United States v. Ricks ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-20-2007
    USA v. Ricks
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 05-4832
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Ricks" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 650.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/650
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 05-4832, 05-4833
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    MICHAEL RICKS and MARC RICKS,
    Appellees.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Nos. 00-CR-00024-2, 00-CR-00024-4)
    District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
    Argued January 23, 2007
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES,
    Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: July 20, 2007 )
    _______
    David E. Troyer
    Ara B. Gershengorn (ARGUED)
    Office of the United States Attorney
    615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorneys for the United States of America
    David L. McColgin (ARGUED)
    Defender Association of Philadelphia
    Federal Court Division
    The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West
    601 Walnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorney for Marc Ricks
    Gavin P. Holihan
    546 W. Hamilton Street, Suite 200
    Allentown, PA 18101
    Attorney for Michael Ricks
    Mark Osler
    Baylor Law School
    1114 South University Parks Drive
    Waco, Texas 76798
    Attorney for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
    Foundation Drug Law Reform Project, American Civil
    Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Douglas A. Berman,
    Michael M. O’Hear, David N. Yellen, and David M. Zlotnick
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    Marc Ricks pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge and
    was sentenced to 135 months in prison. His brother, Michael
    Ricks, was sentenced to 168 months in prison after pleading guilty
    to drug conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, and
    conspiracy to affect interstate commerce by robbery. The
    government appeals these sentences, arguing that they are
    unreasonable because the District Court improperly used a 20-to-1
    crack/powder cocaine drug quantity ratio instead of the 100-to-1
    ratio provided for in the Sentencing Guidelines. Because we
    2
    conclude that courts may not categorically reject the 100-to-1 ratio,
    we will vacate both sentences and remand to the District Court for
    resentencing.1
    I.
    Brothers Michael and Marc Ricks pleaded guilty to their
    crimes in January 2001 without plea agreements. They each
    reserved the issue of the quantity of drugs that should be attributed
    to them. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court concluded
    that each brother was responsible for distributing at least 2000
    grams of cocaine base (“crack”), 3000 grams of powder cocaine,
    and 30 grams of heroin.
    Thereafter, the District Court held sentencing hearings for
    both brothers. The Court determined that Michael’s imprisonment
    range under the Guidelines was 324 to 405 months, and then
    sentenced him, at the bottom of that range, to 324 months in prison.
    Subsequently, the Court determined that Marc’s imprisonment
    range was 188 to 235 months, and sentenced him to 200 months in
    prison. Following appeals by both brothers, this Court affirmed
    their convictions and sentences. United States v. Michael Ricks,
    96 Fed. Appx. 93 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Marc Ricks, 96
    Fed. Appx. 96 (3d Cir. 2004). While their petitions for certiorari
    were pending, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory
    in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). Accordingly, we
    remanded both cases to the District Court for resentencing.
    On remand, the District Court resentenced Michael Ricks
    applying a crack/powder cocaine drug quantity ratio of 20-to-1
    instead of the Guidelines ratio of 100-to-1. Michael’s revised
    range was 151 to 188 months in prison and the Court sentenced
    him to 168 months. Two days later, the Court resentenced Marc
    applying the same 20-to-1 ratio. Marc’s new range was 121 to 151
    months and the District Court sentenced him to 135 months in
    prison. Thus, compared to their initial sentences, Michael’s time
    1
    We have jurisdiction to consider the government’s appeal
    under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).
    3
    in prison was reduced by thirteen years and Marc’s by about five
    and a half years. Viewed another way, Michael and Marc received
    sentences that were 156 months and 53 months below the bottom
    of their original Guidelines ranges.
    II.
    In determining whether the District Court properly
    sentenced Michael and Marc Ricks on remand, we first briefly
    review the relevant history of the 100-to-1 ratio as well as our
    recent sentencing jurisprudence.
    A.
    Amidst growing public concern over the societal impact of
    cocaine, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Pub.
    L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). Although crack and powder
    cocaine are pharmacologically the same, the Act requires 100 times
    more powder cocaine than crack to trigger certain mandatory
    minimum prison terms. In particular, the Act mandates at least five
    years in prison for distribution of 500 grams of powder cocaine, but
    imposes the same penalty for distribution of just 5 grams of crack.
    21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Similarly, distribution of 5000 grams of
    powder cocaine, but just 50 grams of crack, triggers the Act’s ten-
    year mandatory minimum.2 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
    The 1986 Act was passed in expedited fashion and, as a
    result, its legislative history is limited. Indeed, “there were no
    committee hearings and no Senate or House Reports accompanying
    2
    Congress also distinguished crack from powder cocaine
    when it passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. No.
    100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Under the 1988 Act, simple
    possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine results in a
    minimum sentence of five years in prison for a first-time offender.
    21 U.S.C. § 844. Simple possession of any quantity of powder
    cocaine by a first-time offender, however, is a misdemeanor
    punishable by no more than one year in prison. Id.; see also U.S.
    Sentencing Comm’n Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and
    Federal Sentencing Policy 3 (1997).
    4
    the bill that ultimately passed.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Report
    to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 5 (2002)
    [hereinafter “2002 Report”]. According to the Sentencing
    Commission, however, the individual statements of legislators at
    the time suggest that Congress believed crack was (1) especially
    addictive, (2) more likely to be connected with other serious
    crimes, (3) more likely to cause severely damaging physiological
    effects, (4) more attractive and accessible to young users, and (5)
    more prone to widespread use because of its “‘purity and potency,’
    the cost per dose, [and] the ease with which it [was] manufactured,
    transported, disposed of, and administered.” U.S. Sentencing
    Comm’n Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
    Sentencing Policy 118 (1995) [hereinafter “1995 Report”].
    In 1987, the Sentencing Commission incorporated the 100-
    to-1 ratio into the Guidelines’ base offense levels and drug quantity
    table, and thereby established sentencing ranges for the full range
    of crack and powder cocaine quantities. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
    As a result, according to the Commission, sentencing ranges for
    crack offenses are three to six times longer than those for powder
    cocaine offenses involving equal amounts of drugs.3 2002 Report
    at iv.
    Over the years, judges, scholars, practitioners, public
    interest groups, and civic leaders have criticized the 100-to-1 ratio
    on a number of grounds. To date, the Sentencing Commission
    itself has issued four reports highlighting problems with the ratio
    and advising Congress to change it. In February 1995, at the
    request of Congress, the Commission studied the ratio and released
    a report unanimously recommending that the 100-to-1 ratio be
    reduced. Among other criticisms, the Commission noted that it
    disproportionately affected African Americans and sometimes
    forced district courts to punish low-level crack dealers much more
    3
    In 2006, courts sentenced crack offenders to an average of
    122 months in prison and powder cocaine offenders to 85 months.
    In other words, crack offenders received sentences that were on
    average 43.5 percent higher than those of powder cocaine
    offenders. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Report to the Congress:
    Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 13 (2007).
    5
    severely than high-level powder cocaine suppliers. 1995 Report at
    xii-xiii. Soon after the issuance of this report, the Commission
    voted four to three to submit an amendment to Congress that would
    have equalized penalties based on drug quantities. See 60 Fed.
    Reg. 25,074 (May 10, 1995); 2002 Report at v. However,
    Congress passed and the President signed legislation rejecting the
    amendment and directing the Commission to submit new
    recommendations that would reflect the view that “the sentence
    imposed for trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine should
    generally exceed the sentence imposed for trafficking in a like
    quantity of powder cocaine.” Pub L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334
    (Oct. 30, 1995).
    In April 1997, the Commission issued its follow-up report
    and stated that it was “firmly and unanimously in agreement that
    the current penalty differential for federal powder and crack
    cocaine cases should be reduced.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
    Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
    Policy 2 (1997) [hereinafter “1997 Report”]. More specifically, the
    Commission recommended that Congress reduce the ratio to 5-to-1
    for purposes of the five-year mandatory minimum by increasing the
    threshold amount of crack and reducing it for powder cocaine.4 
    Id. at 9.
    The Commission believed these changes would more
    effectively accomplish the goals of federal drug sentencing policy.
    Congress, however, took no action.
    In May 2002, at the request of the Chairman and Ranking
    Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Commission
    issued a third report, which “again unanimously and firmly
    conclude[d]” that Congress should “decrease[] substantially” the
    100-to-1 ratio. 2002 Report at viii. The Commission specifically
    recommended reducing the ratio to 20-to-1 by increasing threshold
    quantities for crack.5 It explained that the statutory and Guidelines
    4
    The Commission also recommended equalizing the penalty
    for simple possession of crack and powder cocaine. 1997 Report
    at 10.
    5
    Unlike the 1997 Report, the 2002 Report did not
    recommend decreasing threshold amounts for powder cocaine.
    6
    penalties exaggerated the harmfulness of crack, swept too broadly
    to include low-level offenders, overstated the seriousness of most
    crack-related crimes, and disproportionately impacted minorities.
    
    Id. at v-viii.
    Congress again failed to act.
    Finally, in May 2007, the Commission issued a fourth report
    that reiterated the conclusions of the 2002 Report. Without
    suggesting any particular ratio, the report “unanimously and
    strongly urge[d] Congress to act promptly” by increasing threshold
    quantities for crack. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Report to the
    Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 8 (2007)
    [hereinafter “2007 Report”].6          In addition, noting that “the
    problems associated with the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio . . . are
    so urgent and compelling,” the Commission submitted an
    amendment to Congress that would adjust crack quantities
    downward by two levels.7 
    Id. at 9-10.
    The amendment, which will
    take effect in November 2007 if Congress does not act, is “tailored
    . . . to fit within the existing statutory penalty scheme,” and, as a
    result, provides only a “partial remedy.” 
    Id. As the
    report states,
    “[a]ny comprehensive solution requires appropriate legislative
    action by Congress.” 
    Id. at 10.
    2002 Report at viii.
    6
    The report also advised against adjusting the ratio by
    reducing threshold quantities for powder cocaine, stating that
    “there is no evidence to justify such an increase in . . . penalties for
    powder cocaine.” 2007 Report at 8. In addition, the report urged
    Congress to repeal the mandatory minimum sentence for simple
    possession of crack under 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
    Id. 7 Under
    the amendment, the statutory minimum sentences
    would fall at the upper limit of their corresponding Guidelines
    ranges rather than below those ranges. For example, assuming a
    Criminal History Category of I and no adjustments, the amendment
    would change the Guidelines range for distribution of 50 grams of
    crack (which carries a minimum statutory sentence of 120 months)
    from 121 to 151 months, to 97 to 121 months. The amendment
    would adjust crack quantities above and below the mandatory
    minimum threshold quantities accordingly. 2007 Report at 9.
    7
    B.
    Until 2005, the Guidelines provided mandatory sentencing
    ranges and thereby required district courts to impose prison terms
    reflecting the 100-to-1 ratio.8 The federal sentencing landscape
    changed, however, when the Supreme Court made the Guidelines
    advisory in Booker. We have since established a three-step
    procedure for sentencing defendants:
    (1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant’s
    Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have
    before Booker.
    (2) In doing so, they must formally rule on the
    motions of both parties and state on the record
    whether they are granting a departure and how that
    departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take
    into account our Circuit’s pre-Booker case law,
    which continues to have advisory force.
    (3) Finally, they are required to exercise their
    discretion by considering the relevant [18 U.S.C.] §
    3553(a) factors, in setting the sentence they impose
    regardless whether it varies from the sentence
    calculated under the Guidelines.
    United States v. Gunter, 
    462 F.3d 237
    , 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal
    quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).9
    8
    Prior to 2005, this Court, like our sister circuits, rejected a
    number of legal and constitutional challenges to the 100-to-1 ratio.
    See, e.g., United State v. Frazier, 
    981 F.2d 92
    (3d Cir. 1992)
    (holding that the 100-to-1 ratio did not violate the Equal Protection
    Clause or constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
    Amendment).
    9
    We had not yet laid out this three-step process at the time
    the District Court resentenced the Ricks brothers. At oral
    argument, the parties contested whether the District Court
    effectively applied the 20-to-1 ratio at what is now step one, the
    8
    In accordance with Booker, we now review sentences for
    “reasonableness.” United States v. Cooper, 
    437 F.3d 324
    , 327 (3d
    Cir. 2006). In order for a sentence to be “reasonable,” the trial
    court must give “meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a)
    factors.”10 
    Id. at 329.
    We have previously noted that “[a] sentence
    calculation of the Guidelines range, or at step three, the application
    of the § 3553(a) factors. We need not address this issue. A
    sentencing court “is required to calculate the crack/powder cocaine
    difference in determining the Guidelines ranges.” 
    Gunter, 462 F.3d at 245
    . But a sentencing court may not, as explained below,
    categorically establish a new ratio rather than apply the § 3553(a)
    factors to the circumstances of a particular defendant.
    10
    The factors listed at § 3553(a) are:
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history and characteristics of
    the defendant;
    (2) the need for the sentence imposed—
    (A) to reflect the seriousness of the
    offense, to promote respect for the law,
    and to provide just punishment for the
    offense;
    (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
    criminal conduct;
    (C) to protect the public from further
    crimes of the defendant; and
    (D) to provide the defendant with needed
    educational or vocational training,
    medical care, or other correctional
    treatment in the most effective manner;
    (3) the kinds of sentences available;
    (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing
    range established for—
    (A) the applicable category of offense
    committed by the applicable category of
    defendant as set forth in the guidelines
    ...
    (5) any pertinent policy statement—
    9
    that falls within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable
    than one outside the guidelines range.” 
    Id. at 332;
    see also Rita v.
    United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2463 (2007) (noting that when “both
    the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission . . . reach[]
    the same conclusion as to the proper sentence . . . [t]hat double
    determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
    sentence is a reasonable one”). In addition, we have explained that
    “the more that a sentence varies from the advisory Guidelines
    range, the more compelling the supporting reasons must be.”
    United States v. Manzella, 
    475 F.3d 152
    , 161 (3d Cir. 2007).
    III.
    We first considered the impact of Booker on the Guidelines’
    crack/powder cocaine ratio in Gunter, which was published after
    the government filed its appeal in this case.11 There, we held that
    a district court erred when it concluded that it had no discretion to
    sentence below a Guidelines range that reflected the 100-to-1 ratio.
    We stated that “district courts may consider the crack/powder
    cocaine differential in the Guidelines as a factor, but not a mandate,
    in the post-Booker sentencing process.” 
    Gunter, 462 F.3d at 249
    .
    (A) issued by the Sentencing
    Commission . . . subject to any
    amendments made to such policy
    statement by act of Congress . . .;
    ...
    (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
    disparities among defendants with similar
    records who have been found guilty of similar
    conduct; and
    (7) the need to provide restitution to any
    victims of the offense.
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The statute also instructs judges to “impose
    a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
    with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2).” 
    Id. 11 In
    response to our request, the parties submitted letters
    discussing the impact of Gunter on this appeal.
    10
    Although we were not squarely presented with the question of
    whether district courts are permitted to establish new ratios, we
    stressed that our holding did “not suggest (or even hint) that
    [district courts] categorically reject the 100:1 ratio and substitute
    [their] own, as this is verboten.” 
    Id. To the
    extent this last
    statement is dictum, we hold today that district courts may not
    replace the 100-to-1 ratio with a ratio of their own choosing.
    A.
    The government argues that district courts are not permitted
    to categorically reject the 100-to-1 ratio established by Congress
    and incorporated into the Guidelines. The government also
    contends that allowing courts to create their own ratios will lead to
    unwarranted sentencing disparities. The Ricks brothers argue that
    the District Court imposed appropriately individualized sentences
    after considering the § 3553(a) factors. In addition, Marc Ricks
    asserts that district courts may apply any ratio that is “reasonable,”
    including the 20-to-1 ratio endorsed by the Commission’s 2002
    Report. We turn first to the issue of whether courts may establish
    their own ratios as a matter of policy, and then to whether the
    District Court did so in this case.
    1.
    There is little disagreement that the 100-to-1 ratio
    overrepresents the relative harm of crack as compared to powder
    cocaine. Nevertheless, it is the role of Congress, and not the
    courts, to determine what crimes are worse than others. See United
    States v. Castillo, 
    460 F.3d 337
    , 357-58 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have
    no authority to substitute our policy preferences for that of the
    legislative branch.”); United States v. Spears, 
    469 F.3d 1166
    , 1178
    (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“Our court, as an unelected body, cannot
    impose its sentencing policy views and dismiss the views of the
    peoples’ elected representatives.”). Indeed, as the Supreme Court
    stated many years ago, “defining crimes and fixing penalties are
    legislative, not judicial, functions.” United States v. Evans, 
    333 U.S. 483
    , 486 (1948).
    As recounted above, Congress created the 100-to-1 ratio
    when setting mandatory minimum sentences in the Anti-Drug
    11
    Abuse Act of 1986. The Sentencing Commission responded by
    incorporating the 100-to-1 ratio into the Guidelines, which were
    approved by Congress. Despite overwhelming criticism of the
    ratio, Congress has repeatedly refused to alter or eliminate it.
    Marc Ricks, however, argues that by rendering the
    Guidelines advisory, Booker permits district courts to reject the
    Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio, as long as they impose sentences that
    comply with the mandatory minimum sentences in the 1986 Act.12
    We disagree. Even under the current advisory system, district
    courts must “meaningfully consider” § 3553(a)(4), i.e., “the
    applicable category of offense . . . as set forth in the guidelines.”
    The section of Booker that makes the Guidelines advisory explains
    that “the remaining system, while not the system Congress enacted,
    nonetheless continue[s] to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred
    direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while
    maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where
    necessary.” 
    Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65
    (emphasis added). The
    Guidelines remain at the center of this effort to “avoid excessive
    sentencing disparities,” and, as the Booker Court explained, the
    Sentencing Commission will continue “to promote uniformity in
    the sentencing process” through the Guidelines. 
    Id. at 263.
    We
    have likewise observed that the “‘Guidelines remain an essential
    tool in creating a fair and uniform sentencing regime across the
    country.’” 
    Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331
    (quoting United States v.
    Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2005)).
    Booker stresses “flexibility” in terms of individualizing
    sentences, not in terms of rejecting Guidelines provisions
    wholesale. While the Guidelines are indeed advisory, “[n]othing
    in Booker specifically authorizes district judges to rewrite different
    Guidelines with which they generally disagree, which is effectively
    what district judges do when they calculate a sentence with a 20:1
    or 10:1 ratio instead of the 100:1 ratio in the drug sentencing
    12
    Michael Ricks, on the other hand, concedes that “the
    ultimate authority to change the ratio is vested with Congress and
    that body has failed to exercise that authority to date.” Michael
    Ricks Br. at 20.
    12
    table.” 
    Castillo, 460 F.3d at 355
    .13 We conclude that a district
    court fails to “meaningfully consider” the Guidelines when it
    rejects the 100-to-1 ratio as a matter of policy.
    In addition, we believe that when a district court
    categorically rejects the 100-to-1 ratio, it fails to properly consider
    “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
    defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
    similar conduct” under § 3553(a)(6). Allowing district courts to
    choose a non-Guidelines ratio as a matter of policy would
    unquestionably lead to such disparities; some judges would
    presumably continue using the 100-to-1 ratio while others might
    13
    Amici curiae argue that to avoid redundancy with §
    3553(a)(1) (“the nature and circumstances of the offense”), the
    reference to “the seriousness of the offense” in § 3553(a)(2)(A)
    must mean that sentencing judges should conduct an independent
    evaluation of the category of the crime. Other courts of appeals
    have disagreed about whether this phrase refers to the individual
    circumstances of a crime or the type of offense. Compare 
    Castillo, 460 F.3d at 360
    (“[P]rovisions such as § 3553(a)(2)(A) refer to the
    seriousness of a particular set of factual circumstances, not to the
    seriousness of the broad category of offenses as a general policy
    matter.”) with United States v. Pickett, 
    475 F.3d 1347
    , 1352 n.4
    (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“With the possible exception of § 3553(a)(2)(C)
    & (D), the broadly stated purposes of sentencing set forth in §
    3553(a)(2) are not confined to any particular defendant’s
    situation.”). Though amici curiae’s reading of the statute is
    certainly a plausible one, we believe that Booker’s focus on
    judicial flexibility for individually tailored sentences weighs
    against their interpretation. Further, while the concepts of “nature
    and circumstances” and “seriousness” may overlap in the context
    of individual offenses, we do not believe the terms are necessarily
    redundant. For example, § 3553(a)(2) refers to “the need for the
    sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense.”
    Unlike § 3553(a)(1), this language suggests the need for a sentence
    to “reflect” to the public the seriousness of the particular crime
    committed. This reading comports with other parts of § 3553(a)(2)
    that require courts to consider the need for the sentence “to
    promote respect for the law” and “to afford adequate deterrence.”
    13
    employ a 20-to-1 or 5-to-1 ratio, or even eliminate the disparity in
    drug quantities altogether. See 
    Castillo, 460 F.3d at 358-59
    .14
    For these reasons, we hold that district courts may not
    categorically reject the 100-to-1 ratio. With this ruling, we join at
    least seven other courts of appeals. See United States v. Pho, 
    433 F.3d 53
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred
    as a matter of law when it constructed a new sentencing range
    based on the categorical substitution of a 20:1 crack-to-powder
    ratio for the 100:1 ratio embedded in the sentencing guidelines.”);
    United States v. Castillo, 
    460 F.3d 337
    , 358 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
    that district courts may not “impose a different ratio as a policy
    matter”); United States v. Eura, 
    440 F.3d 625
    , 634 (4th Cir. 2006)
    (stating that it “wholeheartedly agree[d]” with the First Circuit that
    the categorical rejection of the 100-to-1 ratio is impermissible);
    United States v. Leatch, 
    482 F.3d 790
    , 791 (5th Cir. 2007)
    (“Rejecting the 100:1 ratio because a court disagrees with
    congressional sentencing policy is not a substitute for applying the
    essential considerations of § 3553(a).”); United States v. Jointer,
    
    457 F.3d 682
    , 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A district court simply cannot
    substitute its own ratio for the 100:1 ratio.”); United States v.
    Spears, 
    469 F.3d 1166
    , 1176 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“[N]either
    Booker nor § 3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject the 100:1
    quantity ratio and use a different ratio in sentencing defendants for
    crack cocaine offenses.”); United States v. Williams, 
    456 F.3d 1353
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Congress concluded the 100-to-1
    ratio is justified, and the courts have no authority to change
    that.”).15 To date, not one court of appeals has allowed a district
    14
    As other courts have explained, the disparity between
    sentences for crack and powder cocaine is not “unwarranted”
    because it reflects congressional will. See, e.g., United States v.
    Pho, 
    433 F.3d 53
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2006); 
    Castillo, 460 F.3d at 357
    . We
    have also stated more broadly that “any sentencing disparity
    authorized through an act of Congress cannot be considered
    ‘unwarranted’ under § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Vargas, 
    477 F.3d 94
    , 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
    15
    The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have also made statements
    suggesting their agreement on this issue, but have done so in cases
    14
    court to replace the 100-to-1 ratio with one of its choosing.16
    2.
    Marc Ricks also asserts that the District Court did not reject
    the 100-to-1 ratio as a matter of policy, but instead applied the 20-
    to-1 ratio specifically to his case while properly considering §
    3553(a). Similarly, Michael Ricks argues that whether the District
    Court categorically rejected the 100-to-1 ratio or not, it reduced his
    sentence only after also considering the § 3553(a) factors.
    The record makes clear, however, that in sentencing
    Michael and Marc Ricks, the District Court used a 20-to-1 ratio
    because it disagreed with the 100-to-1 ratio as a policy matter.
    addressing the more narrow question of whether a district court errs
    when it refuses to apply a ratio other than 100-to-1. See United
    States v. Caver, 
    470 F.3d 220
    , 249 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that for
    the appellate court “to declare a portion of the Sentencing
    Guidelines unreasonable under all circumstances” would require
    “exercising legislative power . . . [that] Booker does not
    authorize”); United States v. McCullough, 
    457 F.3d 1150
    , 1172
    (10th Cir. 2006) (citing statements in Pho and Eura prohibiting the
    categorical rejection of the 100-to-1 ratio and stating that it
    “agree[d]” with “this authority”). The D.C. Circuit, by contrast,
    held in a recent case that a district court does err when it “refuse[s]
    to consider the problems that arise from applying the Guideline in
    crack cases,” but specifically noted that it was not presented with
    the application of a different ratio. United States v. Pickett, 
    475 F.3d 1347
    , 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It does not appear that the Ninth
    Circuit has yet issued a precedential opinion addressing the effect
    of Booker on the application of the 100-to-1 ratio.
    16
    We note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
    United States v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. Appx. 798, 799 (4th Cir.
    2006), cert. granted by Kimbrough v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2933
    (2007), in which the Fourth Circuit stated that “a sentence
    that is outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it
    is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack
    and powder cocaine offenses.”
    15
    Although the Court also discussed various relevant factors under
    § 3553(a), it applied the 20-to-1 ratio to establish adjusted
    sentencing ranges and then imposed sentences within those new
    ranges. Further, the Court did not choose a 20-to-1 ratio because
    of the particular facts of either brother’s case. See, e.g., Consol.
    App. 119 (“[A]s I’ve done consistently in the cases that I’ve had
    here . . . I looked to the Sentencing Commission’s suggestion that
    a 20 to 1 might be reasonable, [and] that strikes me as fair.”). In
    any event, as explained below, to the extent district courts may
    consider the crack/cocaine differential, they should not do so by
    creating a new ratio altogether.
    B.
    Although district courts may not categorically reject the
    100-to-1 ratio, they may, as Gunter put it, “consider the
    crack/powder cocaine differential in the Guidelines as a factor”
    when sentencing 
    defendants. 462 F.3d at 249
    . How are trial
    courts, if they choose to exercise their discretion, to go about
    “factoring” the differential without creating a new ratio? They
    should first calculate the correct Guidelines range and rule on any
    departure motions, according to steps one and two of the procedure
    we set out in Gunter. Then, considering the individual
    circumstances of a defendant and the specific crime, district courts
    should consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors. It is at this stage
    (step 3) that courts may consider the crack/cocaine differential as
    it applies to the particular case before them. See 
    Pho, 433 F.3d at 65
    (“[W]e do not intend . . . to suggest that, in a drug-trafficking
    case, the nature of the contraband and/or the severity of a projected
    guideline sentence may not be taken into account on a case-by-case
    basis.”).
    While the views of the Sentencing Commission may not be
    used to justify a new ratio altogether, district courts may consider
    the analysis in the Commission’s reports when applying the §
    3553(a) factors to a specific case and defendant. For example, the
    Commission’s reports, as well as other sources, can inform the §
    3553(a) analysis of “the nature and circumstances of the offense”
    or “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness
    of the offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just
    punishment for the offense . . . [and] to afford adequate deterrence
    16
    to criminal conduct.” See 
    Williams, 456 F.3d at 1369
    (“It may be
    that for some of the reasons stated in the Sentencing Commission’s
    reports, the Guidelines range in a given crack case overstates the
    seriousness of the particular defendant’s offense or that
    individualized mitigating factors counsel against a Guidelines
    sentence.”); 
    Jointer, 457 F.3d at 687
    (“[T]he Sentencing
    Commission’s detailed reports on crack and cocaine sentencing
    may have ‘practical utility’ to a district court’s evaluation of the
    facts and circumstances of the individual case in light of the §
    3553(a) factors.”) (footnote omitted). As one of our colleagues in
    the Fourth Circuit put it, “[t]he Commission’s findings . . . can be
    considered insofar as they are refracted through an individual
    defendant’s case.” 
    Eura, 440 F.3d at 637
    (Michael, J., concurring)
    (quoted in 
    Jointer, 457 F.3d at 687
    ).
    In short, a district court may, at step three, view the
    sentencing disparity as too vast. However, it must do so as applied
    to the particular defendant that appears before the court. In terms
    of sentencing process, a court must give its reasons for why it
    views the ratio as too harsh when applied to the defendant.
    We appreciate that sometimes it will be difficult for trial
    judges to conscientiously balance factors such as seriousness,
    deterrence, and just punishment, while respecting the policy
    choices of Congress and seeking to avoid unwarranted sentencing
    disparities. We imagine this will be particularly challenging in
    cases involving the 100-to-1 ratio, which has been more roundly
    and persuasively criticized than perhaps any other aspect of current
    sentencing law. Certainly, a rule that courts could reject the 100-
    to-1 ratio altogether or, conversely, never consider criticisms of the
    ratio would be simpler for district courts to apply. Nevertheless,
    we believe that prohibiting the categorical rejection of the 100-to-1
    ratio while permitting case-specific consideration of the differential
    is consistent with § 3553(a) as well as the reasoning in Booker and
    Gunter.
    IV.
    The District Court understandably wanted to apply a fairer
    drug quantity ratio than the current Guidelines allow, and it
    logically looked to the recommendations of the Sentencing
    17
    Commission for guidance in doing so. Indeed, as a matter of
    policy, we agree with the District Court that a 100-to-1 ratio leads
    to unjust sentences, and we encourage Congress to revisit the issue
    and heed the recommendations of the Commission. Meaningful
    consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, however, does not permit
    trial courts to categorically reject a provision of the Guidelines that
    Congress has endorsed.
    We conclude that when a district court imposes a below-
    Guidelines sentence for a crime involving crack, the record must
    demonstrate that the court focused on individual, case-specific
    factors. Because courts may not replace the 100-to-1 ratio with
    one of their choosing, we will vacate the sentences of Michael and
    Marc Ricks and remand to the District Court for resentencing in
    accordance with this opinion.
    18