United States v. Landmesser ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-11-2004
    USA v. Landmesser
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 03-2958
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Landmesser" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 373.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/373
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    PRECEDENTIAL          D. Toni Byrd (Argued)
    James V. Wade
    UNITED STATES COURT OF                  Office of Federal Public Defender
    APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT              Middle District of Pennsylvania
    Williamsport, PA 17701
    Daniel I. Siegel
    No. 03-2958                  Office of Federal Public Defender
    Middle District of Pennsylvania
    Harrisburg, PA 17101
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                       Attorneys for Appellant
    v.                     Christian A. Fisanick (Argued)
    George J. Rocktashel
    ROBERT LANDMESSER,                  Thomas A. Marino
    Appellant              Office of United States Attorney
    Middle District of Pennsylvania
    Williamsport, PA 17701
    On Appeal from the United States               Attorneys for Appellee
    District Court for the Middle District
    of Pennsylvania
    District Judge: The Honorable Judge            OPINION OF THE COURT
    James F. McClure, Jr.
    (D.C. No. 03-cr-35)            POLLAK, District Judge.
    On December 25, 2002, appellant
    Robert Landmesser (“Landmesser”), along
    Argued May 5, 2004
    with two persons not involved in this
    appeal, stole anhydrous ammonia from an
    Before: SLOVITER and FUENTES,
    agricultural supply business in Mill Hall,
    Circuit J and POLLAK, District Judge*
    Pennsylvania. The anhydrous ammonia
    was to be used to manufacture
    (Filed: August 11, 2004)
    methamphetamine. During the theft,
    anhydrous ammonia vapor was released
    from the tanks, burning Landmesser’s eyes
    and throat. On the next day, Pennsylvania
    *
    state troopers arrested Landmesser.
    The Honorable Louis H. Pollak,
    Senior District Judge for the Eastern             A federal grand jury returned a one-
    District of Pennsylvania, sitting by       count indictment against Landmesser on
    designation.                               February 13, 2003, charging him with theft
    of anhydrous ammonia in violation of 21           imprisonment. 3 Built into the sentence
    U.S.C. § 864(a)(1)1 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.2           was a two-level enhancement of the base
    Landmesser entered a plea of guilty, and,         offense level pursuant to the specific
    based on the factual findings and guideline       offense characteristic at U.S.S.G. §
    calculations set forth in the probation           2D1.12(b)(2), which applies when the
    official’s presentence report, the District       offense involves an “unlawful discharge,
    Court sentenced Landmesser to 24 months           emission, or release” into the environment
    of a “hazardous or toxic substance.” The
    District Court concluded that (1)
    anhydrous ammonia is a “hazardous
    substance” and (2) the release of the
    1
    anhydrous ammonia during the theft
    a) It is unlawful for any                  constituted an “unlawful discharge,
    person – (1) to steal                      emission, or release.”
    anhydrous ammonia, . . .
    knowing, intending, or                             Landmesser timely filed this
    having reasonable cause to                 appeal.4 While Landmesser does not
    believe that such anhydrous                dispute the District Court’s finding that
    ammonia will be used to                    anhydrous ammonia is a “hazardous
    manufacture a controlled                   substance,” he contends that the release of
    substance in violation of                  the anhydrous ammonia was not
    this part.                                 “unlawful,” and, therefore, that the two-
    level enhancement grounded on guidelines
    21 U.S.C. § 864(a)(1).                            section 2D1.12(b)(2) was unwarranted.
    2                                                      For the reasons set forth below, we
    (a) Whoever commits an
    conclude that the two-level enhancement
    offense against the United
    of Landmesser’s sentence was not
    States or aids, abets,
    justified. Accordingly, we will remand the
    counsels, commands,
    case to the District Court for resentencing.
    induces or procures its
    commission is punishable                   District Court Sentencing Ruling
    as a principal.
    (b) Whoever willfully
    causes an act to be done                      3
    The sentence also included a
    which if directly performed                three-year term of supervised release, a
    by him or another would be                 special assessment of $100 and a
    an offense against the                     required payment of $71.52 in restitution.
    United States, is punishable
    4
    as a principal.                                   This court has appellate
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
    18 U.S.C. § 2.                                    18 U.S.C. § 3742.
    2
    The District Court based its                          manufacture a
    sentencing ruling on the presentence                         controlled
    report, which calculated Landmesser’s                        substance.
    offense level pursuant to the applicable
    offense guideline – U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12.
    Section 2D1.12 provides, in relevant part:       (b)   Specific        Offense
    Characteristics
    (a)    Base Offense Level (Apply
    the greater):                             (1)   I f      t h e
    defendant (A)
    (1)    12, if the
    intended to
    defendant
    ma nuf a c ture
    intended to
    methampheta-
    manufacture a
    mine, or (B)
    controlled
    k n e w ,
    substance or
    believed, or
    knew       or
    h      a      d
    believed the
    reasonable
    prohibited
    cause        to
    f l a s k ,
    believe that
    equipment,
    prohibited
    chemical,
    f l a s k ,
    product, or
    equipment,
    material was
    chemical,
    to be used to
    product, or
    manufacture a
    material was
    controlled
    to be used to
    substance; or
    ma nuf a c ture
    (2)    9,   if th e                             methampheta-
    defendant had                            mine, increase
    reasonable                               by 2 levels.
    cause      to
    (2)   If the offense
    believe the
    involved (A)
    prohibited
    an unlawful
    f l a s k ,
    discharge,
    equipment,
    emission, or
    chemical,
    release into
    product, or
    t      h     e
    material was
    environme n t
    to be used to
    o f          a
    3
    hazardous or                substance,” the offense level was increased
    t o x i c                   by an additional two levels pursuant to
    substance; or               U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12(b)(2).
    ( B )    the
    At the sentencing hearing,
    unlawful
    Landmesser objected to the two-level
    transportation
    increase pursuant to § 2D1.12(b)(2),
    , treatment,
    maintaining that, although there may have
    storage, o r
    been a release, it was not an “unlawful”
    disposal of a
    one as defined by Application Note 3 to
    hazardous
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12. Application Note 3
    w a s t e ,
    states, in relevant part:
    increase by 2
    levels.                            Subsection (b)(2) applies if
    the conduct for which the
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12.
    defendant is accountable
    Because Landmesser “knew” that               under § 1B1.3 (Relevant
    the anhydrous ammonia “was to be used to                Conduct) involved any
    manufacture a controlled substance,” the                discharge, emission, release,
    District Court set a base offense level of              transportation, treatment,
    12 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12(a)(1);                 s t o r ag e , o r d is p o s a l
    additionally, because Landmesser “knew”                 violation covered by the
    that the anhydrous ammonia “was to be                   Resource Conservation and
    used to manufacture methamphetamine,”                   Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
    the offense level was increased by two                  6928(d), the Federal Water
    l e v e l s p ur sua nt to U .S .S .G . §               Pollution Control Act, 33
    2D1.12(b)(1). 5       Finally, because the              U.S.C. § 1319(c), or the
    District Court concluded that the offense               C o m p r e h e n s i v e
    involved an “u nlaw ful discharge,                      Environmental Response,
    emission, or release” of a “hazardous                   Compensation, and Liability
    Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5124,
    9603(b).6
    5
    During Landmesser’s change of             Landmesser argued at the sentencing
    plea proceeding, the court specifically
    asked Landmesser if, when he was
    6
    attempting to steal the anhydrous                       The reference in Application Note
    ammonia, he “knew perfectly well that it         3 to 42 U.S.C. § 5124 appears to be a
    was intended to be used for making               typographical error. Section 5124 of
    methamphetamine.” Joint App. at 31, ll.          Title 42 does not exist. The Sentencing
    10-13. Landmesser answered this                  Commission likely intended to reference
    question in the affirmative. Id. at l. 14.       49 U.S.C. § 5124.
    4
    hearing that, pursuant to Application Note       Hospital in Towanda.
    3, the two-level enhancement could only
    It can hardly be
    apply if the government had proved by a
    argued that that release was
    preponderance of the evidence that there
    lawful. In other words, that
    was a “discharge, emission, or release”
    Mr. Landmesser had any,
    violating the Resource Conservation and
    you know, authority to be
    Recovery Act (“RCRA”), the Federal
    r e le a s i n g it.   As I
    Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”)
    understand, the defense
    or the Comprehensive Environmental
    counsel’s position for it to
    Response, Compensation, and Liability
    be considered unlawful
    Act (“CERCLA”).
    under that clause, it has to
    The District Court overruled               qualify under application
    Landmesser’s objection to the proposed           note three as having been a
    sentence enhancement, stating:                   violation covered by those
    specific sections of the three
    [The Court]: Now, the pre-
    statutes.
    sentence report contains in
    paragraphs seven through                             I don’t think that’s a
    ten, I guess, the offense                 reasonable interpretation of
    conduct as summarized by                  t h a t s e c t io n o f t h e
    Mr. Rocktashel. And there                 guidelines. First of all, the
    are about three instances                 language of application note
    referenced there where there              three is not exclusive, and I
    was a release of the vapor.               think to interpret it as
    e x c l u s ive is not th e
    Paragraph ten refers
    reason a b le, logical
    to the fact that on that
    interpretation of clause two.
    particular instance the vapor
    released from the tanks                          Therefore,         the
    made Landmesser’s eyes                    objection is overruled. The
    and throat burn. Paragraph                Court believes that the
    13 refers to an entire area               conduct in this instance
    being covered in a vapor                  qualifies for           that
    cloud. Paragraph 14 refers                enhancement and that the
    to Landmesser being burned                release of that occurred, and
    when anhydrous ammonia                    it was unlawful for the
    was released from one of the              purposes          of   this
    tanks, and he received                    enhancement.
    medical treatment for the
    And even though the
    chemical burn at Memorial
    Court does not find – I’ll
    5
    certainly make that of                     Landmesser maintains that the District
    record; the Court does not                 Court’s interpretation of “unlawful” in
    find it was unlawful with                  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2) – namely that
    respect to any specific                    Landmesser was without “authority to be
    statutory provisions that are              releasing” the anhydrous ammonia –
    recited in the application                 renders Application Note 3 meaningless.
    note three. So that’s clear on             The gov ernm ent co ntend s that
    the record.                                Landmesser’s arguments fail because he
    does not cite to any “authority holding that
    Ms. Byrd: Just so I’m clear,
    [U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)] requires a
    Your Honor, you’re finding
    violation of one of the specific
    it’s unlawful because there
    environmental provisions set forth in the
    was a release during the
    application note.”
    theft?
    We find the government’s argument
    The Court: Yes.
    unconvincing. Under the basic tenets of
    App. 69-70 ll. 13-25.                             statutory construction, which apply to
    sentencing guideline interpretation, United
    The District Court then applied §
    States v. Milan, 
    304 F.3d 273
    , 293 (3d Cir.
    2D1.12(b)(2)’s two-level enhancement to
    2002), attention must be addressed to the
    Landmesser’s sentence and sentenced him
    entirety of a text, with a view to avoiding
    to 24 months imprisonment.
    interpretations that would render any
    Discussion                                        phrase superfluous. United States v. Swan,
    
    275 F.3d 272
    , 280 (3d Cir. 2002). And we
    Our review of the District Court’s
    have specifically ruled that “[a]n
    application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.12(b)(2) is
    application note must be given ‘controlling
    plenary. United States v. Brennan, 326
    weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
    F.3d 176, 200 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
    inconsistent with the regulation.’” United
    
    540 U.S. 898
     (2003).
    States v. Sau Hung Yeung, 
    241 F.3d 321
    ,
    Landmesser argues that the District        325 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) quoting United
    Court’s enhancement of his sentence by            States v. Miller, 
    224 F.3d 247
    , 253 n.8 (3d
    two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)           Cir. 2000).
    was inappropriate because, as the District
    The Sentencing Commission, in
    Court was at pains to make clear, the
    prefacing the phrase “discharge, emission,
    conduct for which Landmesser was
    or release” with the modifier “unlawful” in
    accountable was not found by the District
    § 2D1.12(b)(2), manifestly intended the
    Court to be a “discharge, emission, or
    release” constituting a “violation covered
    by” any of the three environmental statutes
    referred to in Application Note 3.
    6
    adjective to have meaning.6 That meaning
    is found in the text of Application Note 3.
    Under the language of Application Note 3,
    Offenses). The base offense level varies
    § 2D1.12(b)(2)’s enhancement applies if
    dramatically, depending on the type and
    the release of anhydrous ammonia that
    quantity of the drugs, on whether use of
    occurred during the theft was a “violation
    the drugs has resulted in serious injury or
    covered by” one of the three enumerated
    death, and on whether the defendant has
    statutes – RCRA, FWPCA or CERCLA.7
    a prior conviction for a similar offense.
    Among the specific offense
    6
    Compare U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2, which           characteristics is § 2D1.1(b)(5), which
    addresses Mishandling of Hazardous or             provides for a 2-level increase in offense
    Toxic Substances. The base offense                level for “an unlawful discharge,
    level is 8. “If the offense resulted in an        emission, or release into the environment
    ongoing, continuous, or repetitive                of a hazardous or toxic substance.” The
    discharge, release, or emission of a              initial wording of Application Note 19
    hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide         (former Application Note 20) is verbatim
    into the environment,” an increase of 6           the initial wording of Application Note 3
    levels is called for. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A).           of § 2D1.12(b)(2).
    Where the offense “otherwise involved a                   The Robison court concluded that
    discharge, release, or emission of a              nothing in the wording of U.S.S.G. §
    hazardous or toxic substance or                   2D1.1(b)(5) or the application note
    pesticide,” the required increase is 4            suggests “that the enhancement can apply
    levels. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B). With respect            only if a defendant is also convicted for
    to the application of this guideline,             violating one of the environmental
    whether the “discharge, release, or               statutes listed in the Application Note.”
    emission” is “unlawful” is not a stated           (emphasis in original). Id. at 497. In the
    factor.                                           instant matter, the government’s reliance
    on Robison is misplaced. Landmesser
    7
    The government invokes United             does not argue that, pursuant to
    States v. Robison, 19 Fed. Appx. 490              Application Note 3, section
    (9th Cir. 2001), an unpublished, non-             2D1.12(b)(2)’s enhancement would only
    precedential Ninth Circuit opinion, in            apply if he had been convicted of a
    which that court addressed U.S.S.G. §             violation under one of the three
    2D1.1(b)(5) and its Application Note 20,          enumerated statutes. Landmesser argues
    which has subsequently been renumbered            that, to support the two-level
    Application Note 19. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1             enhancement, the sentencing court must
    is the general drug guideline governing           make a finding of a violation of one of
    Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,                the three statutes, and that in the case at
    Exporting, or Trafficking (Including              bar the District Court specifically noted
    Possession with Intent to Commit These            that it had not found that the release
    7
    The District Court expressly stated that it                      A c c o r d in gl y, Land messer’s
    did not find that the release of the                       sentence will be vacated and this matter
    anhydrous ammonia was “unlawful with                       will be remanded for resentencing in
    respect to any specific statutory provisions               accordance with this opinion.
    that are recited in the application note
    three.” The District Court concluded that
    the release of the anhydrous ammonia was
    “unlawful” because Landmesser, having
    stolen the anhydrous ammonia, had no
    “authority to be releasing it.” Under the
    District Court’s rationale, § 2D1.12(b)(2)
    would appear to apply in every instance in
    which a “discharge, emission, or release”
    occurs in the course of a theft – an
    i n t e rp r e t a tion that w ould re nder
    A p p l i c a ti o n N o t e 3 e s s e n t i a l l y
    further argument captioned as follows:
    meaningless.8
    “Even if the District Court Construed §
    2D1.12(b)(2) Too Broadly, Landmesser’s
    constituted such a violation.                              Conduct Was ‘Covered By’ the
    Environmental Provisions Specified in
    8
    We find no support for the                         the Application Notes.” In support of
    proposition that the language of                           this argument the government cites two
    Application Note 3 is not exclusive.                       statutes – 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) and 49
    Nothing in the Note suggests that §                        U.S.C. § 5104(b) – and contends that
    2D1.12(b)(2) is meant to apply to                          Landmesser’s conduct was “covered by”
    conduct covered by environmental                           each of these statutes. As to the second
    provisions other than the three that are                   of these statutes the government says that
    specifically enumerated. Cf. Collinsgru                    what Landmesser did was “‘covered’ by
    v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 
    161 F.3d 225
    ,                     [the statutory provision], if not
    232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The canon of                          constituting an actual violation of that
    expressio unius est exclusio alterius                      provision.” However (as noted above),
    means that explicit mention of one thing                   Application Note 3 only addresses
    in a statute implies a congressional intent                conduct constituting a “violation covered
    to exclude similar things that were not                    by” (emphasis added) a listed statute.
    specifically mentioned.”). For the                         And the District Court (as also noted
    application of expressio unius est                         above) expressly “[did] not find [that
    exclusio alterius to interpretation of the                 Landmesser’s conduct] was unlawful
    guidelines, see United States v. Milan,                    with respect to any specific statutory
    supra, 304 F.3d at 293.                                    provisions that are recited in the
    The government’s brief presents a                  application note three.”
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-2958

Filed Date: 8/11/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015