Ygana v. Atty Gen USA , 164 F. App'x 265 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-31-2006
    Ygana v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 04-2757
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1699
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 04-2757
    EFREN YGANA,
    Petitioner
    v.
    *ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General Of the United States
    Respondent
    *Submitted pursuant to Rule 43c, F.R.A.P.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of
    The Board of Immigration Appeals
    (No. A29-053-224)
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 12, 2006
    Before: BARRY, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 31, 2006)
    OPINION
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    Efren Ygana petitions us to review the decision of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ygana’s
    motion for reconsideration of the IJ’s order of removal. For the reasons below, we deny
    Ygana’s petition for review.
    I.
    As we write solely for the parties, only a brief summary of the pertinent facts is
    necessary. Ygana is a native and citizen of the Philippines who entered the United States
    as a non-immigrant visitor for business in April 1988, and was authorized to stay only
    until May 18, 1988. Ygana stayed beyond this date without permission to do so, without
    filing any asylum, or other preclusion of removal, petition.1 As a result, on March 7,
    2002, Ygana was served with a notice to appear, alleging he was subject to removal,
    pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the United States for longer than
    his visa permitted. Ygana conceded removability, and reapplied for an adjustment of
    status to that of a lawful permanent resident on the basis of an approved labor
    certification. Ygana also sought voluntary departure as an alternative to removal.
    At the removal hearing, the IJ denied Ygana’s reapplication for adjustment of
    status and declined to grant voluntary departure. Ygana did not appeal the IJ’s decision to
    the BIA. Instead, he filed a motion for reconsideration before the IJ. When the IJ
    rejected Ygana’s motion, he appealed to the BIA, and it affirmed the denial of the motion
    1
    In 1999, Ygana applied for an adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent
    resident, but he withdrew his application in January 2002.
    2
    for reconsideration without a separate opinion. Ygana filed a timely petition for review
    from this affirmance.
    II.
    The Government asserts we do not have jurisdiction to review the order of removal
    by the IJ. This assertion we review de novo. Nugent v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 162
    , 165 (3d
    Cir. 2004). The context is that the Government claims that Ygana waived his appeal of
    the order of removal, as he failed to appeal that decision to the BIA within 30 days as
    required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). It also contends that he failed to comply with the
    administrative exhaustion requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which provides that “[a]
    court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all
    administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”
    We agree. It is uncontested that Ygana did not appeal the IJ’s order of removal to
    the BIA and appealed only the denial of the motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court
    has held that the filing of a motion to reconsider a final order does not toll the period for
    seeking judicial review of the underlying order. Stone v. INS, 
    514 U.S. 386
    , 395 (1995);
    see also Nocon v. INS, 
    789 F.2d 1028
    , 1033 (3d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, in the absence
    of a timely petition for review of the IJ’s order, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits
    of Ygana’s application for adjustment of status and request for voluntary departure.
    III.
    As to what is before us (the denial of the motion to reconsider), the Government
    3
    contends that Ygana waived any claim regarding that motion by failing to argue it in his
    brief to our Court, instead limiting his argument to a challenge to the IJ’s order of
    removal.2
    We agree here as well. “It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or
    argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.” United
    States v. Pelullo, 
    399 F.3d 197
    , 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Lie v. Ashcroft, 
    396 F.3d 530
    ,
    532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding alien’s claim waived when she did not raise any
    argument, except by mentioning the applicable statute in her concluding paragraph, or
    rebut in her reply brief the Government’s argument that she had waived the issue). Ygana
    does not mention the motion to reconsider in his opening brief. Likewise, in his reply
    brief Ygana does not argue that the BIA (or the IJ) abused its discretion in denying
    reconsideration; he claims only that petitioning from the removal order and petitioning
    from the denial of the motion to reconsider are “substantively the same,” and the
    “procedural difference between the two . . . does not impact the valid substantive
    argument brought before this Court.”
    This is incorrect. A petition for review from a decision on the merits is not
    interchangeable with petitioning from the BIA’s denial of a subsequent motion to
    2
    The Government additionally asserts that, under I.C.C. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
    Eng’rs, 
    482 U.S. 270
    , 279 (1987), when an administrative agency denies a motion urging
    reconsideration based on a claim of error in its prior decision, and the agency did nothing
    more than summarily deny reconsideration, the decision is not subject to review. Because
    Ygana waived his challenge to the denial of reconsideration, we do not reach this issue.
    4
    reconsider. Rather, they are distinct petitions that must be reviewed separately. See
    
    Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06
    ; 
    Nocon, 789 F.2d at 1033
    . By not addressing the denial of his
    motion to reconsider, and instead challenging the merits of the IJ’s removal order, Ygana
    has waived his opportunity to have us consider his challenge to the denial of
    reconsideration. Our Court observed in Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    , 182 (3d Cir.
    1993), that the federal appellate rules and our local rules require petitioners to set out the
    issues raised on appeal and to present arguments in support of them in their brief. We
    stated that “[i]t is well settled that if an appellant fails to comply with those requirements
    on a particular issue, the appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on
    appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.” 
    Id. Here, Ygana
    has not
    complied with these requirements. For that reason, we will deny the petition for review.
    IV.
    Ygana waived his claims regarding the IJ’s order of removal by failing to appeal it
    to the BIA and we therefore have no jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order (including the
    alternative request for voluntary departure). Put simply, this matter is not before us.
    Ygana also waived any challenge to the denial of his motion for reconsideration —
    the only matter before us— by failing to raise any such challenge in his petition for
    review. We accordingly deny his petition for review.
    5