Anthony Harper v. , 559 F. App'x 121 ( 2014 )


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  • DLD-188                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-1022
    ___________
    IN RE: ANTHONY HARPER,
    Petitioner
    ____________________________________
    On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 12-cv-02809)
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
    February 27, 2014
    Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: March 20, 2014)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Anthony Harper has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking us to vacate his
    criminal sentence. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the mandamus petition.
    In 1976, Harper was convicted in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas of
    first-degree murder, robbery, and other offenses. Harper was sentenced to life in prison on the
    murder conviction.     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Harper’s conviction and
    sentence. Commonwealth v. Harper, 
    403 A.2d 536
    (Pa. 1979). Harper sought state and
    federal collateral relief without success.
    In 2012, Harper filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in District Court
    that was dismissed without prejudice as an unauthorized successive petition. Harper filed a
    notice of appeal and asserted in this Court that his life sentence violates his Eighth Amendment
    rights under Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012), because he was a juvenile when he
    committed his crimes. We construed Harper’s request for a certificate of appealability as an
    application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to file a second or successive habeas petition. We
    stayed the application pending decisions in In re Pendleton, C.A. No. 12-3617, and In re
    Baines, C.A. No. 12-3996, in which the petitioners also sought to file second or successive
    habeas petitions raising Miller claims.
    On May 23, 2013, while the stay was in effect, Harper filed another habeas petition in
    District Court raising his Miller claim. On November 27, 2013, the District Court, noting that
    we had since decided Pendleton and Baines, ordered the respondents to file a response to
    Harper’s petition by December 18, 2013. The respondents did not do so and on December 26,
    2013, Harper filed a motion for a default judgment. The District Court denied Harper’s motion
    and ordered the respondents to file a response by January 23, 2014. The District Court noted
    that the Clerk of Court had not served a copy of its November 27, 2013 order on the
    respondents.
    On January 8, 2014, Harper filed the present mandamus petition asserting his claim
    under Miller and asking us to vacate his sentence. Harper states that the respondents did not
    respond to his habeas petition by December 18, 2013 and that in his § 2244 proceedings, we
    2
    had ordered that extensions of time would not be granted to address the effect of Pendleton on
    his § 2244 application.1
    The writ of mandamus traditionally has been used “to confine an inferior court to a
    lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is
    its duty to do so.” In re Patenaude, 
    210 F.3d 135
    , 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and
    citations omitted).    “The writ is a drastic remedy that is seldom issued and its use is
    discouraged.” 
    Id. A petitioner
    must show that he has no other adequate means to attain the
    desired relief and that the right to a writ is clear and indisputable. 
    Id. at 141.
    Harper has not made such a showing. Harper has an adequate means to attain the
    desired relief through the adjudication of his habeas petition. To the extent he contends that
    the District Court erred in denying his motion for default judgment, he can pursue that
    contention on appeal if the final judgment in his habeas proceedings is unfavorable. Harper
    also has not shown that the right to a writ is clear and indisputable. As noted above, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases like
    Harper’s, whose judgment of sentence was final when Miller was decided.
    1
    On December 9, 2013, we granted Harper’s application for leave to file a second or successive
    habeas petition, see C.A. No. 12-3532, and our order was entered on the District Court docket
    on January 24, 2014. Harper’s case was then stayed, along with other cases in which we
    granted § 2244(b) applications raising Miller claims, pending disposition of a petition for a
    writ of certiorari to be filed in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    81 A.3d 1
    (Pa. 2013).
    Cunningham held that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
    
    Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 11
    .
    3
    Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. Harper’s motion and
    supplemental motion for bail are also denied. See Landano v. Rafferty, 
    970 F.2d 1230
    , 1239
    (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring extraordinary circumstances before bail will be afforded).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1022

Citation Numbers: 559 F. App'x 121

Judges: Smith, Hardiman, Greenberg

Filed Date: 3/20/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024