United States v. Jaime Snyder ( 2015 )

ALD-073 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-2784
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAIME LYNN SNYDER,
Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Crim. Nos. 11-cr-00097 & 12-cr-00052)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
__________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 30, 2014
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2015)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Jaime Lynn Snyder appeals from an order of the District Court denying her
motion to amend her monthly restitution payments. For the reasons that follow, we will
summarily affirm.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
On October 17, 2011, the Government filed an Information in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware, see D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00097, charging
Snyder with copyright infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) and 18
U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1). Snyder waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the Information.
In the plea agreement, Snyder agreed to restitution in the amount of $971,935.10, and the
parties agreed to this figure as the total loss amount. On July 31, 2012, the Government
filed a one-count Information, see D.C. Crim. No. 12-cr-00052, charging Snyder with
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D). Snyder waived
indictment and pleaded guilty to this Information as well. In the plea agreement, the
parties stipulated to an intended loss amount of greater than $30,000 but less than
$70,000 for purposes of the Guidelines, and Snyder agreed to restitution in the amount of
$35,373.02. The Government reserved the right to argue for restitution in the amount of
$41,472.59. The plea agreement also contained a provision stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3147applied because Snyder committed identity theft during the time that she was on release
in the copyright infringement case, and that this statute required a consecutive term of
imprisonment.
On January 24, 2013, the District Court sentenced Snyder to a term of
imprisonment of 46 months on the copyright infringement and identity theft convictions,
the sentences to be served concurrently, followed by a consecutive sentence of 12 months
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147. The District Court also imposed three years of supervised
release in both cases, to be served concurrently, and ordered restitution to be paid in the
amount of $1,013,407.69, due immediately. The District Court determined that Snyder
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did not have the ability to pay interest on the restitution, and ordered “[p]ayment in equal
monthly … installments of not less than $50.00 over a period of 35 months… , to
commence 30 days … after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision.” See
Docket Entry No. 35, D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00097; Docket Entry No. 25, D.C. Crim. No.
12-cr-00052. Snyder appealed, and her counsel moved to withdraw, see Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that Snyder’s only non-frivolous issue
concerned whether her sentence was reasonable. We affirmed the criminal judgment on
December 13, 2013, see United States v. Snyder, 548 F. App’x 775 (3d Cir. 2013),
holding that the sentence was procedurally reasonable, and that, since the District Court
appropriately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the resulting sentence was
at the bottom end of the Guidelines range, Snyder’s sentence was substantively
reasonable, see id. at 777-78.
Meanwhile, in November 2013, Snyder, now an inmate at Alderson Federal
Correctional Institution in West Virginia, moved pro se in the District of Delaware to
amend her Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) payments on her restitution
obligation. Snyder alleged that her Bureau of Prisons case manager was requiring her to
pay hundreds of dollars in restitution each month even though she was earning virtually
nothing in her prison job, leaving her family to make her payments. In response, the
BOP explained that, pursuant to its IFRP guidelines, it analyzes an inmate’s deposits
made in the last six months, subtracts IFRP payments made in the last six months, and
then excludes $450 every six months from outside resources and institution pay. After
the $450 exclusion, the balance is divided by 6, and the resulting amount constitutes the
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monthly payment due. A minimum payment of $25 is required every three months.
Snyder’s commissary account records reflected that, for the six-month period beginning
in February 2013, there was $2,821.53 deposited into her account. During that same
period, she paid only $25 in IFRP payments. In August 2013, Snyder’s account activity
was examined. The BOP deducted the $450 allocation from her balance, and her
monthly IFRP payment was calculated at $313, through January 2014. Records further
showed that Snyder’s IFRP payment was scheduled to increase in February 2014 to $361
per month because deposits into her commissary account (during the six-month period to
January 31, 2014) totaled $4,004.56. Snyder’s IFRP payments through January 2014
totaled $844.91.
In response to the BOP’s explanation/defense of her current $361 monthly IFRP
payment obligation, Snyder argued that, under Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.
2012), where a defendant has insufficient financial resources to make immediate
repayment, the district court, not Bureau of Prisons, must set the repayment schedule in
the judgment of conviction. Snyder urged the District Court to follow Ward and set her
IFRP payment to $50.00 per month, because her family and friends deposit money into
her commissary account so that she can stay in touch with her children, not so that she
can make restitution payments, and that she uses the money for necessary expenses,
including telephone calls, email, stamps, commissary purchases, doctor co-payments, and
medicine.
In an order entered on April 29, 2014, the District Court denied Snyder’s request
to set her IFRP payments. The court explained, in pertinent part, that:
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Having had the benefit of presiding over her plea and sentencing hearings,
the court recalls the circumstances of defendant’s criminal conduct, as well
as her family background, which includes children and a grandchild. While
the court recognizes defendant’s efforts to maintain ties with her family, it
is because of her own criminal conduct that she owes over one million
dollars in restitution. There is nothing in the record at bar that warrants the
amendment of defendant’s judgment. Defendant’s monthly [I]FRP
payments are calculated based on how much money she earns and how
much money others give to her. Defendant controls how much money is
used to calculate her monthly [I]FRP payment.
United States v. Snyder, --- F. Supp.2d --- , 2014 WL 1761030, at *2 (D. Del. April 29,
2014).
Snyder appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk advised
her that the appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6. Snyder was invited to submit argument in writing and she has done so. In her
summary action response, Snyder acknowledges that she participates in the IFRP,
although she claims that she was “forced … by extortion tactics under total duress and
coercion.” (Response, at 13.) She asserts that she is now in IFRP “refuse” status because
she cannot make the $361 monthly payment. Her mother is making a $25 monthly
payment toward her restitution obligation, but the BOP has threatened that she will still
lose her ability to participate in the prison Residential Drug Treatment Program, which
provides a sentence reduction gratuity, because she is not making the $361 payment.
Snyder complains that recalculation of IFRP payments by the BOP is done only every six
months, and that, because she no longer receives as much financial support, “[i]f her
counselor recalculated her today for the previous 3 months, instead of 6 (the time frame
her financial support drastically decreased) her payment would decrease from $361 a
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month to $19 a month.” (Response, at 2.) Snyder contends that the District Court’s
observation that she could obtain relief from her current $361 IFRP monthly payment by
accepting less support from her family, while true, overlooked the fact that recalculations
occur only every six months, so that even if the inmate is immediately “due” a reduction,
she must still wait for the regularly scheduled recalculation.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its
findings of fact for clear error. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir.
2005) (per curiam). We may affirm a judgment of the District Court on any basis
supported by the record, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). We note that the District Court has limited jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3664(k) to adjust a defendant’s restitution payment schedule if there has been any
material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances, see United States v. Jaffe,
417 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 2005), and that Snyder is not challenging the overall validity
of the District Court’s order that she make restitution to her victims in the amount of
$1,013,407.69.
Snyder’s argument under the Ward case is unavailing because it is an attack on the
validity of the restitution order itself, which must be made on direct appeal. In any event,
it is meritless. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) requires the District
Court to specify the manner in which the defendant will pay restitution in light of a
defendant’s economic circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). Like the Ninth Circuit, see
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Ward, 678 F.3d at 1048-49, we have held that determining the schedule of restitution
payments pursuant to the MVRA is a “judicial act” that may not be delegated to the BOP,
United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007) (sentencing court
impermissibly delegates its authority to BOP when, knowing that the defendant was
financially unable to make immediate restitution payment, it orders payments due
immediately but to be made through Inmate Financial Responsibility Program). Here, the
District Court set a restitution schedule in the criminal judgment, see Docket Entry No.
35, D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00097; Docket Entry No. 25, D.C. Crim. No. 12-cr-00052, and
did not impermissibly delegate its authority to the Bureau of Prisons. The District Court
did not order that payments be made through the IFRP, and in fact there is no mention
whatever in the criminal judgment of the IFRP. Nor did appellate counsel advise us on
direct appeal that there was a non-frivolous issue pertaining to Snyder’s restitution order.
An inmate may voluntarily enter into the IFRP by signing a contract, and give the
BOP authority to collect additional monies toward her restitution obligation, 28 C.F.R. §
545.11(a)-(b). An inmate may wish to contribute additional monies to restitution she
owes, when doing so confers benefits that would otherwise be lost, see id. at § 545(d).
“The IFRP can be an important part of a prisoner’s efforts toward rehabilitation, but
strictly speaking, participation in the program is voluntary[;] ... an inmate in the Bureau
of Prisons’ custody may lose certain privileges by not participating in the IFRP, but the
inmate’s participation cannot be compelled.” United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334
(7th Cir. 2010). Snyder’s participation in the IFRP is voluntary, and her voluntary
participation is determinative of her claim. We disagree that the program amounts to
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“extortion,” as she argues. Prisoners are not entitled, constitutionally or otherwise, “to
any of the benefits agreeing to participate in the IFRP would provide, such as a work
detail outside the prison perimeter, a higher commissary spending limit, a release
gratuity, or pay beyond the maintenance pay level.” United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d
1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, inasmuch as Snyder does not challenge the
BOP’s records regarding the deposits made to her account, we agree with the District
Court that changes in Snyder’s circumstances are under her control. They, therefore, do
not constitute a “material change in [her] economic circumstances” so as to warrant an
adjustment under § 3664(k).
We would add that we doubt that Snyder’s specific challenge to the BOP’s
authority to schedule recalculations only every six months even if the inmate is
immediately “due” a reduction in her voluntary payment falls within the purview of 28
U.S.C. § 2241, see McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that
claim challenging payment schedule imposed through IFRP concerned execution of
petitioner’s sentence and was correctly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). The petitioner
in McGee was challenging BOP conduct that conflicted with the terms imposed by the
sentencing court. The BOP wanted $25 per month, but the District Court specifically
ordered that the petitioner make a $20 monthly payment from his prison earnings. We
held that his claim concerned the execution of his sentence, 627 F.3d at 937. In order to
challenge the execution of her sentence under § 2241, Snyder would thus need to allege
that the BOP’s $361 monthly payment demand was “somehow inconsistent with a
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment,” see Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681
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F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 805 (U.S. 2012). The District Court did
not think that it was, nor do we. In any event, the District Court would lack jurisdiction
because a § 2241 petition must be filed in the district where the petitioner is confined,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004), which in Snyder’s case is not the District
of Delaware.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
denying Snyder’s motion to amend her IFRP payments.
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