Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security , 231 F. App'x 103 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-17-2007
    Rodriguez v. Comm Social Security
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-2810
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
    Recommended Citation
    "Rodriguez v. Comm Social Security" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1272.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1272
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Case No: 06-2810
    RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    District Court No. 04-CV-5550
    District Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    April 13, 2007
    Before: SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges,
    and YOHN, District Judge*
    (Filed: April 17, 2007 )
    OPINION
    *
    The Honorable William H. Yohn, Senior United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    1
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Rafael Rodriguez appeals from the District Court judgment affirming the
    final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied his
    application for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.1 Our review is
    limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the
    Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that
    substantial evidence is lacking in certain respects and we will remand this matter
    for further proceedings.
    I.
    Rodriguez worked for many years as a machine operator and set-up man for
    a metal shop. He was laid off in October 2001. Prior to his layoff, he had been
    diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), an autoimmune disease that
    can affect multiple body systems, and was being treated by Dr. Hsu, a
    rheumatologist at the Robert Wood Johnson Medical School. In September of
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We exercise
    appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    2
    2001, Dr. Hsu characterized Rodriguez’s SLE as mild and noted that he did not
    have any systemic findings. She acknowledged that he suffered from joint pains,
    and she opined that he may find it difficult to work as a machinist. She further
    noted that training for light duty or desk work may be appropriate. In June 2003,
    Dr. Hsu’s physical examination of Rodriguez confirmed the “lack of objective
    findings for active SLE.”
    The following month, in July 2003, Dr. Hsu opined that Rodriguez was
    unable to carry more than five pounds and could stand and walk for no more than
    a half hour. Rodriguez’s other treating physician, Dr. Cramer, a family
    practitioner who followed him since 1979, also opined in a letter dated June 20,
    2003, that Rodriguez was disabled and unable to do work related physical
    activities.
    In addition to Rodriguez’s physical malady, there were also concerns raised
    about his mental status. A consultative examination by Dr. Baharlias in April
    2002 yielded an opinion that Rodriguez had a severe cognitive deficit that must
    have resulted from two motor vehicle accidents and that he was developing early
    dementia. In a report dated July 1, 2002, Dr. Cramer advised that he had been
    treating Rodriguez since 1983 for an anxiety disorder with Lorazepam. Dr.
    Cramer reported that Rodriguez had “never had Dementia.” In contrast to Dr.
    3
    Baharlias’s report, Dr. Cramer’s detailed three page report failed to mention that
    Rodriguez had ever been involved in a motor vehicle accident or sustained a head
    injury. Dr. Cramer opined, however, that Rodriguez’s anxiety disorder caused a
    “difficulty in focusing and maintaining a sustained concentration on his activities
    which would interfere with any work related physical activity.”
    Rodriguez’s medical records were reviewed by Dr. Macchia, a psychologist,
    and Dr. Gieseken. They concluded that Rodriguez’s ability to perform most
    mental activities was not significantly limited. But they checked the box on the
    form provided to indicate that Rodriguez’s ability to maintain attention and
    concentration for an extended period was moderately limited, as was his ability to
    respond appropriately to changes in his work environment and to set realistic goals
    or make plans independently of others. In the narrative report that accompanied
    these assessments, Dr. Macchia and Dr. Gieseken discounted Dr. Baharlias’s
    opinion, noting that it was contradicted by Dr. Cramer’s treatment records from
    1979. These physicians credited Dr. Cramer’s assessment that Rodriguez suffered
    from a history of anxiety and opined that Rodriguez’s ability to cope and adapt
    was moderately limited. In contrast to their earlier assessment in the form that
    Rodriguez’s ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of
    time was moderately limited, these physicians stated that Rodriguez was able to
    4
    concentrate and persist in a task.
    After a hearing and consideration of the medical evidence, the
    administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted the familiar five step analysis set forth
    in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and concluded that Rodriguez was not disabled.
    The District Court affirmed the final decision of the Commissioner.
    This appeal followed. Rodriguez asserts that the ALJ erred in several
    respects. He challenges the ALJ’s analysis at step three, contending that the ALJ
    failed to specifically address whether his SLE satisfied or equaled the criteria of
    listing 14.02 in appendix 1. We find no error by the ALJ in this regard. It is true
    that the ALJ did not specify the listing by number. This does not preclude
    meaningful review, however, in light of the single listing for SLE and Dr. Hsu’s
    opinions in 2001 and June 2003, which were credited by the ALJ, that Rodriguez’s
    condition was mild and that there were no objective findings for active SLE.
    Accordingly, there was no basis for the ALJ to conclude that Rodriguez’s SLE
    satisfied the severity requirements of the listing in § 14.02. See Poulos v. Comm’r
    of Soc. Sec., 
    474 F.3d 88
    , 93 (2007) (pointing out that meaningful review at step
    three is informed by the extent of the ALJ’s review of the objective medical
    evidence).
    Rodriguez also contends that the ALJ erred by refusing to acknowledge that
    5
    he had a psychiatric impairment. He submits that the ALJ improperly discounted
    Dr. Baharlias’s opinion that he had dementia and was severely cognitively
    impaired. We find no error in discounting Dr. Baharlias’s reports as they
    conflicted with Dr. Cramer’s detailed report, which was entitled to more weight in
    light of his status as Rodriguez’s family doctor since 1979. As we explained in
    Plummer v. Apfel, 
    186 F.3d 422
    (3d Cir. 1999), “[t]reating physicians’ reports
    should be accorded great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect expert
    judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
    prolonged period of time.’” 
    Id. at 429
    (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 
    826 F.2d 1348
    ,
    1350 (3d Cir. 1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
    Nonetheless, we are troubled by the ALJ’s evaluation of Rodriguez’s mental
    impairment because, after explaining the basis for discounting Dr. Baharlias’s
    opinion, the ALJ accorded “significant weight” to the opinions of Dr. Macchia and
    Dr. Gieseken on the basis that their conclusions were not contradicted by any
    medical evidence in the record. The opinions of these nonexamining physicians,
    however, were internally inconsistent with regard to Rodriguez’s ability to sustain
    concentration. As noted above, the physicians checked the box to indicate that
    Rodriguez’s ability in this regard was moderately limited, and yet explained in
    their narrative that he could concentrate and persist in an activity. Thus, if we
    6
    assume that the opinions of Dr. Macchia and Dr. Gieseken were that Rodriguez
    had no limitation in his ability to concentrate for extended periods of time, the
    opinions conflict with that of Dr. Cramer, who opined that Rodriguez’s anxiety
    disorder caused a “difficulty in focusing and maintaining a sustained concentration
    on his activities which would interfere with any work related physical activity.” If
    we assume that the opinion of these nonexamining physicians is that Rodriguez
    has some limitation in his ability to sustain concentration for extended periods of
    time, there is a consensus among the practitioners, both nonexamining and
    treating, that Rodriguez’s mental impairment restricted his ability to focus and
    maintain concentration.
    Under either scenario, the ALJ had to explain why he did or did not credit
    the medical evidence that Rodriguez had a non-exertional limitation with respect
    to his ability to concentrate for extended periods of time. Instead, the ALJ’s
    decision failed to consider this limitation which, if credited, would preclude
    application of the Grids. See Sykes v. Apfel, 
    228 F.3d 259
    , 270 (3d Cir. 2000)
    (reiterating that the presence of non-exertional impairments precludes application
    of the Grids). Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and
    7
    will remand for further proceedings.2
    2
    We also note that the ALJ’s decision is internally inconsistent. The ALJ
    initially found that Rodriguez’s anxiety constituted a severe impairment at step
    two. Thereafter, he found that Rodriguez “has no mental disorder that is severe
    within the definition of the Social Security Act.” We are at a loss to understand
    how Rodriguez may be found to have a severe mental impairment initially and yet
    be found to suffer no severe mental impairment thereafter.
    8