a ripeness analysis, the court must consider whether
    or not the question is purely legal and easy to resolve, whether
    the agency or court has an interest in postponing review, and the
    extent to which the parties will be caused hardship if review is
    withheld. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 
    759 F.2d 905
    ,
    915 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, §§
    2.4.2 & 2.4.3, 116-125 (1994); Cf. Artway v. Attorney General of
    N.J., 
    81 F.3d 1235
    , 1247 (3d Cir. 1996).
    Pennsylvania provides us with little assistance in
    evaluating its ripeness challenge. Its opening brief does not
    even mention the term "ripeness," let alone make a substantial
    argument as to why its claim was not ripe at the time of
    promulgation of the regulation. Instead, Pennsylvania's opening
    brief merely states conclusorily that suit could not have been
    realistically brought at the time of promulgation of the
    regulation because there was no "substantial threat" of "real or
    immediate" harm at that time. (Pennsylvania Br. at 23) The
    first time that Pennsylvania mentioned the term "ripeness" was in
    its reply brief, but once again that brief contains nothing
    except a conclusory assertion that there was no substantial
    threat of real and immediate enforcement of the regulation at the
    time of its promulgation. (Pennsylvania Reply Br. at 9) These
    conclusory assertions are not enough. We hold the ripeness
    argument waived. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster
    Wheeler Corp., 
    26 F.3d 375
    , 398 (3d Cir.) ("An issue is waived
    unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those
    purposes ``a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice
    to bring that issue before this court.'" (citation omitted)
    (ellipsis in original)), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 356
    (1994);
    Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199 N.E., 
    70 F.3d 647
    ,
    653 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (argument mentioned in passing, but not
    squarely argued, is waived).
    In any event, Pennylvania's ripeness challenge fails on
    its merits. As a threshold matter, we note that the ripeness
    challenge here arises in an unusual setting. Pennsylvania's
    argument isn't the typical argument that its claim is ripe today
    and should be adjudicated. Rather, the argument is that
    Pennsylvania's claim was not ripe in 1987, when HHS's interest
    rate regulation was promulgated. In effect, Pennsylvania wants
    us to conduct a hypothetical retrospective ripeness analysis. As
    a general matter, courts are not well suited to decide
    hypothetical questions about what they might have done in the
    past. See 
    Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 914
    . If courts were to
    "routinely conduct retrospective ripeness analyses where a late
    petitioner offers no compelling justification for not having
    filed his claim in a timely manner, [it]. . . would wreak havoc
    with the congressional intention that repose be brought to final
    agency action." 
    Id. In this
    case, however, we can make the ripeness
    determination easily. The Abbott Laboratories ripeness test
    involves consideration of: (I) the hardship to the parties of
    withholding consideration and (II) the fitness of the issues for
    judicial 
    decision. 387 U.S. at 149
    ; Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v.
    Reno, 
    76 F.3d 1294
    , 1298 (3d Cir. 1996). We evaluate these
    factors in light of the circumstances that were in existence at
    the time of the promulgation of HHS's interest rate regulation.
    (I) Hardship to the Parties
    The central question here is the extent to which
    denying the plaintiff judicial review would cause it hardship.
    See Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4.2, 116-23.   We
    conclude that had Pennsylvania made its procedural challenges at
    the time of the promulgation of the regulation, a federal court
    would have determined that postponing review would cause
    Pennsylvania hardship.
    At the outset, we note that Pennsylvania does not
    dispute that it had notice of HHS's regulations more than six
    years before October 1994, when the instant suit was commenced.
    HHS had proposed the repeal of its former regulation in the
    Federal Register in 1985 and had received public comment on its
    proposed rule changes that same year. (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 n.2)
    Further, in April 1988, HHS issued an Action Transmittal
    Memorandum to all state agencies administering programs under
    Title IV of the Social Security Act (which covers AFDC), alerting
    them that, in accordance with its regulations, HHS was going to
    charge interest on disallowed paid claims for which states had
    received federal financial participation. (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3
    n.2).
    Pennsylvania argues that its claim was not ripe at the
    time of promulgation of the regulation because it had no
    outstanding debts at the time and hence was not immediately
    subject to an interest charge. In essence, the claim is that
    there was no hardship at the time of the promulgation of the
    regulation. That is like saying that an increase in the interest
    rate charged for late payments on a credit card presents no
    hardship to the customer because the customer has not yet made a
    delayed payment under the new and higher interest rate. We
    disagree with that premise. Instead, we think it more likely
    that the customer will have to change his behavior at the time he
    is informed of the rate hike in order to avoid the risk of having
    to pay the higher interest rate and hence will suffer a direct
    hardship at the time of the rate hike. The fact that the new,
    higher interest rate is a contingent future charge does not
    preclude it from causing harm to the party at the time it is put
    into place. Cf. Riva v. Massachusetts, 
    61 F.3d 1003
    , 1012 (1st
    Cir. 1995) (fact that harm from adoption of a plan negatively
    affected payments that plaintiff was to receive many years into
    the future did not preclude adjudication of claim at the current
    time; the plan concretely harmed plaintiff in creating
    uncertainty regarding his future income stream); cf. also Lorance
    v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 
    490 U.S. 900
    , 906-08 (1989) (in
    suit challenging a seniority system that allegedly discriminated
    against women, Court ruled that plaintiffs could sue at the time
    the system was put into place without waiting for the system's
    adverse effects because the very adoption of the plan imposed a
    concrete harm on the plaintiffs).
    Had Pennsylvania challenged the regulation at the time
    of its promulgation, that would have eliminated the uncertainty
    as to its obligations thereunder. The elimination of this
    uncertainty as to whether or not it could be charged a rate of
    interest as high as the rate applicable on the private consumer
    market would have made it easier for Pennsylvania to decide how
    long it wanted to delay on payments it owed HHS. Concurrently,
    HHS would also have benefitted from the resolution of uncertainty
    regarding the validity of its regulation.
    (II) Fitness of the Issues for Resolution
    Once again we look retrospectively to the time of
    promulgation of the regulation. The question is whether the
    issues were fit to be resolved at the time and whether the agency
    or court would have had an interest in postponing review. SeeEagle-
    
    Picher, 759 F.2d at 915
    ; see also 
    Artway, 81 F.3d at 1249
    ("The more that the question presented is purely one of law, and
    the less that additional facts will aid the court in its inquiry,
    the more likely the issue is to be ripe, and vice-versa.")
    Pennsylvania's challenge would have been to whether HHS followed
    the proper notice and comment procedures in the enactment of its
    regulation. All the facts pertaining to such a challenge would
    have been fully developed and available at the time of the
    promulgation of the regulation. Delay would not have allowed the
    development of additional facts, and would only have served to
    make the relevant facts harder to retrieve.
    In sum, the "injury" to Pennsylvania occurred at the
    time of the alleged procedural improprieties, and Pennsylvania
    was "aggrieved" at the time of promulgation of the regulation.
    See JEM Broadcasting v. FCC, 
    22 F.3d 320
    , 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
    Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 
    906 F.2d 1362
    , 1365-66
    (9th Cir. 1990). Hence, Pennsylvania's procedural challenge
    should have been brought within six years of the promulgation of
    the regulation.
    C. Exclusion of Documents and Incomplete Rulemaking
    Record
    In addition to challenging HHS's notice and comment
    procedures, Pennsylvania argues that the district court erred in
    excluding certain documents from the record on the ground of
    privilege and in granting summary judgment on an incomplete
    rulemaking record. From what we can discern, the documents
    Pennsylvania seeks pertain to the rulemaking process and not the
    application of the rule. Pennsylvania has failed to apprise us
    of how these documents or a more complete rulemaking record would
    change or influence our conclusions as to HHS's application of
    the regulation. Therefore, we see no basis for reversing the
    decision of the district court.
    III.
    The decision of the district court is affirmed. Costs
    are awarded to the appellee, the United States.