Butler v. City of Camden ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-18-2003
    Butler v. Camden
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 02-2903
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    Filed December 18, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 02-2903
    LEONARD BUTLER;
    SHIRLEY BUTLER, H/W,
    Leonard Butler,
    Appellant
    v.
    CITY OF CAMDEN, CITY HALL; TOWNSHIP OF
    PENNSAUKEN; TOWNSHIP OF CHERRY HILL; ROBERT
    ALLENBACH, POLICE CHIEF, CAMDEN POLICE
    DEPARTMENT; GALIAZZI, SERGEANT, CAMDEN POLICE
    DEPARTMENT; JEFF FRETT, POLICE OFFICER, BADGE
    NO. 133, CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
    Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-4367)
    District Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky
    Argued June 26, 2003
    Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges,
    and TUCKER,* District Judge
    (Opinion Filed: December 18, 2003)
    * Honorable Petrese B. Tucker, United States District Court Judge for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    2
    Alan E. Denenberg, Esquire (argued)
    Abramson & Denenberg, P.C.
    1200 Walnut Street
    Sixth Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Attorney for Appellant
    Jonathan E. Diego, Esquire
    Marc A. Riondino, Esquire (argued)
    Office of the City Attorney
    4th Floor, City Hall, Suite 419
    P.O. Box 95120
    Camden, NJ 08101-5120
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    TUCKER, District Judge.
    This is an appeal from a defense verdict following a jury
    trial. Appellant’s complaint alleged violations of his
    constitutional rights resulting from excessive force allegedly
    used against him by police officers following an early
    morning high speed chase through Camden and
    Pennsauken, New Jersey. Prior to trial all defendants
    except Camden City Police Officer Jeffrey Frett were
    dismissed.1 The jury was charged on two counts against
    Officer Frett, excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth
    and Fourth Amendments and bystander liability under the
    federal civil rights statute, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . Appellant has
    raised four assignments of error on this appeal.2 Our
    disposition of this case requires that we only consider the
    first question, which asks whether the district court’s
    1. Appellant’s complaint also named a second Camden City police officer
    and the police chief, the City of Camden, and the townships of
    Pennsauken and Cherry Hill.
    2. The jury returned its verdict on March 13, 2002, and judgment was
    entered on March 19, 2002. Appellant filed a timely Petition for
    Reconsideration/Motion for New Trial, which was denied by order of the
    district court on June 5, 2002. The instant appeal timely followed.
    3
    conduct of the voir dire infringed upon Appellant’s right to
    have his case decided by a fair and impartial jury.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A.   Facts
    The facts as developed at trial are as follows.3 On
    September 16, 1997, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Butler
    lead Camden City police officers on a 5-10 minute high
    speed chase. Butler did not stop until he reached
    Pennsauken, New Jersey, where he lived, stopping his car
    in the parking lot of the Liquor Ranch store. Butler claims
    he put his hands in the air at this point, a fact the defense
    disputed at trial. Thereafter Butler testified that two
    unknown officers approached his car with their guns
    drawn. Officer Frett, the third officer to approach, pulled
    Butler from the car and threw him face first to the ground.
    According to Butler, at this point Officer Frett and the two
    unknown officers proceeded to beat him for the next 3-5
    minutes about the head and body while he was “handcuffed
    and offered no resistance.” The beating is alleged to have
    continued until one of the unknown officers said “stop
    that’s enough.” Butler also testified that he heard another
    officer comment, “I didn’t think he could take an ass
    kicking like that.” Butler was then placed under arrest and
    charged with aggravated assault, resisting arrest and
    eluding arrest. Appellant’s lawsuit claims that he suffered a
    variety of physical injuries and “severe” emotional trauma
    as a result of the alleged beating.
    B.   Voir Dire Examination
    The trial judge conducted the questioning of the jury pool
    at voir dire. Following his initial examination, he called
    counsel to sidebar to determine whether they had any
    3. Appellee did not provide a counterstatement of facts and indicated
    only that he agreed with Appellant’s first paragraph, except for
    Appellant’s statement that he placed his hands in the air after he
    stopped the car. The recitation of the facts are therefore taken from
    Appellant’s statement of the facts. See Appellant’s Br. at 4-5.
    4
    supplemental questions to be asked of the jury panel.
    Appellant’s counsel requested that the district court
    propound the following four questions on the subject of law
    enforcement bias:
    1.   “Whether or not any members of the panel are
    more inclined to believe the testimony of a law
    enforcement officer over the testimony of a citizen.”
    N.T. (3/4/02) at 40.
    2.   “Does anyone have any feelings either adverse or
    pro toward police in general.” N.T. (3/4/02) at 41.
    3.   “Whether or not anyone was more inclined to feel
    force used by the Police Department was lawful
    simply because it was done during the course of an
    arrest?” N.T. (3/4/02) at 42.
    4.   “Whether or not any of the jurors have adverse
    feelings about individuals that lead police on
    pursuit.” N.T. (3/4/02) at 45.
    The trial judge denied the first request, stating, “Just put
    that in your requests to charge and I’ll put that in the
    charge to the jury . . . I give it as a standard charge in all
    cases, anyway.” N.T. (3/4/02) at 40. Regarding the second
    question, the following exchange took place between the
    court and counsel:
    MR. DENENBERG [appellant’s counsel]: Okay. I just
    thought it would be better to preempt that now, if
    anyone here had any feelings one way or another for or
    against police officers based on any experience that
    they had.
    THE COURT: Well, I tried to elicit that, but no one on
    the panel has ever been arrested, no one on the panel
    has ever served for a Police Department, nor does
    anyone on the panel have anyone in their immediate
    family who’s been with the Police Department, except
    for one individual, and none of them have been
    arrested, nor has any member of their immediate
    family been arrested.
    MR. DENENBERG: Okay. I think my question is a little
    different with respect to — you know.
    5
    THE COURT: Well, I will deal with that in the charge.
    If you want me to, I’ll charge — I give that charge, that
    they are to consider the testimony of all witnesses
    without regard to their occupations or whether they are
    members of the clergy or members of the Police
    Department.
    MR. DENENBERG: My question is a little different, as
    well as the second question, does anyone have any
    feelings either adverse or pro toward police in general.
    It would work both ways, toward both the defendant
    and the plaintiff.
    MR. DIEGO [defense counsel]: I don’t have any problem
    with the question being asked, I think the information
    we’re eliciting lends itself to that.
    THE COURT: Well, I don’t want to — my reluctance in
    asking that, I have no problem with giving a charge to
    that effect, my reluctance in asking it at this point is
    that no one on the panel so far has given me any
    indications that they’ve ever been arrested or that they
    believe or disbelieve a police officer or anybody else and
    I don’t want to highlight that. But, I will give you a
    charge in the charge that they are to consider the
    testimony equally. I think that in asking that question
    at this point, in light of what the voir dire has revealed,
    is more prejudicial than helpful.
    N.T. (3/4/02) at 40-42. The trial court rejected Appellant’s
    request to propound the fourth question on a similar basis.
    N.T. (3/4/02) at 45 (“I think by asking that question I make
    it worse.”). The court concluded the third question was
    inappropriate since it concerned a question of law that
    should be addressed in the jury charge. The court did not
    give the jury an instruction on the subject of law
    enforcement bias.
    II.   JURISDICTION
    The district court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s federal
    claims pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1343, and
    supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    . Our appellate jurisdiction
    6
    over the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motions for
    post-trial relief and a new trial is derived from 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . See Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 
    61 F.3d 147
    ,
    152 (3d Cir. 1995).
    III.   DISCUSSION
    A.
    The issue we decide is whether the district court erred in
    denying Appellant’s request to question the venire panel
    regarding potential law enforcement bias.4 The purpose of
    the voir dire is to both “enable[ ] the court to select an
    impartial jury and assist[ ] counsel in exercising peremptory
    challenges.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 
    500 U.S. 415
     (1991). The
    trial court’s duty to seat an impartial jury requires that it
    test prospective jurors for actual bias and strike for cause
    those persons “who will not be able to impartially follow the
    court’s instructions.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 
    451 U.S. 182
    , 188 (1981); United States v. Napoleon, 
    349 F.2d 350
    , 353 (3d Cir. 1965) (“[t]he trial court, while impaneling
    a jury, ‘has a serious duty to determine the question of
    actual bias.’ ”). Since the trial judge “must reach
    conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on
    their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of
    responses to questions,” the trial judge is necessarily vested
    with broad discretion in determining the manner and scope
    of the questioning. Rosales-Lopez, 
    451 U.S. at 188-89
    . This
    discretion is well established under federal case law, and
    an abuse of discretion will only be found where the district
    court’s voir dire examination is “so general that it does not
    adequately probe the possibility of prejudice.” Waldorf v.
    Shuta, 
    3 F.3d 705
    , 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States
    v. Boise, 
    916 F.2d 497
    , 505 (9th Cir. 1991)) (add’l citation
    omitted). See also United States v. Salamone, 
    800 F.2d 1216
    , 1226 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[f]ailure to make the necessary
    inquiry deprives the trial court of the benefit of the factual
    predicate that justifies an exclusion for cause.”).
    4. We review the district court’s conduct of voir dire for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Wooten, 
    518 F.2d 943
    , 945 (3d Cir. 1975).
    7
    It is well established as well that criminal and civil
    litigants have “the right to examine jurors on the voir dire
    as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind” to allow
    for intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Napoleon,
    
    349 F.2d at 353
     (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 
    283 U.S. 308
    , 313 (1931)). Peremptory challenges, though not
    constitutionally mandated, Ross v. Oklahoma, 
    487 U.S. 81
    ,
    88 (1988) (citations omitted), are recognized as a “necessary
    part of trial by jury” and their exercise may not be
    impermissibly infringed. Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 
    347 F.2d 775
    , 780 (3d Cir. 1965) (citing Pointer v. United States, 
    151 U.S. 396
    , 408 (1894)). To facilitate informed use of
    peremptory strikes, a party may submit questions for the
    trial court to pose to the jury pool to “probe for the hidden
    prejudices of the jurors” that may not otherwise be
    discovered. Napoleon, 
    349 F.2d at 353
     (citation omitted);
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a) (providing that where the court
    conducts the voir dire examination, “the court . . . shall
    itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional
    questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems
    proper”). Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a). Notwithstanding,
    it is generally not required that the “district judge . . .
    pursue any specific line of questioning on voir dire.”
    Waldorf, 
    3 F.3d at 710
    . However, the “trial court[’s] . . .
    broad discretion as to the questions to be asked . . . [is]
    subject to the essential demands of fairness.” Wooten, 
    518 F.2d at 945
     (citation and internal quotations omitted). What
    is required of the district court is that it make those
    inquiries necessary to satisfy both its duty to select an
    impartial jury and allow for intelligent exercise of
    peremptory challenges. Napoleon, 
    349 F.2d at 353
    .
    B.
    Appellant contends that district court’s failure to
    question the prospective jurors on potential law
    enforcement bias was prejudicial and impaired his right to
    a fair and impartial jury. Appellant argues that this inquiry
    was necessary and proper since all his witnesses on liability
    were civilians and defense witnesses were exclusively police
    officers, and the resolution of the dispute at trial turned on
    the credibility of these witnesses. Appellant further
    8
    contends that the prior precedents of this circuit and the
    majority of circuit courts to address this issue weigh in his
    favor. Conversely, Appellee contests Appellant’s claim that
    he was entitled to have the particular questions he
    proffered at voir dire asked of the panel, and contends that
    the trial court acted within its discretion and made those
    inquiries necessary to safeguard against any disqualifying
    disposition toward law enforcement.
    This court has not addressed the precise issue raised on
    this appeal. Challenges to the adequacy of the voir dire
    respecting juror attitudes toward police officials have
    primarily arisen in the context of criminal trials, with the
    issue also arising in some reported civil rights cases. See
    Paine v. City of Lompoc, 
    160 F.3d 562
     (9th Cir. 1998);
    Darbin v. Nourse, 
    664 F.2d 1109
     (9th Cir. 1981). The
    majority of federal courts of appeals to have passed on this
    question have held that the district court may, in certain
    circumstances, commit error when it fails to examine the
    jury pool for potential law enforcement bias when requested
    by counsel.5 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 
    338 F.2d 543
    (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 
    920 F.2d 77
     (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Gelb, 
    881 F.2d 1155
     (2d
    Cir. 1989); United States v. Baldwin, 
    607 F.2d 1295
     (9th
    Cir. 1979); United States v. Spaar, 
    748 F.2d 1249
    , 1254
    (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Espinosa, 
    771 F.2d 1382
    (10th Cir. 1985). In Brown, a leading case on this subject,
    the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
    recognizing the special deference a police officer’s credibility
    may be afforded by some venirepersons, observed:
    [W]hen important testimony is anticipated from certain
    categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official
    status is such that a juror might reasonably be more,
    or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to
    whether a juror would have such an inclination is not
    only appropriate but should be given if requested.
    
    338 F.2d at 545
     (then-Circuit Judge Burger). Courts
    following Brown have held that parties are entitled to have
    5. But see United States v. Lancaster, 
    96 F.3d 734
     (4th Cir. 1996) (en
    banc), overruling United States v. Evans, 
    417 F.2d 800
     (4th Cir. 1990);
    United States v. Lawes, 
    292 F.3d 123
     (2d Cir. 2002) (split panel).
    9
    the trial court examine the attitudes of the prospective
    jurors on the question of law enforcement bias as a means
    of providing “the parties . . . some surface information
    about prospective jurors which might furnish the basis for
    an informed exercise of peremptory challenges or motions
    to strike for cause based upon a lack of impartiality,”
    Baldwin, 
    607 F.2d at
    1297 (citing United States v. Segal,
    
    534 F.2d 578
    , 581 (3d Cir. 1976)) (add’l citation omitted),
    though reversal is not mandated in all cases.
    The cases in our circuit concerning the adequacy of the
    voir dire examination have applied these same principles. It
    is the rare case that the failure to ask a particular question
    has resulted in reversal. However, we have found error and
    reversed in cases where the district court barred all inquiry
    into a relevant subject matter designed to elicit a
    disqualifying prejudice. In United States v. Segal, supra, a
    certified public accountant was prosecuted for conspiracy
    and attempted bribery in connection with an Internal
    Revenue Service (“IRS”) audit. The accountant and his co-
    defendant requested voir dire on the question of whether
    any prospective juror or his or her immediate family had
    worked for the IRS or, alternatively, the state or local
    equivalent. The district court denied the request and we
    vacated the convictions. In deciding the case, we first
    acknowledged that “the parties have the right to some
    surface information about prospective jurors which might
    furnish the basis for an intelligent exercise of peremptory
    challenges or motions to strike for cause based on a lack of
    impartiality.” 534 F.2d at 581 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 
    424 U.S. 589
    , 598 n.9 (1976); Kiernan, 
    supra).
     A new trial was
    merited, the court concluded:
    [b]ecause of the circumstances in this case, the
    defendants would reasonably need to know whether
    any member of the panel or any person in his family
    had ever been employed with the Internal Revenue
    Service. The possibility of lingering loyalty to the
    service, friendship of person still employed there, or
    knowledge of agency procedures are all factors which
    counsel would weigh in deciding whether to challenge.
    
    Id.
    10
    Similarly, in United States v. Salamone, 
    supra,
     this court
    vacated a conviction where the district court categorically
    excluded all National Rifle Association (“NRA”) members in
    the jury pool by reason of their association without further
    inquiry. We held that the restricted scope of the voir dire
    “deprive[d] the trial court of the benefit of the factual
    predicate that justifies an exclusion for cause.” 
    800 F.2d at 1226
    . Finally, in Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 
    supra,
     a negligence
    action, the trial judge was found to have committed
    reversible error for refusing to propound questions designed
    to discover whether any panel members were employed by
    or had financial interests in a casualty insurance company
    or were employed as claims adjusters or insurance agents
    upon the plaintiff ’s request. These questions, the court
    held, were “relevant in ascertaining bias against one
    claiming damages for negligence.” 
    347 F.2d at 782
    . See also
    United States v. Poole, 
    450 F.2d 1082
     (3d Cir. 1971) (refusal
    to ask prospective jurors whether they or a family member
    had been a victim of robbery in an armed robbery trial
    reversible error).
    Appellee urges that these cases are distinguishable from
    the present because the district court asked the panel
    whether anyone had been arrested and whether they or an
    immediate family member were or had been employed by a
    police department, and these questions were adequate to
    elicit potential pro police bias. See N.T. (3/4/02) at 40-41.
    We are not persuaded. There is no basis to conclude that
    only arrestees or persons employed in law enforcement or
    their immediate relatives may harbor a disqualifying bias
    toward the police. As the First Circuit has observed, some
    venirepersons may believe “[l]aw enforcement officials wear
    an invisible cloak of credibility by virtue of their position.”
    United States v. Anagnos, 
    853 F.2d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 1988)
    (quoting United States v. Patriarca, 
    402 F.2d 314
    , 321 (1st
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    393 U.S. 1022
     (1969)).
    Appellee does not cite to any independent evidence
    presented at trial which corroborated his or the other
    officers’ testimony. Thus the trial in this case essentially
    boiled down to a swearing contest between Appellant and
    the responding police officers. In light of these
    circumstances, we are in accord with our sister circuits
    11
    which have held that “[w]here government [law
    enforcement] agents are apt to be key witnesses, the trial
    court, particularly if seasonably requested, should
    ordinarily make inquiry into whether prospective jurors are
    inclined to have greater faith in the agents’ testimony
    merely by virtue of their official positions.” United States v.
    Victoria-Peguero, 
    920 F.2d 77
    , 84 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing
    Anagnos, 
    853 F.2d at 3
    ) (add’l citations omitted); Spaar,
    
    748 F.2d at 1254
     (“We agree that a voir dire inquiry of the
    type . . . stated in Brown, ‘is not only appropriate but
    should be given if requested.’ ”).
    Of course, reversal is not necessarily compelled in every
    case where an error of this nature is committed. See Paine,
    
    160 F.3d at 565
     (“[w]hile some circumstances may require
    voir dire on bias in favor of police officer credibility, there is
    no automatic reversal for the lack of it.”); Gelb, 
    881 F.2d at 1165
     (same); United States v. Cardales, 
    168 F.3d 548
     (1st
    Cir. 1999) (no plain error where the defendant failed to
    request that trial court test jurors for potential police bias).
    We believe the harmless error analysis of the Baldwin court
    is appropriate and look to the following factors to determine
    whether the error in the voir dire served to deny Appellant
    his right to have his claims decided by a fair and impartial
    jury:
    [1] importance of the government agent’s testimony to
    the case as a whole; [2] the extent to which the
    question concerning the venireperson’s attitude toward
    government agents is covered in other questions on
    voir dire and on the charge to the jury; [3] the extent
    to which the credibility of the government agent-
    witness is put into issue; and [4] the extent to which
    the testimony of the government agent is corroborated
    by non-agent witnesses [or evidence].
    Baldwin, 
    607 F.2d at 1298
    , quoted in Gelb, 
    881 F.2d at 1164
    . We also consider a fifth factor: the extent to which
    the trial court’s charge to the jury may have remediated any
    prejudice. Paine, 
    160 F.3d at 565
    . As discussed previously,
    the defense’s case on liability consisted entirely of the
    testimony of Officer Frett and the other responding police
    officers and the outcome of this case was thus predicated
    on the jury’s determination as to these witnesses’
    12
    credibility. The court’s examination at voir dire did not
    touch upon the subject of potential police bias, and was
    limited to an inquiry into the panel’s arrest background and
    employment and familial connections to law enforcement.
    Nor did the district court’s charge to the jury include an
    instruction against police bias, despite the trial judge
    stating that such an instruction was standard and would
    be included in the charge.
    Notwithstanding, Appellee contends that the “equal
    standing of the parties” charge given by the district court
    effectively mitigated any prejudice Appellant may have
    suffered during the jury selection process. Again, we are
    not persuaded. The district court instructed the jury:
    This case should be considered and decided by you as
    a dispute between persons of equal standing in the
    community, of equal worth, and of the same station in
    life. The parties in this case, the plaintiff and
    defendant, are on an equal footing in this Court. You
    should base your verdict on an objective evaluation of
    the evidence that has been presented.
    N.T. (3/13/02) at 20.6 The concern in this case is that there
    may have been venirepersons in the jury pool who were
    dispositioned to credit the testimony of a police officer over
    that of a civilian simply by reason of the officer’s official
    status, and the district judge failed to engage in
    questioning which would have assisted him and counsel in
    identifying such venirepersons. Jurors are assumed to
    follow the law as instructed by the court. Richardson v.
    Marsh, 
    481 U.S. 200
    , 206 (1987) (“the almost invariable
    assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions”)
    (internal citation omitted). Thus, in some cases, depending
    on the circumstances, it may fairly be concluded that a
    police credibility charge substantially similar to that
    proposed by Appellant at trial had the effect of curing any
    6. The trial transcript of the charge conference and the district court’s
    charge to the jury is provided in Appellant’s supplemental appendix,
    submitted pursuant to this court’s order issued at oral argument. See
    Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). The supplemental appendix also includes
    Appellant’s proposed jury instructions as well as the district court’s
    written charges.
    13
    harm resulting from an inadequate voir dire.7 See Victoria-
    Peguero, 920 F.2d at 85; United States v. Nash, 
    910 F.2d 749
    , 755-56 (11th Cir. 1990). Such determinations,
    however, must be made on a case-by-case basis. Paine, 
    160 F.3d 565
    .
    We need not make that determination in this case since
    a law enforcement bias charge was not given by the district
    court.8 The equal standing charge was not an adequate
    substitute because it failed to draw the jurors’ attention to
    the fact that the testimony of the police officers was not to
    be given any more or any less weight than any other
    witness by reason of their status as police officers. The
    district court’s general instruction on witness credibility
    was likewise inadequate. In reaching this conclusion we do
    not decide that Appellant was entitled have the court ask
    all the supplemental questions he proposed. It is the trial
    court’s province to determine the questions to be asked,
    their phrasing and the scope of the inquiry into any subject
    matter, subject only to the requirements of fundamental
    fairness. United States v. Dansker, 
    537 F.2d 40
    , 56 (3d Cir.
    1976) (citing Wooton, 
    supra);
     Paine, 
    160 F.3d at 565
     (no
    error where trial court posed “other questions [on the
    subject of police bias] which would elicit partiality in favor
    of or against police officers[ ]”). The first two questions
    proposed by Appellant essentially cover the same ground,
    and the district court may on remand reasonably conclude
    that these questions are duplicative. Appellant’s fourth
    7. Appellant requested the following charge on police credibility at trial:
    “The testimony of a law enforcement officer is entitled to no more or less
    consideration based on the fact that the witness is employed in the law
    enforcement field. You are to evaluate the officer’s testimony as you
    would any other witness.” Appellant’s Suppl. Appendix at 9. See also
    N.T. (3/12/02) at 5-6.
    8. During voir dire, the trial judge indicated a willingness to include a
    police related bias charge in his instructions to the jury, but expressed
    the concern that questioning the jury pool on this issue would be “more
    prejudicial than helpful.” The trial judge did not expound on the basis
    for this belief and we will not speculate. However, we note the
    appropriate time to first address concerns about potential juror
    impartiality, particularly regarding matters material to the case, is
    during the voir dire examination.
    14
    question broadens the inquiry into jury pool’s attitudes
    toward law enforcement. It is within the district court’s
    discretion to determine whether additional questioning in
    this area is necessary to facilitate the selection process. As
    for the third question concerning whether a juror would be
    inclined to believe that any force used in the course of an
    arrest was lawful, the district court was well within its
    discretion in concluding that this matter concerned a
    question of law to be covered by the jury charge and not
    voir dire.
    Thus we recognize that the district court possesses wide
    latitude over the determination of the particular questions
    to be asked, and the scope of the inquiry at voir dire. See,
    e.g., Dansker, 
    537 F.2d at 56
    ; United States v. Madrigal, 
    43 F.3d 1367
    , 1372 (10th Cir. 1994) (no abuse of discretion
    “when the court inquires into the proposed subject matter
    in its own questions”). However, the law requires that the
    district court make those “inquiries relevant to the
    discovery of actual bias” and which, in the final analysis,
    satisfy “the essential demands of fairness.” Dansker, 
    537 F.2d at 56
    ; Wooten 
    518 F.2d at 945
    . We find that the
    district judge failed in this task.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we vacate the judgment entered
    below and remand for a new trial.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit