Dure v. Attorney General , 241 F. App'x 28 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-31-2007
    Dure v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-2959
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
    Recommended Citation
    "Dure v. Atty Gen USA" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1056.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1056
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 05-2959
    ________________
    RENE DURE,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
    UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A38 762 600
    on July 11, 2002
    Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 15, 2007
    Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND COWEN. CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed: May 31, 2007)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    1
    PER CURIAM
    Rene Dure petitions for review of a final order of removal, entered July 11, 2002.
    As the petition was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider the petition, and will
    dismiss it.
    Dure, a native and citizen of Haiti, was found removable by an Immigration Judge
    (IJ) on November 6, 2001. The IJ found that Dure had committed an aggravated felony
    and was ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a). However, the IJ
    granted deferral of removal to Haiti under the United Nations Convention Against
    Torture (CAT). On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the
    aggravated felony determination, held that Dure is ineligible for a waiver or cancellation
    of removal, and vacated the award of CAT relief. The BIA entered its final order of
    removal on July 11, 2002.
    Nearly three years later, on June 3, 2005, Dure filed a counseled § 2241 habeas
    petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (where he
    was confined). Dure claimed that he was only recently informed of the BIA’s final order
    of removal, and he sought to challenge that order on the grounds that CAT relief was
    improperly denied and that he should not have been deemed ineligible for a waiver or
    cancellation of removal. The District Court, citing the REAL ID Act of 2005– which was
    enacted before Dure filed his habeas petition– sua sponte transferred the habeas petition
    to this Court to be docketed as a petition for review. The Government filed two motions
    2
    to dismiss, both of which were referred to this panel.
    The REAL ID Act, which became law on May 11, 2005, amended § 242 of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) so that petitions for review filed with the courts
    of appeals are the “sole and exclusive means for judicial review of” most orders of
    removal, including the order of removal at issue in this case. See INA § 242(a)(5) [8
    U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)]; see also Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 
    414 F.3d 442
    , 445 (3d Cir.
    2005). “In so doing, the Act expressly eliminated district courts’ habeas jurisdiction over
    removal orders.” Jordon v. Attorney General, 
    424 F.3d 320
    , 326 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
    
    Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 445
    ). Thus, when Dure filed his § 2241 petition in June 2005,
    the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it. Indeed, after May 11, 2005, the
    only means for review of Dure’s removal order was a petition for review.
    A petition for review must be filed within 30 days of a final order of removal. See
    INA § 242(b)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)]; Malvoisin v. INS, 
    268 F.3d 74
    , 75 (2d Cir.
    2001). The courts of appeals “may not extend the time to file” a petition for review of an
    order of an administrative board, such as the BIA. Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2); 
    Malvoisin, 268 F.3d at 76
    . Because the BIA’s decision was filed on July 11, 2002, Dure had until
    thirty days thereafter to file a timely petition for review.
    In his pro se brief, which appears to be a portion of the counseled habeas petition
    that was filed in the District Court, Dure argues if he had filed a petition for review prior
    to May 11, 2005, which is when the REAL ID Act became law, his petition would have
    3
    been dismissed due to his aggravated felony conviction. Petitioner’s Brief at 5. However,
    he would have been permitted at that time to seek habeas review under § 2241, and he
    notes that there was no deadline or limitations period on filing a § 2241 petition to
    challenge an order of removal. But because he filed his § 2241 petition after enactment
    of the REAL ID Act, Dure notes that he is in the position of having no court with
    jurisdiction to review his claims– this Court lacks jurisdiction because the petition for
    review is untimely, and the district court no longer has habeas jurisdiction. Claiming that
    he is “stranded by retroactive application of the REAL ID Act,” 
    id. at 7,
    Dure essentially
    raises an equitable argument that some court–presumably this one–should exercise
    jurisdiction over his claims.
    Dure’s argument has some appeal. One might argue that an alien in his situation
    should have a grace period of 30 days from May 11, 2005, within which to file a timely
    petition for review. In Burns v. Morton, 
    134 F.3d 109
    (3d Cir. 1998), this Court held
    that petitioners had one year from the date of enactment of the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to file their § 2254 or § 2255 petitions. However,
    AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, see Miller v. New Jersey
    State Dep’t of Corrections, 
    145 F.3d 616
    (3d Cir. 1998), whereas courts have held that
    the time for filing a petition for review is not. See e.g., Dakane v. Attorney General, 
    399 F.3d 1269
    , 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the solution achieved in Burns is not
    appropriate for a petition for review. As the Seventh Circuit recently held, “[a] petition
    4
    under § 2241 filed in a district court after [May 11, 2005] must be dismissed; it can be
    neither entertained nor transferred.” Chen v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 788
    , 790 (7 th Cir. 2006)
    (per curiam).
    Under these circumstances, we will grant the government’s motion to dismiss the
    petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.1
    1
    Dure’s motion for a stay of removal is denied as moot. Catney v. INS, 
    178 F.3d 190
    ,
    196 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999).
    5