United States v. Glenn Worley , 592 F. App'x 100 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-2062
    ___________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    GLENN WORLEY; TAMERA WORLEY,
    Appellants
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 13-cv-00761)
    District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 21, 2014
    Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed February 9, 2015)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    In this tax case, Glenn Worley and his wife Tamera Worley, proceeding pro se,
    appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
    Pennsylvania granting summary judgment for the United States. For the reasons that
    follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    The United States filed a complaint against the Worleys seeking to reduce tax
    assessments to a judgment and to sell the Worleys’ non-residential real property to satisfy
    the judgment. The United States moved for summary judgment and submitted evidence
    showing that the Worleys each owe more than $80,000 in federal income taxes. Notices
    and demands for payment were issued but the Worleys did not pay the amount due.
    Glenn Worley was also assessed a $500 penalty for filing a frivolous tax return for the
    2004 tax year and he has not paid the penalty.
    The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court grant the United
    States’ motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge explained that the United
    States had established a prima facie case of liability against the Worleys by providing
    certified copies of the certificates of assessments and payments, and that the Worleys did
    not present evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. The Magistrate
    Judge rejected the Worleys’ arguments that they are not required to pay taxes. The
    Magistrate Judge also concluded that the United States was entitled to a penalty for Glenn
    Worley’s filing of a frivolous tax return. Finally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the
    2
    United States should be permitted to foreclose on their real property and have the
    proceeds allocated to the tax liabilities.
    The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and
    granted summary judgment for the United States. Noting that the Worleys did not file
    objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, the District Court found no clear error and
    stated that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis was well-reasoned and fully supported by the
    record. The District Court ordered the sale of the Worleys’ real property. The District
    Court also denied the Worleys’ subsequent motion for reconsideration in which they
    again argued that they are not required to pay income tax. This appeal followed.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the Worleys did not
    file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, we review the decision below for plain
    error. Brightwell v. Lehman, 
    637 F.3d 187
    , 193 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 
    488 F.3d 187
    , 194 (3d Cir. 2007).
    The Worleys reiterate on appeal the arguments they presented below disputing that
    they are subject to income tax. They assert, based on the language of the Internal
    Revenue Code, that the statute does not impose a tax on them or their revenue. They also
    contend, among other things, that the Internal Revenue Service lacks authority to tax
    them and the revenue they received for services rendered in their employment. These
    3
    arguments are the kind of “tax protester” arguments that we have rejected as patently
    frivolous. Sauers v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 
    771 F.2d 64
    , 66-67 (3d Cir. 1985).1
    The Worleys also argue that they did not receive a copy of the Magistrate Judge’s
    report before the District Court adopted it. The Worleys, however, state that they
    obtained the report on February 18, 2014, but they did not raise this issue in the brief they
    filed in support of their motion for reconsideration on February 28, 2014. Rather, the
    Worleys first raised their belated receipt of the report in a “petition for rehearing” filed
    after reconsideration was denied and a judgment was entered. As noted by the
    Government, even if the Worleys’ failure to file objections were excused, they would at
    most be entitled to de novo review rather than plain error review. See Leyva v. Williams,
    
    504 F.3d 357
    , 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying de novo review where litigant did not receive
    notice that failure to object would result in forfeiture of rights). The Worleys’ arguments
    that summary judgment was not warranted because they are not required to pay taxes fail
    under either standard.
    The Worleys also contend that they were never given an opportunity to refuse
    consideration of their case by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 73. The Government correctly notes in its brief that Rule 73, which permits a
    1
    The courts of appeals have also specifically rejected arguments similar to those made by
    the Worleys. See, e.g., United States v. Sloan, 
    939 F.2d 499
    , 500-01 (7th Cir. 1991)
    (rejecting argument that individual was not subject to the jurisdiction of the laws of the
    United States); Ficalora v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 
    751 F.2d 85
    , 87-88 (2d Cir. 1984)
    (rejecting argument that the Internal Revenue Code does not impose a tax on any
    4
    Magistrate Judge to conduct a trial and enter a judgment if all parties consent, is
    inapplicable. Here, the Magistrate Judge only made a recommendation concerning the
    disposition of the case pursuant to Rule 72(b), which does not require the parties’
    consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). Finally, to the extent the Worleys contend that they
    were denied a trial by jury, they have not shown that a genuine issue of material fact
    existed for trial.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    individual but on undefined “taxable income”).
    5