National Labor Relations Board v. Konig , 79 F.3d 354 ( 1996 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1996 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-11-1996
    Nat'l Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Konig
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 95-3085
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    Recommended Citation
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 95-3085 and 95-3129
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
    Petitioner
    v.
    MICHAEL KONIG t/a NURSING HOME
    CENTER AT VINELAND
    Respondent/
    Cross-Petitioner
    * COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
    Intervenor-Petitioner
    *(Granted as per Court's 4/7/95 Order)
    On Application for Enforcement of an Order
    of the National Labor Relations Board
    Argued October 30, 1995
    BEFORE: NYGAARD, ALITO and
    SAROKIN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed March 11, 1996)
    Linda J. Dreeben
    John D. Burgoyne (argued)
    Aileen A. Armstrong
    Angela Washington
    National Labor Relations
    1
    Board
    1099 14th St., NW
    Suite 8101
    Washington, DC 20570
    Attorneys for Petitioner
    Steven P. Weissman
    Weissman & Mintz
    One Executive Drive, Suite 200
    Somerset, NJ 08873
    Attorney for Intervenor
    David Lew (argued)
    Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
    70 Grand Avenue
    River Edge, NJ 07661
    Attorney for Respondent/
    Cross-Petitioner
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SAROKIN, Circuit Judge:
    This case comes before this court on an application of the
    National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") to enforce
    an Order against Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at Vineland
    ("the Home") to cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor
    practices.   The Board had issued a Decision and Order concluding
    that the Home had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4) and (5) of
    the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(1),
    (3), (4) & (5), by committing unfair labor practices against
    2
    several licensed practical nurses ("LPNs") engaged in union
    activities.   The Home contests this Decision and Order on the
    ground that an intervening Supreme Court case, NLRB v. Health
    Care & Retirement Corp. of America,       U.S.    , 
    114 S. Ct. 1778
    (1994), overturned Board precedent, rendering LPNs supervisory
    employees who are not covered by the NLRA.       Because the Home
    waived this contention by failing to raise it in the prior
    proceedings, we deny review and grant enforcement.
    I.
    The Home is a long-term nursing home in Vineland, New
    Jersey.   In June 1992, the Communications Workers of America,
    Local 1040, AFL-CIO ("CWA" or "the union") began seeking to
    organize the LPNs working at the Home.0    Several LPNs became
    interested in the union.   The union filed a petition for
    representation of the Home's LPNs on June 8, 1992.
    On July 8, 1992, the Board held a representation hearing to
    address three questions:   (1) whether the LPNs were already
    represented by another union; (2) whether the unit was
    appropriately limited to LPNs; and (3) whether three of the LPNs
    were "charge nurses" and thus supervisors within the meaning of
    0
    The following brief summary of the facts in this case is based
    on the findings of the Board in its Decision and Order issued in
    Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at Vineland, 
    314 N.L.R.B. 947
    (1994). The Home has not raised any objections with respect to
    the Board's factual findings, nor did it object to the Board's
    conclusion that these facts constituted unfair labor practices
    under the Act. They have thus waived any objection as to the
    Board's findings, see NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Etc.,
    
    691 F.2d 1117
    , 1125 (3d Cir. 1982), and we will accept them as
    true.
    3
    section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).    The Regional
    Director found in favor of the union on all three issues and
    issued a Decision and Direction of Election on September 17,
    1992.   The election was conducted, and on October 27, 1992 the
    union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of
    the LPNs.
    Throughout this period, particularly following the CWA's
    filing of its representation petition and around the time of the
    representation hearing, the LPNs' unionization efforts met with
    serious impediments by the Home management.   The LPNs were
    threatened, harassed, and some eventually were terminated as a
    result of their union activities.
    The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the
    Home, alleging that the Home had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3),
    (4) and (5) of the NLRA in July, August and September of 1992.
    The case was heard during March and May of 1993.    On August 31,
    1994, the NLRB issued a Decision and Order.   Michael Konig t/a
    Nursing Center at Vineland, 
    314 N.L.R.B. 947
    (1994).   The Board found
    that the Home had discouraged employees from engaging in union
    activities and had discharged three LPNS and reduced the pay of a
    fourth because of their union activities and had thus engaged in
    unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA.    The Board
    accordingly ordered the Home to reinstate the three who had been
    terminated to their former positions or substantially similar
    positions and to make them whole for losses incurred, and to
    restore pay to the one whose salary had been reduced, including
    backpay.    The Order also required the Home to bargain with the
    4
    CWA as the exclusive representative of the employees in the LPN
    unit on terms and conditions of employment.   It is this Decision
    and Order that the Board seeks to enforce before this Court.
    Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, after the case had been heard
    but before the Board had issued its opinion, the Supreme Court
    issued its decision in Health Care & Retirement Corp., in which
    it held that nurses who engage in patient care are acting "in the
    interest of the employer" and therefore may be supervisors within
    the meaning of the NLRA.   NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.,
    
    114 S. Ct. 1778
    (1994).0    Based on this Supreme Court decision,
    the Home has since refused to bargain with the CWA on the ground
    that the LPNs are supervisors not protected by the NLRA.
    In an action separate from the instant one, the union filed
    another unfair labor practice charge for refusal to bargain with
    the LPNs in July 1994, and a hearing was held on this issue in
    February 1995.   Prodded by the decision in Health Care &
    Retirement Corp. the Home presented evidence that the LPNs were
    supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA and therefore
    unprotected by the Act.    On May 12, 1995, the Administrative Law
    Judge ("ALJ") issued a Decision and Order in Case No. 4-CA-22933,
    concluding that the Home was barred from raising the objection to
    the representation unit on the basis that the LPNs were
    0
    As explained, infra, the Supreme Court did not alter the Board's
    statutory interpretation of the other two prongs of the
    definition of supervisor, i.e. that (1) the individual engages in
    at least one of twelve designated supervisory activities; and (2)
    that the individual exercises independent judgment in performing
    these activities. See Health Care & Retirement 
    Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1780
    .
    5
    supervisors at this unfair labor practices hearing when they had
    not raised this issue at the original representation proceeding,
    and that, in any event, the evidence introduced at the original
    representation hearing and the findings from that hearing did not
    support the contention that the LPNs were supervisors, even under
    Health Care & Retirement Corp.        The Home was thus ordered to
    bargain with the union as the representative of the certified LPN
    unit.     The Board later affirmed the ALJ's decision, accepting its
    rulings, findings and conclusions and explicitly noting that
    there was "no showing that the LPNs . . . exercise independent
    judgment in performing" assignments and that Health Care &
    Retirement Corp. was therefore inapplicable.      Michael Konig t/a
    Nursing Center at Vineland, 318 NLRB No. 64 at 1 n.1 (1995). This
    court summarily denied the Home's petition to review this
    decision and granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement on
    December 14, 1995.     Konig v. NLRB, No. 95-3507 (December 14,
    1995) (order).
    II.
    The NLRB had jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice
    proceeding under section 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
    This court has jurisdiction over the Board's appeal for
    enforcement of the Order under section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29
    U.S.C. § 160(e), and over the Home's petition for review of the
    Order under section 10(f).     29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
    We will uphold the Board's findings of fact if they are
    supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
    6
    whole.    Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
    340 U.S. 474
    , 485-87
    (1951).   Our review of questions of law is plenary.   Tubari Ltd.
    v. NLRB, 
    959 F.2d 451
    , 453 (3d Cir. 1992).
    III.
    The NLRA does not provide protection for individuals who are
    supervisors within the meaning of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §152(3);
    see also Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center v. NLRB, 
    933 F.2d 626
    , 629 (8th Cir. 1991) ("By excluding 'supervisors' from the
    definition of 'employee,' § 2(3) of the Act . . . excludes
    supervisors from protection under the Act.").   Section 2(11) of
    the NLRA defines "supervisor" as follows:
    any individual having authority, in the interest of the
    employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
    promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
    employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
    their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
    action, if in connection with the foregoing the
    exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
    or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
    judgment.
    29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (emphasis added).   An individual is a
    supervisor within the meaning of the statute, then, if she (1)
    has the authority to engage in one of the twelve listed
    activities; (2) exercises that authority with "the use of
    independent judgment;" and (3) holds the authority "in the
    interest of the employer."    Health Care & Retirement 
    Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1780
    .
    Prior to Health Care & Retirement Corp., the Board
    consistently had held that "'a nurse's direction of less skilled
    employees, in the exercise of professional judgment incidental to
    7
    the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised "in the
    interest of the employer."'"   
    Id. (citation omitted).
       See, e.g.,
    Northcrest Nursing Home, 
    313 N.L.R.B. 491
    , 493-94 (1993); Beverly
    Enters., Alabama Inc., 
    304 N.L.R.B. 861
    , 864 (1991) ("[W]e further
    find that assignment and direction of nurses aides' work by LPNs
    is routine and primarily in connection with patient care and does
    not establish that the LPNs are supervisors."); Phelps Community
    Medical Center, 
    295 N.L.R.B. 486
    , 490 (1989) (same); The Ohio Masonic
    Home, 
    295 N.L.R.B. 390
    , 395 (1989) (LPNs not supervisors because
    their direction of aides' work was done in "connection with
    patient care and did not go beyond into 'personnel authority
    which more directly promote the interests of the employer and
    which is not motivated by patient care needs.'") (citation
    omitted).
    The Supreme Court overturned the Board's statutory
    interpretation in its opinion in Health Care & Retirement Corp,
    
    114 S. Ct. 1778
    (1994).   There, the Court concluded that
    "[p]atient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows
    that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are
    the employer's customers, is in the interest of the employer."
    
    Id. at 1782.
      It thus found that four LPNs who performed some of
    the twelve activities listed in the statute in the interest of
    patient care necessarily did so "in the interest of the employer"
    and were therefore supervisors under the Act.   
    Id. at 1781,
    1785.
    A.
    The Home argues that in light of this recent decision, this
    court should deny enforcement of the Board's Order because it
    8
    renders the LPNs in the instant case supervisors and thus not
    entitled to the protection of the Act.   Initially, we emphasize
    that Health Care & Retirement Corp. did not rule that all LPNs
    are necessarily supervisors; rather it ruled that all LPNs who
    perform one of the twelve tasks listed in section 2(11),
    exercising their own independent judgment and in the interest of
    patient care, are supervisors.   
    Id. The Home
    claims that the record from the hearing before the
    administrative law judge in Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at
    Vineland, Case No. 4-CA-22933, the action filed by the union in
    July of 1994 for the Home's refusal to bargain, demonstrates that
    the LPNs are supervisors under Health Care & Retirement Corp.       We
    first note that case No. 4-CA-22933 was not consolidated with the
    instant case and is thus not presently before this panel on
    appeal.0   Therefore, we decline to consider the record from that
    case in this appeal.   In any event, the Board in case No. 4-CA-
    22933 ruled that the record failed to demonstrate that the LPNs
    were supervisors, even in light of Health Care & Retirement
    Corp.,0 and this court has affirmed the Board.0   Thus, even were
    0
    On October 3, 1995, this court denied a motion to consolidate
    the instant appeal with the appeal from the Board's decision in
    case No. 4-CA-22933. Case No. 4-CA-22933 was then appealed
    separately from the instant matter, and a panel of this court
    denied review and granted enforcement. See Konig v. NLRB, No.
    95-3507 (December 14, 1995) (order).
    0
    In affirming the ALJ, the Board specifically noted that any
    evidence in the record suggesting that LPNs assigned and directed
    nurses' aides indicated that such actions were not taken with the
    exercise of independent judgment and therefore Health Care &
    Retirement Corp. was not applicable. Konig, 318 NLRB No. 64 at 1
    n.1.
    0
    We note that, because the Board's decision in case No. 4-CA-
    22933 was based on alternative grounds (i.e. that the Home waived
    9
    we to consider the record, it seems doubtful that it would
    support the Home's contentions.
    Accordingly, there is nothing in the record before us to
    support the Home's contention that the LPNs are supervisors under
    Health Care & Retirement Corp.     However, because we decide,
    infra, that the Home may not object to the Board's Order on the
    ground that the LPNs are supervisors at this juncture in the
    proceeding, it will not be necessary to remand this case to
    determine whether the LPNs are supervisors.
    B.
    In the original proceeding before the Board, the Home failed
    to raise its current contention that the Act did not apply to the
    LPNs because they were supervisors.0   Section 10(e) of the NLRA
    bars an appellate court from reviewing an issue that was not
    its opportunity to raise this issue and that the record did not
    demonstrate that the LPNS were supervisors), this court's denial
    of review and grant of enforcement in that action does not
    preclude the Home from litigating the supervisory status of the
    LPNs in this action. The Board's findings regarding the
    supervisory status of the LPNs was not essential to the court's
    judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 cmt. h
    (1982) ("If issues are determined but the judgment is not
    dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those issues
    in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded.").
    0
    During the hearing regarding the union's petition for
    representation, the Home did raise the claim that certain LPNs
    were supervisors within the meaning of § 2(11) because they are
    charge
    nurses. First, we note that this objection was proffered in a
    different proceeding from the one at issue in this appeal for
    review and therefore has no bearing on the instant action.
    Second, even had this objection been raised in the instant
    action, it was only in reference to these three LPNs as charge
    nurses. The objection did not apply to the remaining LPNs in the
    bargaining unit. In fact, by claiming supervisory status
    specifically as to these three employees, the Home implicitly
    accepted that the other LPNs were not supervisors.
    10
    raised in the Board proceeding:    "No objection that has not been
    urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court,
    unless the failure or neglect to urge such exception shall be
    excused because of extraordinary circumstances."   29 U.S.C.
    §160(e).   The Supreme Court has construed this rule strictly.
    See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    456 U.S. 645
    , 665-66
    (1982).    In Woelke & Romero Framing, the Board had addressed an
    issue sua sponte which had not been raised or argued by either
    party.    When the petitioner sought review of the court of
    appeals' ruling on that issue before the Supreme Court, the Court
    held that under section 10(e), the court of appeals had no
    jurisdiction to consider the question because the petitioner had
    not raised it before the Board.    The Court specifically noted
    that the petitioner "could have objected to the Board's decision
    in a petition for reconsideration or rehearing" and its "failure
    to do so prevents consideration of the question by the courts."
    
    Id. at 666.
    The Home argues, however, that the Supreme Court's decision
    in Health Care & Retirement Corp. constitutes an "extraordinary
    circumstance," and that, thus, by the terms of section 10(e) of
    the NLRA, its failure to raise the issue of the LPNs' supervisory
    status before the Board should be excused in this case.
    The Supreme Court has held on at least one occasion that
    intervening Supreme Court case law may be considered an
    "extraordinary circumstance" under section 10(e), allowing a
    reviewing court to decide an issue that was not raised originally
    11
    before the Board.   In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the petitioners
    sought to raise for the first time a First Amendment argument
    suggested by a Supreme Court decision, Bill Johnson's Restaurant,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    461 U.S. 731
    (1983), which had been issued six
    months after the petition for certiorari in Sure-Tan had been
    filed. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    467 U.S. 883
    , 896 & n.7 (1984).
    The Court held that it could address this argument even though
    petitioners had not raised it before the Board as required by
    section 10(e) because the intervening and substantial change in
    controlling law occasioned by Bill Johnson's Restaurant qualified
    as an extraordinary circumstance.    
    Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 896
    n.7.
    Thus, it might appear that under Sure-Tan, the Home may raise the
    issue of the LPNs' supervisory status in light of the Health Care
    & Retirement Corp. decision.
    We find, however, that the facts of the instant matter are
    substantially different from those in Sure-Tan, rendering that
    holding inapplicable to the instant case.   As noted above, the
    decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurant was issued six months after
    the petition for certiorari in Sure-Tan was filed.     The
    petitioner in that case thus could not have raised the issue
    before the Board or even the court of appeals because Bill
    Johnson's Restaurant had not yet been decided.   Here, by
    contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Health Care &
    Retirement Corp. was issued on May 24, 1994, three months before
    the Board's August 31, 1994 decision in this matter.    Thus, the
    Home easily could have informed the Board of the Health Care &
    Retirement Corp. decision and raised the issue of the LPNs'
    12
    supervisory status before the Board during those three months.
    Indeed, as made clear in Woelke & Romero Framing, the Home had
    the obligation to raise the argument itself because, even had the
    Board addressed the issue sua sponte, any reviewing court would
    not have had jurisdiction due to the parties' failure to argue
    the point before the Board.   Woelke & Romero 
    Framing, 456 U.S. at 665-66
    .   The Home could even have filed a petition for
    reconsideration as permitted by 29 CFR § 102.48(d)(1) following
    the Board's decision.0   Yet, it failed to do so.
    Unlike in Sure-Tan, then, where the petitioner could not
    have raised the argument suggested by intervening precedent until
    after the petition for certiorari was granted, there were no
    extraordinary circumstances here that would have prevented the
    Home from raising the issue of the LPNs' supervisory status until
    now. The Home's failure to raise the argument, and certainly its
    failure to file a petition for reconsideration, deprives this
    court of jurisdiction to address this question under section
    10(e) of the NLRA.   See Woelke & Romero 
    Framing, 456 U.S. at 665
    -
    66.
    C.
    0
    The text of 29 CFR § 102.48(d)(1) reads, in relevant part, as
    follows:
    A party to a proceeding before the Board may, because
    of extraordinary circumstances, move for
    reconsideration, . . . after the Board decision or
    order. A motion for reconsideration shall state with
    particularity the material error claimed and with
    respect to any finding of material fact shall specify
    the page of the record relied on.
    13
    We now briefly address the question of whether, assuming the
    LPNs at issue in the current action are supervisory personnel,
    the Board had jurisdiction to issue an order compelling
    reinstatement and backpay for supervisors.    We address this issue
    despite our 
    conclusion, supra
    , that the Home has waived its
    objection because the Home claims that a challenge regarding lack
    of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.   Petitioner's Brief at
    27.
    The Home's argument fails to recognize the distinction
    between jurisdiction in the sense of the overall authority of the
    Board to hear the case under the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the
    Board to issue an order based upon a factual determination made
    by the Board.    "While the Board's statutory jurisdiction may be
    raised at any time, the facts upon which the Board determines it
    has jurisdiction may be challenged only upon timely exception."
    NLRB v. Peyton Fritton Stores, Inc., 
    336 F.2d 769
    , 770 (10th Cir.
    1964) (per curiam); see also Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    582 F.2d 467
    , 472 (9th Cir. 1978).
    The question of whether the Board had the jurisdiction to
    order reinstatement and backpay to the LPNs rests on the factual
    determination by the Board regarding their supervisory status.
    The Home cannot raise this type of jurisdictional objection for
    the first time before this court absent extraordinary
    circumstances.
    Indeed, in NLRB v. International Health Care, Inc., 
    898 F.2d 501
    , 506-507 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit arrived at the
    same conclusion when addressing an issue virtually identical to
    14
    the one currently before us.   There, as here, the court was
    called upon to decide whether the employer could raise an
    objection for the first time that the Board lacked jurisdiction
    to order the employer to bargain with a unit of LPNs because the
    LPNs were supervisors under the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's
    case NLRB v. Beacon Light, 
    825 F.2d 1076
    (6th Cir. 1987).      The
    court concluded that this sort of jurisdictional challenge based
    on factual determinations could not be raised for the first time
    before the court of appeals.   International Health 
    Care, 898 F.2d at 506-07
    (citing NLRB v. Ferraro's Bakery, Inc., 
    353 F.2d 366
    (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that the Board had jurisdiction to
    determine whether certain workers were "employees" within the
    NLRA and failure of respondent to file timely exception to
    factual determination was not an exceptional circumstance)).
    We accept the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, as well as the
    Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and conclude that the Home cannot raise
    for the first time before this court an objection to the Board's
    jurisdiction to award backpay and reinstatement to LPNs on the
    theory that they are supervisors.0
    We further mention here, as an aside, that even if the LPNs
    are in fact supervisors, the Board may still have jurisdiction to
    order their reinstatement and backpay.   First, "it is settled law
    that, notwithstanding the statutory exclusion of supervisors from
    the Act's protection . . . an employer's discharge of a
    supervisor may give rise to an 8(a) (1) violation."   Kenrich
    0
    Judge Alito does not join the portion of Part III of this
    opinion that comes after this footnote.
    15
    Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    893 F.2d 1468
    , 1475 (3d Cir.),
    enforced on other grounds, 
    907 F.2d 400
    (3d Cir. 1990) (in banc)
    (citations omitted).    Specifically, the Board has the authority
    "to order the reinstatement of a supervisor whose firing resulted
    not from her own pro-union conduct, but from the employer's
    efforts to thwart the exercise of section 7 rights by protected
    rank-and-file employees."   Kenrich 
    Petrochemicals, 907 F.2d at 406
    .
    We recognize that, assuming arguendo that the LPNs are
    supervisors under Health Care & Retirement Corp., this case does
    not involve the discharge of supervisors for purposes of
    thwarting the exercise of rights of non-supervisory employees.
    Rather, the LPNs in this case were discharged for engaging in
    pro-union activity to protect their own rights.    This court has
    held that in instances where a supervisor is discharged for
    seeking to invoke the Board's protection on her own behalf, the
    Board lacks jurisdiction to grant reinstatement and backpay.      Hi-
    Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 
    660 F.2d 910
    , 917-18 (3d Cir. 1981).
    Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the reality that, at the time
    that the LPNs were engaged in pro-union activity and the Home
    actively discouraged it, the Home knew that under the Board's
    legal precedent in force at the time, the LPNs were employees not
    supervisors.    It would be ironic to deny enforcement of the
    Board's Order merely because the Home's egregious violations of
    the Act were perpetrated against individuals who subsequently
    were determined to be supervisors and thus not protected.       Such a
    conclusion would violate the spirit of the Act.    Thus, while
    16
    there is no precedent on this exact question, there are strong
    policy arguments that militate in favor of finding that the Board
    has jurisdiction to order reinstatement and backpay of
    supervisors in this type of situation.    These policy reasons,
    considered in tandem with the well-settled rule that the Board
    has jurisdiction to reinstate supervisors in instances where
    their discharge was accomplished to thwart the exercise of rights
    of protected employees, could support a conclusion that the Board
    has jurisdiction to order reinstatement and backpay to
    supervisors under these circumstances.    See, e.g., Oil City Brass
    Works v. NLRB, 
    357 F.2d 466
    , 471 (5th Cir. 1966) (ordering
    reinstatement of supervisor discharged for testifying before the
    Board on behalf of the union so as to ensure that "the overriding
    purpose of the Act [is not] frustrated.").
    The Home engaged in deliberate conduct intended to
    discourage, prevent and punish union activity by those whom it
    believed were entitled to engage in such activity.    If subsequent
    events fortuitously rendered those employees not subject to the
    protection of the Act, the intentional wrongful conduct of their
    employers should not be without remedy.    However, because of our
    decision that the Home is barred from challenging the LPNs
    supervisory status in this appeal, we do not decide this issue.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will deny review of the
    Board's Decision and grant enforcement of the Board's Order.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95-3085, 95-3129

Citation Numbers: 79 F.3d 354

Judges: Nygaard, Alito, Sarokin

Filed Date: 3/11/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (16)

Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations ... , 102 S. Ct. 2071 ( 1982 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement ... , 114 S. Ct. 1778 ( 1994 )

kenrich-petrochemicals-inc-in-no-89-3392-v-national-labor-relations , 907 F.2d 400 ( 1990 )

Oil City Brass Works v. National Labor Relations Board , 357 F.2d 466 ( 1966 )

Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., Petitioner/cross-Respondent v.... , 893 F.2d 1468 ( 1990 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Peyton Fritton Stores, ... , 336 F.2d 769 ( 1964 )

Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. National Labor ... , 582 F.2d 467 ( 1978 )

Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center, Inc. v. National ... , 933 F.2d 626 ( 1991 )

Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 660 F.2d 910 ( 1981 )

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board , 71 S. Ct. 456 ( 1951 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Ferraro's Bakery, Inc. , 353 F.2d 366 ( 1965 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Beacon Light Christian ... , 825 F.2d 1076 ( 1987 )

Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, ... , 959 F.2d 451 ( 1992 )

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 104 S. Ct. 2803 ( 1984 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Browning-Ferris ... , 73 A.L.R. Fed. 597 ( 1982 )

National Labor Relations Board v. International Health Care,... , 898 F.2d 501 ( 1990 )

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