Jones v. United States ( 1996 )

Opinions of the United
1996 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-31-1996
Jones v. United States
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-1719
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Recommended Citation
"Jones v. United States" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 141.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/141
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 95-1719
ROTHER JONES
Appellant
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellee
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 94-05086)
Argued on March 11, 1996
Before: NYGAARD, SAROKIN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed July 31, 1996)
David C. Harrison (Argued)
2100 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103-1399
Attorney for Appellant
Susan D. Bricklin (Argued)
Suite 1250
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Rother Jones alleges that, while he was a federal
prisoner, prison officials denied him his prescription high blood
pressure medication, causing him to suffer a debilitating stroke,
which left him aphasic and quadriplegic. The district court
granted the United States' motion for summary judgment and denied
Jones' motion for reconsideration. We will reverse.
I.
Jones alleges that in 1991, while a prisoner at the
Federal Correctional Institution at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he
suffered from high blood pressure and had been prescribed
appropriate medication. In October, 1991, he was transferred
from Lewisburg to the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean,
Pennsylvania. He did not receive his medication the morning of
the transfer, nor was he medicated when he arrived at McKean,
although he did receive a medical examination.
Discovery revealed that within twelve hours of his
medication being withheld he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage,
leaving him aphasic and quadriplegic. Jones alleges that this
cerebral hemorrhage was a result of appellee's negligence in
failing to provide him with his prescription medication despite
knowledge of his need for it; that appellee failed to act with
due regard for his rights as a federal prisoner, a status which
denied him open access to the medication; and, that appellee
deviated from the applicable standard of care.
II.
Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that
this was a malpractice case and that Jones produced no expert
testimony that established appellee's negligence. The district
court, however, granted summary judgment on a ground not raised
in appellee's motion. It stated that:
under a simple negligence theory, Plaintiff
has failed to show negligence because he has
failed to show a duty. There is no evidence
in the record to indicate that the prison
authorities had a duty to provide Plaintiff
with his medication at a certain period of
time. . . . Plaintiff had a duty to establish
every element of his case.
The court concluded that "Plaintiff has not 'set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" We
disagree with the district court's conclusion that summary
judgment was appropriate because Mr. Jones "produced no evidencethat there
was a duty" to provide him his prescription medicine
at a certain time. Rather than requiring evidentiary proof,
"[w]hether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a
question of law." Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d
1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 328(B)
(1965)) (other citations omitted). Therefore, we need
only determine whether, as a matter of law, the defendant owed a
duty to Jones.
In Paragraph 2 of his complaint, Jones specifically
pointed to the relevant legal duty the government negligently
breached:
Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA operates a
prison system and is responsible for the
care, health and welfare of federal prisoners
within its custody in the federal prison
system.
Jones also alleged that federal employees "failed to supply
Plaintiff with his medication although it knew or should have
known that [the medicine] was necessary for his health."
We find the defendant's duty articulated in 18 U.S.C.
4042(a)(2) and (3), which provide:
The Bureau of Prisons . . . shall -- (2) . .
. provide for the safekeeping, care and
subsistence . . . (3) provide for the
protection . . . of all persons charged with
or convicted of offenses against the United
States.
The statute is unambiguous, and to avert summary judgment, Jones
was not required to provide a further basis for his contention
that defendant had a duty of care toward him. United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 164-65, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1859 (1963). ("[T]he duty
of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners is
fixed by 18 U.S.C. 4042 . . . .").
The facts are undisputed that Jones had been prescribed
medicine to treat his condition; that the medicine had been
withheld; and that he then suffered a severe stroke -- just what
the medicine was designed to prevent -- which left him
permanently disabled. We conclude that this evidence is
sufficient to allow a jury to determine that the government
breached its legal duty of care toward Jones by failing to
provide him with his medication within twelve hours of its normal
prescription time.
III.
We will reverse the summary judgment of the district
court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.