In Re: Kaiser Grp ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-25-2005
    In Re: Kaiser Grp
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 04-1634
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    Recommended Citation
    "In Re: Kaiser Grp " (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1489.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1489
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 04-1634
    __________
    IN RE: KAISER GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC.,
    Debtor
    __________
    INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
    v.
    KAISER GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC.,
    Appellant
    FRANK J. PERCH, III,
    Trustee
    ___________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. No. 03-cv-00038)
    District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
    ___________
    Argued: December 15, 2004
    ___________
    BEFORE: NYGAARD and GARTH, Circuit Judges
    and POLLAK * , District Judge.
    (Opinion Filed: February 25, 2005)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    George E. Rahn, Jr., Esq. (Argued)
    Saul Ewing
    1500 Market Street
    Centre Square West, 38th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Counsel for Appellant
    Robert J. Stearn, Jr., Esq.
    Richards Layton & Finger
    One Rodney Square
    P. O. Box 551
    *
    Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge for the
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    -2-
    Wilmington, DE 19899
    Warren E. Zirkle, Esq. (Argued)
    McGuire Woods
    1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1800
    McLean, VA 22102
    Counsel for Appellee
    GARTH, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant, Kaiser Group International (“International”),
    appeals from the District Court’s decision granting International
    Finance Company’s (“IFC”)1 Motion to Dismiss International’s
    Third Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter
    Jurisdiction. In doing so, the District Court reversed the
    Bankruptcy Court to the extent that the bankruptcy decision
    concluded that International’s claims were within the scope of
    the waiver of sovereign immunity by IFC pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
    § 106(b).
    On appeal, International argues that its claims fall within
    1
    IFC is an international organization composed of
    member states, including the United States and the Czech
    Republic. As a public international organization, IFC is entitled
    to the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by the
    International Organizations Immunities Act, including sovereign
    immunity, a subject discussed in text infra.
    -3-
    the scope of IFC’s waiver of sovereign immunity, thereby
    conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court.
    It contends that its claims are both property of the estate and
    arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Proof of
    Claim filed by IFC in International’s bankruptcy proceeding and
    that, therefore, the claims asserted by International in the Third
    Amended Complaint are viable and should be considered on the
    merits. We agree.
    Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District
    Court, remand to the District Court, and direct that the District
    Court remand this case to the Bankruptcy Court so that there
    may be a ruling on the merits of International’s Third Amended
    Complaint.
    I.
    The District Court had jurisdiction over this case as an
    appeal from the determination of the Bankruptcy Court under 28
    U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
    158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    The District Court dismissed the instant action upon
    IFC’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction predicated on sovereign immunity.
    We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal
    under Rule 12(b)(1). In re Cybergenics Corp., 
    226 F.3d 237
    ,
    239 (3d Cir. 2000). When reviewing a facial challenge to this
    Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we accept all well-pleaded
    allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff. See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am.
    -4-
    Airlines Inc., 
    303 F.3d 293
    , 300 (3d Cir. 2002).
    II.
    As we indicated above, because the present appeal is
    before us on the District Court’s order granting IFC’s 12(b)(1)
    motion to dismiss, we must accept the allegations of the Third
    Amended Complaint as true and view them in the light most
    favorable to International. Consequently, the following factual
    summary is drawn from the facts as alleged in the Third
    Amended Complaint.
    A.
    On July 18, 1994, Kaiser Engineers (“Engineers”)3 , a
    debtor subsidiary of International, entered into a Letter of Intent
    with Nova Hut, a Czech steel manufacturer (“Nova Hut”),
    pursuant to which International agreed to provide certain
    advisory services to Nova Hut in connection with the
    construction of a continuous caster and reversing rolling mill,
    also known as a “minimill,” to be located in the Czech
    Republic. Nova Hut agreed to pay a fee of $1.5 million for
    those services. In order to assist Nova Hut funding the project,
    International eventually agreed to defer $510,000 of that fee.
    According to International, that fee was never paid.
    On November 8, 1996, International, Kaiser Netherlands,
    3
    Engineers is joined with International as a debtor in
    International’s bankruptcy proceedings.
    -5-
    B.V. (“Netherlands”), a wholly-owned, non-debtor subsidiary
    of International, and Nova Hut, entered into a Memorandum of
    Understanding for the construction of the minimill which set the
    total purchase price for Phase 1 of the project at $168.5 million.
    On June 27, 1997, Netherlands and Nova Hut entered
    into a contract for construction of Phase 1 of the minimill (the
    “Construction Agreement”) pursuant to which Netherlands
    agreed to design and supply Nova Hut’s existing steel mill with
    a “fully constructed, operational Phase 1 of the mini-mill for flat
    rolled products.” It is undisputed that International was not a
    party to the Construction Agreement. In order to finance its
    obligations under the Construction Agreement, Nova Hut
    obtained a secured loan from IFC in the amount of $125
    million.
    To secure Netherlands’ timely and proper design,
    manufacture, and construction of the mini-mill, the
    Construction Agreement required Netherlands to submit a
    performance letter of credit in the amount of $11.1 million (the
    “Letter of Credit”). The Construction Agreement provided that
    Nova Hut could draw down against the Letter of Credit if
    Netherlands breached the contract or failed to renew the Letter
    of Credit as required. First Union Bank issued the Letter of
    Credit on July 8, 1997 (as amended on September 15, 1998).
    It is also undisputed that Netherlands, not International,
    is listed as the “customer” on the Letter of Credit. At the same
    time, according to the Third Amended Complaint, First Union
    Bank required International to post collateral as security for the
    Letter of Credit. To meet this requirement, International
    -6-
    deposited $11.1 million in cash with First Union Bank.
    To further ensure Netherlands’ performance under the
    Construction Agreement, International executed a written
    “Guaranty of the Performance of Kaiser Netherlands” pursuant
    to the agreement between Nova Hut and Netherlands (the
    “Performance Guaranty”).         This Performance Guaranty
    provided that if Netherlands failed to prove that the mini-mill
    passed the requisite performance tests, and if Netherlands was
    unable to correct that deficiency or pay Nova Hut what it owed,
    then Nova Hut would have the right to seek liquidated damages
    from International.
    On November 7, 1997, Nova Hut granted IFC a security
    interest in the Construction Agreement and Performance
    Guaranty. Nova Hut conditionally assigned its rights under the
    Construction Contract, but not its obligations, to IFC.
    Netherlands and International acknowledged and consented to
    this conditional assignment.
    Thereafter, Netherlands commenced construction of the
    minimill. The Construction Agreement required Netherlands to
    pass a four week integrated production performance test (the
    “Performance Test”) in connection with the minimill
    construction. The four week performance test was run from
    October 16, 2000 through November 13, 2000.               After
    completing the test, Nova Hut informed Netherlands that it had
    failed to prove that the mini-mill performed as required by the
    Construction Agreement. Thus, Nova Hut notified Netherlands
    that it was in default. International, however, claims that
    Netherlands passed that test and met all of its other contractual
    -7-
    obligations under the Construction Agreement.
    In January 2001, a dispute arose over the Letter of
    Credit, which was set to expire on March 7, 2001. International
    agreed to extend the Letter of Credit in return for Nova Hut’s
    and IFC’s representations that they would not draw on the
    Letter of Credit if it was extended until July 31, 2001. Despite
    these representations, on February 16, 2001, Nova Hut drew
    down on the $11.1 million Letter of Credit and terminated the
    Construction Agreement (allegedly at the direction of IFC).
    That draw down, which International alleges was improper and
    in breach of the Construction Agreement and the additional
    agreements that it had with Nova Hut and IFC, forms the basis
    of the present litigation.
    B.
    On June 9, 2000, International and certain subsidiaries
    filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On
    August 14, 2000, IFC filed a Proof of Claim in the bankruptcy
    case seeking recovery from International based on an
    assignment IFC had received from Nova Hut. It alleged claims
    in connection with the Performance Guaranty, the Letter of
    Credit and the Construction Agreement and sought damages in
    excess of $46 million. IFC further alleged that it was entitled to
    recover the $46 million from International because it had the
    “right to step into the shoes of Nova Hut and enforce the terms
    and provisions of the [Construction Contract] and the
    [Performance] Guaranty” pursuant to the Assignment.
    At the same time, IFC stated that it was filing the Proof
    -8-
    of Claim under the compulsion of the bar date and that the filing
    was not a consent by IFC to the jurisdiction of the court with
    respect to the subject matter of those claims.
    On April 9, 2001, after Nova Hut drew down on the
    Letter of Credit, International filed an amended objection to
    Nova Hut’s and IFC’s proofs of claim and filed claims against
    IFC and Nova Hut. 4 In response, on June 12, 2001, IFC filed a
    motion for leave to withdraw its proof of claim.
    In an order dated January 9, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court
    granted IFC’s motion, but only on the conditions that the
    Bankruptcy Court would retain jurisdiction over International’s
    claims and that IFC was barred from asserting other claims
    against the debtors.
    On October 21, 2002, International filed its Third
    Amended Complaint.
    C.
    The Third Amended Complaint alleges that at the time
    Nova Hut drew on the Letter of Credit, Netherlands had passed
    the Performance Test, had met all of the requirements for final
    4
    International subsequently filed its Second Amended
    Complaint on December 17, 2001. IFC moved to dismiss the
    Second Amended Complaint on June 14, 2002. The Bankruptcy
    Court denied that motion on October 18, 2002. IFC did not
    appeal that decision.
    -9-
    acceptance of the minimill project, and was in compliance with
    the requirements of the Construction Amendment. Thus, the
    Third Amended Complaint alleges that the draw down on the
    Letter of Credit was wrongful and resulted in International
    sustaining damages of over $11.1 million in loss of collateral.
    International further charges that Nova Hut improperly drew
    down on the Letter of Credit at the direction of IFC.
    As against IFC, International asserted both contract and
    equitable claims. These claims can be summarized as follows:
    •      First, Nova Hut and IFC are liable for breach of
    warranty for allegedly false representations and
    warranties made by Nova Hut at the direction of
    IFC in connection with the draw on the Letter of
    Credit.
    •      Second, Nova Hut and IFC are liable for breach
    of contract in connection with agreements they
    had with International concerning the Letter of
    Credit whereby International agreed to establish
    the Letter of Credit on behalf of Netherlands and
    Nova Hut agreed not to draw on the Letter of
    Credit if International extended the Letter of
    Credit prior to its expiration.
    •      Third, as an alternative to its breach of contract
    claims, Nova Hut and IFC are liable to
    International under a theory of unjust enrichment
    for (1) improperly drawing on the Letter of
    Credit, (2) failing to pay $510,000 in deferred
    -10-
    payments allegedly owed to Engineers for
    financial and engineering services it provided
    pursuant to the Letter of Intent, and (3) failing to
    pay $5.25 million allegedly owed to International
    for engineering and construction goods and
    services it provided pursuant to the Memorandum
    of Understanding.
    •      Fourth, as an alternative to its breach of contract
    and unjust enrichment claims, Nova Hut and IFC
    are liable to International under a theory of
    quantum meruit.
    •      Fifth, in the event a contract existed between
    Nova Hut and International or Engineers, IFC is
    liable for tortious interference with contract.
    •      Sixth, in the event no enforceable contract
    existed, IFC is liable for tortious interference with
    business relations and prospective economic
    advantage.
    In response, IFC filed a motion to dismiss the Third
    Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
    claiming sovereign immunity under § 106 of the Bankruptcy
    Code. IFC argued that it was immune under the International
    Organizations Immunity Act; that IFC could not waive its
    immunity under § 106(b) because it was not a governmental
    unit or a sovereign; and that even if it could waive its immunity,
    it had not done so by filing the Proof of Claim.
    -11-
    The Bankruptcy Court ruled that IFC is a governmental
    unit under § 106(b) and that its filing of the Proof of Claim was
    an express waiver of its immunity. Consequently, in an order
    dated December 9, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court denied IFC’s
    motion to dismiss.
    On appeal to the District Court of Delaware, in addition
    to the arguments it raised before the Bankruptcy Court, IFC
    asserted for the first time that even if it had waived its immunity,
    the claims set forth in the Third Amended Complaint were
    outside the scope of its waiver pursuant to § 106(b). In an order
    dated September 30, 2003, the District Court affirmed the
    Bankruptcy Court’s decision that IFC constituted a
    “governmental unit” for purposes of § 106(b) of the Bankruptcy
    Code and that IFC had expressly waived its immunity by filing
    the Proof of Claim in International’s bankruptcy proceeding.
    The District Court, after reviewing supplemental briefs which it
    had ordered, reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision and held
    that International’s claims were outside the scope of IFC’s
    waiver of sovereign immunity under 11 U.S.C. § 106(b), and
    thus IFC prevailed.
    With respect to International’s breach of contract claims
    in connection with the Letter of Credit, the District Court found
    that those claims were not “property of the estate.” Specifically,
    it held that because neither a letter of credit nor its proceeds are
    “property of the estate” under bankruptcy law, any recourse
    International might have, would be limited to the underlying
    Construction Agreement. Such a cause of action could not be
    “property of the estate” because International was not a party to
    that contract.
    -12-
    As for International’s equitable claims, the District Court
    found that even assuming they were “property of the estate,”
    they were not within the scope of IFC’s waiver, because they
    did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as IFC’s
    Proof of Claim. It so held because International’s claims were
    predicated on events that occurred subsequent to International’s
    filing of its objections to the Proof of Claim and thus had not
    “matured” within the period of time prescribed by Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 13(a). The District Court concluded, therefore, that those
    claims did not meet the compulsory counterclaim test under
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and were therefore outside the scope of
    IFC’s waiver.
    By order dated February 23, 2004, the District Court
    dismissed International’s Third Amended Complaint with
    prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This timely
    appeal followed.
    III.
    As an initial matter, International asserts that IFC has
    waived the issues of: (1) whether its claims were “property of
    the estate” and (2) whether the claims arose out of the same
    transaction or occurrence, and therefore, cannot raise these
    issues on appeal. International relies on the general rule that
    when a party fails to raise an issue in the bankruptcy court, the
    issue is waived and may not be considered by the district court
    on appeal. See Buncher Co. v. Official Comm . of Unsecured
    Creditors of Genfarm LP IV, 
    229 F.3d 245
    , 253 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Although the general rule of Buncher is correct, International
    fails to note the exception for subject matter jurisdiction, which
    -13-
    is applicable to this case.
    It is well-settled law that subject matter jurisdiction can
    be challenged at any point before final judgment, even if
    challenged for the first time on appeal. See Grupo Dataflux v.
    Atlas Global Group, L.P., 
    124 S. Ct. 1920
    , 1924 (2004). We
    have consistently held that the defense of lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See, e.g., Brown v.
    Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 
    350 F.3d 338
    , 347 (3d Cir. 2003)
    (citing Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 
    735 F.2d 1535
    , 1538 (3d Cir.
    1984) (defense that district court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to enforce consent decree may be raised for the first
    time on appeal)).
    Specifically, we have stated that Courts of Appeals must
    consider whether sovereign immunity was waived under 11
    U.S.C. § 106(b) even though “neither presented or considered
    below” because “a waiver of sovereign immunity is a
    prerequisite for jurisdiction.” In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 
    973 F.2d 1065
    , 1085 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). We therefore
    reject International’s “waiver” argument.
    IV.
    11 U.S.C. § 106 sets forth the conditions under which an
    entity will be deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity in
    the bankruptcy courts. Section 106(b) provides that:
    A governmental unit that has filed a proof of
    claim in the case is deemed to have waived
    sovereign immunity with respect to a claim
    -14-
    against such governmental unit that is property of
    the estate and that arose out of the same
    transaction or occurrence out of which the claim
    of such governmental unit arose.
    
    Id. Thus, by
    its terms, § 106(b) limits the scope of a waiver
    predicated on the filing of a proof of claim to those adversarial
    claims that are both “property of the estate” and “arise out of the
    same transaction or occurrence” as the claims set forth in the
    proof of claim.
    A.
    As we observed earlier, the District Court found that
    International’s breach of contract claims concerning the Letter
    of Credit were not “property of the estate.” It based this
    conclusion on the “well-established” rule of bankruptcy law that
    “a letter of credit and the proceeds therefrom are not property of
    the debtor’s estate.” Matter of Compton Corp., 
    831 F.2d 586
    ,
    589 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also In re Hechinger
    Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 
    282 B.R. 149
    , 161 (D. Del. 2002).
    Instead, a debtor seeking to remedy an improper draw on a letter
    of credit is limited to a cause of action on the underlying
    contract. See In re Graham Square, Inc., 
    126 F.3d 823
    , 827 (6th
    Cir. 1997). Because the District Court found that International
    was not a party to the Construction Agreement upon which the
    Letter of Credit was based, it found that International’s claim for
    $11.1 million predicated on Nova Hut’s improper draw down
    was not “property of the [International] estate” and could not be
    recovered by International.
    -15-
    On appeal, International argues that the general “well-
    established” rule of letter of credit jurisprudence relied upon by
    the District Court is not applicable in this case. In the typical
    case, a debtor either seeks to enjoin 5 a bank’s distribution of the
    proceeds of a letter of credit or to recover the bank’s distribution
    as a voidable preference or unauthorized postpetition transfer. 6
    See, e.g., In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., No. 99-2261
    (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). Such challenges to the distribution of
    proceeds of a letter of credit are barred in the routine letter of
    credit case. See In re Graham Square, 
    Inc., 126 F.3d at 827
    .
    This rule is predicated on the “independence principle” which
    seeks to preserve the viability of letters of credit, whose purpose
    is to allow the beneficiary to draw on the money before
    obtaining a judgment. See In re Sabratek Corp., 
    257 B.R. 732
    ,
    738 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000).
    Here, however, International is not seeking to enjoin First
    Union Bank’s distribution of the Letter of Credit proceeds, nor
    is it alleging that there was a preferential payment to Nova Hut.
    Rather, International seeks damages against Nova Hut and IFC
    for the resultant loss of the collateral that International posted
    and subsequently lost as a result of Nova Hut’s allegedly
    improper draw down on the Letter of Credit. As International
    argues explicitly in its opening brief, “[i]t is this $11.1 million
    in collateral, which was posted by Kaiser International, a
    5
    See 11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides for an automatic
    stay upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
    6
    See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 549.
    -16-
    Debtor, that was property of the estate.” Kaiser Br. at 23 n.2.
    Several courts , including the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh
    Circuits, have held that the collateral posted to secure a Letter
    of Credit is property of the estate. In Matter of Compton, the
    Fifth Circuit held expressly: “Overall, the letter of credit itself
    and the payments thereunder may not be property of [the]
    debtor, but the collateral pledged as a security interest for the
    letter of credit 
    is.” 831 F.2d at 590-91
    ; see also In re Mayan
    Networks Corp., 
    306 B.R. 295
    , 299 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004); In re
    Air Conditioning, Inc., 
    845 F.2d 293
    , 296 (11th Cir. 1988); In re
    Metro Comms., Inc., 
    115 B.R. 849
    , 854 (W.D. Pa. 1990). Thus,
    as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noted in In re
    Mayan Networks, where the claim centers around the collateral
    pledged to the bank and not the distribution of the proceeds
    themselves, “the fact that letters of credit themselves are not
    property of the estate is a red 
    herring.” 306 B.R. at 299
    .
    The logic and reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Matter of
    Compton is compelling and has direct application here.
    Applying the “collateral” analysis of Compton, therefore, we
    hold that the District Court erred in disposing of International’s
    claims concerning the Letter of Credit and holding that they
    were not “property of the estate.” Taking as true the Third
    Amended Complaint’s allegation that International, not
    Netherlands, posted the collateral to secure the Letter of Credit,
    it is evident that International’s claim predicated on posting its
    own $11.1 million collateral constitutes “property of the estate”
    for purposes of § 106(b).
    Indeed, the Third Amended Complaint’s further alleges
    -17-
    that International had independent agreements with Nova Hut
    and IFC whereby International (1) agreed to post the collateral
    for the Letter of Credit and (2) agreed to extend the Letter of
    Credit in exchange for Nova Hut’s representation that it would
    not draw down on the Letter of Credit. Thus, International has
    alleged causes of action predicated on its own – not
    Netherlands’ – agreements that it had with Nova Hut.
    International’s claims are therefore “property of the estate” and
    assets to which its creditors in bankruptcy can look. As such,
    they are within the scope of IFC’s sovereign immunity waiver
    under § 106(b) and should not have been dismissed.7
    B.
    The District Court also dismissed the Third Amended
    Complaint’s claims, advanced by International, because it found
    that they did not satisfy the “same transaction or occurrence”
    requirement of § 106(b). We do not agree.
    The legislative history of § 106(b) and the case law
    interpreting that provision make clear that courts should look
    “to the standards employed in identifying compulsory
    counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) for
    guidance in discerning the applicability of section 106(a)’s
    waiver of immunity.” In re Univ. Med. 
    Center, 973 F.2d at 7
             A claim deemed to be “outside the scope of IFC’s
    sovereign immunity waiver under § 106(b)” as the District Court
    held, could not be entertained, as IFC would be protected by
    immunity.
    -18-
    1086. As set forth in In re University Medical Center, “[t]he
    operative question in determining whether a claim is a
    compulsory counterclaim is whether it bears a ‘logical
    relationship’ to the opposing party’s claim.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    The District Court never reached the issue of whether
    International’s claims bore a logical relationship to IFC’s
    claims. Instead, it relied on the fact that International’s claims,
    as set forth in the Third Amended Complaint, matured after it
    filed objections to IFC’s Proof of Claim. Based on that finding,
    the District Court concluded that the claims were not
    compulsory counterclaims as defined in Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 13(a) and so fell outside the scope of IFC’s § 106(b)
    waiver. The District Court admitted that the Rule 13(a)
    “maturity” requirement had never been discussed in the
    bankruptcy context. However, it added that requirement,
    finding it to be appropriate in light of the “overriding policy that
    waivers of sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed.”
    While the District Court correctly noted a significant
    policy concern in rendering its decision, it ignored the equally,
    if not more, compelling consideration that the Bankruptcy Code
    is intended to be both remedial and quasi-equitable.
    Furthermore, in imposing Rule 13(a)’s maturity requirement on
    International’s claims, the District Court failed to accord proper
    weight to both the language of § 106(b) itself and the
    authoritative case law interpreting that provision. In our view,
    the analogy to compulsory counterclaims begins and ends with
    the phrase “same transaction or occurrence.” Because we hold
    that there is no “maturity” component in § 106(b) and because
    -19-
    we conclude that International’s claims arose from the “same
    transaction or occurrence” as IFC’s claims, we will reverse the
    District Court as to that element of § 106(b) as well.
    As we set forth above, 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) provides:
    A governmental unit that has filed a proof of
    claim in the case is deemed to have waived
    sovereign immunity with respect to a claim
    against such governmental unit that is property of
    the estate and that arose out of the same
    transaction or occurrence out of which the claim
    of such governmental unit arose.
    
    Id. (italics added).
    On the other hand, Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) reads:
    A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
    which at the time of serving the pleading the
    pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
    out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
    subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and
    does not require for its adjudication the presence
    of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
    jurisdiction.
    
    Id. (italics added).
    A comparison of the two provisions reveals that there is
    no basis in the statutory language for requiring “maturity” of
    -20-
    claims in the context of § 106(b). “Maturity” as an element of
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) compulsory
    counterclaims is expressly set forth in the rule itself: “A
    pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
    time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
    opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). The
    bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 106(b), has no comparable
    language and cannot be construed to incorporate the separate
    and distinct element of “maturity.” “Maturity” is just not an
    element or modifier of Rule 13(a)’s “same transaction or
    occurrence” requirement.
    The plain language of § 106(b), however, speaks only of
    “same transaction or occurrence.” The concept of “maturity” is
    simply absent from § 106(b). “Maturity” is best understood in
    the context of Rule 13(a) as an entirely separate element of the
    compulsory counterclaim analysis of Rule 13(a) and one that
    has no place in the operation of § 106(b).
    Furthermore, the notes to § 106 do not support the
    wholesale importation of Rule 13(a)’s compulsory counterclaim
    elements into § 106(b) claims. The relevant legislative history
    of § 106(b) states:
    [T]he filing of a proof of claim against the estate
    by a governmental unit is a waiver by that
    governmental unit of sovereign immunity with
    respect to compulsory counterclaims, as defined
    in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . that
    is, counterclaims arising out of the same
    transaction or occurrence.
    -21-
    11 U.S.C. § 106 (italics added). In our view, the addition of the
    italicized phrase necessarily acts as a qualifier on the
    relationship between § 106(b) waivers and compulsory
    counterclaims. To read it otherwise, and invoke a total
    parallelism between § 106(b) and Rule 13(a) claims as the
    District Court chose to do, renders the final phrase of that
    legislative history meaningless.
    In reaching its holding, the District Court relied on a
    single bankruptcy court case, In re Pullman Const. Indus., Inc.,
    
    142 B.R. 280
    , 282-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), which held a
    counterclaim must exist at the time of the pleading for purposes
    of § 106(b). That case, of course, is in no way binding
    precedent on this Court. Furthermore, its reasoning is seriously
    suspect in light of later Seventh Circuit precedent. In re
    Pullman relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Burlington
    N. R.R. v. Strong, 
    907 F.2d 707
    (7th Cir. 1990) – a Rule 13(a)
    case. However, in In re Price, 
    42 F.3d 1068
    (7th Cir. 1994), an
    opinion filed four years after Burlington, the Seventh Circuit
    noted that reliance on Burlington in the bankruptcy context was
    misplaced. 
    Id. at 1073
    n.4.
    Instead of examining all of Rule 13(a) requirements, the
    Seventh Circuit, as well as all of the other circuits that have
    analyzed § 106(b), including the Third Circuit, have focused on
    whether the claims of the governmental unit and the estate arise
    out of the “same transaction or occurrence.” To define that
    phrase, and that phrase only, the courts have turned to Rule
    13(a) and have focused solely on a “logical relationship”: “The
    operative question in determining whether a claim is a
    compulsory counterclaim is whether it bears a ‘logical
    -22-
    relationship’ to the opposing party’s claim.” In re Univ. Med.
    
    Center, 973 F.2d at 1086
    (citation omitted). Applying the logic
    and reasoning of the foregoing cases to this appeal, we now
    expressly hold that there is no “claim maturity” requirement
    grafted onto the “same transaction or occurrence” test of §
    106(b).
    Turning to the “same transaction or occurrence” test, we
    are instructed that the logical relationship standard should be
    construed liberally. See In re 
    Price, 42 F.3d at 1073
    . Thus, to
    determine whether a logical relationship exists under § 106(b),
    we must examine whether the claim “arises from the same
    aggregate set of operative facts as the initial claim, in that the
    same operative facts serve as the basis of both claims or the
    aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates
    additional legal rights otherwise dormant in the defendant.” In
    re Pinkstaff, 
    974 F.2d 113
    , 115 (9th Cir. 1992). Furthermore,
    it is not necessary that the parties’ claims arise at the same
    moment. See In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 
    270 F.3d 280
    , 287
    (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the “transaction may comprehend a
    series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the
    immediateness of their connection as upon their logical
    relationship.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation omitted).
    On appeal, IFC cites to In re William Ross, Inc., 
    199 B.R. 551
    (W.D. Pa. 1996) and In re Sacred Heart Hospital, 
    204 B.R. 132
    (E.D. Pa. 1997), both of which are non-binding and
    inapposite. Those lower court cases, involved claims by debtors
    that were asserted against different government agencies than
    the agency that filed the proof of claim. See In re William 
    Ross, 199 B.R. at 554-55
    ; In re Sacred Heart 
    Hosp., 204 B.R. at 141
    .
    -23-
    Here, however, International asserted its claims against IFC –
    the same entity that filed the Proof of Claim. Thus, IFC’s
    attempt to demonstrate that there is no logical relationship
    between its claims and those of International, is unpersuasive.
    Instead, applying the flexible logical relationship
    standard enunciated above, we hold that International’s claims
    satisfy the “same transaction or occurrence” test. Both IFC’s
    Proof of Claim and International’s counterclaims arise out of
    the construction of the Nova Hut minimill. That fact alone –
    that all of the claims and counterclaims arise out of that one
    complex transaction – is sufficient to demonstrate a logical
    relationship between the claims.8
    VI.
    The District Court properly addressed, for the first time
    on appeal, the scope of IFC’s waiver of sovereign immunity
    under § 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the District
    Court’s holding that International’s claims were neither
    “property of the estate” nor part of the “same transaction or
    occurrence” as IFC’s Proof of Claim was in error.
    8
    A liberal application of the logical relationship test is
    particularly appropriate given the fact that the present case is
    proceeding in bankruptcy.            Thus, if the allegations of
    International’s Third Amended Complaint are proven, see pages
    
    9-10 supra
    , it is the creditors of the bankrupt estate that stand to
    gain from the additional assets that will inure to the estate.
    -24-
    Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order
    of February 24, 2004, and remand to the District Court with the
    direction that the case be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court so
    that the Bankruptcy Court may rule on International’s Third
    Amended Complaint, and for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    -25-