Tarrawally v. Atty Gen USA ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-29-2003
    Tarrawally v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 02-2951
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003
    Recommended Citation
    "Tarrawally v. Atty Gen USA" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 314.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/314
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    PRECEDENTIAL
    Filed July 29, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 02-2951
    SULAIMAN TARRAWALLY,
    Petitioner
    v.
    JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL
    OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (INS No. A 94-006-655)
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 10, 2003
    Before: NYGAARD, SMITH, Circuit Judges
    and IRENAS,* District Judge.
    (Opinion Filed: July 29, 2003)
    Counsel for Petitioner
    Steven A. Morley, Esq.
    Bagia & Morley
    The Bourse, Ste. 592
    111 S. Independence Mall East
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    * Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior United States District Judge for the
    District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
    2
    Counsel for Respondent
    Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Esq.
    Assistant Attorney General
    Civil Division
    Terri J. Scadron, Esq.
    Assistant Director
    Efthimia S. Pilitsis, Esq.
    Michael P. Lindemann, Esq.
    John D. Williams, Esq.
    Office of Immigration Litigation
    Civil Division
    U.S. Department of Justice
    P.O. Box 878
    Ben Franklin Station
    Washington, DC 20044-0878
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    I.    INTRODUCTION
    Petitioner Sulaiman Tarawally1 appeals the denial of his
    application for asylum and for withholding of removal
    under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and his request
    for relief under the United Nations Convention Against
    Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
    Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture” or
    “Convention”). We now add our voice to the chorus of other
    circuits which have held that a court of appeals lacks
    jurisdiction to review an asylum petition that an
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) or Board of Immigration Appeals
    (“BIA”) deems untimely. In reaching the merits of the
    petitioner’s requests for withholding of removal and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture, we conclude that
    the Immigration Judge’s finding that Tarawally was not
    1. Petitioner’s name is frequently misspelled “Tarrawally” in the record,
    as it is in the above caption.
    3
    likely to be persecuted or tortured was supported by
    substantial evidence.
    II.   FACTS
    Sulaiman Tarawally is a citizen of Sierra Leone who
    entered the United States in January 1998 as a visitor for
    pleasure with authorization to remain until February 10,
    1998. Tarawally filed an application for Temporary
    Protected Status, which was eventually denied. Sometime
    after October 12, 1999, he filed an application for asylum,
    withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture.
    During the asylum hearing that followed, Tarawally
    testified to his personal history in Sierra Leone. Tarawally’s
    father was chairman of the All People’s Congress (“APC”) for
    the Kono district of Sierra Leone. The APC was the ruling
    party until a 1992 coup, during which the National
    Provisional Ruling Council, also known as the Armed
    Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”), took power. In early
    1992, the AFRC arrested Tarawally’s father for his political
    activities and detained him for about a month. At that time,
    Tarawally was living in the town of Bamakonta, some nine
    to twelve miles away from his family. Sometime after his
    father’s detention, in March of 1992, Tarawally was visiting
    his family’s home and awoke one night to the sound of
    gunfire. When he discovered that the rest of his family was
    missing, he immediately left Kono. He spent three days
    walking to the town of Bo, Sierra Leone, where he lived and
    attended secondary school from 1992 to 1993.2
    In 1993, the school was closed due to civil unrest, so
    Tarawally traveled first to Guinea for three months, then to
    Gambia for a year, returning to Sierra Leone in 1994.
    Although Tarawally’s application for admission to Injala
    University in Bo was accepted, he did not attend because of
    financial constraints.
    2. Tarawally’s testimony on this point is unclear. He seems to suggest
    that between 1986 and 1993 his primary residence was in Bamakonta,
    but that he spent most of his time in Bo where he attended high school.
    4
    Tarawally regularly traveled back and forth between
    Sierra Leone and Gambia from 1994 until 1996. Sometime
    in 1996 or 1997, Tarawally was sleeping in a school in
    Gambia when other Sierra Leone citizens, also in Gambia,
    threw a Molotov cocktail into the building. When Tarawally
    attended a soccer game in Gambia, he was physically
    attacked by the same individuals who had thrown the
    Molotov cocktail.3
    Between 1993 and 1997, Tarawally advocated in support
    of the APC and assisted new members to register to vote.
    He also was active in the Student Mobilization For
    Democracy (“SMFD”), and the Youth Defense Army vigilante
    group in Sierra Leone. All of these groups opposed the
    Revolutionary United Front (“RUF ”) and AFRC.
    In 1996, Tarawally discovered that his family was living
    in the town of Makeni in Sierra Leone and visited them for
    a week. He then went to Freetown, Sierra Leone, where he
    lived for a year. Around this time, he became uneasy about
    his participation in the SMFD and therefore decreased his
    involvement in its activities.
    Although the Sierra Leone People’s Party had been
    elected to power in 1996, a coup d’etat occurred in May of
    1997, and the RUF, with support from the AFRC, overthrew
    the government.4 After the coup, the AFRC and the SMFD
    met in Freetown, and the AFRC threatened Tarawally and
    other SMFD members with amputation of their limbs if they
    did not cooperate and support the AFRC regime. Three days
    later, Tarawally was arrested5 in Freetown and then taken
    to the Pademba detention facility where he was held for
    several weeks and beaten. Around the same time, on June
    3. In his 1998 affidavit accompanying his asylum application, which was
    prepared with the assistance of his counsel, Tarawally claimed that the
    threats occurred in Gambia in 1994, and that he did not return to Sierra
    Leone until 1996.
    4. The RUF and AFRC subsequently merged into one party, but the party
    was overthrown in March of 1998 after Tarawally left Sierra Leone.
    5. In his affidavit, Tarawally stated that these threats about amputation
    were made when he was arrested, rather than at the meeting. During his
    cross-examination, he sought to explain the discrepancy by saying that
    the same threats were made on both occasions.
    5
    18, 1997, Tarawally’s father and sister were killed for their
    political activities and their opposition to the RUF.6
    Tarawally was able to escape from prison with the
    assistance of a former school friend who was working there.
    Tarawally fled through the jungle to Guinea, a journey of
    approximately 75 miles, which he said he made in two
    days. He then went from Guinea to Gambia. He
    subsequently fled to the United States.
    III.   PROCEDURAL POSTURE
    Following a removal hearing, the IJ issued an opinion in
    which he determined that because Tarawally did not file his
    asylum application within one year of his entry into the
    United States, his request for asylum should not be
    considered. The IJ then denied Tarawally’s application for
    withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture, finding that Tarawally was not credible
    because of: 1) his initial uncertainty as to how long his
    father was detained following arrest; 2) his lack of
    knowledge regarding how his father was treated in prison;
    3) his initial uncertainty as to what night he heard gunfire
    and fled Kono; 4) the implausibility that he would walk 97
    kilometers from Kono to Bo and “instead of trying to locate
    his missing family, decide[ ] to enroll in a school in that
    city;” 5) the inconsistency between his 1998 affidavit, in
    which he stated that he started a new chapter of the SMFD
    in Bo in 1997 and that he was chairman of the chapter at
    the school, and his later testimony that he stopped actively
    participating in the SMFD organization in 1996, and that
    he never attended the University; 6) the conflicting dates he
    provided of his arrest, both early 1997 and June of 1997;
    7) contradictions between petitioner’s affidavit and his
    testimony as to the dates he attended high school; 8)
    contradictions as to whether he attended the University and
    whether he applied in 1993 or in 1997 after his father’s
    death; 9) contradictions between his affidavit and his
    testimony as to whether threats of amputation occurred at
    6. In his affidavit, Tarawally stated that after his father and sister were
    killed he returned to Bo to attend the University, and it was at that time
    that the meeting between the SMFD and ARFC took place.
    6
    the meeting between the AFRC and SMFD or three days
    later; 10) his failure to testify, consistent with his affidavit,
    that he was cut with razor blades and beaten senseless
    when arrested; 11) the inconsistency between his statement
    that he left prison in June 1997 and his affidavit that he
    arrived in Guinea in September, and that the trip took him
    only two days; 12) the implausibility that, between 1993
    and 1997, he would have traveled back and forth between
    Sierra Leone and Gambia (a three to four day trip each way)
    with regularity to participate in student groups; and 13)
    contradictions as to whether he ever returned to Bo after
    1993.
    The BIA affirmed without opinion pursuant to 
    8 C.F.R. § 3.1
    (a)(7).7
    IV.   JURISDICTION
    The IJ had subject matter jurisdiction under Sections
    208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (“INA”), 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
    , 1231(b). The BIA exercised
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1
     and 240.15. We
    have jurisdiction under Section 242(a) of the INA, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a).
    V.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Although we normally review only the decisions of the
    BIA, where the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision, we
    “must then review the decision of the IJ.” Gao v. Ashcroft,
    
    299 F.3d 266
    , 271 (3d Cir. 2002).8
    We review de novo the issue of whether we have
    jurisdiction to determine what constitutes extraordinary
    circumstances for a late filed asylum petition. See Valansi
    v. Ashcroft, 
    278 F.3d 203
    , 207 (3d Cir. 2002).
    7. The BIA issued its ruling on June 13, 2002. In 2003, the regulations
    were renumbered and the streamlining regulation by which a single
    Board member is permitted to affirm without opinion is now set forth at
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (a)(7).
    8. Petitioner did not challenge our authority to review the IJ’s decision
    when the BIA issues a summary affirmance under the streamlining
    regulation, or the validity of the regulation.
    7
    The IJ’s adverse credibility determination and findings of
    fact with respect to his withholding and Convention claims
    must be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
    We will not disturb the IJ’s credibility determination and
    findings of fact if they are “supported by reasonable,
    substantial and probative evidence on the record
    considered as a whole.” Balasubramanrim v. INS, 
    143 F.3d 157
    , 161 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted). Although we generally defer to the IJ’s
    inferences, “deference is not due where findings and
    conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that
    are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a
    whole.” 
    Id. at 162
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    VI.   LEGAL ANALYSIS
    A.   Eligibility for Asylum
    An alien must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that he filed his asylum application within one year of
    arrival in the United States. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B).
    However, if the alien can establish that there are
    “extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing
    the application,” failure to file the application within the
    one year period may be excused. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(D).
    The   relevant   regulation   lists  as   one   possible
    extraordinary circumstance that “the applicant maintained
    Temporary Protected Status . . . until a reasonable period
    before the filing of the asylum application.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.4
    (a)(5)(iv). Tarawally argues that although he
    submitted his application for asylum more than a year after
    his arrival and although he was never granted Temporary
    Protected Status, the application for such status was itself
    an extraordinary circumstance.
    The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction to
    review this question. In most cases, this court has
    jurisdiction to review a final order of removal resulting from
    the denial of an asylum request. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1).
    However, INA Section 208(a)(3), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(3),
    provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any
    determination by the Attorney General under paragraph
    8
    [(a)](2),” which includes the provision relating to whether
    extraordinary circumstances warrant waiving the one year
    time limitation for asylum applications. While there must
    be “clear and convincing evidence” to support a finding that
    Congress intended to preclude judicial review of an
    administrative action, specific language in a statute that
    indicates an intent to preclude judicial review satisfies this
    requirement. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
    Sys. v. McCorp Fin. Inc., 
    502 U.S. 32
    , 44 (1991); Block v.
    Community Nutrition Inst., 
    467 U.S. 340
    , 349 (1984); see
    also INS v. St. Cyr, 
    533 U.S. 289
    , 298 (2001).
    In Ismailov v. Reno, 
    263 F.3d 851
    , 855 (8th Cir. 2001),
    the Eighth Circuit addressed whether it had jurisdiction to
    review the BIA’s determination that the petitioner failed to
    demonstrate extraordinary circumstances with respect to
    his failure to file his asylum petition within one year of his
    arrival in the United States. That court held that it had no
    jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision, “because
    § 1158(a)(3) clearly indicates congressional intent to
    preclude judicial review of decisions made pursuant to
    § 1158(a)(2).” Id.
    The Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s lead in
    Hakeem v. INS, 
    273 F.3d 812
    , 815 (9th Cir. 2001). In
    Hakeem, the IJ denied the petitioner’s request for asylum
    based on the untimeliness of his application, and the BIA
    dismissed the appeal, adopting the IJ’s reasoning. The
    Ninth Circuit held that based on the language in
    § 1158(a)(3) it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of
    asylum, as it was premised on the IJ’s finding that the
    petitioner failed to file his asylum application within one
    year after his entry into the United States.
    The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits subsequently addressed
    the same issue and held that they lacked jurisdiction to
    review denials of asylum petitions that an IJ or the BIA
    deemed untimely, based on the plain meaning of
    § 1158(a)(3). Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 
    318 F.3d 1226
    , 1230
    (10th Cir. 2003); Fahim v. INS, 
    278 F.3d 1216
    , 1217 (11th
    Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he language
    of section 1158(a)(3) is so clear that several courts have, in
    dicta, used the section as an example of a clear
    9
    congressional limit on courts’ jurisdiction.” Fahim, 
    278 F.3d at 1218
    .
    We agree that the language of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(3)
    clearly deprives us of jurisdiction to review an IJ’s
    determination that an asylum petition was not filed within
    the one year limitations period, and that such period was
    not tolled by extraordinary circumstances. We therefore join
    the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding
    that we are precluded from reviewing such determinations
    made pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2). See Tsevegmid,
    
    318 F.3d at 1230
    ; Fahim, 
    278 F.3d at 1217
    ; Hakeem, 
    273 F.3d at 815
    ; Ismailov, 
    263 F.3d at 855
    . While we lack
    jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of Tarawally’s asylum
    petition, based on the IJ’s finding of untimeliness,
    Tarawally’s applications for withholding of removal and
    relief under the Convention Against Torture are ripe for
    disposition.
    B.   Withholding of Removal
    The standard for withholding of removal under INA
    § 241(b)(3)(A), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A), is: “the Attorney
    General may not remove an alien to a country if the
    Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom
    would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group or political opinion.” The alien must establish by a
    “clear probability” that his life or freedom would be
    threatened in the proposed country of deportation. INS v.
    Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
     (1987); Janusiak v. INS, 
    947 F.2d 46
    ,
    47 (3d Cir. 1991). A clear probability means “more likely
    than not.” Stevic, 
    467 U.S. at 429-30
    .
    Since Tarawally did not introduce any evidence other
    than his testimony to show that he belonged to groups
    opposing the AFRC/RUF and was persecuted on account of
    his political opinion, the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination precludes Tarawally from prevailing on his
    INA withholding of removal claim. We therefore must
    determine whether the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
    was supported by substantial evidence.
    Tarawally argues that the reasons offered by the IJ for
    his adverse credibility determination were either based on
    10
    inferences or presumptions not grounded in the record as
    a whole, or on minor inconsistencies in dates that were
    easily explainable. First, Tarawally explains that his
    confusion as to dates was reasonably based, in part, on the
    fact that the events in question occurred almost nine years
    earlier. Second, he suggests that even though he requested
    that the hearing be held in English, the language barrier
    played a role in his misunderstanding the IJ’s questions.9
    Tarawally points to two examples of confusion which he
    claims arose from the language barrier. First, Tarawally
    suggests that the IJ did not understand what he meant
    when he said the rebel forces sought his father’s “consent.”
    The record demonstrates, however, that the IJ was able to
    determine that the “consent” the rebels were seeking was
    that Tarawally’s father agree to withdraw from his political
    activities. Second, when the IJ asked if Tarawally “missed”
    his father, Tarawally claims he was unsure whether the IJ
    was asking if he was longing for his father or whether the
    two failed to connect at a particular time. This alleged
    uncertainty does not demonstrate that Tarawally had
    difficulty comprehending English; a person fluent in the
    language could just as easily be confused by the use of the
    word “miss.” In any case, these examples are completely
    unrelated to the contradictions cited by the IJ. They do not
    demonstrate that Tarawally was having problems
    understanding the IJ because of a language barrier, and in
    light of the fact that Tarawally turned down the IJ’s offer to
    provide a translator, he cannot now blame inconsistencies
    in his testimony on his lack of fluency.
    Some of the IJ’s reasons for his adverse credibility
    determination were based on presumptions not grounded in
    9. In his brief in support of appeal to the BIA, Tarawally also pointed out
    that he injured his head in a serious automobile accident on May 20,
    2000, and was taking numerous prescription medications for
    forgetfulness and loss of memory. A letter dated June 15, 2000, from the
    Reading Hospital and Medical Center confirms that Tarawally was
    hospitalized for a month as a result of the accident, and that he
    “continue[d] to have significant cognitive deficits and [was] continuing
    therapy on an outpatient basis.” However, Tarawally did not introduce
    any evidence that he continued to experience cognitive deficits a year
    later when the hearing took place.
    11
    the record, such as his conclusion that it was implausible
    that Tarawally would not know exactly how his father was
    treated in prison, and that after walking 97 kilometers from
    Kono to Bo, “instead of trying to locate his missing family,
    [he] decided to enroll in a school in that city.” However, the
    IJ also offered other rationales which went to the heart of
    the withholding of removal and Convention claims, and
    which could not be adequately explained by forgetfulness
    on the part of petitioner. For example, the IJ noted that
    Tarawally stated in his affidavit that he started a school
    chapter of the SMFD in Bo in 1997 and that he was
    chairman of the chapter, but testified that he was rarely
    participating in SMFD meetings or activities in 1997, and
    was living in Freetown not Bo; he contradicted himself as to
    whether he ever attended the University and whether he
    applied in 1993 immediately after high school or in 1997
    after his father’s death; he stated that he left prison in
    June 1997 and arrived in Guinea in September, but that
    the trip took him only two days; and he could not decide if
    he had ever returned to Bo for SMFD activities after his
    high school closed in 1993.
    Moreover, although some minor discrepancies between
    Tarawally’s 1998 affidavit and 2001 testimony might
    be   understandable,     Tarawally   made     irreconcilable
    contradictory assertions within the span of a few minutes.
    Judge: I’m getting different answers here. He’s
    answering both ways. Let me, let me understand. From
    the time you left Bo in ‘93, did you go back there, yes
    or no?
    A: Yes
    Judge: You went back to Bo?
    A. [Indiscernible]
    Judge: Let me go on to the next tape. You can think
    about your answer while I change the tape.
    Q. All right. Now, you thought about the question,
    sir. Since you, since you left Bo in ‘93 did you ever
    return there? . . . Since you left Bo in ‘93 did you ever
    return to Bo?
    12
    A. No.
    . . .
    Q. When was the last time you lived at that address
    [in Bo]?
    A. ‘93.
    Q. ‘93
    A. Yeah
    Q. All Right.
    Judge: Proceed, Counsel.
    Tarawally to Judge: To ‘97, something like that.
    Judge: ‘93 to ‘97?
    A. ‘93, something like that . . . .
    These inconsistencies and contradictions are not minor in
    nature but are material to the claim. As such, they
    constitute substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s adverse
    credibility determination. Therefore, the IJ did not err in
    denying Tarawally’s application for withholding of removal.
    C. Convention Against Torture
    The IJ denied the application for withholding under the
    Convention, in part because he found that Tarawally lacked
    credibility. He also stated that even if Tarawally were
    credible, he did not prove that he would be tortured if
    returned to Sierra Leone.
    Under the Convention’s implementing regulations “the
    burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that it is
    more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
    removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2). The torture must be inflicted “by or at the
    instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
    public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
    
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(1). However, the torture need not be on
    the basis of Tarawally’s political opinion, as is the case with
    asylum and withholding of removal. The evidence that the
    decision-maker should consider in evaluating whether the
    petitioner would be tortured includes “[e]vidence of gross,
    13
    flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the
    country of removal” and “[o]ther relevant information
    regarding conditions in the country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(3). Several courts have held that “country
    conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief
    under the Convention.” Kamalthas v. INS, 
    251 F.3d 1279
    ,
    1280 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Mansour v. INS, 
    230 F.3d 902
    , 908 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a decision-maker
    must review claims for relief under the Convention and
    consider relevant country conditions even where adverse
    credibility determinations have precluded relief under the
    INA. See Mansour, 
    230 F.3d at 908
    ; Kamalthas, 
    251 F.3d at 1284
    .
    Petitioner suggests that even if his testimony is not
    credible, he established his eligibility for relief under the
    Convention based on the documents he submitted
    discussing country conditions. He claims that these
    documents demonstrate that torture by the AFRC/RUF, the
    current government, and the ECOMOG, a coalition of West
    African peace-keeping forces stationed in Sierra Leone, is so
    widespread that he is likely to be tortured if returned to
    Sierra Leone.
    While the documents do establish that citizens who do
    not support the AFRC/RUF are specifically targeted for
    torture, such as limb amputation, petitioner has introduced
    no evidence other than his own testimony that he was a
    member of groups opposing AFRC/RUF, such as the APC
    and SMFD. Therefore, accepting the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination, we must assume that the AFRC/RUF would
    treat Tarawally no differently than an ordinary citizen.
    Although Amnesty International recognizes that AFRC/RUF
    members commit “gross human rights abuses on a large
    scale,” [R. 333] and that many civilians are killed arbitrarily
    even if they do not oppose the AFRC/RUF [R. 344], these
    statements alone are insufficient to demonstrate that it is
    more likely than not that a particular civilian, in this case
    Tarawally, will be tortured by AFRC/RUF if returned to
    Sierra Leone.10
    10. Moreover, even if Tarawally could establish that he was likely to be
    tortured by the AFRC/RUF, his claim would still fail. The AFRC/RUF is
    14
    Similarly, Tarawally failed to establish the likelihood that
    he will be tortured by the current government and/or the
    ECOMOG. While both have been accused of “gross
    violations of human rights.” [R. 323], this does not
    demonstrate that it is more likely than not that Tarawally
    will be tortured.
    Nor can Tarawally prevail on his argument that the
    current government will detain and torture him because it
    will believe him to be a supporter of the rebels based on the
    fact that he fled the country. Tarawally introduces no
    evidence to support either the fact that the government
    detains individuals re-entering Sierra Leone, or the fact that
    it presumes such individuals to be its opponents.11 Thus,
    the IJ did not err in refusing to grant relief under the
    Convention Against Torture.
    no longer in power; therefore Tarawally cannot establish that any torture
    by the AFRC/RUF is at the instigation or with the acquiescence of the
    current government. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 
    329 F.3d 157
    , 183 (3d
    Cir. 2003) (upholding denial of relief under Convention because
    petitioner alleged he would be tortured by the LRA rebels and since this
    was a guerilla group that fought the government, the government did not
    acquiesce in the LRA activities); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 
    328 F.3d 719
    , 726
    (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding denial of relief under Convention because
    petitioner did not show that any public official had “awareness of this
    torture” by private individuals but refused to intervene and provide
    protection).
    It might be possible to argue that the AFRC/RUF should be viewed as
    a government entity since they were formerly in power, the Sierra Leone
    government is not particularly stable, and the AFRC/RUF might regain
    control at any moment. Nonetheless, in light of Tarawally’s failure to
    introduce substantial evidence to show the likelihood he will be tortured
    by the AFRC/RUF, we need not reach this issue.
    11. Cf. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2868, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2003 WL 21436806
     at *14-15 (3d Cir. June 23, 2003) (where documentary
    evidence showed that government routinely tortured those it detained, if
    IJ took administrative notice of the likelihood that petitioner would be
    detained upon his return, petitioner might be entitled to withholding
    under the Convention despite adverse credibility determination).
    15
    VII.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of
    the IJ.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit