Craig Alford v. Laquise , 604 F. App'x 93 ( 2015 )

DLD-133 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3350
___________
CRAIG ALFORD,
Appellant
v.
LAQUISE, Hearing Examiner; DORINA VARNER, Chief Hearing Examiner;
SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL; SUPERINTENDENT JOHN KERESTES;
SUPERINTENDENT BRENDA TRITT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-00013)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 12, 2015
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 19, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Craig Alford, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District
Court’s order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1),
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Alford filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at the State
Correctional Institute in Mahanoy claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights, stemming from a disciplinary hearing in which Alford alleges he was not
given the opportunity to be heard or to present witness testimony or documentary
evidence. Following the hearing, Alford was found guilty of fighting and was sentenced
to ninety days of disciplinary custody. Alford argues that in addition to the direct
sentence issued at his disciplinary hearing, he further suffered the loss of: (1) a high-
paying job; (2) a low custody level status; (3) his privilege of “reparole”; and (4) his
ability to move about the institution freely.
The District Court dismissed Alford’s complaint as frivolous, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), noting that Alford had previously
raised the same claims as part of a habeas corpus petition, and the court there,
interpreting the petition as raising both habeas and § 1983 claims, had held that they were
without merit. See Alford v. PA Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:13cv435, 2014 WL 310100, at *2-
4 (M.D. Pa. January 28, 2014). Alford now appeals the dismissal of his complaint.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the federal claims. Lake
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). We must “accept as true
the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them.” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We may summarily affirm
the decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal. See
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the District Court that Alford’s complaint does not state a claim
because he fails to show any deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest that
occurred without due process of law. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285
(3d Cir. 2008). Prisoners typically have a protected liberty interest only in “freedom
from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship…in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Disciplinary or segregated confinement is “rarely . . . sufficient, without more, to
establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty
interest.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that seven
months of disciplinary confinement was insufficient to implicate a protected liberty
interest). Alford was sentenced to ninety days of disciplinary detention and, according to
his response filed before this Court, only served sixty of those days. His disciplinary
3
detention, therefore, does not constitute the sort of “atypical deprivation of prison life”
that “implicate[s] a liberty interest.” Smith, 293 F.3d at 653-54.
Alford’s claim regarding his expectation for parole likewise fails because the Due
Process Clause does not establish a protected liberty interest in the expectation of release
on parole. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Moreover, Pennsylvania
does not recognize “a protected liberty interest, or due process rights, in parole until the
inmate is actually released on parole.” Nieves v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 995 A.2d
412, 418 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). See also Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that parole is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest under
Pennsylvania law). Alford had not been released on parole at the time of his hearing and
therefore did not acquire a protected liberty interest in the grant of parole.
Alford’s remaining claims regarding his loss of the freedom to move about the
institution, and his loss of employment at the institution, likewise fail to implicate
protected liberty interests. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, (1983) (explaining
that there is no protected liberty interest in the custody level or “degree of confinement”
of inmates); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that prisoners
do not have a protected liberty or property interest in prison employment).
Finally, given that Alford merely repeated claims that he had previously raised,
and which the District Court previously explained do not give rise to any protected liberty
interests, amendment in this case would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State
4
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Nor does Alford dispute that the claims and
allegations raised here are duplicative of those previously addressed by the District Court.
For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial
question, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5