Williams v. LaCrosse , 179 F. App'x 141 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-8-2006
    Williams v. LaCrosse
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-2568
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    Recommended Citation
    "Williams v. LaCrosse" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1147.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1147
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 05-2568
    ____________
    WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THOMAS J. LaCROSSE
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-06724
    (Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter)
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 25, 2006
    Before: FUENTES, STAPLETON and ALARCÓN,* Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: May 8, 2006)
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge.
    *
    The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals
    for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    William E. Williams appeals from the District Court’s judgment in favor of
    Captain Thomas J. LaCrosse. Mr. Williams, a former probationary trooper with the
    Pennsylvania State Police, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Capt.
    LaCrosse, his supervisor. He alleged that Capt. LaCrosse’s recommendation regarding
    discipline, which resulted in his discharge, violated his rights to procedural and
    substantive due process, equal protection, and free speech. The District Court granted
    Capt. LaCrosse’s motion for summary judgment. In this appeal, Mr. Williams argues that
    there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to his procedural due process claim,
    as it pertains to his asserted liberty interest in his reputation.1 We affirm.
    Mr. Williams argues that he was denied procedural due process. Specifically, he
    contends that because the accusations against him impugned his reputation and
    1
    Mr. Williams also argues that he was deprived of his property interest in his
    employment without due process of law and that he was denied equal protection.
    However, he does not raise these arguments until his reply brief. An argument not raised
    and argued in the opening brief is abandoned. See, e.g., Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    ,
    182 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that all issues must be raised and argued in the opening
    brief); Institute for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.,
    
    931 F.2d 1002
    , 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). In order to raise an argument properly, “the
    appellant’s brief shall contain under appropriate headings a ‘statement of the issues
    presented for review’ and . . . the argument section of the brief [must] ‘contain the
    contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
    with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.’” Lunderstadt v.
    Colafella, 
    885 F.2d 66
    , 78 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(2) and (4)). Mr.
    Williams’s opening brief contains no argument or citation to authority with regard to his
    property interest and equal protection claims. Therefore he has abandoned these claims.
    2
    deprived him of his employment, he was entitled to a “name-clearing hearing.” Ersek v.
    Township of Springfield, 
    102 F.3d 79
    , 83-84 (1996). Mr. Williams argues: “[t]hat
    interest, however, is not accorded substantive due process protection; rather, the right
    accorded is that of procedural due process or more specifically the right to an opportunity
    to refute the charges and clear one’s name.” (Appellant’s Br. 51).
    “[I]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes
    a waiver of the argument.” Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 
    198 F.3d 100
    , 105-06 n.3
    (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
    Joiners of America, 
    927 F.2d 1283
    , 1298 (3d Cir. 1991)). Mr. Williams failed to argue to
    the District Court that the alleged deprivation of his liberty interest, without procedural
    due process, violated his rights. In the memorandum he filed in the District Court in
    opposition to Capt. LaCrosse’s motion for summary judgment, he argued:
    [P]laintiff was terminated from his protected position under
    circumstances that were likely to, and did, cause harm to his
    reputation together with the extinguishment of his protected
    position, all of which are in violation of his rights protected
    by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally
    Clark v. Twp. Of Falls, 
    890 F.2d 611
    (3d Cir. 1989).
    He did not offer further explanation. Nor did he mention his liberty interest in his
    reputation during the oral argument before the District Court.
    The District Court understood Mr. Williams’s argument to be that he was deprived
    of substantive due process. The District Court concluded,
    3
    Although it is challenging to discern from the face of the
    complaint or his Opposition Memo, Mr. Williams seems to
    assert that his substantive due process claim arises from the
    fact that his termination caused harm to his reputation that,
    when considered with the termination of his employment,
    constituted a due process violation in the form of a violation
    of his right to liberty.
    The District Court analyzed Mr. Williams’s claim using standards applicable to
    substantive due process. The District Court did not address Mr. Williams’s claim in
    terms of procedural due process. Mr. Williams did nothing to correct this understanding
    of his claims. Accordingly, the District Court did not have an opportunity to consider the
    argument Mr. Williams now raises. See Lugar v. Texaco, Inc., 
    755 F.2d 53
    , 57 n.2 (3d
    Cir. 1985) (noting that because “of the failure to present the issue below, the district court
    did not make any findings . . . .”).
    Mr. Williams failed to argue below that he was deprived of his liberty interest
    without procedural due process. He therefore waived the only argument he raises on
    appeal.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    4