United States v. Coffie ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-22-2004
    USA v. Coffie
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 02-3921
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Coffie" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 793.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/793
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 02-3921
    __________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee
    v.
    KEN COFFIE,
    a/k/a KENYATTA COFFIE,
    a/k/a ROBERT JACKSON,
    a/k/a ROBERT MOORE,
    a/k/a KENNY MOORE
    KEN COFFIE,
    Appellant.
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    Criminal Action No. 01-633
    District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
    __________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    April 20, 2004
    ___________
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, GARTH, and BRIGHT * , Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: April 22, 2004)
    __________
    *
    Myron H. Bright, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
    Circuit, sitting by designation.
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________
    Garth, Circuit Judge:
    On October 30, 2001, Appellant Ken Coffie was indicted by a grand jury in the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a
    felony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).1 The indictment also alleged that Coffie
    had seven prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, which would
    classify Coffie as an armed career criminal and trigger a sentence enhancement under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e). On March 1, 2002, following a three day trial, a jury found Coffie
    guilty of the charged offense, and separately found that Coffie had been convicted of
    seven predicate violent felony offenses.
    On October 16, 2002, the District Judge imposed a sentence of 235 months
    imprisonment, a term of supervised release of five years, and a special assessment of
    $100. Coffie now appeals. The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    ,
    and we exercise jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We will affirm.
    I.
    Coffie’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
    1
    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
     (g)(1) provides:
    It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a
    crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship
    or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
    commerce, any firearm or ammunition[.]
    -2-
    U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no non-frivolous issues raised in this appeal; he
    has also filed a motion requesting to withdraw as counsel. Coffie has filed a
    supplemental pro se brief, in which he argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing
    to argue on appeal that police officers apprehended him and seized his firearm in
    violation of Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968), and that the District Court admitted a
    statement at trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1968). The
    government has submitted a brief in which it agrees with counsel for Coffie that there are
    no nonfrivolous issues presented for appeal, and contends that Coffie’s ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim should not be heard on direct appeal, but rather should be
    raised for collateral review before the District Court under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    II.
    In reviewing an Anders brief, we ask (1) whether counsel adequately examined
    the record for appealable issues and explained why such issues are frivolous, and (2)
    whether an independent review of the record presents any non-frivolous issues. United
    States v. Youla, 
    241 F.3d 296
    , 300 (3d Cir. 2001). With regard to the first duty,
    counsel’s Anders brief must “assure us that counsel has made a sufficiently thorough
    evaluation of the record to conclude that no further discussion of other areas of the case
    is necessary.” United States v. Marvin, 
    211 F.3d 778
    , 780 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
    United States v. Tabb, 
    125 F.3d 583
    , 585 (7th Cir. 1997)). As to the second duty,
    “counsel must also explain to the court why the issues are frivolous.” Id. at 781.
    -3-
    Coffie’s counsel has met the first requirement by reviewing the record and
    identifying one possible issue that might arguably support an appeal: whether the District
    Judge properly sentenced Coffie as an armed career criminal under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) & 924(e) and the corresponding section of the United States Sentencing
    Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), § 4B1.4. In his brief, counsel argues that Coffie was properly
    sentenced under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e), which directs that a 15 year minimum sentence be
    imposed upon a defendant in possession of a firearm who has at least three predicate
    convictions.2 Counsel asserts that, under United States v. Schoolcraft, 
    879 F.2d 64
     (3d
    Cir. 1989), the District Court properly considered Coffie’s seven previous convictions
    when determining his status as an armed career criminal.3 In addition, counsel argues
    that the District Judge correctly enhanced Coffie’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4,
    which applies to a defendant who has been classified as an armed career criminal under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e).
    2
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) provides:
    In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
    previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title
    for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions
    different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and
    imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other
    provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a
    probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under
    section 922(g).
    3
    The jury determined that Coffie had been convicted of seven previous violent
    felonies or serious drug felonies – six robbery convictions and one conviction for
    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
    -4-
    Where an appellant has raised issues in a pro se brief that were not raised in his
    counsel’s Anders brief, this Court may consider those issues in determining whether the
    record presents any non-frivolous issues for appeal. Youla, 
    241 F.3d at 301
    . In his pro
    se brief, Coffie argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to attack his conviction
    under Terry and Brady, and for failing to consult with him regarding the instant appeal.
    The government responds that because no record was developed in the District Court
    which would enable this Court to assess trial counsel’s failure to request that the firearm
    be suppressed and to assess his failure to object to the alleged Brady violation, this Court
    should deny Coffie’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to United States
    v. Thornton, 
    327 F.3d 268
     (3d Cir. 2003). The government argues that this claim may
    only be raised in a collateral attack under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    III.
    Our independent review of both issues confirms that Coffie’s appeal is
    frivolous. First, Coffie’s counsel is correct that an appeal from the sentence entered by
    the District Judge would be frivolous. A jury convicted Coffie of violating § 922(g) –
    which carries a base offense level of 24 – and the jury also found that Coffie had been
    convicted of seven predicate violent felony offenses. As a result, the District Judge
    properly applied § 924(e), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years
    imprisonment, and triggers the application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Section 4B1.4 raised
    Coffie’s offense level to 33. Based on Coffie’s record of prior convictions, and on the
    -5-
    fact that he was on parole at the time the instant offense was committed and that he had
    been released from custody less than two years prior to committing the instant offense, he
    was assigned a criminal history category of VI. The corresponding sentencing range
    under the guidelines is 235-293 months. The District Judge imposed a sentence of
    imprisonment of 235 months, at the bottom end of the applicable range.
    Moreover, we agree with the government that on the record before us, Coffie’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be entertained. In Thornton, we noted that
    although we may address the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
    when the record is sufficient to allow determination of the issue, it has long been our
    practice to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack under
    § 2255. 
    327 F.3d at 271-72
    . We will therefore deny Coffie’s pro se claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel without prejudice to his right to bring this claim in a collateral
    attack pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    As required by Anders, Coffie’s counsel has conducted a conscientious review of
    the record and has concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues on which to base an
    appeal. Satisfied that all of the Anders requirements have been met, we will affirm the
    judgment of the District Court and we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. We
    certify that the issues presented in the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the
    filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b).
    -6-
    -7-