Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1997 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-15-1997
    Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 95-1300
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997
    Recommended Citation
    "Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 84.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/84
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ______________________
    NO. 95-1300
    ______________________
    FANNIE HARRISON,
    Appellee
    v.
    NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN U.S.A.,
    Appellant
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    D.C. Civ. No. 94-cv-06791
    _________________________
    Argued: February 9, 1996
    Opinion Filed: October 9, 1996
    Panel Rehearing Granted and Opinion Vacated: November 4, 1996
    Reargued: December 17, 1996
    BEFORE: BECKER, ROTH and MCKEE, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: April 15, 1997)
    JOHN E. HALL, ESQUIRE
    ALFRED S. PELÁEZ, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
    BRIAN K. PARKER, ESQUIRE
    Pietrangallo, Bosick & Gordon
    One Oxford Centre
    38th Floor
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Attorney for Appellant
    SAMUEL B. FINEMAN, ESQUIRE
    GLENN I. GERBER, ESQUIRE
    CRAIG THOR KIMMEL, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
    ROBERT M. SILVERMAN, ESQUIRE
    Kimmel & Silverman
    30 E. Butler Pike
    Ambler, PA 19002
    Attorney for Appellee
    _______________________
    1
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________________
    BECKER, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal arises from a civil suit based on diversity
    jurisdiction brought by appellee, Fannie Harrison ("Harrison"),
    against appellant, Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. ("Nissan"),
    seeking damages for alleged defects in the 1994 Nissan Sentra
    that Harrison purchased on July 11, 1994.       Nissan moved to
    dismiss the complaint for failure to "first resort" to the
    informal dispute resolution procedure provided by Nissan pursuant
    to the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law, 73 P.S. § 1951 et seq.
    (Purdon 1993).   The district court denied the motion, and also
    denied Nissan's subsequent motion for reconsideration.       Nissan
    has appealed from both orders.
    Harrison submits that, because the district court has
    not entered a final order, the appeal should be dismissed for
    lack of appellate jurisdiction.       Nissan rejoins that we have
    appellate jurisdiction under § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act
    ("FAA"), 
    9 U.S.C. § 16
    , which allows an interlocutory appeal of
    an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.
    Nissan argues that appellate jurisdiction lies under this
    provision because its motion to dismiss was a surrogate for a
    motion to compel arbitration.    Harrison takes issue with this
    characterization, and also contends that the FAA does not apply
    to the informal ADR procedure provided by Nissan under the Lemon
    Law.   We need not decide if Nissan’s motion to dismiss is the
    2
    functional equivalent of a motion to compel arbitration because
    we agree with Harrison’s latter contention, and hence we will
    dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
    I.
    Under the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law ("Lemon
    Law"), "any purchaser of a new motor vehicle who suffers any loss
    due to nonconformity of such vehicle as a result of the
    manufacturer's failure to comply with this act may bring a civil
    action."   73 P.S. § 1958.   However, the law requires the claimant
    to "first resort" to any alternative dispute resolution
    procedures that the manufacturer has established before
    initiating litigation.   Id. § 1959.1
    By the terms of the Lemon Law, id., before a consumer
    must “first resort” to it, the alternative dispute resolution
    procedure provided by the manufacturer must comply with the
    Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulations, 16 C.F.R. pt. 703,
    promulgated under a cognate federal act, the Magnuson-Moss
    Warranty Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 2301
     et seq.   The most important of
    1. The statute provides:
    If the manufacturer has established an informal dispute
    settlement procedure which complies with the provisions
    of 16 C.F.R. Pt. 703, as from time to time amended, the
    provisions of [73 P.S. § 1958] shall not apply to any
    purchaser who has not first resorted to such procedure
    as it relates to a remedy for defects or conditions
    affecting the substantial use, value or safety of the
    vehicle. The informal dispute settlement procedure
    shall not be binding on the purchaser and, in lieu of
    such settlement, the purchaser may pursue a remedy
    under [§ 1958].
    73 P.S. § 1959.
    3
    these regulations for purposes of the case at bar requires
    alternative dispute resolution "mechanisms" to render a decision
    within forty days of notification of the dispute.    Id. §
    703.5(d).    The regulations provide that a “requirement that a
    consumer resort to the Mechanism prior to commencement of an
    action . . . shall be satisfied 40 days after notification to the
    Mechanism of the dispute or when the Mechanism completes all of
    its duties under . . . this section, whichever occurs sooner.”
    Id. § 703.5(i).2
    Nissan has contracted with the Better Business Bureau
    ("BBB") to provide a mechanism, the BBB “Auto Line,” that will
    satisfy the alternative dispute resolution provisions of both the
    Pennsylvania Lemon Law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.    The
    contract between Nissan and the BBB provides that the Auto Line
    program will provide arbitration services that comply with the
    FTC requirements described above.3
    2. This provision refers explicitly only to the "resort"
    requirement of §110(d) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. We
    find, however, that this provision also applies to the "first
    resort" requirement of the Lemon Law. As explained in the text,
    the FTC regulations were promulgated only with the Magnuson-Moss
    Act in mind, but the Lemon Law requires that qualifying
    mechanisms comply with the FTC regulations. Hence, these
    regulations apply to Lemon Law ADR even if they reference only
    the Magnuson-Moss Act explicitly.
    3. Harrison contends that the BBB Auto Line program does not
    comply with 16 C.F.R. pt. 703; inter alia, she relies on a letter
    written by a FTC investigator. Nissan responds that the
    investigator's letter is taken out of context and has no
    relevance to the point for which Harrison submits it. Nissan
    also submits that, at all events, the BBB Auto Line informal
    dispute resolution mechanism is used nationally by several
    automobile manufacturers, and in virtually every state, and that
    4
    The warranty that accompanies Nissan's vehicles
    describes the BBB Auto Line as a remedy available to consumers
    who are dissatisfied with their vehicles' performance.4      The
    warranty informs consumers how to register their complaints with
    the BBB Auto Line and what information to provide.       It also
    explains that the BBB Auto Line has both a mediation and an
    arbitration component.   If the complaint cannot be mediated, the
    consumer can present the matter to an impartial person or a
    three-person arbitration panel.       The arbitrators' decision is not
    binding unless the consumer accepts it as binding.       While the
    warranty states that resort to the BBB Auto Line is completely
    voluntary, it also notes that some state laws require resort to
    the program before filing a lawsuit.
    Harrison, through counsel, sent to the BBB Auto Line a
    request for arbitration, dated August 16, 1994, which claimed
    that her 1994 Nissan Sentra did not comply with the warranty.
    The Sentra allegedly had a faulty engine, air conditioner, and
    steering system, as well as other defects. Harrison requested a
    (..continued)
    all such mechanisms are audited "at least annually, to determine
    whether the Mechanism and its implementation are in compliance
    with this part." Id. § 703.7(a). It points out that the
    attorney charged with insuring that the BBB Auto Line is in
    compliance with the FTC regulations has testified that neither
    the FTC nor any state has ever found the BBB Auto Line program to
    be wanting. In the final analysis, however, that question is for
    the FTC, and not this Court, to decide.
    4. A copy of the warranty was submitted after this Court asked
    the parties to supplement the record pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.
    10(e). This document was not in the record before the district
    court.
    5
    refund of her purchase price, approximately nineteen thousand
    dollars.    After forty days had passed without a response, at
    least according to Harrison, she filed a diversity-based civil
    suit, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    , against Nissan in the District Court for
    the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.    Harrison's five-count
    complaint pled a Pennsylvania Lemon Law claim, a Magnuson-Moss
    Warranty Act claim,5 a Uniform Commercial Code claim, a
    detrimental reliance claim, and a Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
    Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") claim.    Harrison
    asserts that her UTPCPL claim, under which she could be awarded
    three times the amount recoverable under the Lemon Law (the
    purchase price of the car), see 73 P.S. § 1955 (Purdon 1993); id.
    § 201-9.2, allows her to satisfy the amount in controversy
    requirement of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    .
    Nissan moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(1).    It argued that the Lemon Law claim should be dismissed
    because the “first resort” provision requires that a claimant
    fully exhaust the available ADR procedures, in this case the BBB
    Auto Line, before filing suit.    Because, according to Nissan, the
    BBB Auto Line had responded to Harrison’s request for arbitration
    and she had failed to take action, she had not satisfied this
    5.   Although the Magnuson-Moss Act is a federal law, a private
    enforcement action cannot be brought in federal court unless the
    value of all of the claims in the suit is at least $ 50,000. 
    15 U.S.C. § 2310
    (d)(1)(B) and (d)(3).
    6
    exhaustion requirement.   In Nissan's submission, if the Lemon Law
    claim was dismissed, Harrison could no longer assert an UTPCPL
    claim, and thus the amount in controversy would no longer meet
    the $50,000 statutory requirement.    Under these circumstances,
    the district court would lack subject matter jurisdiction.
    In response, Harrison contended that there is no such
    exhaustion obligation, reasoning that the Lemon Law is a consumer
    statute that imposes burdens on manufacturers, but not on
    claimants, and that the regulations promulgated under the
    Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act clearly imply that the customer need
    only make the initial notification.    Harrison repeated her
    allegation that she had never received a response from the BBB
    Auto Line.
    The district court denied the motion to dismiss,
    reasoning that, taking the facts of the complaint as true,
    Harrison had sufficiently resorted to the alternative remedies
    under the Lemon Law before filing her complaint.    In doing so, it
    relied upon the opinion in Polischchuk v. Nissan Motor Corp. in
    U.S.A., Civ. No. 94-6771, 
    1995 WL 94798
     (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1995).
    In Polischchuk, the court held that the Lemon Law did not
    require exhaustion of the mechanism prior to filing suit, and
    that the “first resort” requirement was satisfied by the
    plaintiffs’ allegations that they had forwarded a request for
    arbitration to the BBB Auto Line and had received no response.
    7
    
    Id. at *2
    .6
    Nissan moved for reconsideration, and in the
    alternative, to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for
    summary judgment.   In its motion, Nissan again represented that
    Harrison had failed to comply with the “first resort” requirement
    of the Lemon Law.   Nissan attached as an exhibit an affidavit
    from the director of the Eastern Pennsylvania BBB Auto Line
    Program who stated that, a few days after receiving Harrison's
    request for arbitration, she sent a letter to Harrison's counsel
    informing him that he had an affirmative duty to respond and
    6. There has been a recent proliferation of Lemon Law cases in
    the district courts of this Circuit regarding the import of the
    “first resort” requirement. The question that has divided the
    district courts is whether, after requesting arbitration,
    claimants are entitled to resort to the district court
    immediately upon expiration of the forty-day period set forth in
    the FTC regulations if they have not heard from the contracting
    ADR agency, see Polischchuk v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 94-6991,
    
    1995 WL 94798
     (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1995) (sending in request to BBB
    Auto Line and not receiving a response was sufficient); Jenkins
    v. General Motors Corp., No. 95-2710, 
    1995 WL 422680
     (E.D. Pa.
    July 13, 1995) (issue of material fact precluded summary judgment
    as to whether plaintiff failed to ‘first resort’ to the informal
    dispute mechanism where plaintiff claimed that she was never sent
    a notice of hearing but defendant claimed it sent notice); Rudder
    v. American Motor Co., No. 94-6769, 
    1995 WL 216955
     (E.D. Pa. Apr.
    12, 1995) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff refused to
    participate in ADR procedure after requesting arbitration and
    receiving notice of hearing); Morganstein v. General Motors
    Corp., No. 94-3795, 
    1994 WL 558822
     (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1994)
    (claim dismissed where plaintiff filed a complaint rather than
    responding to notice of hearing from ADR procedure), or whether
    they must call or write so as to manifest a good faith effort to
    schedule the arbitration if the ADR body has not independently
    done so within that period, Levin v. American Honda Motor Co.,
    No. 94-5380, 
    1994 WL 719856
     (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1994) (court
    dismissed claim without prejudice where plaintiff had requested
    arbitration and allegedly had not received a response).
    8
    schedule an arbitration hearing within five days.   The director
    represented that neither Harrison nor her counsel contacted the
    BBB regarding arbitration.   Therefore, a week after sending the
    letter, the BBB Auto Line closed the case.   The district court
    denied the motion for reconsideration as well.
    II.
    A.
    The denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction is not appealable.   Commonwealth of Pa. v.
    Brown, 
    373 F.2d 771
     (3d Cir. 1967).   However, an order denying a
    motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act
    ("FAA") is immediately appealable. 
    9 U.S.C. § 16
    .   Nissan submits
    that this Court has jurisdiction because the district court
    orders were equivalent to orders denying motions to compel
    arbitration under the FAA.
    In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA to encourage courts
    to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts, contrary to prior
    common law which disfavored such agreements.   Gilmer v.
    Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
    500 U.S. 20
    , 24 (1991).     The FAA
    provides in this regard the following:
    A written provision in any...contract evidencing a
    transaction involving commerce to settle by
    arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
    out of such contract or transaction, or the
    refusal to perform the whole or any part
    thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
    to arbitration an existing controversy
    arising out of such contract, transaction, or
    refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
    enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
    at law or in equity for the revocation of any
    9
    contract.
    
    9 U.S.C. § 2
    .    In furtherance of this provision, § 4 of the FAA
    authorizes a party to file a motion to compel arbitration if the
    other party refuses to comply with the agreement to arbitrate.
    Id. § 4.7
    Section 16 of the FAA, passed in 1988, allows the
    interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to compel
    arbitration under the FAA.     The section was added to "make[]
    clear that any order favoring litigation over arbitration is
    immediately appealable and any order favoring arbitration over
    litigation is not."     Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc, 
    878 F.2d 729
    , 732 (3d Cir. 1989).     Nissan argues that, since the
    district court chose litigation over arbitration, the orders are
    immediately appealable.8
    7.   § 4 provides:
    A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
    another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
    arbitration may petition any United States district
    court which, save for such agreement, would have
    jurisdiction under Title 28 in a civil action or in
    admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out
    of the controversy between the parties, for an order
    directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
    provided for in such agreement. . . . The court shall
    hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
    making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure
    to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall
    make an order directing the parties to proceed to
    arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
    agreement. . . . If the making of the arbitration
    agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to
    perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
    summarily to the trial thereof.
    8. We note as a threshold matter that, for the FAA to apply, the
    party seeking to compel FAA arbitration must show the existence
    10
    Nissan’s jurisdictional argument, however, faces two
    significant hurdles, both of which present issues of potential
    first impression for this Court.    First, it is not evident that
    Nissan's motion to dismiss was a sufficient surrogate for a
    motion to compel arbitration under the FAA to enable us to
    sustain appellate jurisdiction under § 16.   Second, it is unclear
    whether the FAA applies to an agreement to participate in an
    "informal dispute resolution mechanism," such as the BBB Auto
    Line.
    Turning to the first question, we note that other
    courts have treated a motion to dismiss for failure to arbitrate
    claims as a motion to compel arbitration.    See Hercules & Co. v.
    Beltway Carpet Serv., 
    592 A.2d 1069
    , 1071-72 (D.C. App. 1991)
    (..continued)
    of a written agreement that contains an arbitration clause and
    affects interstate commerce. See 
    9 U.S.C. § 1
    , § 2, and § 4.
    The point is not free from doubt in the case at bar. However,
    leaving aside for a moment the (cognate) question whether the ADR
    procedure at issue here is "arbitration" within the meaning of
    the FAA, the point we find case-dispositive, see infra, we are
    satisfied that there is a sufficient agreement qua agreement.
    Although the warranty states that the use of the BBB Auto Line is
    voluntary, and it alone does not constitute a sufficient written
    agreement, the warranty constituted an offer to arbitrate that
    was accepted by the written request for arbitration sent by
    Harrison's counsel to the BBB Auto Line, the manner of acceptance
    prescribed by the offer, see Kroeze v. Chloride Group Ltd., 
    572 F.2d 1099
    , 1105 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The offeror is the master of
    his offer. An offeror may prescribe as many conditions, terms or
    the like as he may wish, including but not limited to, the time,
    place and method of acceptance."); Glenway Indus., Inc. v.
    Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 
    686 F.2d 415
    , 417 (6th Cir. 1982)
    (same). Alternatively, Harrison's counsel's letter to the BBB
    Auto Line constituted an offer to arbitrate which was accepted by
    Nissan’s reply to the BBB Auto Line that it would arbitrate the
    dispute. Under either of these theories, there was a sufficient
    agreement.
    11
    (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to
    arbitrate was appealable under the D.C. arbitration statute,
    which is similar to the FAA); Interstate Securities Corp. v.
    Siegel, 
    676 F. Supp. 54
    , 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to dismiss
    treated as a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings
    until completion of arbitration).9   There is, of course, logic to
    this construction.   On the other hand, linguistically, a motion
    to dismiss, even for failure to pursue the statutorily provided
    threshold arbitral remedy, is a far cry from a "motion to compel
    arbitration."   Fortunately, we need not resolve this question
    here because of our resolution of the second issue before us.10
    B.
    We turn to the question whether the FAA cognizes an
    agreement to submit to the ADR procedure at issue here.   Harrison
    contends that, because the BBB Auto Line arbitration is
    nonbinding (at least on the claimant), the FAA is not applicable
    here.   Contrary to Harrison’s contention, there is authority for
    the proposition that a court may issue an order compelling
    9. We note, too, the policy favoring the avoidance of
    jurisdictional-based dismissals that might waste judicial
    resources. See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 
    490 U.S. 826
     (1989) (holding that the courts of appeals may grant a
    motion to dismiss a dispensable party when dismissal is required
    to maintain diversity jurisdiction and results in no prejudice to
    any of the parties, even though no statute specifically
    authorizes granting the motion at the appellate level).
    10. Judge Roth would hold that, under the facts of this case, a
    motion to dismiss is not a surrogate for a motion to compel
    arbitration and would dismiss the appeal on that ground as well.
    12
    nonbinding arbitration under the FAA.   See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick
    Corp. 
    621 F. Supp. 456
    , 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (court could compel
    the parties to submit their dispute to third party for an
    advisory non-binding opinion under the FAA); Kelley v. Benchmark
    Homes, Inc., 
    550 N.W.2d 640
     (Neb. 1996) (FAA applies to non-
    binding arbitration).   Moreover, New York appellate courts have
    held that, under the New York Arbitration Act, courts should
    enforce agreements to submit disputes to nonbinding arbitration,
    see Board of Educ. v. Cracovia, 
    321 N.Y.S.2d 496
     (App. Div. 1971)
    (court can compel arbitration although the arbitration may be
    advisory rather than binding), and the Federal Arbitration Act
    was modeled after the New York Arbitration Act.    See S. Rep. No.
    536, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1924).   These courts have pointed
    out that the arbitration acts were designed to encourage courts
    to enforce agreements to arbitrate, and have suggested that this
    policy is no less compelling where the parties have agreed to
    submit their disputes to nonbinding arbitration.
    Perhaps the most useful approach to the question
    whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration is that of
    Judge Weinstein in AMF v. Brunswick Corp., 
    621 F. Supp. 456
    (E.D.N.Y. 1985).   In that case, Judge Weinstein enforced an
    agreement to submit a dispute to nonbinding arbitration.    He,
    however, did not explicitly hold that the FAA applies to all
    forms of non-binding arbitration; rather, he relied on § 2 of the
    FAA which states that the FAA applies to “contract[s] . . . to
    13
    settle [disputes] by arbitration,” 
    9 U.S.C. § 2
     (emphasis added).
    Thus focusing the question on whether the arbitration at issue
    there might realistically settle the dispute, Judge Weinstein
    held that "[v]iewed in the light of reasonable commercial
    expectations the dispute will be settled by this arbitration."
    
    Id. at 461
    .
    Considering the Auto Line mechanism in light of Judge
    Weinstein’s approach, the question whether the nonbinding
    character of the procedures precludes the application of the FAA
    is close.     Harrison contends that the requirements for Lemon Law
    mechanisms are such that there is no reasonable expectation that
    resort to the mechanism will settle the dispute.    In this regard,
    Harrison argues that the Lemon Law and the FAA are a mismatch.
    The FAA was intended to apply to those contracts that show a true
    undertaking by both parties to arbitrate the dispute.    But Lemon
    Law mechanisms are conditional and one-sided -- in particular,
    decisions are not binding on the claimants and claimants may file
    suit after forty days if a decision is not forthcoming -- and it
    cannot be said, according to Harrison, that claimants under all
    circumstances undertake to settle their disputes when they submit
    them to Lemon law arbitration.
    At oral argument, Harrison’s counsel also pointed out
    that a Lemon Law claimant will almost always file suit after the
    completion of the BBB Auto Line procedures because the BBB Auto
    Line is not authorized to award many types of damages that a
    14
    plaintiff can receive under the Lemon Law.   Moreover, a Lemon Law
    plaintiff will usually have other causes of action against the
    dealer or manufacturer (e.g., Consumer Fraud Act, UCC) that can
    only be resolved through litigation.    In sum, Harrison credibly
    asserts that there is no reasonable commercial expectation that
    the disputes will be resolved through the BBB Auto Line.
    Nissan rejoins that the purpose of the Lemon Law “first
    resort” requirement is to encourage manufacturers to establish
    informal dispute resolution mechanisms through which the bulk of
    warranty disputes can be resolved fairly and quickly without
    resort to litigation.   Under this view, the FTC regulations are
    slanted in favor of consumers to ensure that the informal dispute
    resolution procedures are as fair as possible to the consumers.
    Because of the safeguards guaranteeing fairness, Nissan contends
    that there is a reasonable expectation that Lemon Law disputes
    will be resolved by the BBB Auto Line.   If there was no
    expectation that these procedures would settle the majority of
    such disputes, Nissan forcefully points out, automobile
    manufacturers would refuse to bear the cost of creating
    mechanisms such as the BBB Auto Line.
    We also acknowledge the force of Nissan's arguments
    that Congress intended to provide for the enforcement of
    arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce
    Clause, see Perry v. Thomas, 
    482 U.S. 483
    , 490 (1987), and that
    whether an agreement to arbitrate a dispute in interstate
    15
    commerce is "binding," "partially binding" or "not binding at
    all" may have nothing to do with "the full reach of the Commerce
    Clause."    All that is required for any such agreement to trigger
    the Commerce Clause, the argument continues, is that it pertain
    to a matter affecting interstate commerce, and the agreement
    involved in this case does.     However, we need not reach the
    question whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration in
    general, or whether the nonbinding character of the BBB Auto Line
    prevents the application of the FAA to this particular case,
    because we are satisfied that the informal dispute resolution
    procedure provided by Nissan pursuant to the Lemon Law and the
    Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not “arbitration” as contemplated
    by the FAA.
    We note first that the FAA does not define the term
    “arbitration,” and both courts and commentators have struggled to
    do so.     This debate has occurred largely in the context of
    whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration, as we
    explained above.     Judge Weinstein has pointed out that
    arbitration has been defined in different ways, and “[a]t no time
    have the courts insisted on a rigid or formalistic approach to a
    definition of arbitration.”     AMF, 
    621 F. Supp. at 460
    .   In
    defining arbitration for purposes of determining whether the
    nonbinding arbitration clause before him was subject to
    enforcement under the FAA, he concluded that “[a]rbitration is
    creature of contract, a device of the parties rather than the
    16
    judicial process.     If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute
    for a decision by a third party, they have agreed to
    arbitration.”   
    Id.
    Although it defies easy definition, the essence of
    arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit
    their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate these
    disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made by a third-
    party arbitrator.     Arbitration does not occur until the process
    is completed and the arbitrator makes a decision.     Hence, if one
    party seeks an order compelling arbitration and it is granted,
    the parties must then arbitrate their dispute to an arbitrators’
    decision, and cannot seek recourse to the courts before that
    time.   Cf. Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, ___ F.3d ___,
    
    1997 WL 153012
     (3d Cir. 1997) (“Once a dispute is determined to
    be validly arbitrable, all other issues are to be decided at
    arbitration.”).
    But the informal alternative dispute resolution process
    contemplated by the Lemon Law does not fit this characterization.
    Rather, while many cases in which claimants invoke the informal
    process will proceed to an arbitrator’s award, some will not.
    That is because, under the FTC regulations with which a mechanism
    must comply, a dissatisfied car owner can file suit under the
    Lemon Law if he or she has not received a decision from the
    arbitrator after forty days.     In other words, whatever the
    meaning of the “first resort” requirement, a claimant cannot be
    17
    barred from pursuing litigation under the Lemon Law if the
    mechanism delays for more than forty days.   The claimant would
    not, therefore, pursue the procedure to completion in all cases.
    Under all these circumstances, the informal dispute resolution
    mechanism provided for by Nissan pursuant to the Lemon Law does
    not constitute arbitration within the meaning of the FAA.
    This conclusion is supported by the policies that
    underlie the Lemon Law.   Consumer statutes, such as the Magnuson-
    Moss Warranty Act and the Lemon laws, were enacted under the
    assumption that manufacturers are often reluctant to provide the
    relief to consumers that their warranties promise.   See H.R. Rep.
    93-1107, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702 (“Another growing
    source of resentment has been the inability to get many . . .
    products properly repaired and the developing awareness that the
    paper with the filigree border bearing the bold caption
    ‘Warranty’ . . . was often of no greater worth than the paper it
    was printed on.”).
    Therefore, the consumer laws and the FTC regulations
    promulgated to guide providers of alternative dispute resolution
    mechanisms are slanted toward the consumer: consumers must comply
    with only minimal requirements, while the warrantors must follow
    more elaborate and more burdensome rules, 
    16 C.F.R. § 703.2
    , and,
    moreover, are bound by the results of the arbitration, see 73
    P.S. § 1959.   Additionally, the contracting ADR agency must
    comply with certain requirements under the FTC regulations; among
    18
    them is the requirement that the body not delay its decision for
    more than forty days, with only few exceptions.    
    16 C.F.R. § 703.5
    (d), (e) & (i).   Applying the FAA to these procedures would
    arguably frustrate the policies underlying the consumer laws by
    placing additional burdens on consumers.   That is, if forced to
    arbitrate their disputes with the manufacturers to an
    arbitrator’s decision in every case, consumers would face
    additional hurdles that were not contemplated by the drafters of
    the Lemon Law.
    We find further support for the conclusion that the FAA
    does not apply to Lemon Law ADR procedures in the fact that the
    Lemon Law, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and the FTC
    regulations all refer to the procedure at issue as an “informal
    dispute resolution procedure.”   If the drafters had intended this
    procedure to be cognizable under the FAA, then it is likely that
    they would have referred to it as “arbitration.”    Indeed, the
    term “arbitration” has come into this case solely because the BBB
    Auto Line has labeled the second part of its procedures
    “arbitration.”   That alone is not sufficient to trigger the FAA.
    We, therefore, hold that Harrison and Nissan did not enter into
    a contract to arbitrate their dispute within the meaning of the
    FAA and that we lack jurisdiction over Nissan’s appeal.
    In reaching this holding, we acknowledge the force of
    Nissan’s contention that refusing to extend the FAA to Lemon Law
    arbitration would make
    a mockery of the scheme Congress created, [would] discourage,
    19
    rather than encourage, manufacturers from establishing
    and making available such mechanisms, and delay
    resolution of consumer warranty claims. That would be
    in a direct conflict with the expressly stated
    Congressional policy of "encourag[ing] warrantors to
    establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are
    fairly and expeditiously settled through informal
    dispute settlement mechanisms.”
    We are sympathetic to Nissan’s concerns, and view with disfavor
    the apparent policy of some Lemon Law counsel of “going through
    the motions” of the alternative dispute resolution process to get
    quickly into court, rather than trying to effect a speedy
    resolution of the claim through the ADR procedures.11   We also
    understand that such tactics might frustrate the policies behind
    the Pennsylvania Lemon Law.   But such an argument cannot and does
    not control the question whether § 16 of the FAA permits our
    11. We note in this regard that representations made during oral
    argument on the question of the extent to which the “first
    resort” requires Lemon Law claimants to exhaust the available ADR
    procedures before filing suit were troubling. Counsel for Ms.
    Harrison, who concededly has one of the largest Lemon Law
    practices in Southeastern Pennsylvania, acknowledged during oral
    argument that he has never participated in a BBB Auto Line
    arbitration, observing that “the program cannot provide what our
    clients want.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at 47. Nissan asserts, against
    this background, that Harrison’s contention that the consumer
    should be able to satisfy the "first resort" requirement by the
    simple act of "requesting" arbitration and then refusing to
    participate further is suspect. In Nissan's submission,
    counsel's actions and contentions are contrary to the very
    purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the state lemon
    laws, which is to encourage manufacturers to establish informal
    dispute resolution mechanisms so that the bulk of warranty
    disputes can be quickly and inexpensively resolved in unbiased
    neutral nonjudicial forums. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 2310
    (a)(1). We
    could not, of course, decide what the Lemon Law requires in the
    way of first resort even if it were before us, because of the
    absence of a record. We assume that the matter will come before
    us after final judgment in one of the district courts of this
    Circuit in the not too distant future.
    20
    asserting appellate jurisdiction in this case.
    C.
    Nissan has not argued that these orders entered by the
    district court are collaterally appealable.   See Cohen v.
    Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
     (1949).    At all
    events, there is no support for treating the orders as such.     To
    satisfy Cohen, the order must be conclusive, resolve an important
    issue severable from the merits of the action, and be effectively
    unreviewable upon appeal from the final order.    The district
    court's orders do not meet these requirements.    The fact that an
    order will require a party to continue to litigate the matter
    does not alone make the order effectively unreviewable.    See
    Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 
    490 U.S. 495
     (1989) (district court order
    denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in
    a contract was not a collaterally appealable order under Cohen);
    Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 863
    (1994) (district court's order vacating dismissal based on
    settlement agreement that would protect settling parties from
    trial was not a collaterally appealable order).   Therefore, there
    is no other basis for exercising appellate jurisdiction.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders
    denying appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction and appellant's motion for reconsideration are not
    immediately appealable.   The appeal will therefore be dismissed
    21
    for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
    22