Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London , 106 F.3d 494 ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1997 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-6-1997
    Dresser Ind Inc v. Underwriters Lloyds
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 96-1044
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    "Dresser Ind Inc v. Underwriters Lloyds" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 33.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/33
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 96-1044
    ___________
    DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; DRESSER CANADA, INC.,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON, AND CERTAIN LONDON
    MARKET COMPANIES; BISHOPGATE INSURANCE
    COMPANY, LTD.; BISHOPGATE INSURANCE P.L.C.;
    BRITISH LAW INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; CORNHILL
    INSURANCE, P.L.C.; DAI-TOKYO INSURANCE
    COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED; ENGLISH & SCOTTISH
    MARITIME & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.;
    EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED; HANSA
    MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LTD.; THE
    INDEMNITY MARINE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.;
    INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA (U.K.)
    LIMITED; ICAROM P.L.C. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE
    INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND LTD.); IRON
    TRADES MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; LONDON
    & HULL MARITIME INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.;
    MINSTER INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; THE NATIONAL
    INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW ZEALAND, LIMITED;
    NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; THE NIPPON
    FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY (UK) LIMITED;
    OCEAN MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; PEARL
    ASSURANCE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY; PHOENIX
    ASSURANCE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY; POLARIS
    ASSURANCE; PROVINCIAL INSURANCE PUBLIC
    LIMITED COMPANY; PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY
    LIMITED; SKANDIA U.K. INSURANCE P.L.C.;
    SPHERE DRAKE INSURANCE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
    (FOR ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR TO SPHERE
    INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED AND THE DRAKE
    INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED); SUMITOMO MARINE
    & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED;
    SWITZERLAND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
    (LONDON), LTD.; TAISHO MARINE AND FIRE
    INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; THE THREADNEEDLE
    INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED; THE TOKIO MARINE &
    FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED; VESTA (UK)
    INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; THE YASUDA FIRE &
    MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY (UK), LTD.; YASUDA
    1
    FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; THE
    YORKSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
    ___________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. No. 95-cv-04578)
    ___________
    ARGUED AUGUST 6, 1996
    BEFORE:   NYGAARD, LEWIS and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed February 6, 1997)
    ___________
    Mary M. O'Day
    Donald E. Seymour
    John K. Baillie
    Michael G. Zanic (ARGUED)
    Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
    1500 Oliver Building
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Attorneys for Appellants
    Edward R. Dunham, Jr.
    Miller, Dunham & Doering
    1515 Market Street
    13th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Martin R. Baach
    James P. Davenport (ARGUED)
    Nussbaum & Wald
    One Thomas Circle, N.W.
    Suite 200
    Washington, DC 20005
    Attorneys for Appellees
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ___________
    2
    LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
    The principal question we are asked to decide in this
    appeal is whether federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain a
    suit between diverse citizens when, in addition to those
    citizens, aliens appear as both plaintiffs and defendants.       We
    conclude they do, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), and will
    reverse the district court's decision to the contrary.
    I.
    Dresser Industries, Inc. ("Dresser"), a publicly held
    company incorporated in the State of Delaware with its principal
    place of business in Texas, and its subsidiary, Dresser Canada,
    Inc. ("Dresser Canada"), a corporation organized under Canadian
    law with its principal place of business in Ontario, Canada
    brought this action in the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the London Market
    Insurers for insurance coverage.     Dresser alleged that the
    district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(a)(3).   The London Market Insurers are comprised of
    underwriting syndicates at Lloyd's of London and companies
    participating in the London insurance market.     One of the
    Insurers, New Hampshire Insurance Company, is a corporation
    organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with
    its principal place of business in the State of New York.       The
    remaining London Market Insurers are aliens.
    The underlying dispute involves seven insurance
    policies that provide for $150,000,000 in excess liability
    3
    coverage.   The policies in question were not issued by a single
    insurer.    Each policy was "subscribed to" by a number of entities
    with each assuming a set percentage of the risk (and receiving a
    set percentage of the premium).       The percentages ranged from
    approximately 0.03% to 5.5%.   In addition, under the terms of the
    policies each of the insuring entities was to be severally liable
    for the particular percentage of the risk that it assumed.       New
    Hampshire Insurance had a 0.564% share of one of the policies at
    issue, which represented $282,000 in potential liability.
    The London Market Insurers moved to dismiss the action
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the
    presence of an alien as one of the plaintiffs and aliens as
    several of the defendants destroyed complete diversity.       The
    district court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.       Relying
    upon dicta in two opinions of this Circuit interpreting 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(a)(2), the court concluded:
    Under the rule of complete diversity, there is no
    federal subject matter jurisdiction over
    claims between the alien plaintiff and the
    alien defendants. Moreover, the reference in
    § 1332(a)(3) to aliens as "additional
    parties" does not apply to the instant
    action. The dispute is between Dresser and
    Dresser Canada and a lengthy list of insurers
    only one of which is a citizen, and whose
    exposure is limited to 0.564% of one of the
    three policies at issue. The alien insurers
    in this case cannot be considered additional
    parties.
    Dresser Industries, Inc. & Dresser Canada, Inc. v. Underwriters
    at Lloyd's, London, No. 95-4578, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
    1995) (interpreting Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 
    626 F.2d 293
    (3d
    Cir. 1980) and Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 
    9 F.3d 303
    (3d Cir.
    4
    1993) as requiring complete diversity among all parties).    This
    appeal followed.
    II.
    The district court's jurisdiction was predicated upon
    28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).   We have jurisdiction over the appeal
    from the final order of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291.   Our review of the district court's decision to dismiss
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.   Singh v.
    Daimler-Benz AG, 
    9 F.3d 303
    , 305 (3d Cir. 1993).
    III.
    A.
    Section 1332(a) provides in pertinent part that:
    The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
    all civil actions where the matter in
    controversy exceeds the sum or value of
    $50,000, exclusive of interests and costs,
    and is between --
    (1)        citizens of different States;
    (2)        citizens of a State and citizens or subjects
    of a foreign state;
    (3)        citizens of different States and in which
    citizens or subjects of a foreign state
    are additional parties . . . .
    28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).   To determine whether the district court had
    jurisdiction over this matter, we must interpret section
    1332(a)(3), which grants jurisdiction in cases between citizens
    of different states in which aliens are "additional parties."
    Toward that end, we begin with the plain language of the statute.
    See Commissioner v. Engle, 
    464 U.S. 206
    , 214 (1984); Health
    5
    Maintenance Org. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Whitman, 
    72 F.3d 1123
    ,
    1128 (3d Cir. 1995).
    The language of section 1332(a)(3) grants federal
    jurisdiction when aliens are additional parties.     The statute
    makes no distinction based upon which side of the controversy --
    plaintiff, defendant, or both -- the aliens appear.     Although the
    statute plainly requires that the dispute be between citizens of
    different states, it includes the phrase "additional parties"
    without any such limitation.    Dresser and the London Market
    Insurers disagree over how this language, or lack thereof, should
    be interpreted.
    Dresser contends that the words "additional parties,"
    which are unaccompanied by any limiting language, unequivocally
    vest federal courts with jurisdiction over disputes in which
    aliens appear on both sides of the controversy.     In other words,
    Dresser suggests that we need look no further than the language
    of the statute to answer the jurisdictional question.
    London Market Insurers maintains, however, that the
    statute as written is ambiguous.      They contend that the statute's
    failure to limit the phrase "additional parties" cannot be
    plainly interpreted to allow aliens on both sides of a
    controversy.   In support of this view, London Market Insurers
    offers two hypothetical constructions of the statute.     They claim
    that, had the statute contained language to qualify "additional
    parties," such as:     (1) "on either side of the controversy but
    not on both sides"; or (2) "on either or both sides of the
    controversy," then the statute would be unambiguous, but the
    6
    words "additional parties" standing alone render the statute as
    currently written subject to two interpretations.   Accordingly,
    they suggest, we must look to the statute's legislative history.
    We disagree.   Because we find that the language of § 1332(a)(3)
    is plain, we need not consider the legislative history.1
    1.    Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the legislative
    history is relevant to our analysis, we disagree with London
    Market Insurers' contention that a review of section 1332(a)(3)'s
    legislative history confirms that Congress intended this section
    to allow aliens on one side of the controversy only. At best,
    the legislative history is incomplete and does little to
    illuminate the statute. See James W. Moore, Moore's Judicial
    Code: Commentary 64 n.3 (1949). Although we agree with London
    Market Insurers that the Reviser's Notes to the statute indicate
    a specific congressional intention to allow for suits by a
    citizen against a diverse citizen and an alien, the Notes do not
    explicitly disallow suits between diverse citizens and aliens on
    both sides of the controversy. Moreover, other parts of the
    legislative history indicate that Congress was motivated by a
    desire to provide diverse citizens with a federal forum despite
    the presence of alien parties. K&H Business Consultants Ltd. v.
    Cheltonian, Ltd., 
    567 F. Supp. 420
    , 422-23 (D.N.J. 1983) (noting
    that the legislative history of § 1332(a)(3) indicates that it
    was enacted to provide a federal forum for suits among diverse
    citizens in which aliens were also parties). (For an interesting
    discussion of this point, see Nancy M. Berkley, Note, Federal
    Jurisdiction Over Suits Between Diverse United States Citizens
    With Aliens Joined to Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28
    U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 71, 94 (1985)
    [hereinafter Federal Jurisdiction] (noting that the purpose of
    § 1332(a)(3) was to provide a federal forum for diverse United
    States citizens irrespective of their involvement with alien
    parties)). We believe that allowing a case to proceed in federal
    court even though aliens are present on both sides of the
    controversy is consistent with this intent. As one commentator
    put it: "[I]t seems clear that the statute allows joinder of
    aliens on both sides of a controversy in which there is an
    underlying dispute between citizens of different American
    states." 1 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
    ¶ 0.75[1.-2-4], at 800.44 (2d ed. 1996); see also 13B Charles A.
    Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
    Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3604, at 390 (1984) ("[T]he language
    of Section 1332(a)(3) is broad enough to allow aliens to be
    additional parties on both sides of the dispute."); Federal
    Jurisdiction, supra at 87-89 ("[B]y not specifying where the
    ``additional' foreign parties are located within the suit, [§
    1332(a)(3)] permits a suit with aliens on both sides of the
    controversy . . . .").
    7
    Our holding is consistent with the circuits that have
    squarely addressed this issue and have uniformally concluded that
    jurisdiction exists when diverse citizens are joined with aliens
    even if they appear on both sides of the dispute.       See Goar v.
    Compania Peruana de Vapores, 
    688 F.2d 417
    , 420 n.6 (5th Cir.
    1982); Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 
    10 F.3d 425
    , 428 (7th Cir. 1993); Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan,
    Inc., 
    766 F.2d 1297
    , 1299 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Bank of New
    York v. Bank of America, 
    861 F. Supp. 225
    , 228-229 (S.D.N.Y.
    1994); Timco Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co., Inc., 
    603 F. Supp. 925
    ,
    929-30 (E.D. Pa. 1985); K&H Business 
    Consultants, 567 F. Supp. at 422-24
    .   But see Jet Traders Inv. Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd., 
    89 F.R.D. 560
    , 566 (D. Del. 1981).       As the Seventh Circuit noted,
    when citizens of states are on both sides of the litigation and
    are completely diverse, the presence of aliens on one or both
    sides of the controversy "fits section 1332(a)(3) to a t."
    
    Allendale, 10 F.3d at 428
    .
    In dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction, the
    district court concluded that the "complete diversity"
    requirement announced in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
    (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), precludes such a result.        We disagree.     In
    Strawbridge, the Supreme Court concluded that the precursor to 28
    U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) required that "each distinct interest should
    be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or
    may be sued, in the federal courts."       
    Id. As the
    Supreme Court
    later noted, however, the requirement of complete diversity is
    derived from "the words of the act of Congress," and not the
    8
    Constitution.   State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 
    386 U.S. 523
    , 531 (1967).     Article III of the Constitution requires
    only minimal diversity.     Id.; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
    Nigeria, 
    461 U.S. 480
    , 492 n.18 (1983).
    Again, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3)
    grants federal courts jurisdiction over controversies between
    diverse citizens joined with aliens.     Strawbridge's complete
    diversity requirement is, therefore, inapplicable.    As such,
    section 1332(a)(3) can best be understood as a congressional
    abrogation of the complete diversity rule.    1 Moore's Federal
    Practice ¶ 0.75[1.-2-4], at 800.44.    First, in addition to the
    plain language of the statute, this conclusion is supported by
    the fact that section 1332(a)(3) was added in the 1948 revision
    and codification of the Judicial Code, Title 28.     While the
    general diversity and alienage jurisdiction provisions had
    existed previously, section 1332(a)(3) was new.     As Strawbridge
    was decided long before Congress created this new provision, we
    must assume that Congress was well aware of the complete
    diversity requirement when it adopted section 1332(a)(3).
    Second, the language used by section 1332(a)(3) differs
    from the language used in both section 1332(a)(1) and section
    1332(a)(2).   1 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.75[1.-2-4], at 800.44
    ("The language of the additional provision for aliens mirrors the
    language of neither the diversity provision in § 1332(a)(1) nor
    the general alienage provision in § 1332(a)(2).").    Taken
    together, because Congress was well aware of the judicial
    interpretation of the diversity statute requiring complete
    9
    diversity, specifically used language that differs from the
    sections in which complete diversity had been applied, and used
    language which encompasses situations such as this, we must
    conclude that "complete diversity" of alien parties is not
    required under section 1332(a)(3).
    Likewise, the cases in which courts have stated that
    complete diversity is required among aliens when interpreting
    section 1332(a)(2) are simply inapplicable here.   See, e.g.,
    
    Singh, 9 F.3d at 305
    ("Other circuits have also construed the
    diversity statute to apply the complete diversity requirement to
    aliens.").   See also Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 
    626 F.2d 293
    ,
    296 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[The complete diversity] requirement
    pertains to suits between aliens as well as to suits between
    citizens."); Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters
    Corp., 
    506 F.2d 757
    , 758 (5th Cir. 1975) ("There is no indication
    -- legislative or judicial -- that a deviation from the rule
    applied in ordinary diversity cases would or ought obtain in a
    suit brought by an alien."); Eze v. Yellow Cab Co. of Alexandria,
    Va., Inc., 
    782 F.2d 1064
    , 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("A diversity
    suit in line with the Strawbridge rule, may not be maintained in
    federal court by an alien against a citizen of a state and a
    citizen of some other foreign country.").   These cases all
    addressed whether jurisdiction exists in suits between aliens on
    one side of the controversy and aliens and citizens on the other.
    Applying the complete diversity rule under these circumstances
    makes sense for two reasons.   First, the language of section
    1332(a)(2) parallels the language used in section 1332(a)(1).     As
    10
    such, applying the complete diversity requirement to that section
    represents a judicial attempt to interpret similar provisions in
    a similar manner.   Second, section 1332(a)(2) only grants
    jurisdiction in cases between aliens and citizens.   Cases between
    aliens on one side and aliens and citizens on the other,
    therefore, do not fit the jurisdictional pigeonhole.2
    Consequently, while a conclusion that the presence of aliens on
    both sides of the controversy defeats jurisdiction may be sound
    under section 1332(a)(2) as discussed above, such a conclusion is
    inconsistent with the plain language of section 1332(a)(3).
    Finally, our conclusion that the presence of aliens on
    both sides of the controversy does not defeat federal
    jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(3) is consistent with the
    policy considerations that form the foundation for diversity and
    alienage jurisdiction.   As one commentator has noted, "[i]t is
    the generally accepted view that diversity jurisdiction was
    established to provide access to a competent and impartial
    tribunal, free from local prejudice or influence . . . ."    1
    Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.71[3.-1], at 709.   Whether this
    prejudice or influence does in fact exist is not the question.
    As Chief Justice Marshall observed:
    However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the
    states will administer justice as impartially
    as those of the nation, to parties of every
    description, it is not less true that the
    Constitution itself either entertains
    apprehensions on this subject, or views with
    such indulgence the possible fears and
    2.    They also do not fit the pigeonhole created by section
    1332(a)(3) because section 1332(a)(3) requires citizens to be
    present on both sides of the controversy.
    11
    apprehensions of suitors, that it has
    established national tribunals for the
    decision of controversies between aliens and
    a citizen, or between citizens of different
    states.
    Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87
    (1809).
    In addition to fears of prejudice and bias, alienage
    jurisdiction is also based upon significant foreign policy
    concerns, which are exclusively within the province of the
    federal government. As Alexander Hamilton explained:
    As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences
    of courts, as well as in any other manner, is
    with reason classed among the just causes of
    war, it will follow that the federal
    judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
    causes in which the citizens of other
    countries are concerned. This is not less
    essential to the preservation of the public
    faith, than to the security of the public
    tranquility.
    The Federalist No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
    Cooke ed., 1961).   Alienage jurisdiction, therefore, reflects a
    national concern over our relations with foreign governments and
    how they may be affected by the resolution of controversies
    involving their citizens.
    Given the justification for diversity jurisdiction,
    there is a reasonable basis for the complete diversity rule.     If
    diversity jurisdiction exists because of a fear that the state
    tribunal would be prejudiced towards the out-of-state plaintiff
    or defendant, that concern is understandably allayed when that
    party is joined with a citizen from the forum state.   Indeed,
    when members from the forum state are present on both sides of
    12
    the controversy, it becomes more difficult to imagine that a
    state tribunal would favor one side based upon biases in favor of
    its own citizens.   Bank of New York v. Bank of America, 861 F.
    Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
    The same cannot be said, however, for applying the
    complete diversity rule to cases involving aliens.    The mere
    presence of aliens on both sides of the controversy does nothing
    to allay concerns that the in-state party will receive more
    favorable treatment.   While the bias towards aliens may be
    somewhat abated due to the presence of aliens on both sides of a
    case, the bias in favor of an in-state resident is not.
    Consider a case brought in New York state court where a
    citizen of New York and a citizen of
    Lithuania sue a Texan and a co-defendant. If
    the co-defendant is a New Yorker, the Texan's
    fear of bias will be allayed -- for in order
    to penalize the Texan the judge will have to
    harm one of his or her neighbors. On the
    other hand, if the co-defendant is a
    Lithuanian, the nervous Texan will be little
    comforted -- he or she has no reason to think
    that the judge will be any less willing to
    penalize a Texan and a Lithuanian than to
    penalize a Texan alone. For diversity
    purposes, an alien is an alien is an alien.
    
    Id. at 229.
      More important, the international relations concerns
    remain.   Indeed, the presence of aliens on both sides of the
    controversy heightens those federal concerns.
    Thus, while the need for diversity jurisdiction has
    been questioned, see 1 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.71[3.-2], at
    713-19, the need for alienage jurisdiction has not.    In fact,
    while legislation passed by the House of Representatives in 1978
    would have abolished diversity jurisdiction, it left the alienage
    13
    jurisdiction sections, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and (3), intact.
    
    Id. at 800.31
    n.7.    Given the globalization of the United States
    economy, and the fact that citizens of the United States are
    becoming increasingly involved in international transactions, the
    need for impartial national tribunals remains unchanged.
    B.
    The London Market Insurers alternatively argue, and the
    district court agreed, that even if section 1332(a)(3) grants
    jurisdiction when aliens are present on both sides of a case,
    they cannot be considered "additional parties."      The thrust of
    their argument is that because New Hampshire Insurance is only
    responsible for 0.564% of a single policy, the alien defendants
    are the principal parties.    As such, the main suit is between
    Dresser and the alien defendants -- not New Hampshire Insurance,
    which serves merely as "window dressing."      In effect, the London
    Market Insurers argue that section 1332(a)(3) requires us to
    weigh the relevant interests at stake.      We disagree.
    In support of this argument, the London Market Insurers
    rely upon L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,
    
    700 F. Supp. 114
    , 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).      In that case, the
    district court held, without explanation, that under section
    1332(a)(3) the United States citizens must be the "principal
    adverse parties."    We are unconvinced by this conclusion and can
    find no authority to support it.      The authority upon which the
    district court relied in turn rely only upon cases construing
    section 1332(a)(2).   As discussed earlier, however,
    section 1332(a)(2) and section 1332(a)(3) differ in both language
    14
    and form.    Because the statute's language does not demand such a
    weighing requirement and because the London Market Insurers
    cannot offer any reasoned authority to support its
    interpretation, we refuse to engraft such a requirement onto the
    statute.
    Under the plain language of the statute, we conclude
    that so long as there is a legitimate dispute between the
    citizens involved, jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(a)(3).    Bank of New 
    York, 861 F. Supp. at 229
    ; 1 Moore's
    Federal Practice ¶ 0.75[1.-2-5], at 800.47 ("[W]e stress that
    § 1332(a)(3) requires a legitimate dispute between citizens of
    different states to which the aliens are joined. . . . [T]he
    United States citizens [cannot be] merely window dressing for the
    principal dispute between aliens.").    The use of the term
    "additional" does not reference the level of involvement of the
    parties or the interests at stake.    Rather, it merely indicates
    that the jurisdictional hook upon which the case hangs is the
    existence of a legitimate controversy between diverse citizens,
    and unless that requirement is satisfied, jurisdiction will not
    exist.   As there is no dispute that the controversy between
    Dresser and New Hampshire Insurance is legitimate, we conclude
    that section 1332(a)(3) is satisfied.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district
    court will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for further
    consideration.
    _________________________
    15
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing opinion.
    _______________________________
    Circuit Judge
    16