United States v. Hsu ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1998 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-26-1998
    United States v. Hsu
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 97-1965
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/205
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    Filed August 26, 1998
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 97-1965
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    KAI-LO HSU, a/k/a JAMES HSU
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    CHESTER S. HO
    United States of America,
    Appellant
    ON APPEAL FROM THE
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Criminal Nos. 97-cr-323-1 and 97-cr-323-2)
    Argued: June 10, 1998
    Before: STAPLETON, COWEN, and RENDELL,
    Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: August 26, 1998)
    Michael R. Stiles
    Walter S. Batty, Jr.
    Richard W. Goldberg (ARGUED)
    Louis D. Lappen
    Office of the United States Attorney
    615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorneys for Appellant
    William E. McDaniels (ARGUED)
    Paul Mogin
    Williams & Connolly
    725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20005
    Thomas H. Suddath, Jr.
    Montgomery, McCracken, Walker
    & Rhoads, LLP
    123 South Broad Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19109
    Attorneys for Appellee,
    Chester S. Ho
    Norman E. Greenspan
    Ian M. Comisky
    Blank Rome Comisky &
    McCauley LLP
    One Logan Square
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellee,
    Kai-Lo Hsu
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
    In this appeal we explore for the first time the
    relationship between the confidentiality provisions of the
    newly-enacted Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.
    S 1831, et seq., and principles of criminal law regarding
    discovery and disclosure of material evidence. The district
    court ordered the government to disclose alleged corporate
    trade secrets based upon a theory that we find does not
    2
    apply. It also held that the defense of legal impossibility
    does not pertain to the attempt and conspiracy crimes with
    which the defendants are charged. We will affirm the
    court's holding regarding the applicability of the defense of
    legal impossibility, but will reverse its discovery order and
    remand for a review of other asserted defenses to the
    crimes in the indictment.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. The Government's Sting Operation
    On July 10, 1997, a federal grand jury indicted Kai-Lo
    Hsu, Chester S. Ho, and Jessica Chou (collectively,"the
    defendants") for their involvement in an alleged conspiracy
    to steal corporate trade secrets from Bristol-Myers Squibb.
    The indictment alleges that the defendants sought to obtain
    the processes, methods, and formulas for manufacturing
    Taxol, an anti-cancer drug produced by Bristol-Myers and
    regarded by the company as a highly valuable trade secret.1
    According to the indictment, the defendants' conspiracy
    began on June 7, 1995, when Chou, the Manager of
    Business Development for Yuen Foong Paper Company in
    Taiwan ("YFP"), requested information about Taxol from
    John Hartmann, an undercover FBI agent whom Chou
    mistakenly believed to be a technological information
    broker in the United States. From August 28, 1995, until
    January 12, 1996, Chou allegedly contacted Hartmann
    repeatedly to obtain information about Taxol manufacturing
    techniques and distribution. These contacts led to a
    meeting in Los Angeles on February 27, 1996, between
    Hartmann and Hsu, the Technical Director for YFP's
    operations. Hsu purportedly told Hartmann at that meeting
    that YFP wanted to diversify into biotechnology and to
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. The factual summary that follows is based entirely on the as yet
    unproven allegations in the July 1997 indictment. Because this is an
    interlocutory appeal, the record is not complete, discovery has not
    concluded, and no determination of the facts has yet occurred.
    Therefore, we offer these facts as averred to provide a context for the
    issues on appeal, without vouching for the truth of any of the facts we
    recite.
    3
    introduce technology from advanced countries into Taiwan.
    When Hartmann responded that Bristol-Myers would be
    unlikely to share its secret technology with YFP, Hsu
    allegedly responded, "We'll get [it] another way," and told
    Hartmann to pursue paying Bristol-Myers employees for the
    confidential Taxol formulas.
    The indictment asserts that Hsu and Chou then
    "communicated many times" with Hartmann over the next
    fourteen months to discuss the transfer of Taxol technology
    and to negotiate a specific price for the acquisition of
    Bristol-Myers's trade secrets. In response, Hartmann told
    the defendants that a corrupt Bristol-Myers scientist would
    be willing to sell Taxol information to YFP. The"corrupt"
    scientist was actually a Bristol-Myers employee cooperating
    with the FBI. Intrigued by such a prospect, Chou allegedly
    sent an e-mail to Hartmann on March 13, 1997, outlining
    the "core technology" that YFP would need to complete a
    deal, including:
    "1. The design and assembly of bioreactor with an
    agreed scale
    2. Light requirement
    3. Media requirement for growth and production
    4. Operating mode for the process, such as batch or
    continuous
    5. Yield, such as cell density, titers, taxane
    constitution
    6. Duration of culture to reach the maximal yield
    7. Scientific names of yew species which are
    applicable to the bioreactor.
    8. Cell lines excluded!!!"
    Chou also allegedly told Hartmann that she would offer
    $400,000 in cash, stock, and royalties to the Bristol-Myers
    scientist in exchange for his disclosure of the Taxol secrets.
    In addition, Chou and Hsu purportedly began making
    arrangements for a 1997 meeting between the parties, the
    purpose of which was for YFP to establish the authenticity
    of the "corrupt" scientist and to determine whether
    Hartmann really could produce the Taxol trade secrets that
    Chou and Hsu had requested.
    Hartmann agreed to a meeting, and on June 14, 1997, he
    and the Bristol-Myers scientist met with three
    4
    representatives from YFP, including Hsu, Ho, and another
    unidentified scientist, at the Four Seasons Hotel in
    Philadelphia. Ho was a professor of biotechnology and the
    Director of the Biotechnology Innovation Center at the
    National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan, and he had
    apparently been asked to evaluate the Taxol technology at
    the meeting as a favor to YFP.
    The indictment alleges that the bulk of the June 14
    meeting consisted of detailed discussions regarding the
    manufacturing processes for Taxol. The Bristol-Myers
    scientist explained the background and history of Taxol
    production, and displayed copies of Bristol-Myers
    documents outlining specific technological processes and
    scientific data pertaining to the manufacture of the drug.
    According to the indictment, these documents contained
    trade secrets and were "clearly marked with Bristol-Myers
    identification as well as the block stamped word
    ``CONFIDENTIAL.' " Hsu, Ho, and the other YFP employee
    reviewed the documents during the meeting and
    purportedly asked the Bristol-Myers scientist "numerous"
    questions regarding specific areas of Taxol technology.
    Finally, after Hartmann and the Bristol-Myers scientist left
    the room, the FBI rushed in and arrested Hsu and Ho at
    the hotel.2
    The indictment returned by the grand jury charged Hsu,
    Ho, and Chou with six counts of wire fraud in violation of
    18 U.S.C. S 1343, one count of general federal conspiracy in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, two counts of foreign and
    interstate travel to facilitate commercial bribery in violation
    of 18 U.S.C. S 1952(a)(3), one count of aiding and abetting
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2, and, most importantly for our
    purposes, two counts of criminal activity under the
    Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("the EEA"), including
    attempted theft of trade secrets, and a conspiracy to steal
    trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1832 (a)(4) and
    (a)(5).
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. An arrest warrant has since been issued for Chou, but she lives in
    Taiwan, which has no extradition treaty with the United States.
    5
    B. The Government's Motion to Maintain the
    Confidentiality of the Bristol-Myers Trade Secrets
    Shortly after the indictment was returned, the defense
    requested in discovery a copy of the Bristol-Myers
    documents disclosed to Hsu and Ho at the June 14
    meeting. However, on August 12, 1997, the government
    filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1835 and Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 16(d)(1) for a protective order to prevent the
    disclosure of the Bristol-Myers trade secrets allegedly
    contained in those documents.3 The government proposed
    that the district court enter an order under which the trial
    judge would review the documents and the proposed
    redactions by Bristol-Myers in camera, and would then
    permit redactions of proprietary secret information. The
    documents as redacted would be used at trial. The
    gravamen of the government's contention was that the
    defendants had no need for the actual trade secrets
    themselves, because they had been charged only with
    attempt and conspiracy to steal trade secrets, rather than
    with the actual theft of trade secrets, under the EEA.
    The defendants maintained, though, that unique
    constitutional and procedural requirements of criminal
    prosecutions dictated full access to the documents shown
    to them during the investigation. The defendants also
    contended that they needed the documents to establish the
    defense of legal impossibility, arguing that they could not
    be convicted of attempting to steal trade secrets if the
    documents did not actually contain trade secrets.
    Therefore, they proposed an order under which the
    proprietary information in the Bristol-Myers documents
    would be disclosed, but only to select members of the
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. Section 1835 is part of the EEA and provides, inter alia, that "[i]n
    any
    prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter
    such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and
    appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent
    with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
    Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws."
    Rule 16(d)(1) provides in relevant part that "[u]pon a sufficient showing
    the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be
    denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is
    appropriate."
    6
    defense team, such as the defendants' attorneys and trial
    experts, and under which the documents would befiled
    under seal and returned or destroyed at the end of the
    case.
    The district court agreed with the defendants and
    adopted their version of the proposed protective order. See
    United States v. Hsu, 
    982 F. Supp. 1022
    (E.D. Pa. 1997).
    The court held that legal impossibility is not a viable
    defense to the crime of attempted theft of trade secrets
    under the EEA, and it thus rejected the defendants'
    argument that they needed the documents to establish that
    claim. 
    Id. at 1028-29.
    Nevertheless, it ordered the
    government to divulge the alleged trade secrets, because it
    found that the existence of a trade secret is an essential
    element of the crime of the theft of trade secrets, and that
    the existence of a trade secret in that prosecution is "a
    question of fact which the defendants have the right to have
    a jury decide." 
    Id. at 1024.
    Believing the defendants to be
    charged both with actual theft and attempted theft of trade
    secrets, the court concluded that "if during discovery we
    deny to the defendants complete access to the Taxol
    technology, we inhibit their constitutional right to effective
    cross-examination as well as their right to have a jury,
    rather than a judge, determine whether a ``trade secret'
    exists." 
    Id. at 1025.
    Therefore, the court held, the
    defendants "are entitled to review the June 14th documents
    to the extent of their constitutional rights." 
    Id. at 1029.
    The district court's opinion "encourage[d]" the
    government to file an interlocutory appeal to clarify the
    "unsettled and important questions of law" raised by this
    case. 
    Id. at 1022
    n.1. Accordingly, the government appealed
    the district court's Order on November 25, 1997, pursuant
    to a section in the EEA providing that "[a]n interlocutory
    appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or
    order of a district court authorizing or directing the
    disclosure of any trade secret." 18 U.S.C. S 1835. We now
    have jurisdiction under that section, and we exercise
    plenary review over the novel legal questions presented by
    7
    the government's appeal. In re Grand Jury, 
    111 F.3d 1066
    ,
    1069 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).4
    We note at the outset that we disagree with the district
    court as to the offenses charged. The indictment is limited
    to charging the defendants with attempt and conspiracy
    and contains no charge of actual theft of trade secrets. As
    we will discuss below, we believe this changes the analysis
    greatly. We begin, though, with an overview of the EEA and
    an analysis of the relevant statutory provisions.
    II. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
    The EEA became law in October 1996 against a backdrop
    of increasing threats to corporate security and a rising tide
    of international and domestic economic espionage. The end
    of the Cold War sent government spies scurrying to the
    private sector to perform illicit work for businesses and
    corporations, S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 7 (1996), and by
    1996, studies revealed that nearly $24 billion of corporate
    intellectual property was being stolen each year. Richard J.
    Heffernan & Dan T. Swartwood, Trends in Intellectual
    Property Loss 4, 15 (1996).
    The problem was augmented by the absence of any
    comprehensive federal remedy targeting the theft of trade
    secrets, compelling prosecutors to shoehorn economic
    espionage crimes into statutes directed at other offenses.5
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. The issues are "novel" in part because this is a matter of first
    impression in the federal courts. Only five EEA prosecutions were
    publicly announced in the first eighteen months of the statute's
    existence, and none had proceeded to trial as of March 1998. See Lorin
    L. Reisner, Criminal Prosecution of Trade Secret Theft, N.Y.L.J., March
    30, 1998, at 1. Furthermore, EEA prosecutions are likely to remain
    infrequent in the near future, because the Attorney General of the United
    States has pledged that the government will not, until October 2001,
    pursue charges under the EEA "without the personal approval of the
    Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney
    General for the Criminal Division (or the acting official in each of these
    positions if a position is filled by an acting official)." 142 Cong. Rec.
    S12,214 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (letter of Janet Reno).
    5. Prior to the passage of the EEA, the only federal statute directly
    prohibiting economic espionage was the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.
    8
    For example, the government often sought convictions
    under the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), 18 U.S.C.
    S 2314, or the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.
    SS 1341 and 1343. However, the NSPA "was drafted at a
    time when computers, biotechnology, and copy machines
    did not even exist," S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 10, 6 and
    industrial espionage often occurred without the use of mail
    or wire.7 Consequently, it soon became clear to legislators
    and commentators alike that a new federal strategy was
    _________________________________________________________________
    S 1905, which forbids the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
    government information, including trade secrets, by a government
    employee. See, e.g., United States v. Wallington, 
    889 F.2d 573
    (5th Cir.
    1989) (upholding a defendant's conviction under S 1905 for running
    background checks on persons whom the defendant's friend suspected of
    trafficking in narcotics). However, the Trade Secrets Act was of limited
    value, because it did not apply to private sector employees and it
    provided only minor criminal sanctions of a fine and not more than one
    year in prison.
    6. In fact, several cases cast serious doubt as to whether the NSPA even
    applies to the type of intangible information involved in modern schemes
    of corporate espionage. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 
    473 U.S. 214
    ,
    216 (1985) (stating that the NSPA "seems clearly to contemplate a
    physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those
    eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the
    subject goods"); United States v. Brown, 
    925 F.2d 1301
    , 1307-08 (10th
    Cir. 1991) (holding that the theft of purely intellectual property is not
    punishable by the NSPA because it is not physical property within the
    meaning of the statute).
    7. State remedies were also of little assistance. As of 1996, at least
    twenty-four states had criminal statutes directed at the theft of trade
    secrets, James H.A. Pooley, et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage
    Act of 1996, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 177, 186 (1997), and forty-four
    states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of the
    Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which permits civil actions to enjoin and
    obtain damages for actual and attempted misappropriation of trade
    secrets. Victoria A. Cundiff, The Economic Espionage Act and You, 490
    PLI/Pat 9, 27 (1997). Yet the states often lacked sufficient resources to
    pursue espionage prosecutions, see 
    Pooley, supra, at 186
    , and
    corporations eschewed bringing civil lawsuits, because they had to
    shoulder their own litigation costs, individual defendants were frequently
    judgment proof, and it proved difficult for the state courts to exercise
    jurisdiction over lawsuits involving out-of-state defendants. See 
    Cundiff, supra, at 27
    .
    9
    needed to combat the increasing prevalence of espionage in
    corporate America. Congress recognized "the importance of
    developing a systematic approach to the problem of
    economic espionage," H. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996),
    reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025, and stressed
    that "[o]nly by adopting a national scheme to protect U.S.
    proprietary economic information can we hope to maintain
    our industrial and economic edge and thus safeguard our
    national security." S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 11. The House
    and Senate thus passed the Economic Espionage Act, and
    the President signed the bill into law on October 11, 1996.
    The EEA consists of nine sections which protect
    proprietary information from misappropriation. Three
    sections are of particular import to our analysis: what acts
    are penalized by the statute, how the law defines a "trade
    secret," and when trade secrets are to remain confidential.
    A. Criminal activities
    The EEA criminalizes two principal categories of
    corporate espionage, including "Economic espionage" as
    defined by 18 U.S.C. S 1831, and the "Theft of trade
    secrets" as defined by S 1832.8 The former provision
    punishes those who knowingly misappropriate, or attempt
    or conspire to misappropriate, trade secrets with the intent
    or knowledge that their offense will benefit a foreign
    government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent. The
    legislative history indicates that S 1831 is designed to apply
    only when there is "evidence of foreign government
    sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity." 142 Cong.
    Rec. S12,212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (Managers' Statement
    for H.R. 3723). By contrast, S 1832, the section under
    which the defendants are charged, is a general criminal
    trade secrets provision. It applies to anyone who knowingly
    engages in the theft of trade secrets, or an attempt or
    conspiracy to do so, "with intent to convert a trade secret,
    that is related to or included in a product that is produced
    for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the
    economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof,
    _________________________________________________________________
    8. The EEA also permits parallel civil actions to "obtain appropriate
    injunctive relief against any violation" of the statute. 18 U.S.C. S
    1836(a).
    10
    and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any
    owner of that trade secret." Section 1832(a) makes clear
    that attempt and conspiracy are distinct offenses, and it
    lists them separately from those acts that constitute
    completed crimes under the statute.
    Section 1832 also contains at least three additional
    limitations not found in S 1831. First, a defendant charged
    under S 1832 must intend to convert a trade secret "to the
    economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof,"
    including the defendant himself. This "economic benefit"
    requirement differs from S 1831, which states merely that
    the offense "benefit," in any manner, a foreign government,
    instrumentality, or agent. Therefore, prosecutions under
    S 1832 uniquely require that the defendant intend to confer
    an economic benefit on the defendant or another person or
    entity. Second, S 1832 states that the defendant must
    intend or know that the offense will injure an owner of the
    trade secret, a restriction not found in S 1831. The
    legislative history indicates that this requires "that the
    actor knew or was aware to a practical certainty that his
    conduct would cause such a result." S. Rep. No. 104-359,
    at 15. Finally, unlike S 1831, S 1832 also requires that the
    trade secret be "related to or included in a product that is
    produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce."9
    B. What constitutes a "trade secret"
    The EEA defines a "trade secret" to expressly extend
    protection to the misappropriation of intangible information
    for the first time under federal law. 18 U.S.C. S 1839(3)
    provides that a "trade secret" means:
    _________________________________________________________________
    9. Section 1832 also imposes more lenient punishments than S 1831.
    Under S 1832, individuals can be sentenced to ten years in prison
    and/or fined $250,000, and organizations can befined up to $5 million.
    Section 1831, however, provides that individuals can be imprisoned for
    fifteen years and/or fined $500,000, and organizations can be fined a
    maximum of $10 million. Moreover, under both sections, defendants are
    subject to criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S 1834, which states
    that a person or entity shall forfeit any property constituting, or
    derived
    from, the proceeds of an EEA crime, and, if the sentencing court "in its
    discretion so determines," any property used, or intended to be used, to
    commit or facilitate an EEA offense.
    11
    all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
    technical, economic, or engineering information,
    including patterns, plans, compilations, program
    devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
    techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
    whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how
    stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
    electronically, graphically, photographically, or in
    writing if --
    (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures
    to keep such information secret; and
    (B) the information derives independent economic
    value, actual or potential, from not being generally
    known to, and not being readily ascertainable through
    proper means by, the public.
    The EEA's definition of a "trade secret" is similar to that
    found in a number of state civil statutes and the Uniform
    Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), a model ordinance which
    permits civil actions for the misappropriation of trade
    secrets.10 There are, though, several critical differences
    which serve to broaden the EEA's scope. First, and most
    importantly, the EEA protects a wider variety of
    technological and intangible information than current civil
    laws. Trade secrets are no longer restricted to formulas,
    patterns, and compilations, but now include programs and
    codes, "whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how
    stored." Second, the EEA alters the relevant party from
    whom proprietary information must be kept confidential.
    Under the UTSA, information classified as a "trade secret"
    cannot be generally known by businesspersons or
    _________________________________________________________________
    10. For example, S 1(4) of the UTSA states that a "trade secret" includes:
    information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
    device, method, technique, or process, that:
    (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
    not
    being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
    proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
    from its disclosure or use, and
    (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
    circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
    12
    competitors of the trade secret owner. UTSA S 1(4). The
    EEA, however, indicates that a trade secret must not be
    generally known to, or readily ascertainable by, the general
    public, rather than simply those who can obtain economic
    value from the secret's disclosure or use. Finally, the EEA
    contains a definition crafted to reach only illicit behavior.
    Although legislators eliminated language providing that
    general knowledge, skills, and experience are not"trade
    secrets," 142 Cong. Rec. S12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)
    (Managers' Statement), it is clear that Congress did not
    intend the definition of a trade secret to be so broad as to
    prohibit lawful competition such as the use of general skills
    or parallel development of a similar product. See, e.g., 
    id. at S12,212
    (noting that "[t]his legislation does not in any way
    prohibit companies, manufacturers, or inventors from using
    their skills, knowledge and experience to solve a problem or
    invent a product that they know someone else is working
    on").
    C. Preservation of confidentiality
    The EEA also contains a provision designed to preserve
    the confidentiality of trade secrets during criminal
    prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. S 1835 states that a court:
    shall enter such orders and take such other action as
    may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the
    confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the
    requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
    Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other
    applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United
    States shall lie from a decision or order of a district
    court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any
    trade secret. (emphasis added).
    This section does not, of course, abrogate existing
    constitutional and statutory protections for criminal
    defendants. It does, however, represent a clear indication
    from Congress that trade secrets are to be protected to the
    fullest extent during EEA litigation. Moreover, it further
    encourages enforcement actions by protecting owners who
    might otherwise "be reluctant to cooperate in prosecutions
    for fear of further exposing their trade secrets to public
    13
    view, thus further devaluing or even destroying their
    worth." H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 13, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
    4032. Therefore, as with the definition of trade secrets, the
    confidentiality provision aims to strike a balance between
    the protection of proprietary information and the unique
    considerations inherent in criminal prosecutions.
    III. DISCUSSION
    With this statutory framework in mind, we turn our
    attention to determining whether the district court properly
    ordered the government to disclose the alleged trade secrets
    in this case. We begin by recognizing that the defendants
    are charged only with attempting to steal, and conspiring to
    steal, trade secrets under S 1832. The district court believed
    that the defendants were charged with both attempted theft
    of trade secrets as well as with "the completed offense of
    unauthorized conveyance of a trade secret under 18 U.S.C.
    S 
    1832(2)." 982 F. Supp. at 1023
    (emphasis added). It thus
    found that the defendants' constitutional rights to cross-
    examination and a fair trial would be violated absent full
    disclosure of the Bristol-Myers documents.
    However, the district court's analysis represents an
    incorrect reading of the indictment and a mistaken view of
    the charges lodged under the EEA. For one thing, there is
    no S 1832(2) in the statute. More importantly, the
    defendants are not charged with the completed offense of
    theft of trade secrets. They have been indicted only for
    attempting to steal, and conspiring to steal, trade secrets
    pursuant to SS 1832(a)(4) and (a)(5). Therefore, our task is
    to examine the defendants' entitlement to the information
    they seek, as defending against the attempt and conspiracy
    provisions of the EEA, rather than the completed theft
    provisions. We need not decide, as the district court did,
    whether a failure to disclose trade secrets would undermine
    the constitutional rights of defendants charged with a
    completed offense under the statute.
    The defendants argue that unfettered access to
    confidential documents is required even in EEA
    prosecutions for attempt and conspiracy. They assert that
    documents containing trade secrets are "material to the
    14
    preparation of the defendant's defense," and therefore, that
    they must be disclosed consistent with the terms of Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).11 In particular, they contend that
    disclosure is warranted by (1) the availability of a legal
    impossibility defense, and (2) their need for access to the
    proprietary information as it relates to their defense of the
    allegations of the indictment and other defenses to the
    crimes charged.12
    A. Legal Impossibility:
    The Relationship of the Existence of
    Trade Secrets to the Crimes Charged
    As previously mentioned, the district court believed that
    the defendants had been charged with the substantive
    offense of theft of trade secrets, and, without addressing in
    any detail the EEA's concern for confidentiality of trade
    secrets in prosecutions under the statute, concluded that
    the defendants' constitutional rights required disclosure of
    the redacted material. The court premised its view on the
    fact that the existence of a trade secret was an element of
    the offense, and that the defendants thus had a
    constitutional right to access the alleged secrets based on
    the due process and fair trial guarantees of the Fifth and
    Sixth Amendments.13 We need not determine whether the
    _________________________________________________________________
    11. It should be noted that the information sought to be disclosed here
    includes those portions of the documents used at the June 14 meeting
    which Bristol-Myers redacted before providing them to anyone, including
    their counsel. The district court did not examine the redactions or assess
    their true materiality. We have been advised by counsel for the
    government that the redactions consist of technical information that
    constitutes trade secrets under any definition.
    12. The defendants also argue that disclosure is warranted because the
    government has not met its burden of proving the need for a protective
    order precluding discovery of the documents. However, their argument is
    based entirely on the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
    and on the cases interpreting its requirements in civil actions. See,
    e.g.,
    Smith v. BIC Corp., 
    869 F.2d 194
    , 199 (3d Cir. 1989). No such burden-
    shifting or elements of proof exist under the facts of this case, where
    the
    government seeks to protect trade secrets in a criminal prosecution
    under the provisions of the EEA.
    13. Although seeking to address the government's interests in the
    confidentiality of trade secrets, the district court concentrated on the
    defendants' rights and did not engage in any discussion of the
    relationship between the two.
    15
    district court was correct in its ruling, because the crimes
    actually charged do not include the substantive offense of
    theft of trade secrets. Rather, the crimes charged--
    attempt and conspiracy -- do not require proof of the
    existence of an actual trade secret, but, rather, proof only
    of one's attempt or conspiracy with intent to steal a trade
    secret. 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a).14 We must determine how and
    to what extent this alters the analytic landscape, including
    statutory and policy considerations regarding confidentiality
    under the EEA, and principles of disclosure of material
    information under the federal criminal rules.
    It should be noted at the outset that the confidentiality
    provision of the EEA does not exist in a vacuum. As the
    EEA provides in S 1835, confidentiality must coexist with or
    be tempered by other principles of the law, including a
    defendant's constitutional rights and the Federal Rules of
    Criminal Procedure. Therefore, we must first ask whether
    the non-disclosure of trade secret data does have
    implications if a defendant is defending against charges of
    attempt and conspiracy to steal trade secrets. The answer
    lies in the resolution of the question of whether the non-
    existence of a trade secret matters in defense of an attempt
    or conspiracy crime. If the defense of legal impossibility is
    viable -- that is, if the defendants are not guilty of attempt
    if the material is not truly a trade secret -- then it could
    matter, and the defendants' constitutional or statutory
    rights could be implicated. If the defense of legal
    impossibility is not cognizable, then the existence or non-
    existence of an actual trade secret is of little consequence
    for an attempt or conspiracy crime. Thus, we willfirst
    _________________________________________________________________
    14. See, e.g., Model Penal Code S 5.01(1)(c) (declaring a defendant guilty
    of attempt when, "acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required
    for commission of the crime, he ... purposely does or omits to do
    anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an
    act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
    planned to culminate in his commission of the crime"); 
    id. at S
    5.02(1)(a)
    (stating that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy with other persons if,
    "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating[the crime's] commission
    he agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of
    them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt
    or solicitation to commit such crime").
    16
    address the threshold question of whether legal
    impossibility is a defense to crimes of attempt and
    conspiracy, as this discussion frames the remainder of our
    analysis.15
    1. Attempt
    The defendants' primary contention in the district court,
    and one of their principal arguments on appeal, is that they
    need to view the unredacted Taxol documents to prove their
    defense of legal impossibility. They assert that they can
    successfully defend against a charge of attempt to steal
    trade secrets if the documents used at the June 14, 1997,
    meeting did not actually contain trade secrets. Only by
    disclosure can they determine whether the materials did, in
    fact, contain proprietary information, and therefore mount
    their defense.
    The law of impossible attempts has received much
    scholarly attention, but remains a murky area of the law.
    The common law distinguishes between two types of
    impossibilities -- legal and factual -- and provides that the
    former is a defense while the latter is not. In this regard,
    "[l]egal impossibility is said to occur where the intended
    acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime."
    United States v. Berrigan, 
    482 F.2d 171
    , 188 (3d Cir. 1973).16
    _________________________________________________________________
    15. We emphasize that we need not reach, and are not determining, the
    issue addressed by the district court of whether the disclosure of trade
    secrets is mandated by the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure if a defendant is charged with the actual theft of trade
    secrets.
    This is a complex issue. For one thing, whether information qualifies as
    an actual "trade secret" is precisely defined by the EEA, and centers on
    such factual questions as how the information has been guarded by its
    owner and whether it is ascertainable by the public, rather than on the
    content of the secret or the defendant's requests as such. This raises an
    issue as to whether the information or formula itself is in fact material
    to the existence of the trade secret. In addition, the other elements of
    the
    offense, and the available defenses, may differ significantly if the
    defendant is accused of a completed crime rather than a crime of
    attempt or conspiracy.
    16. This type of legal impossibility is actually what some commentators
    have termed "hybrid" legal impossibility, because the actor's goal is
    17
    By contrast, "factual impossibility is said to occur when
    extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
    his control prevent consummation of the intended crime."
    
    Id. For example,
    legal impossibility occurs when A shoots a
    corpse believing it to be alive and intending to commit
    murder; the attempt does not amount to murder even if
    completed. Factual impossibility occurs when A fires a gun
    at a bed intending to kill V, and V is not on the bed; the
    crime cannot be completed because of extraneous factors
    beyond A's control.
    The difficulty, of course, is that the distinction between
    factual and legal impossibility is essentially a matter of
    semantics, for every case of legal impossibility can
    reasonably be characterized as a factual impossibility. For
    instance, the fact that A shoots a corpse, rather than a
    person, is also a product of circumstances beyond A's
    control; A did not commit murder because the person he
    intended to kill was already dead. Likewise, in the case at
    bar, the defendants argue that their crimes would have
    been legally impossible if the redacted portions of the June
    14 documents did not contain trade secrets. Yet this could
    just as easily be characterized as a factual impossibility,
    because extraneous circumstances unknown to the
    defendants, i.e., that documents they believed to contain
    trade secrets really did not, would have prevented the
    consummation of their crime.
    As a result, the great majority of jurisdictions have now
    recognized that legal and factual impossibility are "logically
    indistinguishable," United States v. Darnell, 
    545 F.2d 595
    ,
    _________________________________________________________________
    illegal, but commission of the offense is somehow rendered impossible by
    attendant circumstances. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding
    Criminal Law, S 27.07[D], at 372 (2d ed. 1995). Another type of legal
    impossibility -- "pure" legal impossibility-- occurs when the law does
    not even "proscribe the goal that the defendant sought to achieve." Ira P.
    Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 Harv.
    J. on Legis. 377, 389 (1986). Pure legal impossibility is always a
    defense.
    For example, a hunter cannot be convicted of attempting to shoot a deer
    if the law does not prohibit shooting deer in thefirst place. Therefore,
    we
    make clear that our discussion refers only to "hybrid" legal impossibility
    as we have defined it.
    18
    597 (8th Cir. 1976), and have abolished impossibility as a
    defense. See, e.g., United States v. Quijada, 
    588 F.2d 1253
    ,
    1255 (9th Cir. 1978) (eschewing any effort to distinguish
    between the two concepts); United States v. Duran, 884 F.
    Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that "categorizing
    a case as involving legal versus factual impossibility is
    difficult, if not pointless."), aff'd , 
    96 F.3d 1495
    (D.C. Cir.
    1996).
    In fact, we are the only circuit which continues to
    recognize a common law defense of legal impossibility. We
    established its validity in United States v. 
    Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 190
    , where we held that legal impossibility is a
    defense to certain crimes of attempt. Berrigan involved a
    federal prisoner convicted of attempting to smuggle letters
    in and out of a federal prison without the knowledge and
    consent of the warden, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1791 and
    28 C.F.R. S 6.1. The evidence showed that the defendant
    used another prisoner on study-release as a courier for his
    mail, believing all along that the warden was not aware of
    the duo's scheme. However, the warden had learned of the
    defendant's first correspondence, and, working with the
    police, he allowed the courier to carry all subsequent letters
    with his knowledge and consent. Thus, the defendant
    argued that his crime was legally impossible; he had been
    charged with attempt to smuggle letters without the
    warden's knowledge and consent, and yet the warden both
    knew and consented to the crime.
    On appeal, we agreed with the defendant and held that
    his crime was legally impossible. We recognized that
    "elimination of impossibility as a defense . . . is consistent
    with the overwhelming modern 
    view," 482 F.2d at 186
    (quotation omitted), but we concluded that legal
    impossibility remains a valid defense to common law crimes
    of attempt in this circuit. Emphasizing that "[f]ederal
    criminal law is purely statutory," 
    id. at 185,
    we wrote that
    we had no choice but to recognize a defense of legal
    impossibility in the absence of a federal statute providing
    otherwise. 
    Id. at 190.
    Therefore, we stated,"attempting to
    do that which is not a crime is not attempting to commit a
    crime." 
    Id. 19 In
    subsequent years, however, we have explored and
    defined Berrigan's reach and have recognized exceptions to
    the Berrigan rule. In United States v. Everett, we held that
    legal impossibility was "no defense to the charge of
    attempted distribution of a controlled substance under 21
    U.S.C. S 846 (1976)." 
    700 F.2d 900
    , 908 (3d Cir. 1983). In
    that case, a jury convicted the defendant of attempting to
    distribute the drug phenyl-2-propanone in violation of the
    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
    ("the Drug Control Act"). However, the liquid Everett gave to
    an undercover agent was not, in fact, a controlled
    substance. Relying on Berrigan, Everett thus argued that
    his conviction should be set aside as having been legally
    impossible; he was convicted of an attempt to distribute
    drugs, but the substance he distributed was not actually a
    narcotic.
    We rejected Everett's argument and held that Berrigan
    did not apply to the Drug Control Act. We noted that
    Berrigan was a case of statutory interpretation, and we
    found that we should limit its reasoning to the particular
    law in that case (18 U.S.C. S 1791). As our opinion stated,
    "[w]e cannot rest on Berrigan's interpretation of what
    Congress meant by the word ``attempts' when it enacted 18
    U.S.C. S 1791. Instead we must examine legislative intent
    anew. If Congress chose in enacting [the Drug Control Act]
    to define ``attempt' to punish efforts to [distribute narcotics]
    regardless of impossibility, that intent 
    governs." 700 F.2d at 904
    . Therefore, we reviewed the legislative history of the
    Drug Control Act, and we concluded that "Congress
    intended to eliminate the defense of impossibility when it
    enacted section 846." 
    Id. We agree
    with Everett's analysis and we believe it should
    be employed in this case. Consistent with Everett, we
    should resort to legislative intent to determine whether
    Congress meant to permit a defense of impossibility to an
    "attempt" crime under the EEA. When Congress uses a
    common law term such as "attempt," we generally presume
    that it intended to adopt the term's widely-accepted
    common law meaning, including any common law defenses
    such as impossibility. United States v. Cicco, 
    10 F.3d 980
    ,
    984 (3d Cir. 1993). However, as Everett recognized, "the
    20
    courts will not impose that meaning if there are ``grounds
    for inferring an affirmative instruction from Congress' to
    define it 
    otherwise." 700 F.2d at 904
    (quoting Morissette v.
    United States, 
    342 U.S. 246
    , 273 (1952)).
    After reviewing the legislative history of the EEA, we
    conclude that Congress did not intend to allow legal
    impossibility to be asserted as a defense to attempt crimes
    created by its terms. Congress never spoke directly as to
    why it used the term "attempt," or as to the issue of legal
    impossibility, in any of the reports or debates on the
    statute. We find, however, that, as we held in Everett, the
    underlying purposes of the law provide substantial evidence
    of a congressional intent that the defense of legal
    impossibility should not apply.
    One of the key findings in Everett was that the Drug
    Control Act was designed to offer a "comprehensive"
    solution to narcotics 
    offenses. 700 F.2d at 906-07
    . We
    concluded from this that Congress could not have intended
    to adopt the impossibility defense, "whose viability at
    common law was questionable at best," because doing so
    would only "hamper federal efforts to enforce the drug
    laws." 
    Id. at 907.
    Here, the very same goals, and the very same language,
    appear throughout the legislative history of the EEA. Just
    as the Drug Control Act embraced a "comprehensive"
    solution for drug trafficking, so too does the EEA attempt to
    provide a "comprehensive" mechanism for curtailing the
    escalating threat of corporate espionage. The Senate Report
    includes an entire section entitled "Need for a
    Comprehensive Federal Law," and "underscore[s] the
    importance of developing a systematic approach to the
    problem of economic espionage." S. Rep. No. 104-359, at
    11. The Report notes that "a Federal criminal statute will
    provide a comprehensive approach to [the theft of trade
    secrets] -- with clear extraterritoriality, criminal forfeiture,
    and import-export sanction provisions." 
    Id. at 12.
    Likewise,
    the House Report states that the EEA is designed to provide
    a "systematic approach" to trade secret theft, and asserts
    that "a comprehensive federal criminal statute will better
    facilitate the investigation and prosecution of this crime."
    H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4025.
    21
    The House also explained that the EEA was crafted to
    punish virtually every form of illegal industrial espionage,
    "from the foreign government that uses its classic espionage
    apparatus to spy on a company, to the two American
    companies that are attempting to uncover each other's bid
    proposals, or to the disgruntled former employee who walks
    out of his former company with a computer diskette full of
    engineering schematics." 
    Id. at 5,
    1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
    4024.17
    In an effort to undermine this evidence of intent, the
    defendants offer the statement of Senator Herbert Kohl, a
    co-sponsor of the trade secrets legislation, who commented
    that the EEA should "only be used in flagrant and
    egregious cases of information theft." 142 Cong. Rec.
    S12,212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). The defendants contend
    that this demonstrates an intent to limit the statute's
    reach. However, the Senator's remarks are taken out of
    context. His entire statement reads, in pertinent part, as
    follows:
    [W]e have carefully drafted these measures to ensure
    that they can only be used in flagrant and egregious
    cases of information theft. Moreover, trade secrets are
    carefully defined so that the general knowledge and
    experience that a person gains from working at a job is
    not covered.
    Mr. President, we do not want this law used to stifle
    the free flow of information or of people from job to job.
    But we built in a number of safeguards to prevent
    exactly these problems.
    
    Id. Senator Kohl
    did not intend to limit the statute's
    comprehensive scope. He meant merely to allay any fears
    that the government would use the EEA to police clearly
    _________________________________________________________________
    17. Individual legislators echoed these goals as well, declaring that the
    EEA would serve as a "comprehensive statute" to combat corporate
    espionage. 142 Cong. Rec. H10,461 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement
    of Rep. Hyde). Even the President himself stated upon signing the bill
    that "[t]his Act establishes a comprehensive and systematic approach to
    trade secret theft and economic espionage." Statement by President
    William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3723, reprinted in 1996
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034.
    22
    innocuous and otherwise lawful behavior, such as occurs
    when employees change jobs or start their own companies
    using general knowledge that they have acquired through
    prior employment. See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 104-359, at 12
    (clarifying that the EEA "does not apply to innocent
    innovators or to individuals who seek to capitalize on their
    lawfully developed knowledge, skill or abilities"). We do not
    read Senator Kohl's comments as undermining the
    comprehensiveness of the statute as it pertains to the theft
    of trade secrets. We believe that the great weight of the
    EEA's legislative history evinces an intent to create a
    comprehensive solution to economic espionage, and wefind
    it highly unlikely that Congress would have wanted the
    courts to thwart that solution by permitting defendants to
    assert the common law defense of legal impossibility.
    We also find it significant, as Everett did, that the statute
    we are considering was drafted at a time when "the doctrine
    of impossibility had become mired in fine distinctions and
    had lost whatever acceptance at common law it may have
    possessed when the statute considered in Berrigan was first
    enacted in 
    1930." 700 F.2d at 905
    . The EEA was drafted in
    1996, more than twenty-five years after the National
    Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws had
    concluded that the abolition of legal impossibility was
    already "the overwhelming modern position." 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    In fact, to this day, "[a]side from the Third Circuit
    in Berrigan, every Circuit that has considered the defense
    of impossibility has rejected it." 
    Duran, 884 F. Supp. at 580
    (emphasis added). Thus, we doubt that Congress meant to
    permit legal impossibility to be asserted as a defense to
    EEA crimes.
    Finally, we are mindful, as Everett 
    was, 700 F.2d at 907
    n.16, of the potential damage that the defendants' position
    could work on law enforcement under the statute. If we
    were to hold that legal impossibility is a defense to the
    attempted theft of trade secrets, the government would be
    compelled to use actual trade secrets during undercover
    operations in order to obtain convictions underS 1832(a)(4).18
    _________________________________________________________________
    18. The government claims that it used documents containing actual
    trade secrets in this case, only "because of the difficulty in preparing
    on
    short notice documents which appeared to be authentic for presentation
    to the trained scientists brought to the meeting by Hsu." (Gov't. Reply
    Br. at 4 n.3.)
    23
    Aside from the logistical difficulties this would create, it
    would also have the bizarre effect of forcing the government
    to disclose trade secrets to the very persons suspected of
    trying to steal them, thus gutting enforcement efforts under
    the EEA. We believe Congress could not have intended such
    a result, inasmuch as it was striving to prevent economic
    espionage and to maintain the confidentiality of trade
    secrets. Therefore, given the strong indicia of legislative
    intent, and given the practical import of a contrary finding,
    we conclude that Congress could not have intended EEA
    attempt crimes to be subject to the somewhat obscure and
    rarely used common law defense of legal impossibility.
    Accordingly, we hold that legal impossibility is not a
    defense to a charge of attempted misappropriation of trade
    secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a)(4). We agree with
    the district court's conclusion that a charge of "attempt"
    under the EEA requires proof of the same elements used in
    other modern attempt statutes, including the Model Penal
    Code. A defendant is guilty of attempting to misappropriate
    trade secrets if, "acting with the kind of culpability
    otherwise required for commission of the crime, he ...
    purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the
    circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or
    omission constituting a substantial step in a course of
    conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the
    crime." Model Penal Code S 5.01(1)(c) (1985).19 Thus, the
    defendant must (1) have the intent needed to commit a
    crime defined by the EEA, and must (2) perform an act
    amounting to a "substantial step" toward the commission of
    that crime. See 
    Cicco, 10 F.3d at 984-85
    (attempt crimes
    _________________________________________________________________
    19. We adopt the Model Penal Code ("MPC") test for attempt because it
    is consistent with our own caselaw and with the great weight of modern
    precedent. We have indicated that the MPC constitutes "well-settled
    principles of the law of attempt," United States v. Kikumura, 
    918 F.2d 1084
    , 1108 (3d Cir. 1990), we have found that it"is logical and in
    conformity with the purposes of the criminal law," United States v. Cruz-
    Jimenz, 
    977 F.2d 95
    , 102 n.10 (3d Cir. 1992), and we have employed its
    principles on several occasions. See, e.g., id.; 
    Cicco, 10 F.3d at 984-85
    ;
    
    Everett, 700 F.2d at 908
    . Moreover, the majority of federal courts have
    now embraced the MPC test for attempts as well. See 
    Cruz-Jimenz, 977 F.2d at 102
    n.8 (citing cases); 
    Dressler, supra
    , at S 27.09[A].
    24
    require a showing of intent and "evidence of conduct
    constituting a substantial step toward commission of the
    crime in pursuit of the culpable intent"); 
    Everett, 700 F.2d at 908
    (conviction for attempt requires proof of intent and
    "some measure of objective evidence corroborating the
    attempted" crime).
    It naturally follows that the government need not prove
    that an actual trade secret was used during an EEA
    investigation, because a defendant's culpability for a charge
    of attempt depends only on "the circumstances as he
    believes them to be," not as they really are. The government
    can satisfy its burden under S 1832(a)(4) by proving beyond
    a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to acquire
    information which he or she believed to be a trade secret,
    regardless of whether the information actually qualified as
    such. Consequently, in the instant case, the defendants
    have no arguable constitutional or statutory right to view
    the unredacted portion of the Taxol documents in order to
    defend against charges of attempt on the basis of legal
    impossibility.
    2. Conspiracy
    We also hold that the defendants have no need for the
    Taxol documents to defend against the government's
    charges of conspiracy, because we conclude that legal
    impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy. Although we
    have stated that impossibility may be a valid defense to
    attempt crimes, 
    Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 190
    , we have never
    recognized the defense for conspiracy charges, and we are
    persuaded by the views of our district courts, and by the
    decisions of our sister circuits, that the impossibility of
    achieving the goal of a conspiracy is irrelevant to the crime
    itself. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 
    935 F.2d 445
    , 470
    (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. LaBudda, 
    882 F.2d 244
    ,
    248 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Petit, 
    841 F.2d 1546
    ,
    1550 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Everett, 
    692 F.2d 596
    , 599 (9th Cir. 1982); Yepes v. United States, Civ. A. No.
    93-2310, 
    1993 WL 525578
    , at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 1993).
    It is well-settled that conspiracy and attempt serve
    different roles in the criminal law. The law of attempts was
    25
    traditionally viewed as a way "to deal with conduct which
    create[d] a risk of immediate harmful consequences."
    Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive
    Criminal Law, S 6.5(b), at 91 (2d ed. 1986). Even under the
    modern view, attempt prosecutions generally proceed only
    against those who have taken a "substantial step" toward
    commission of a substantive crime. See Model Penal Code
    S 5.01(1)(c) (1985). However, the law of conspiracy is much
    more preventive, aiming to nip criminal conduct in the bud
    before it has the chance to flourish into more ominous
    behavior. See 
    Wallach, 935 F.2d at 470
    (noting that
    conspiracy serves to protect society and prevent criminal
    behavior "in its early stages"); LaFave & Scott, supra,
    S 6.5(b), at 91 (stating that "[c]ourts have generally taken a
    broader view of the purposes of conspiracy"). As the
    Supreme Court has written,
    [t]he law of conspiracy identifies the agreement to
    engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient
    threat to social order to permit the imposition of
    criminal sanctions for the agreement alone, plus an
    overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the
    crime agreed upon actually is committed. Criminal
    intent has crystallized, and the likelihood of actual,
    fulfilled commission warrants preventive action.
    United States v. Feola, 
    420 U.S. 671
    , 694 (1975) (citations
    omitted).
    It is thus the conspiratorial agreement itself, and not the
    underlying substantive acts, that forms the basis for
    conspiracy charges. United States v. Jannotti, 
    673 F.2d 578
    ,
    591 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). The "illegality of the
    agreement does not depend on the achievement of its ends,"
    and it is "irrelevant that the ends of the conspiracy were
    from the very inception of the agreement objectively
    unattainable." Id.; see also United States v. Olgin, 
    745 F.2d 263
    , 273 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that "the objective
    impossibility of attaining the goals of a conspiracy is
    irrelevant to the guilt of those who conspire").
    Consequently, it is equally irrelevant that the commission
    of a substantive offense may have been legally impossible
    for the conspiracy to achieve all along. We therefore join
    our sister circuits, and the district courts in our own
    26
    circuit, in squarely holding that legal impossibility is not a
    defense to conspiracy.20
    As a result, the Taxol trade secrets in the Bristol-Myers
    documents are not "material" to the preparation of the
    defendants' impossibility defense, because proof that the
    defendants sought to steal actual trade secrets is not an
    element of the crimes of attempt or conspiracy under the
    EEA. A defendant can be convicted of attempt or conspiracy
    pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 1832(a)(4) or (a)(5) even if his
    intended acts were legally impossible.
    _________________________________________________________________
    20. We are aware of only three federal appellate decisions even implying
    that legal impossibility is a defense to conspiracy, but none of these
    cases is probative of the issue before us. First, in Ventimiglia v. United
    States, the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions of three defendants
    accused of conspiring to violate a Taft-Hartley Act provision forbidding
    the payment of money by an employer to "any representative of any of
    his employees." 
    242 F.2d 620
    (4th Cir. 1957). Because the defendants
    had paid a person who was not, in fact, a "representative of " their
    employees, the court held that the conviction for conspiracy was legally
    impossible. However, the defendants in that case knew that the
    individual in question was not a "representative" within the meaning of
    the statute. 
    Id. at 266.
    Therefore, the court's comments regarding legal
    impossibility were entirely in dicta; the convictions were reversed
    because the defendants did not even have the specific intent needed to
    sustain a charge of conspiracy.
    Second, in O'Kelley v. United States, the Eighth Circuit held that
    several defendants could not be convicted of a conspiracy to steal goods
    in interstate commerce where the goods were not in interstate commerce.
    
    116 F.2d 966
    , 968 (8th Cir. 1941). However, this statement was also
    dicta, because there was no jurisdiction to prosecute the defendants
    absent proof of an effect on interstate commerce, and, as in Ventimiglia,
    there was no showing that the defendants possessed the requisite
    criminal intent.
    Finally, in Woo Wai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
    conviction for a conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the U.S., because,
    inter
    alia, the act would not have been a crime even if completed. 
    223 F. 412
    ,
    414-15 (9th Cir. 1915). Yet Woo Wai was an entrapment case, and any
    references to the impossibility of the crime were wholly extraneous to the
    holding. Moreover, to the extent that Woo Wai states that impossibility
    is a defense to conspiracy in the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has
    since rejected that claim expressly. See, e.g., 
    Everett, 692 F.2d at 599
    ;
    United States v. Sanford, 
    547 F.2d 1085
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 1976).
    27
    B. Relevance of Purported Secret Information to
    Other Aspects of the Defense Strategy
    Having concluded that the defendants' right to access
    actual trade secrets is not required in order to defend
    against an element of the government's case, the question
    remains whether the defendants' right of access to the
    information as it relates to other defenses passes muster
    under the test of materiality. The defendants argue that the
    unredacted documents are also material to the preparation
    of the potential defenses of entrapment, outrageous
    government conduct, and jurisdiction, and contend that the
    documents are needed to defend against the elements of
    attempt and conspiracy, the allegations of the indictment,
    and the evidence that the government intends to introduce
    at trial.
    As an initial matter, we note that we are skeptical of the
    materiality, let alone relevance, of the redacted trade secret
    information to these issues. For example, the defendants
    argue that they need the unredacted documents to disprove
    the intent and "substantial step" elements of attempt and
    the "overt act" requirement of conspiracy.21 However, proof
    of these factors is necessarily independent of any trade
    secrets contained in the Bristol-Myers documents, because
    the defendants can be guilty of attempt and conspiracy to
    steal trade secrets even if the documents contained no
    confidential information at all. See MPC S 5.01(1)(c)
    (attempt), S 5.02(1)(a) (conspiracy).22
    _________________________________________________________________
    21. Conspiracy charges under S 1832 require both an agreement and
    an "overt act" in furtherance of the conspiratorial objective. See 18
    U.S.C. S 1832(a)(5) (providing that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy if
    he "conspires with one or more other persons" to commit an offense
    proscribed by S 1832, and if "one or more of such persons do any act to
    effect the object of the conspiracy").
    22. Moreover, the government has assured us that it has no intention
    to use or refer to the alleged trade secrets at trial. The government
    intends to prove its allegations instead by using other materials that
    reflect an attempt and a conspiracy to violate the EEA. For example, the
    government has stated that it may offer the e-mail list that Chou
    allegedly sent to Hartmann on March 13, 1997, outlining the "core
    technology" that YFP would need to complete a deal. By this list the
    government intends to prove that the defendants attempted to steal what
    they believed to be "trade secrets" without ever revealing the actual
    trade
    secrets themselves. The jury will thus never learn-- and will have no
    reason to learn -- of the content of the redacted material.
    28
    However, we will not address defendants' claim of need
    for the redactions as to any other defense or aspect of the
    case for two reasons. First, the defendants never raised the
    materiality of the redacted information as to any other
    defenses before the district court, and the court never
    addressed these other arguments in its opinion. The
    defendants' briefs to the district court argued only that the
    government must prove the existence of an actual trade
    secret in a prosecution for attempt and conspiracy and that
    legal impossibility remains a viable defense. We will not
    examine other contentions as to the materiality or relevance
    of trade secret information that are being raised for the first
    time on appeal. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 
    35 F.3d 840
    , 845 (3d Cir. 1994) ("This court has consistently held
    that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first
    time on appeal.").23
    Further, no one -- not this Court, not the district court,
    not even the parties themselves -- knows the content of the
    redacted Bristol-Myers documents at issue in this case. It
    was stated at oral argument that the documents have been
    reviewed and edited for trade secrets by Bristol-Myers
    employees alone, without any oversight by the court, the
    government, or the defense. Thus, while we might be
    skeptical of the defendants' asserted need for this
    information, we will not decide whether they have a right to
    access documents that could conceivably reveal information
    needed to preserve their rights to a fair trial. Only defense
    counsel know the precise contours of the defendants' case,
    and we are not in a position to make judgments about the
    _________________________________________________________________
    23. In some situations, we provide direction to the parties by
    addressing issues that are certain to arise upon a remand of the case,
    even if the issues were not discussed initially by the district court.
    See,
    e.g., New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House Owners v.
    Mayor of Asbury Park, ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-5483, 
    1998 WL 427231
    , at
    *2 (3d Cir. July 30, 1998) (highlighting statutory and constitutional
    claims "that may require further consideration" upon remand). Here,
    however, we are unable to offer informed guidance, because we are
    without the benefit of a full review of the redacted materials. The
    complete breadth of the defendants' arguments cannot be determined
    unless and until this case is remanded and the district court examines
    the potential defenses in light of the content of the Bristol-Myers
    documents.
    29
    impact of the redacted material without having seen the
    material ourselves.
    Accordingly, we will remand this action to the district
    court. If the defendants raise before the district court the
    additional arguments that they have urged on appeal, we
    would expect the district court to conduct an in camera
    review to determine whether the documents have been
    properly redacted to exclude only confidential information
    and to assess whether what was redacted is "material" to
    the defense.
    In such event, because "public policy requires protection
    of portions of a document, . . . in camera inspection by the
    trial judge or magistrate is unavoidable." Bogosian v. Gulf
    Oil Corp., 
    738 F.2d 587
    , 596 (3d Cir. 1984). Even if proof
    of an actual trade secret is not an element of SS 1832(a)(4)
    and (a)(5), an independent assessment of whether materials
    are nonetheless discoverable is anticipated in the language
    of S 1835, which provides that the district court "shall enter
    such orders and take such other action as may be
    necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of
    trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the
    Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal
    Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws." Rule
    16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
    enables the defendants to obtain documents in the
    government's possession that are material to the
    preparation of their defense, or are intended for use by the
    government as evidence in chief at trial. These principles
    suggest that the district court should examine the relevant
    portions of the Bristol-Myers documents to assess the
    materiality of those portions of the documents sought to be
    withheld. See United States v. Bocra, 
    623 F.2d 281
    , 285 (3d
    Cir. 1980) ("The submission of discovery materials to the
    court for an in camera inspection and decision as to which
    materials are discoverable is commonly used when the
    Government's need for preserving confidentiality over the
    materials must be balanced with the defendant's
    constitutional right to evidence material to his defense.").
    We leave to the district court the ultimate resolution of
    these issues if raised on remand by the defendants.
    30
    IV. CONCLUSION
    The district court's Order dated October 27, 1997, will be
    reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    31
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-1965

Filed Date: 8/26/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (21)

smith-francis-h-administrator-of-the-estate-of-smith-ethel-e , 869 F.2d 194 ( 1989 )

United States v. Everett, George , 700 F.2d 900 ( 1983 )

Frank Paul Ventimiglia, James Harold Parran, and Weather-... , 242 F.2d 620 ( 1957 )

United States v. Gerald Olgin, Marilyn Olgin, Jerome ... , 745 F.2d 263 ( 1984 )

O'KELLEY v. United States , 116 F.2d 966 ( 1941 )

United States v. Wallace G. Wallington , 889 F.2d 573 ( 1989 )

United States v. Thomas Arthur Darnell , 545 F.2d 595 ( 1976 )

United States v. William Bocra , 623 F.2d 281 ( 1980 )

United States v. Hector Cruz-Jiminez , 977 F.2d 95 ( 1992 )

United States v. Philip Berrigan, in No. 72-1938, and ... , 21 A.L.R. Fed. 105 ( 1973 )

United States v. Leon W. Labudda and Edward J. Mozdzeniak , 882 F.2d 244 ( 1989 )

Kisi Petelosanele Raass v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 692 F.2d 596 ( 1982 )

martin-harris-jesse-kithcart-william-davis-randall-cummings-evelyn , 35 F.3d 840 ( 1994 )

United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu , 982 F. Supp. 1022 ( 1997 )

United States v. John M. Brown , 925 F.2d 1301 ( 1991 )

United States v. Francisco Martin Duran , 96 F.3d 1495 ( 1996 )

United States v. Angel Petit, Roger Fernandez, Francisco ... , 841 F.2d 1546 ( 1988 )

United States of America, in No. 81-1020 v. Jannotti, Harry ... , 673 F.2d 578 ( 1982 )

paul-bogosian-and-louis-parisi-on-behalf-of-themselves-and-all-others , 738 F.2d 587 ( 1984 )

Morissette v. United States , 72 S. Ct. 240 ( 1952 )

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